平台责任
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每经热评|当骑手可以“拉黑”用户 平台的责任在哪里?
Mei Ri Jing Ji Xin Wen· 2025-10-16 02:51
Core Viewpoint - The introduction of a dual evaluation mechanism for food delivery services aims to balance the power dynamics between riders and customers, allowing riders to block problematic customers and enhancing their rights as workers [1][2][3] Group 1: Evaluation Mechanism - The new feature allows riders to select "do not deliver to this customer" for up to 365 days if they face abusive behavior, thus correcting the previous one-sided evaluation system [1][2] - This dual evaluation system empowers riders to refuse unreasonable demands from customers, potentially improving service quality and fostering a more harmonious relationship between riders and customers [2][3] Group 2: Challenges and Concerns - There are concerns regarding the protection of user rights in cases where riders block customers, especially in difficult delivery scenarios, and how to ensure fair treatment of customers who may be unjustly blocked [2][3] - The platform's role as a neutral rule-maker raises questions about its responsibility in managing the relationship between riders and customers, as it may avoid its obligations as the primary organizer [3][4] Group 3: Recommendations for Improvement - To address the underlying issues, the platform should consider implementing differentiated pricing based on order difficulty, ensuring fair compensation for riders and preventing mass blocking of customers [4][5] - Establishing formal employment relationships for riders would compel the platform to create effective complaint channels and support systems, enhancing riders' dignity and promoting a healthier ecosystem [4][5]
为数字经济筑牢公平竞争法治基石
Nan Fang Du Shi Bao· 2025-10-09 16:12
Core Viewpoint - The newly revised Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China, effective from October 15, aims to address new challenges in market competition, particularly in the digital economy, by targeting new forms of unfair competition and enhancing regulatory measures [2][3]. Group 1: New Market Characteristics - The rapid development of platform and sharing economies has led to significant changes in market competition, with data becoming a key element and technologies like algorithms and artificial intelligence being widely applied [2]. - Increased market concentration and scale effects have made it easier for leading platforms to establish dominant market positions, presenting new challenges for anti-unfair competition [2]. Group 2: Key Provisions of the New Law - The law specifically targets false transactions, aiming to dismantle the gray industrial chain of fake reviews and sales, which mislead consumers and create a vicious cycle of poor quality [3]. - It emphasizes the protection of data rights, prohibiting illegal data acquisition and interference with others' data products, thus ensuring safe and regulated data utilization [3][4]. - The law clarifies the responsibilities of platform operators, requiring them to provide a fair competitive environment and not to exploit their advantages to engage in monopolistic practices [4]. Group 3: Implementation Challenges - Effective implementation of the law requires enhanced regulatory enforcement to detect hidden violations, utilizing technologies like big data and artificial intelligence for real-time monitoring [4]. - There is a need for mechanisms that encourage consumers and businesses to assert their rights, addressing the high costs and difficulties associated with legal recourse [5].
网络荐股行为的监管困境与规制进路|资本市场
清华金融评论· 2025-08-20 10:57
Core Viewpoint - The article emphasizes the need for a regulatory framework to address the chaotic state of online stock recommendations, highlighting the blurred boundaries of administrative regulation, weak deterrent effects of penalties, and unclear collaboration among regulatory bodies [5][9][17]. Summary by Sections Online Stock Recommendation Chaos - Since late September 2024, a surge in retail investor accounts has been observed, driven by a new ecosystem in the A-share market, significantly influenced by online stock recommendations [5]. - The current landscape of online stock recommendations is mixed, involving licensed securities consulting firms and unlicensed influential online figures, with methods ranging from factual analysis to spreading false information for profit [6]. Regulatory Dilemmas - The article identifies three main regulatory challenges: 1. **Ambiguity in Administrative Regulation**: The distinction between securities investment consulting activities and businesses is unclear, leading to regulatory gaps [10][11]. 2. **Weak Deterrent Effect of Penalties**: Many licensed investment consulting firms continue to violate regulations, with low penalties for misconduct, resulting in a culture of non-compliance [12][13]. 3. **Unclear Collaboration Among Regulatory Bodies**: Multiple agencies are involved in regulating online stock recommendations, but lack clear coordination, making comprehensive oversight difficult [15][16]. Platform Responsibility - The article argues for recognizing the dual role of large online platforms as both market competitors and self-regulatory managers, suggesting that effective regulation of online stock recommendations requires a focus on platform responsibility within a framework that includes administrative bodies and recommendation entities [17][19]. - It advocates for adaptive regulation that allows for flexibility and innovation in regulatory approaches, emphasizing the importance of self-regulation by platforms to balance efficiency and safety in the financial market [19][20].