技术援助报告 刚果民主共和国 具体化《法定特殊银行救助机制》 十月 2025 准备人： David Blache（国际货币基金组织负责人），Thibault Godbillon（国际货币基金组织外部专家） 货币与资本市场部 ©2026 国际货币基金组织 本文件的全部或部分内容构成国际货币基金组织工作人员为响应中刚（"CD受益人"）的技术援助请求而提供的技术咨 询。除非CD受益人明确反对此类披露，否则该文件（全部或部分）或其摘要可由国际货币基金组织向中刚的基金组织 执行董事、其他执行董事及其工作人员、CD受益人其他机构或实体披露，并应其请求，向世界银行工作人员及其他对 CD受益人具有合法利益的技术援助提供者和捐赠者披露（详见）。 员工操作指南：能力发展信息传播 发布或披露本 报告（全部或部分）给国际货币基金组织（IMF）以外的各方，包括但不限于CD受益国的机构或机构、世界银行工作 人员、其他技术援助提供者和有合法利益的捐助者，需获得CD受益方和国际货币基金组织货币与资本市场部门的明确 同意。 这份出版物中表达的分析和政策考量是国际货币基金组织货币和资本市场部门的观点。 国际货币基金组织，IMF出版物 邮政信箱9 ...

Group 1 - China sold $6.1 billion in U.S. Treasury bonds in a single month, bringing its holdings down to $682.6 billion, the lowest level since 2008 [3][5] - Since March 2025, China has reduced its U.S. Treasury holdings for nine consecutive months, totaling $18.4 billion, indicating a strategic withdrawal over three years [3][5] - In contrast, other countries like Japan and the UK are increasing their U.S. Treasury holdings, with Japan adding $2.6 billion and the UK purchasing $10.6 billion in a single month [5] Group 2 - Concerns over U.S. debt levels, which are approaching $38 trillion, and annual interest payments exceeding $1 trillion, have led to fears about the sustainability of U.S. debt [5][16] - China's strategy includes diversifying its reserves by increasing gold holdings, which reached 74.15 million ounces by the end of December 2025, marking a 14-month growth streak [7][16] - The share of the U.S. dollar in global foreign exchange reserves has fallen to 56.92%, the lowest since 1995, as countries increasingly turn to gold and reduce their reliance on U.S. assets [16] Group 3 - The political dynamics in the U.S. are affecting the Federal Reserve's independence, with Trump previously attempting to pressure Fed Chair Powell for rate cuts, but later backing off amid concerns over market stability [11][13] - International organizations, including the IMF and ECB, have expressed support for Powell, warning against political interference in monetary policy, which could undermine trust in U.S. assets [14][16] - The ongoing reduction of U.S. Treasury holdings by major creditors, including China, may lead to increased yields on U.S. debt, raising the government's interest burden [18]

Core Insights - The article emphasizes the significance of internet finance as an inevitable global trend, highlighting its transformative impact on traditional banking functions and its integration into the real economy [3][4]. Group 1: Internet Finance Trends - Internet finance is not merely a channel innovation but represents a complete migration of financial functions, creating an open ecosystem of "platform + scenario" [3]. - The rapid growth and user acquisition in internet finance are attributed to its seamless integration into the transaction processes of the real economy [3]. Group 2: China's Competitive Advantage - China possesses the world's largest single consumer market and highly digitized commercial scenarios, providing a "natural experimental field" for internet finance [4]. - The large user base in China leads to significant scale effects, allowing models like mobile payments and online credit to be validated and potentially exported internationally [4]. Group 3: Risks and Challenges - The cross-border and cross-industry nature of internet finance disrupts traditional regulatory frameworks, leading to blurred lines in risk-bearing entities and legal boundaries [5]. - Traditional banking regulations, which rely on capital adequacy and physical inspections, are rendered ineffective in the context of internet finance, creating regulatory gaps [5]. Group 4: Regulatory Innovations - A call for a systemic upgrade from "institutional regulation" to "functional regulation" is made, emphasizing the need for legislation that recognizes "data as capital" and includes algorithms and data assets in regulatory frameworks [6]. - Establishing national-level RegTech laboratories and participating in international rule-making are proposed to enhance China's global leadership in internet finance [6]. - The ultimate goal is to create a multi-layered, complementary financial ecosystem where fintech operates transparently, traditional finance evolves through competition, and regulation achieves dynamic balance [6].

Core Viewpoint - The People's Bank of China (PBOC) is exploring mechanisms to provide liquidity to non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) under specific circumstances, marking a new phase in the construction of China's financial safety net [2][5]. Group 1: Importance of Non-Bank Financial Institutions - NBFIs have become increasingly significant in China's financial system, managing assets worth trillions of yuan and actively participating in various financial markets [3]. - The business models of these institutions often involve liquidity transformation, making them inherently susceptible to liquidity risks [3]. Group 2: Need for Liquidity Support Mechanism - Although China has not experienced a systemic liquidity crisis among NBFIs, proactive measures are necessary to prevent potential issues [4]. - Current liquidity tools from the PBOC primarily target commercial banks, leaving NBFIs reliant on indirect support, which may fail under market stress [4]. Group 3: Conditions for Liquidity Support - The PBOC's emphasis on "specific circumstances" for providing liquidity reflects a cautious and forward-looking policy design [5]. - These conditions aim to prevent moral hazard by ensuring that liquidity support is not a routine measure but rather a response to systemic pressures [5]. Group 4: International Practices and Lessons - Global central banks have evolved their stance on providing liquidity support to NBFIs, recognizing their systemic importance post-2008 financial crisis [6]. - Emergency tools created by the Federal Reserve during crises serve as examples of how liquidity support can be structured for NBFIs [6]. Group 5: Challenges in Preventing Moral Hazard - Establishing clear triggering conditions for liquidity support is crucial to avoid indiscriminate aid to struggling NBFIs [7]. - A cost mechanism should be designed to ensure that liquidity support is not free or low-cost, thereby incentivizing institutions to restore normal financing capabilities [7]. Group 6: Mechanism Design Innovations in China - China's diverse types of NBFIs necessitate a flexible liquidity support mechanism tailored to their unique needs [9]. - The financial market structure in China, which includes both interbank and exchange markets, requires consideration of cross-market effects in liquidity support design [10]. Group 7: Coordination with Macro-Prudential Management - The exploration of liquidity support mechanisms aligns with the need to build a comprehensive macro-prudential management system [11]. - Macro-prudential measures can help mitigate liquidity risks at NBFIs by enforcing regulatory indicators and conducting stress tests [11]. Group 8: Institutional Framework and Continuous Improvement - Establishing a legal foundation for liquidity support is essential to clarify the PBOC's responsibilities and conditions for providing aid [12]. - Continuous evaluation and optimization of the liquidity support mechanism are necessary to adapt to evolving market conditions and risks [13].

Core Viewpoint - The People's Bank of China (PBOC) is exploring mechanisms to provide liquidity to non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) under specific circumstances, marking a new phase in the construction of China's financial safety net [1][2]. Summary by Sections Importance of NBFIs - NBFIs, including securities firms, fund management companies, trust companies, and insurance asset management companies, manage assets worth trillions of yuan and are deeply involved in various financial markets, making them increasingly significant in China's financial system [1]. Liquidity Risks and Historical Context - Internationally, liquidity crises in NBFIs can be sudden and contagious, as seen in the 2008 financial crisis with Lehman Brothers and the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic when U.S. money market funds faced severe liquidity issues [2]. Policy Design and Conditions - The PBOC's approach emphasizes that liquidity support for NBFIs will only occur in "specific scenarios," such as systemic market pressure or liquidity crises that could lead to systemic risks, reflecting a cautious and forward-looking policy design [2][3]. Avoiding Moral Hazard - The design aims to prevent over-reliance on liquidity support, which could lead to moral hazard, while also ensuring that the central bank can act as a lender of last resort in extreme situations [3][4]. International Practices - Other major economies have evolved their stance on providing liquidity support to NBFIs post-2008 crisis, recognizing their systemic importance and the potential for liquidity issues to trigger broader financial instability [4]. Challenges in Moral Hazard Prevention - Key challenges include setting clear trigger conditions for support, designing cost mechanisms for liquidity, and ensuring accountability and structural reforms for institutions receiving support [5][6]. Mechanism Design Considerations - The liquidity support mechanism in China must be flexible to accommodate the diverse types of NBFIs and their unique risk profiles, while also considering the interconnectedness of different financial markets [6][8]. Macro-Prudential Management - The exploration of liquidity support mechanisms aligns with the need for a comprehensive macro-prudential management system to mitigate systemic risks posed by NBFIs [7]. Legal and Operational Framework - Establishing a legal basis for liquidity support, creating an operational framework, and ensuring coordination with existing regulatory structures are essential for the effective implementation of the proposed mechanisms [8].

Core Viewpoint - The article emphasizes the importance of the deposit insurance system as a crucial component of financial security in China, highlighting its role in maintaining financial stability and protecting depositors' interests, particularly in the context of its ten-year implementation since 2015 [1][4]. Summary by Sections Deposit Insurance Pricing Mechanism - The book systematically studies the deposit insurance pricing issue from three dimensions: regulatory penalties, interval pricing, and macroeconomic policy considerations. It introduces a tolerance coefficient into Merton's classic model, showing that increased regulatory penalties lead to lower risk preferences among banks and subsequently lower deposit insurance rates [1][2]. - The research also incorporates fuzzy mathematics into the deposit insurance pricing model, demonstrating the theoretical significance and practical necessity of interval pricing, ultimately deriving deposit insurance prices based on triangular intuition fuzzy numbers [1][2]. - The impact of tax reduction policies on the real economy and financial sector is analyzed, revealing that a decrease in income tax rates leads to lower deposit insurance premiums, with empirical evidence indicating that higher bank income tax rates increase risk-taking and thus raise deposit insurance rates [1][2]. Risk Effects of Deposit Insurance System - The study investigates the impact of the deposit insurance system on banks' risk-taking behavior through four dimensions: the influence mechanism, differentiated rates, early corrective actions, and prudent regulatory policies. It finds that the implementation of the deposit insurance system effectively reduces risk-taking levels among small and medium-sized banks [2][3]. - The research expands on classic theoretical models, proving that differentiated deposit insurance rates have a suppressive effect on banks' risk-taking, particularly in the context of rural commercial banks' reforms [2][3]. - The book constructs indicators to characterize the early corrective actions of the deposit insurance system, confirming its effectiveness in early risk correction through unique data on real deposit insurance rates for small and medium-sized banks [2][3]. Policy Recommendations for Improvement - The author proposes four policy recommendations to enhance China's deposit insurance system: accelerating the legislation of the Deposit Insurance Law to improve its role and independence; strengthening regulatory collaboration to enhance efficiency; establishing a financial firewall between small and large banks to reinforce oversight; and utilizing big data to improve risk management and public supervision mechanisms [3][4]. Overall Assessment - The book presents a comprehensive study of the deposit insurance pricing mechanism and the effects of the deposit insurance system, characterized by a framework that integrates empirical facts, pricing mechanisms, risk effects, and mechanism design. It effectively combines theoretical and empirical research, addressing both pricing mechanisms and risk effects in detail [4][5]. - The theoretical contributions include integrating prudent regulation and macroeconomic policies into deposit insurance pricing models, enriching the theoretical landscape of deposit insurance [4][5]. - The empirical focus on small and medium-sized banks provides valuable insights into the effects of the deposit insurance system, offering a scientific evaluation that can inform future improvements [4][5].

Core Viewpoint - The establishment of a financial stability guarantee fund is crucial for preventing and resolving systemic financial risks, reflecting the increasing importance of financial stability in economic and social development [4] Group 1: Financial Risk Prevention and Resolution - The government work report emphasizes the importance of preventing and resolving major financial risks, requiring the strengthening of risk warning, prevention mechanisms, and capacity building [1] - Significant progress has been made in preventing and resolving major financial risks since the 19th National Congress, with key areas of risk being controlled and systemic financial risk trends being curbed [1] - From 2017 to 2021, high-risk shadow banking was dismantled by 25 trillion yuan, and approximately 1.2 trillion yuan of non-performing assets were disposed of [1] Group 2: Financial Stability Mechanisms - A financial stability development committee has been established, along with a last-resort lender mechanism by the central bank, to manage and guide financial safety and stability [2] - Various funds have been created, including deposit insurance funds and investor protection funds, to accumulate experience in risk prevention and resolution in specific financial sectors [2] - There is a need for a long-term, top-level design for financial safety, enhancing risk disposal mechanisms to address the complexities of financial institutions and their interconnections [2] Group 3: Financial Stability Guarantee Fund - The financial stability guarantee fund aims to prevent systemic financial risks and enhance overall market safety, broadening the sources of funds for risk resolution [3] - The fund's establishment should be based on realistic needs, clearly defining its functions and the scope of financial stability risks [3] - Funding for the guarantee fund should be sourced from multiple parties, including government and market institutions, with contributions based on asset size and risk [3]

Core Viewpoint - The establishment and implementation of the deposit insurance system in China have significantly enhanced the protection of depositors' rights and contributed to financial stability over the past decade, especially highlighted by the successful resolution of the Baoshang Bank crisis [1][2][3]. Group 1: Background and Development of Deposit Insurance - The deposit insurance system was officially established on May 1, 2015, after a long development process that began with proposals in 1993 [2]. - The system aims to safeguard public interests by ensuring the safety of deposits through a legally established insurance fund [2]. - Over the past ten years, the system has played a crucial role in protecting depositors and maintaining financial stability, particularly during crises [2]. Group 2: Case Study of Baoshang Bank - Baoshang Bank was placed under regulatory takeover on May 24, 2019, due to severe credit risks and significant asset impairment [1][3]. - The bank's crisis was exacerbated by the failure of its major shareholder to repay funds, leading to a liquidity crisis [3]. - The deposit insurance system facilitated the resolution of Baoshang Bank's issues by establishing a new bank to take over deposits and core operations, thus protecting depositors [1][3]. Group 3: Functionality and Impact of Deposit Insurance - The deposit insurance system has a compensation limit of 500,000 yuan, which covers 99% of depositors, placing it at a relatively high international level [4][5]. - Since its inception, the system has collected a total of 373.2 billion yuan in premiums, providing a solid resource base for protecting depositors [5]. - The system has effectively reduced the frequency and impact of bank runs, particularly after the introduction of deposit insurance branding and public awareness campaigns in 2020 [5]. Group 4: Risk Management and Regulatory Framework - The deposit insurance system is designed not just as a payout mechanism but as a proactive risk management tool, incorporating monitoring, early intervention, and market exit strategies [6][7]. - A risk-based premium system was introduced in 2016, requiring higher premiums from riskier institutions, thereby encouraging prudent management [8]. - The system's effectiveness relies on accurate risk assessment and timely intervention, necessitating enhanced monitoring and regulatory powers for the deposit insurance fund management [9][10]. Group 5: Future Enhancements and Recommendations - There is a need to strengthen the deposit insurance system's risk management capabilities and enhance its authority to initiate risk resolution measures [11][12]. - Recommendations include developing a dedicated deposit insurance law, improving risk monitoring systems, and ensuring effective early intervention mechanisms [10][12]. - The overall goal is to create a robust financial safety net that prevents systemic risks while ensuring fair competition among financial institutions [12][13].

Core Viewpoint - The establishment of the deposit insurance system in China has significantly protected depositors' rights and enhanced public trust in the banking system, but there are calls for legislative improvements to address existing limitations in the current framework [1][7]. Group 1: Overview of Deposit Insurance System - The deposit insurance system has been operational since May 1, 2015, providing full protection for over 99% of depositors with a compensation limit of 500,000 yuan, which is significantly higher than the international average [1]. - The system has played a crucial role in maintaining the stability of the banking sector and has been involved in risk resolution for institutions like Baoshang Bank and Liao Yang Rural Commercial Bank [1]. Group 2: Legal and Regulatory Challenges - The current legal framework, including the People's Bank of China Law and the Banking Supervision Law, does not provide sufficient authority for the deposit insurance system, which is primarily governed by the lower-tier Deposit Insurance Regulation [2][3]. - The Deposit Insurance Regulation, established in 2015, lacks detailed provisions and has been criticized for its limited effectiveness in risk monitoring and early intervention [4][5]. Group 3: Calls for Legislative Reform - Industry experts and officials have emphasized the need for a dedicated deposit insurance law to enhance the legal standing and effectiveness of the deposit insurance system, particularly in risk prevention and resolution [6][7]. - Recent meetings, including the Central Financial Work Conference, have highlighted the importance of improving the deposit insurance framework to better manage systemic risks and enhance financial stability [7][8]. Group 4: Recommendations for Improvement - Experts suggest that a new deposit insurance law should clarify the roles and responsibilities of the deposit insurance system in risk resolution and improve the mechanisms for early intervention and risk monitoring [9]. - Establishing a robust risk monitoring and early warning system is essential for timely identification and management of risks within financial institutions [8][9].

Group 1 - The 28th ASEAN Plus Three (10+3) Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting was held on May 4 in Milan, Italy, focusing on global and regional macroeconomic conditions and financial cooperation [1] - The meeting resulted in a joint statement emphasizing the need for deeper policy coordination and strengthening the regional financial safety net [1] - China announced a donation of $4 million to the AMRO China Technical Assistance Trust Fund to support macroeconomic monitoring and financial stability capacity building among regional members [1] Group 2 - A new rapid financing tool funded by freely usable currencies like the Renminbi was established under the CMIM, marking a significant step towards diversifying the international monetary system in the region [2] - The meeting highlighted the rising economic and financial risks faced by the 10+3 region, underscoring the importance of enhancing the Chiang Mai Initiative mechanism and regional financial safety nets [2] - The introduction of this financing tool expands the resources available under the Chiang Mai Initiative and reflects the region's unique characteristics [2]