Macroeconomic Policy and Trends - The Central Economic Work Conference emphasized a more proactive fiscal policy, with the fiscal deficit rate likely to exceed 3%, aiming to expand domestic demand and stabilize the economy[4][8][25] - The GDP growth rate for 2024 is projected to be 4.9%, with a V-shaped recovery trend observed throughout the year[17] - External challenges, such as potential tariff increases by the Trump administration, are expected to impact China's exports, necessitating stronger domestic demand stimulation[18] Fiscal Policy and Debt Management - The fiscal deficit for 2024 is estimated at 4.06 trillion yuan, with total debt issuance reaching 9.96 trillion yuan, equivalent to 7.6% of GDP[26] - The fiscal deficit rate for 2025 is expected to approach 10%, with a focus on optimizing fiscal expenditure structure and increasing local fiscal autonomy[25][30] - A "real estate stabilization fund" of around 2 trillion yuan is proposed to address the liquidity pressures of real estate companies and ensure housing delivery[35] Monetary Policy and Financial Stability - Monetary policy will shift to "moderately loose," with anticipated reductions in the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) and interest rates by 0.5 percentage points in 2025[36] - The central bank will explore expanding its macroprudential and financial stability functions, potentially influencing asset pricing paradigms[38] - Coordination between monetary and fiscal policies will be strengthened to enhance policy effectiveness and stabilize market expectations[37] Real Estate and Capital Market Reforms - Real estate policies will focus on stabilizing the market, promoting urban renewal, and releasing demand for rigid and improved housing[43] - Capital market reforms will emphasize mergers and acquisitions, long-term capital inflows, and the development of index-based investment products[40][41][42] Future Industries and Innovation - Future industries, such as AI and advanced manufacturing, will receive increased policy support, with a focus on innovation and industrial upgrading[46] - The establishment of a unified national market will be prioritized to eliminate local protectionism and promote fair competition[47]

证券研究报告 | 宏观点评 宏观研究 【粤开宏观】宏观政策更加积极有为 ——1209 政治局会议学习体会 2024 年 12 月 09 日 分析师：罗志恒 执业编号：S0300520110001 电话：010-83755580 邮箱：luozhiheng@ykzq.com 分析师：马家进 执业编号：S0300522110002 电话：13645711472 邮箱：majiajin@ykzq.com 分析师：原野 执业编号：S0300523070001 电话：15810120201 邮箱：yuanye_zb@ykzq.com 近期报告 《【粤开宏观】化债之后与特朗普冲击—— 2025 年中国经济展望》2024-12-08 《【粤开宏观】 2025 年财政如何发力稳经 济 ？ 赤 字 率 达 到 4% 的 三 重 效 果 》 2024-12-03 《【粤开宏观】特朗普 2.0：内阁成员思想 图景及对华影响——外交篇》2024-11-27 《【粤开宏观】如何看待特朗普宣布对华加 征 10%关税？上一轮关税复盘及未来路径 推演》2024-11-26 《【粤开宏观】特朗普 2.0：内阁成员思想 图景及对华影响——经济篇 ...

Investment Rating - The report does not explicitly state an investment rating for the industry Core Insights - The commercial health insurance sector in China has rapidly expanded, with premium income increasing from 112.35 billion yuan in 2013 to 903.45 billion yuan in 2023, reflecting an average annual growth rate of 23.2% over the past decade. However, its contribution to overall healthcare spending remains low, accounting for only about 4% of the total medical expenditure of 85,327.5 billion yuan in 2022 [7][27][26] - The penetration of commercial health insurance in the innovative drug payment sector is still limited, with only 5.3% of the 1,400 billion yuan market for innovative drugs covered by commercial health insurance in 2023, amounting to approximately 7.4 billion yuan [27][26] - The report emphasizes the need for optimizing commercial health insurance payments for innovative drugs through the sharing of medical insurance data, which could address issues such as low payment volumes, limited product variety, and sustainability concerns [12][40] Summary by Sections Current Support and Issues of Commercial Health Insurance for Innovative Drugs - The scale of commercial health insurance has grown significantly, but its share of overall healthcare costs and innovative drug expenditures remains low. In 2022, commercial health insurance payouts were only 3,599.5 billion yuan, compared to 24,597.24 billion yuan for basic medical insurance [7][26] - The payment for innovative drugs through commercial health insurance is primarily concentrated in group insurance, critical illness insurance, and local supplementary insurance, with most products only covering out-of-pocket expenses for drugs listed in the medical insurance directory [27][32] Optimization of Payments for Innovative Drugs - The report highlights the importance of data sharing from medical insurance platforms to enhance the payment capabilities of commercial health insurance for innovative drugs. This includes historical data analysis and sharing information on drugs, medical supplies, and service projects [12][44][40] Market Performance - The pharmaceutical and biotechnology index rose by 2.15% in November, outperforming the CSI 300 index by 1.49 percentage points. However, the index has declined by 9.29% year-to-date, lagging behind the CSI 300 index by 23.43 percentage points [47][49] - The total trading volume in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology sector reached 21,798.51 billion yuan in November, accounting for 5.28% of the total A-share market, indicating a relatively high trading activity [52] Industry News - The report discusses the pilot program for expanding foreign-invested hospitals, which is expected to enhance the supply of high-end medical services and benefit the commercial health insurance and innovative drug sectors. The policy allows foreign-invested hospitals to become designated medical insurance institutions, potentially increasing the market for commercial health insurance [60][61]

Economic Outlook - The economic growth rate in China has been shifting since 2010, currently facing cyclical, structural, and external challenges, with a focus on extending the "5 era" of GDP growth[5] - The target for economic growth in 2025 is set at "double 5," aiming for both nominal and real GDP growth rates to reach 5%[7] - The proportion of the population aged 15-64 peaked at 74.5% in 2010 and has decreased to 68.3% in 2023, indicating demographic shifts that will impact economic growth[5] Fiscal Policy Recommendations - The recommended deficit rate should be increased to above 3.5% or even 4.0%, which corresponds to a deficit of approximately 4.8 trillion and 5.5 trillion yuan respectively for 2025[4][49] - The focus should shift from static deficit rates to monitoring expenditure growth, aligning it with nominal economic growth to ensure a proactive fiscal policy[41][45] - Fiscal policy should prioritize expenditure measures over revenue measures during economic downturns to effectively stimulate growth[12][41] Investment and Consumption - Investment in infrastructure and consumption is expected to rebound in 2025, while real estate investment will see a narrowing decline[8] - The structure of investment and consumption is crucial, with a need to balance both to ensure economic and social benefits[8][16] Risks and Challenges - Potential risks for 2025 include economic impacts from Trump's policies, geopolitical tensions, and hidden local government debts[39] - Addressing these risks effectively could transform challenges into opportunities for economic growth[39]

Group 1: Key Members and Their Roles - The key cabinet members influencing U.S. foreign policy include the Vice President, Secretary of State, National Security Advisor, Secretary of Defense, U.N. Ambassador, CIA Director, and Director of National Intelligence[5] - Marco Rubio has been nominated as Secretary of State, Mike Waltz as National Security Advisor, and Pete Hegseth as Secretary of Defense, all of whom are seen as strong proponents of a hardline stance towards China[19] Group 2: Characteristics of Cabinet Members - The cabinet members are predominantly hawkish towards China, viewing it as a significant threat that requires containment[6] - The average age of the cabinet members is 51.7 years, significantly younger than previous administrations, indicating a shift in generational perspectives[27] - Loyalty to Trump is a key criterion for cabinet selection, especially in light of past political challenges faced by the administration[28] Group 3: Core Foreign Policy Ideas - The core principle of the Trump 2.0 cabinet is "America First," emphasizing national interests over ideological commitments[33] - The administration aims to adopt a more isolationist approach, reducing international commitments and responsibilities[34] - There is a focus on reducing the costs of maintaining the current international order, with demands for allies to increase their military spending[34] Group 4: Impacts on U.S.-China Relations - The new cabinet is likely to exacerbate tensions in U.S.-China relations, primarily through trade and political measures, including tariffs[8] - The administration views China as a multifaceted threat, necessitating a comprehensive strategy to counter its influence across trade, technology, and geopolitics[36] - Support for Israel remains strong, with the administration's policies reflecting a commitment to bolster Israel's position in the Middle East[37]

Group 1: Tariff Announcement and Impact - Trump announced a 10% tariff on all Chinese goods due to fentanyl issues, with a potential 25% tariff on goods from Mexico and Canada[4] - The previous round of tariffs raised the average tariff rate on Chinese imports from 3.1% in early 2018 to 21% by the end of 2019[5] - The new tariffs are seen as a significant external risk to the Chinese economy, necessitating a thorough assessment and response strategy[4] Group 2: Legal Framework and Procedures - The legal basis for the new tariffs includes the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which allows for immediate action without congressional approval[8] - Previous tariffs were implemented under various legal provisions, including Sections 232, 201, and 301 of U.S. trade law, which require different levels of investigation and congressional involvement[8] - The process for revoking China's Most Favored Nation status would require a vote from both houses of Congress, making it more complex[8] Group 3: Historical Context and Future Projections - The first round of tariffs under Trump (2018-2019) affected approximately $370 billion worth of goods, accounting for 68.7% of U.S. imports from China[9] - Future tariffs could potentially increase the average tariff rate on Chinese goods to between 40% and 50%, with some products facing tariffs exceeding 60%[11] - The worst-case scenario could see tariffs on all Chinese goods rise to 60%, but this is considered unlikely due to potential economic backlash[11] Group 4: China's Response Strategies - China is advised to implement countermeasures, including tariff retaliation and diversifying export markets to mitigate the impact of U.S. tariffs[14] - Strengthening internal policies and increasing domestic demand are recommended to offset potential declines in external demand[14] - Enhancing the competitiveness of exports through regional adjustments and partnerships, particularly with Belt and Road Initiative countries, is crucial[14]

Group 1: Cabinet Composition and Economic Policy - The core economic policy cabinet members nominated by Trump include Scott Bessent (Treasury Secretary), Howard Lutnick (Commerce Secretary), and Russell Vought (Director of the Office of Management and Budget) [19] - The cabinet members exhibit higher loyalty and alignment with Trump's policies, with a significant presence of business figures and fewer establishment personnel [23] - Key economic ideas from the Trump 2.0 cabinet include domestic tax cuts, increased tariffs, and reduced government spending to lower the deficit [24] Group 2: Economic Policy Characteristics - Bessent aims to reduce the budget deficit to 3% by 2028, suggesting annual federal spending cuts of $100 billion, with the 2022 and 2023 deficits at $1.4 trillion and $1.7 trillion respectively [29] - Lutnick supports broad tariffs, particularly against China, and advocates for income tax reductions, emphasizing that tariffs can revitalize American manufacturing [37] - Vought proposes a budget plan to cut $11.3 trillion in spending over ten years and reduce income taxes by approximately $2 trillion [41] Group 3: Policy Implementation and Challenges - The Trump 2.0 cabinet is expected to push policies more efficiently due to unified economic thought and Republican majority in Congress [6] - There are potential conflicts in achieving simultaneous goals of spending cuts, tax reductions, and inflation control, with estimates suggesting a possible increase in the deficit by $1.7 trillion to $15.6 trillion over ten years [51] - The cabinet's hardline stance on China is expected to lead to increased tariffs, with proposals suggesting tariffs on Chinese goods could reach 60% [50]

Tax System Comparison - The US tax system is divided into federal, state, and local levels, with no hierarchical relationship, while China's tax system is centralized with limited local tax authority[3] - The US relies heavily on direct taxes (73.3% in 2023), primarily personal income tax (39.6%) and social security tax (25.3%), whereas China's tax structure is dominated by indirect taxes, with 80% of taxes levied on enterprises, including VAT (39.0%) and corporate income tax (22.7%)[4] Macro Tax Burden Comparison - China's small-caliber macro tax burden (excluding social security) was 14.4% in 2023, 5.1 percentage points lower than the US (19.5%)[6] - China's medium-caliber macro tax burden (including social security) was 21.0% in 2023, compared to 26.0% in the US[7] - China's large-caliber macro tax burden (excluding land transfer income) was 25.8% in 2023, 1.6 percentage points lower than the US (27.4%)[8] - China's full-caliber macro tax burden (including land transfer income) was 30.4% in 2023, 3.0 percentage points higher than the US[9] Future Trends - Trump's potential tax cuts could reignite international tax competition, but the impact on China's tax burden is expected to be limited, with domestic economic recovery and fiscal space being the primary determinants[10] - China's macro tax burden is already at a low level, and future policy should focus on stabilizing it rather than further reductions[11] Corporate Tax Burden - China's corporate tax burden is perceived as heavy due to the high proportion of indirect taxes (71.2% in 2023) and the inability to fully pass on VAT costs[12] - Chinese companies face higher comprehensive operating costs, including social insurance fees and energy costs, with natural gas costs being 5.4 times higher than in the US[13]

Group 1: Tax System Comparison - The U.S. tax system is a federal structure with independent tax levels (federal, state, local), while China's tax system is centralized with a "tax-sharing" system established in 1994[3] - In 2023, the U.S. personal income tax accounted for 49.5% of federal revenue, while China's personal income tax only represented 8.2% of total tax revenue[4] - China's primary tax is VAT, which constituted 39.0% of total tax revenue in 2023, while the U.S. does not have a VAT[4] Group 2: Macro Tax Burden Comparison - China's macro tax burden has been generally lower than the U.S. due to extensive tax cuts; in 2023, China's overall macro tax burden was slightly higher than the U.S. for the first time since 2022[5] - The small-caliber macro tax burden in China was 5.1 percentage points lower than the U.S. in 2023[6] - The medium-caliber macro tax burden in China was 21.0% in 2023, compared to the U.S. at 26.0%[7] Group 3: Future Tax Trends - The "Trump 2.0" era may lead to renewed tax cuts in the U.S., potentially increasing competitive pressure on China's tax policies[10] - China's future macro tax burden will depend on domestic economic recovery, particularly in the real estate sector[10] - In 2023, China's full-caliber macro tax burden was 30.4%, remaining stable compared to 2022, while the U.S. saw a decline in its macro tax burden[9] Group 4: Corporate Tax Burden Insights - Approximately 71.2% of China's tax revenue comes from indirect taxes, placing a heavier burden on enterprises compared to the U.S., where corporate taxes and social security taxes account for 33.7%[12] - High administrative fees and social insurance costs contribute to the perception of a heavy tax burden on Chinese enterprises[13] - In 2023, China's average natural gas cost was 5.4 times higher than that of the U.S., impacting operational costs for businesses[13]

Group 1: Necessity of Establishing a Market Stabilization Fund - The establishment of a stock market stabilization fund is necessary to prevent systemic risks and market failures, especially given that there are 220 million stock investors in China[5] - Historical examples, such as the 1929 U.S. stock market crash and Japan's 1990 market collapse, illustrate the severe economic consequences of unregulated market declines[5] - Temporary measures in China, such as the 2 billion yuan intervention in 1990 and the 2 trillion yuan from the central bank in 2015, highlight the need for a structured approach to market stabilization[28] Group 2: International Practices and Lessons - Major economies have shifted from laissez-faire to decisive intervention during market crises, with stabilization funds being a common tool, as seen in Japan and South Korea during the COVID-19 pandemic[28] - The Korean stock market stabilization fund, established during the 2003 credit card crisis, was valued at 400 billion won and successfully stabilized the market, leading to a four-year bull market[6] - The Hong Kong government's intervention in 1998, which involved buying blue-chip stocks, successfully countered speculative attacks and stabilized the Hang Seng Index[49] Group 3: Key Design Considerations for China's Fund - The fund should be managed by a government body with a clear organizational structure to ensure timely and effective interventions[56] - The fund's size should be between 2% to 6% of the total market capitalization, which is approximately 2 trillion to 6 trillion yuan based on the current market value of 98.5 trillion yuan[15] - A clear exit strategy is essential, allowing for gradual divestment during market recovery to minimize distortions[11]