专题："业绩为王"时代来了，时隔三年公募绩效迎重大改革！近千名基金经理面临"降薪" 基金行业薪酬体系即将迎来重大改革。根据中基协新规指引，若基金经理过去三年产品收益率低于业绩 比较基准10个百分点以上且基金利润为负，其绩效薪酬下调幅度不得低于30%。同时，新规要求基金公 司对管理多只产品的基金经理，需依据基金规模、管理时长等对业绩表现进行加权考核，且任职不满一 年的基金不纳入评估范围。 在此背景下，嘉实基金旗下拥有近十年投资经验的基金经理归凯，其管理产品组合近三年的表现引发关 注。Wind数据显示，截至12月8日，归凯目前管理6只基金，总规模达189.11亿元。若聚焦新规重点关注 的近三年业绩表现，归凯管理的6只产品在近三年期间均未跑赢各自的业绩比较基准，整体呈现全线跑 输态势。 | 证券代码 | 证券简称 | 近三年区间净值 超越基准收益率 | 基金规模合计 | 归凯 | 基金经理 | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | | | (%) | (1Z) | 任职日期 | | | 000751.OF | 嘉实新兴产业 | -34.09 | 51.19 | 201812 ...

Core Viewpoint - The fund industry is undergoing significant reform in its compensation system, emphasizing performance-based pay for fund managers, which may lead to salary reductions for nearly a thousand fund managers [1][4]. Summary by Sections Compensation Reform - New regulations from the Asset Management Association of China stipulate that if a fund manager's product returns are more than 10 percentage points below the benchmark over the past three years and the fund is unprofitable, their performance pay must be reduced by at least 30% [1][4]. - Fund companies are required to assess fund managers managing multiple products based on weighted performance metrics, considering fund size and management duration, excluding funds managed for less than a year from evaluations [1][4]. Performance Analysis - Fund manager Zheng Chengran's portfolio has gained attention, managing eight funds with a total size of 13.877 billion yuan as of December 8 [1][4]. - The best-performing fund, Guangfa Carbon Neutrality Theme A, has achieved a return of over 76% since its management began in June 2024 [2][6]. - Over the past three years, Guangfa New Energy Select A outperformed its benchmark by 17.99%, while other funds managed by Zheng Chengran significantly underperformed, with Guangfa High-end Manufacturing A lagging by 81.71% [7][9]. Structural Implications - There is a notable divergence between fund performance and size, with Guangfa High-end Manufacturing A being the largest fund at 5.272 billion yuan but having shrunk by 12.973 billion yuan over three years [9]. - The new regulations will fundamentally change the incentive structure for fund managers, shifting from a focus on standout products to an overall weighted performance approach, promoting accountability for each product [3][9].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the newly released "Guidelines for Performance Assessment and Compensation Management of Fund Management Companies (Draft for Comments)", which aims to standardize performance assessment and compensation management in the fund industry, ensuring long-term incentives are aligned with the interests of fund shareholders [3][9]. Summary by Sections Performance Assessment and Compensation Structure - The guidelines emphasize strengthening performance assessments, requiring that the weight of long-term performance indicators (over three years) in overall quantitative assessments should not be less than 80% [4][10]. - For senior management, the weight of investment return indicators in performance assessments should be at least 50% [11]. Investment in Own Funds - Senior management and key personnel are required to invest a minimum of 30% of their total performance compensation in their company's funds, with at least 60% of that in equity funds [5][15]. - Fund managers must invest at least 40% of their total performance compensation in the funds they manage, excluding non-equity products [5][15]. Salary Adjustments Based on Performance - Fund managers whose performance lags behind the benchmark by more than 10% over three years and have negative profit margins will see a minimum 30% reduction in their performance compensation [6][16]. - The guidelines establish a tiered adjustment mechanism for performance compensation based on the fund's performance relative to benchmarks [16]. Long-term Incentives and Accountability - The guidelines allow for the use of equity, options, and other long-term incentives to align employee interests with the long-term benefits of fund shareholders [9][18]. - A strict accountability mechanism is introduced, which includes salary stoppage, recovery, and clawback provisions applicable even to departing employees [19]. Overall Compensation Management - Fund management companies are encouraged to manage total compensation budgets effectively, linking changes in total compensation to fund performance and company profitability [17]. - The structure of compensation should include basic salary, performance pay, benefits, and long-term incentives, ensuring a balanced approach to avoid risks associated with unreasonable compensation structures [18].

Core Viewpoint - The newly released "Guidelines for Performance Evaluation and Compensation Management of Fund Management Companies (Draft for Comments)" aims to standardize performance evaluation and compensation management in the fund management industry, promoting sustainable development and robust operations by aligning employee incentives with long-term fund performance [1][2]. Summary by Sections Performance Evaluation - The guidelines emphasize strengthening performance evaluation, requiring that the weight of long-term investment return indicators (over three years) in overall quantitative assessments must not be less than 80% [2][9]. - For senior management, the weight of investment return indicators should be at least 50%, while for active equity fund managers, the performance indicators should account for no less than 80% [2][10]. Compensation Structure - Fund company executives must invest at least 30% of their annual performance compensation in their own company's funds, with fund managers required to invest at least 40% [3][16]. - The deferred payment of performance compensation must last for at least three years, with a minimum of 40% of the deferred payment for senior management and key personnel [3][16]. Salary Adjustments - Fund managers whose performance lags behind the benchmark by more than 10% over three years and have negative profit margins will face a minimum 30% reduction in their performance compensation [4][17]. - A tiered adjustment mechanism for performance compensation is established based on the fund's performance relative to benchmarks [17][18]. Long-term Incentives - The guidelines allow for the use of equity, options, and other long-term incentives to align with the long-term interests of fund shareholders [6][19]. - The compensation structure should include basic salary, performance pay, benefits, and long-term incentives, ensuring a balanced approach to avoid risks associated with unreasonable compensation structures [19][20]. Accountability Mechanism - A strict accountability mechanism is mandated, which includes salary suspension, recovery, and clawback provisions applicable even to departing employees [7][21]. - Fund management companies must clearly define the conditions under which performance compensation can be reduced or reclaimed in their internal management systems and contracts [21].

Core Viewpoint - The newly released "Guidelines for Performance Assessment and Compensation Management of Fund Management Companies (Draft for Comments)" aims to standardize performance assessment and compensation management in the fund management industry, ensuring long-term incentives are aligned with the interests of fund shareholders and promoting sustainable development of the industry [1][2]. Summary by Sections Performance Assessment and Compensation Structure - The guidelines emphasize performance assessment, requiring that the weight of long-term indicators (over three years) in the overall quantitative assessment of fund investment returns must not be less than 80% [2][10]. - For senior management, the weight of fund investment return indicators should be no less than 50% [11]. - Differentiated assessments for fund managers are mandated, with performance indicators for actively managed equity fund managers having a weight of at least 80%, and the benchmark comparison weight not less than 30% [12]. Investment in Own Funds - Fund company chairpersons and senior executives must use at least 30% of their annual performance compensation to purchase their company's funds, while fund managers must invest at least 40% of their performance compensation in the funds they manage [3][20]. Deferred Compensation and Co-investment Requirements - The guidelines introduce new requirements for deferred compensation, mandating a minimum deferral period of three years and a co-investment ratio of at least 40% for senior management and key personnel [4][18]. - Senior management and key department heads must invest at least 30% of their total performance compensation in their company's funds, with at least 60% of that in equity funds [20][21]. Salary Adjustments Based on Performance - Fund managers whose performance lags the benchmark by more than 10% over three years and have negative profit margins will face a salary reduction of at least 30% [5][22]. - A tiered salary adjustment mechanism is established based on performance relative to benchmarks, ensuring that poor performance directly impacts compensation [22]. Long-term Incentives and Accountability Mechanisms - The guidelines allow for the use of equity, options, and other long-term incentives to align employee interests with the long-term benefits of fund shareholders [7][23]. - A strict accountability mechanism is introduced, which includes salary stoppage, recovery, and clawback provisions applicable even to departing employees [8][25]. Encouragement of Pension Systems - Fund companies are encouraged to establish enterprise annuities and support employees in participating in personal pension systems, integrating compensation mechanisms with pension insurance [9]. Overall Compensation Structure - The guidelines stress the importance of linking total compensation changes to fund investment returns and company performance, while ensuring a balanced structure that avoids excessive focus on senior management [24].

智通财经12月6日讯（记者 闫军）事关基金经理薪酬改革重磅文件落地。 智通财经记者获悉，《基金管理公司绩效考核管理指引（征求意见稿）》已经下发。该《指引》旨在进一步规范基金 管理公司绩效考核与薪酬管理行为，健全长效激励约束机制，推动基金行业实现稳健经营和可持续发展。 作为公募基金行业发展进入高质量转型阶段的重要制度安排，《指引》从薪酬结构、绩效考核、支付机制、问责制度 等多个维度作出系统性规定，明确提出"坚持基金份额持有人利益优先"的基本原则，通过一系列量化指标和刚性约 束，引导基金管理公司将员工激励与基金长期业绩深度绑定。 梳理后，《指引》重点如下： 一是强化业绩考核，盈利比等指标，多处实现挂钩。整体定量考核中，要求基金投资收益指标中三年以上中长期指标 权重不得低于80%。 其中，高管层考核，基金投资收益指标权重应当不低于50%。基金经理等差异化考核，对主动权益类基金经理，基金 产品业绩指标考核权重应当不低于80%，其中业绩比较基准对比指标考核权重不得低于30%；对负责销售的高级管理 人员及核心销售业务人员，投资者盈亏情况指标考核权重应当不低于50%。 二是基金公司董事长、高管等当年全部绩效薪酬应不少于30 ...

Core Viewpoint - The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has released an action plan aimed at promoting the high-quality development of public funds, focusing on changing the previous model of guaranteed returns and linking fund performance to differentiated fee rates for investors based on their holding periods [1][2]. Group 1: Key Highlights of the Action Plan - The action plan emphasizes that for investors with a holding period, differentiated fee rates will be applied based on the product's performance during that period [1]. - It mandates that leading institutions in the industry should issue no less than 60% of the number of actively managed equity funds compared to the total fund issuance in the coming year [1]. - Performance assessment for funds will place a weight of no less than 80% on medium to long-term returns over three years [2]. Group 2: Fund Manager Performance Evaluation - Fund managers whose products underperform the benchmark by more than 10 percentage points over three years will see a significant decrease in their performance compensation [2]. - Conversely, fund managers whose products significantly outperform the benchmark can receive reasonable increases in their performance compensation [2]. - The new rules will only apply to newly issued funds, while existing funds will continue under the previous assessment rules, indicating a clear distinction between old and new regulations [2]. Group 3: Industry Implications - The current public fund operation reflects a focus on individual fund managers rather than team collaboration, which may lead to talent retention issues as high-performing managers often leave for private funds [4]. - The action plan encourages better performance incentives for fund managers, suggesting that extending the assessment period to 3-5 years could enhance motivation and retention of top talent [4][5]. - Addressing the distribution of excess returns for fund managers is seen as a necessary step to prevent the loss of talented managers due to inadequate incentive mechanisms [5].