Group 1 - The potential new round of U.S. sanctions is no longer considered news by the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson [1]

Core Viewpoint - Russia is prepared to respond to potential new sanctions from the United States, indicating a proactive stance in managing geopolitical risks and economic pressures [1] Group 1 - The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister stated that Russia is aware of how to handle possible new sanctions from the U.S. [1]

Group 1 - The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced sanctions on multiple commercial networks assisting Iranian oil trade on July 3 [1] - The sanctioned entities include companies operated by Iraqi businessmen and vessels involved in the covert transportation of Iranian oil [2] - Additionally, sanctions were imposed on seven senior officials of Hezbollah and an entity related to a financial institution controlled by Hezbollah [2]

Group 1 - The core viewpoint of the article is that the U.S. Treasury Department has imposed sanctions on entities involved in facilitating Iranian oil trade, indicating a continued effort to restrict Iran's oil exports [1] Group 2 - On July 3, the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced sanctions against multiple commercial networks assisting Iranian oil trade [1] - The sanctioned entities include companies operated by Iraqi businessmen and vessels involved in the clandestine transportation of Iranian oil [1] - Additionally, sanctions were imposed on seven senior officials of Hezbollah and an entity related to a financial institution controlled by Hezbollah [1]

Core Viewpoint - The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has imposed sanctions on multiple entities involved in facilitating Iranian oil trade, including companies operated by Iraqi merchants and vessels secretly transporting Iranian oil [1] Group 1: Sanctions on Entities - The sanctions target entities that assist in the oil trade with Iran, specifically those operated by Iraqi businessmen [1] - The sanctions also include vessels that are involved in the covert transportation of Iranian oil [1] Group 2: Sanctions on Individuals and Institutions - Seven senior officials of Hezbollah and an entity related to a financial institution controlled by Hezbollah have also been sanctioned [1]

Group 1 - The U.S. has imposed sanctions on Iran's defense industry, targeting a specific individual and eight entities, and has identified a vessel, SHUN KAI XING, as property subject to freezing [1] - The vessel SHUN KAI XING, flagged in Panama, was transporting sensitive goods to Iran, with RRA and Towse Sanaye Nim Resanaye Tarashe listed as consignees on the bill of lading [1] - Chinese Futech Co Limited has previously exported sensitive proliferation materials directly to Iran-based Rayan Fan Kav Andish [1] Group 2 - Dongguan Zanyin Machinery Equipment Co., Ltd. in China has shipped items intended for RRA [2] - Unico Shipping Co Ltd, based in Hong Kong, has been the legal owner of SHUN KAI XING since April 2024, while V-Shipping PTE LTD from Singapore is the charterer attempting to coordinate shipments to Iran [2] - Shenzhen Xinxin Shipping Co., Ltd. is involved in coordinating shipments to OFAC-designated entities and is aware of the potential sanctions risks associated with their actions [2] Group 3 - Zhang Yanbang, a Chinese citizen, is the captain of SHUN KAI XING, and he is aware that the goods are being sent to Iran [3] - An agent representing Zhang submitted a false bill of lading, omitting RRA and Iran-based Towse Sanaye Nim Resanaye Tarashe as consignees [3]

Core Viewpoint - Iran's uranium enrichment activities are non-negotiable, and any U.S. demands regarding this should be rejected. Any new agreement with the U.S. should involve the complete and verifiable lifting of all sanctions [1] Group 1 - Iranian lawmakers assert that uranium enrichment is not open for negotiation [1] - Any U.S. requests related to uranium enrichment must be firmly declined [1] - For any new agreement with the U.S., all sanctions should be lifted in a verifiable and permanent manner [1]

伊朗外交部发言人：我们必须观察美国在制裁问题上的立场是否发生变化，迄今为止我们尚未看到任何 变化。 ...

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the significant decline in imports of AMD and Intel CPUs to Russia, with reported decreases of 81% and 95% respectively, while local companies claim there is no chip shortage and supply has increased for three consecutive years [1][2]. Group 1: Import Data - According to the Russian Federal Customs Service (FCS), the delivery of chips in 2024 is expected to be around 37,000 units, valued at 439 million rubles, compared to 537,000 units worth approximately 6.3 billion rubles the previous year [1]. - The drastic reduction in CPU imports is attributed to U.S. sanctions and export controls following Russia's invasion of Ukraine [1]. Group 2: Local Market Conditions - Russian companies assert that there is no shortage of processors, and many report an increase in supply, contradicting FCS data [2]. - A supplier's business development director noted that foreign manufacturers are raising prices by 10% to 12% due to inflation and the U.S.-China trade war, but the price increase for popular processors remains relatively stable [2]. Group 3: Efficacy of Sanctions - Experts suggest that U.S. attempts to control chip exports to China and Russia have largely been ineffective, with many indicating that these sanctions are futile [2]. - Investigations reveal that U.S. government agencies responsible for enforcing these controls rely on outdated processes and voluntary compliance from chip manufacturers [2].

Core Viewpoint - The import volume of diluted asphalt in China reached a new low in April 2025, primarily due to trade tensions and reduced profitability in processing diluted asphalt, indicating that "low imports" may become the norm for the remainder of 2025 [1][6]. Group 1: Import Data - In April 2025, China's diluted asphalt import volume was 0.71 million tons, a decrease of 97.58% month-on-month and 97.65% year-on-year, marking the lowest monthly import level since February 2019 [1]. - The total import volume from January to April 2025 was 1.29 million tons, a year-on-year decline of 37.18%, also the lowest for the same period since 2021 [1]. Group 2: Impact of U.S. Sanctions - U.S. sanctions have significantly contributed to the record low import levels of diluted asphalt, with President Trump announcing the termination of oil trading agreements with Venezuela on February 26, 2025, and requiring Chevron to exit Venezuelan oil operations by April 3, 2025 [3]. - The sanctions have led to a reduction in U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude oil and have limited the import enthusiasm of other countries [3]. - Contrary to market expectations, the anticipated increase in China's diluted asphalt imports following the sanctions has not materialized, as evidenced by the low import figures in April [3]. Group 3: Processing Profitability - The current tax policy on processing diluted asphalt, which allows deductions based only on the proportion of taxable products, has significantly reduced the profitability of processing diluted asphalt, leading to a decline in domestic refineries' willingness to process it [5]. - The production of asphalt using crude oil quotas is becoming the primary method in 2025, as the profitability of processing diluted asphalt has not improved compared to processing crude oil [5]. - To achieve profitability in processing diluted asphalt, the price spread would need to decrease by approximately $10 per barrel, which is unlikely to happen without affecting the high cracking margins of diluted asphalt [5]. Group 4: Future Outlook - Given the combined internal and external factors, it is expected that the import volume of diluted asphalt will remain low and may become a norm for the remainder of 2025 [6].