Core Viewpoint - The article argues that securitization is not an effective method for disposing of non-performing loans, despite its appearance of providing immediate liquidity and reducing the bank's non-performing loan balance [2][3]. Summary by Sections Securitization Process - A bank issued a securitized product based on personal credit non-performing loans, with a total principal amount of 11.10 billion yuan and an expected recovery of 2.37 billion yuan over 2-3 years [3][5]. - The securitized product was issued for 1.82 billion yuan, which is only 16.40% of the total principal amount [4]. Investor and Bank Perspectives - Investors are attracted to the securitized product because the expected recovery of 2.37 billion yuan exceeds the issued amount of 1.82 billion yuan, providing potential profit [6]. - The bank benefits from securitization by reducing its non-performing loan balance and receiving service fees for managing the loans post-securitization [7]. Profit Impact Analysis - The actual recovery from the securitized loans during the transition period was 1.05 billion yuan, which is 60.73% of the investment amount received [11]. - If the bank had not securitized, it could have potentially increased its profit by approximately 1.14 billion yuan through recovery and reversal of provisions [19][21]. Accounting and Provisioning - The securitized loans had a book value of 1.725 billion yuan after provisioning, and the profit from the securitization was only 0.004 billion yuan, indicating minimal financial benefit [16][19]. - The article highlights that the bank's profit from securitization is limited due to the high level of provisions already accounted for [20]. Long-term Implications - The article suggests that securitization may lead to a long-term negative impact on the bank's profitability, as future recoveries from the securitized loans will not contribute to the bank's profits [21]. - The potential for multiple securitizations could cumulatively result in significant profit losses for the bank [21].

Core Viewpoint - The article argues that while securitization is a financing tool, it is not suitable for banks to dispose of non-performing loans due to various inefficiencies and potential losses associated with the process [1][2][21]. Summary by Sections Principle Explanation - Securitization primarily generates returns for investors from the recovery of non-performing loans, which are still collected by the banks themselves, leading to a situation where banks effectively pay out a portion of their own recoveries to investors [1][2]. - The cash flow from securitized non-performing loans tends to be stable initially but decreases over time, which complicates the timing of cash recovery during the transition period before formal issuance [2][5]. - During the transition period, banks may only receive about 50% of the expected cash flow from the securitized assets, as the initial recoveries belong to the investors [5][6]. - The article highlights that banks often incur significant write-off resources when securitizing loans, which could be avoided through direct recovery methods [7][8]. Empirical Analysis - From 2021 to 2024, Postal Savings Bank issued 22 securitization products, with the total amount of non-performing loans disposed of and the corresponding cash received from securitization detailed in a table [11][12]. - The average cash recovery during the transition period reached approximately 47.8% of the securitization proceeds, demonstrating the inefficiency of the securitization process [14]. - The analysis shows that the cash recovery period for these products averaged around 367 days, indicating that banks could have achieved similar results through direct recovery without securitization [14][15]. Related Thoughts - The article discusses the motivations behind banks engaging in securitization, suggesting that intermediaries benefit financially from the process, which may lead to a lack of thorough cost-benefit analysis by the banks themselves [20][21]. - It emphasizes that while securitization is a common practice, it may not be the most effective method for managing non-performing loans, as banks could achieve better outcomes through direct recovery and write-off strategies [21][22].

Core Viewpoint - The article provides a comprehensive comparison between Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank and Chongqing Bank, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses in terms of financial performance, asset quality, and operational efficiency. Group 1: Background Information - Chongqing is the largest municipality in China by area, with a GDP of 3.22 trillion yuan in 2024, ranking 17th among all provinces and municipalities, and 3rd among the four municipalities [2] - Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank was established in 2008, evolving from various rural credit cooperatives [3] - Chongqing Bank was founded in 1996, originally as Chongqing City Cooperative Bank, and has undergone several name changes [5] Group 2: Shareholding Structure - As of June 2025, the top shareholders of Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank include Hong Kong Central Clearing Limited (22.07%) and several state-owned enterprises [4] - Chongqing Bank's major shareholders include Hong Kong Central Clearing Limited (33.75%) and other state-owned and private enterprises [5] Group 3: Capital Market and Operations - Both banks are listed in A+H shares, with Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank listed in Hong Kong in 2010 and on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2019, while Chongqing Bank was listed in Hong Kong in 2013 and on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2021 [7] - Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank has a more extensive branch network with 1,733 branches, while Chongqing Bank has 199 branches [8] Group 4: Financial Performance - In 2024, Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank had total assets of 1,514.94 billion yuan, significantly higher than Chongqing Bank's 856.64 billion yuan [12] - The net profit attributable to shareholders for Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank was 11.51 billion yuan, compared to 5.12 billion yuan for Chongqing Bank [12] - Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank's return on assets and return on equity are higher than those of Chongqing Bank, indicating better operational efficiency [12] Group 5: Asset Quality - As of 2024, Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank had a non-performing loan ratio of 1.18%, slightly better than Chongqing Bank's 1.25% [12][29] - The provision coverage ratio for Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank was 363.44%, significantly higher than Chongqing Bank's 245.08%, indicating stronger asset quality management [12][30] Group 6: Employee and Compensation Structure - As of 2024, Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank employed 14,542 staff, while Chongqing Bank had 5,337 employees [11] - Employee costs for Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank were 5.53 billion yuan, compared to 2.30 billion yuan for Chongqing Bank, but the average salary for Chongqing Bank employees was higher [36][41] Group 7: Long-term Trends - Over the past decade, Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank's total assets have consistently been higher than those of Chongqing Bank, although the gap has been narrowing [14] - Both banks experienced fluctuations in revenue growth, with Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank's revenue consistently higher but also showing a decreasing ratio compared to Chongqing Bank [16][18] Group 8: Conclusion - Overall, Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank demonstrates superior operational efficiency and asset quality compared to Chongqing Bank, despite having a larger workforce and higher employee costs [39][40]

Core Viewpoint - The article argues that securitization is not an effective method for disposing of non-performing loans, despite being a financing tool [2][10]. Summary by Sections Securitization Example - Postal Savings Bank issued a securitized product based on personal credit non-performing consumer loans, with a total of 18,529 loans and 8,675 borrowers involved [3][4]. - The total principal amount of the underlying assets was 1.11 billion yuan, with an expected recovery of 237.33 million yuan over 33 months [3][4]. Issuance Details - The securitized product had a total issuance amount of 182 million yuan, with a senior tranche of 142 million yuan at a fixed interest rate of 2.38% [4][5]. - The expected maturity date for the senior tranche is January 26, 2024, with a legal maturity date of April 26, 2028 [5]. Recovery and Issuance Discrepancies - The article questions why only 182 million yuan was issued against a principal of 1.11 billion yuan, highlighting that the loans are non-performing and not all can be recovered [7]. - It also discusses why the expected recovery of 237 million yuan led to an issuance of only 182 million yuan, emphasizing the need to account for costs and investor returns [7]. Investor Interest - Investors are willing to purchase the securitized product because the expected recovery exceeds the amount invested, providing a potential profit margin [8]. Bank's Motivation for Securitization - The bank benefits from reducing its non-performing loan balance and receiving upfront cash from the securitization, which can enhance profits if the loans have been fully provisioned [9]. Critique of Securitization - The article argues that the cash received from securitization may be less than what could be recovered through traditional collection methods, especially when considering the transitional period where funds are not accessible to the bank [11][15]. - It highlights that the supposed time advantage of receiving cash earlier through securitization does not hold up under scrutiny, as the bank cannot freely use funds collected during the transitional period [15][17]. Alternative Solutions - The article suggests that traditional methods like write-offs and collections could effectively replace securitization, as they do not incur the same costs and risks associated with securitization [20][22]. - It emphasizes that banks can still manage their non-performing loans effectively without resorting to securitization, which may lead to negative impacts on profitability and loan classification [24][26].

Core Viewpoint - The article argues that securitization is not an effective method for disposing of non-performing loans, despite being a financing tool [2][10]. Summary by Sections Securitization Example - Postal Savings Bank issued a securitized product based on personal credit non-performing consumer loans on October 18, 2022, with the asset pool being finalized on May 18, 2022 [2][4]. - The total amount of non-performing loans included in the securitization was 1.11 billion yuan, with an expected recovery of 237.33 million yuan over 33 months [3][4]. Asset Characteristics - The asset pool consisted of 18,529 loans from 8,675 borrowers, with a total principal amount of 1.11 billion yuan and interest and fees amounting to 90.91 million yuan [3]. - The average outstanding balance per borrower was 138,400 yuan, and the average expected recovery amount was 27,400 yuan [3]. Issuance Details - The securitized product had a total issuance size of 182 million yuan, with 142 million yuan in senior tranches and 40 million yuan in junior tranches [4][5]. - The senior tranche had a fixed interest rate of 2.38% and was rated AAAsf by China Chengxin International [5]. Recovery and Investor Interest - The expected recovery amount of 237.33 million yuan was gross and included costs associated with recovery efforts [7]. - Investors were willing to purchase the securitized product due to the potential for profit, as the expected recovery exceeded the amount invested [8]. Bank's Perspective on Securitization - The bank benefits from securitization by reducing its non-performing loan balance and receiving upfront cash, which can enhance profits if the loans are fully provisioned [9]. - The bank retains the role of loan servicer, allowing it to earn service fees from the recovery process [9]. Critique of Securitization - The article highlights that the cash received from securitization may be less than what could be recovered without it, as evidenced by the actual recovery amounts [11][14]. - The "transition period" during which cash flows are restricted limits the bank's ability to utilize funds effectively [15]. Long-term Implications - Over a longer time frame, the advantages of receiving cash upfront diminish, especially if the bank engages in rolling securitizations [18][19]. - The article argues that traditional methods of write-offs and recoveries could achieve similar results without the drawbacks of securitization [20][26]. Conclusion - Securitization is portrayed as a financing method that may not effectively address the underlying issues of non-performing loans, potentially leading to negative impacts on bank profitability and loan management [26].

Core Viewpoint - The article provides a comparative analysis of Hangzhou Bank and Ningbo Bank, highlighting their leading positions among city commercial banks in Zhejiang Province, and their significant roles in driving the province's economic growth [2]. Group 1: Background and Ownership - Hangzhou Bank was established in 1996 and has undergone several name changes, with its current name adopted in 2011. Its major shareholders include state-owned enterprises and private companies, with the largest shareholder holding 16.60% [3]. - Ningbo Bank was formed in 1997 and also underwent name changes, with significant foreign investment from Singapore's OCBC Bank in 2006. Its largest shareholder holds 18.74% [5]. Group 2: Capital Market - Both Hangzhou Bank and Ningbo Bank are publicly listed, with Hangzhou Bank listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange since October 2016 and Ningbo Bank on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange since July 2007 [6][7][8]. Group 3: Operational Coverage - Both banks have established a presence across all 11 cities in Zhejiang Province. Hangzhou Bank has nearly 300 branches, while Ningbo Bank has 16 branches, with both banks having additional branches in major cities outside Zhejiang [10]. Group 4: Subsidiaries - Hangzhou Bank has one wholly-owned subsidiary and a joint venture in consumer finance, while Ningbo Bank has four subsidiaries, including wealth management and financial leasing companies [12]. Group 5: Employee Situation - As of the end of 2024, Hangzhou Bank has 14,409 employees, while Ningbo Bank has 26,976 employees, indicating a significant difference in workforce size [13][14]. Group 6: Financial Performance - In 2024, Ningbo Bank's total assets reached 3.13 trillion yuan, significantly higher than Hangzhou Bank's 2.11 trillion yuan. Ningbo Bank's operating income and net profit also surpassed those of Hangzhou Bank, with ratios of 1.74 and 1.60, respectively [16][17][21]. - Both banks maintain a similar asset quality, with non-performing loan ratios at 0.76% and high provision coverage ratios, indicating strong asset management [20][36]. Group 7: Long-term Trends - Over the past decade, Ningbo Bank has consistently outperformed Hangzhou Bank in total assets, with the gap widening from 1.23 times in 2016 to 1.48 times in 2024. Both banks have shown growth in operating income and net profit, but the growth rate of Ningbo Bank has been more pronounced [21][23][26]. Group 8: Business Structure - The majority of revenue for both banks comes from net interest income, with Ningbo Bank's proportion surpassing that of Hangzhou Bank in 2024. Both banks have seen an increase in the loan-to-asset ratio, though it remains below 50% [30][32]. Group 9: Quality of Assets - Both banks exhibit strong asset quality, with stable non-performing loan rates and declining overdue rates. Hangzhou Bank has improved its asset quality significantly over the years [36][41]. Group 10: Compensation and Benefits - Ningbo Bank's employee costs have consistently been higher than those of Hangzhou Bank, reflecting its larger workforce and higher profits. Average employee compensation for both banks is around 540,000 yuan [42][44].

Core Viewpoint - The overall non-performing loan (NPL) ratio of Chinese commercial banks is on a downward trend, reaching 1.50% by the end of 2024 and 1.49% by mid-2025, down from 1.96% in September 2020, indicating stable asset quality in the banking sector [2][3]. Summary by Sections Non-Performing Loan Ratio and Balance - The non-performing loan balance of commercial banks is increasing despite the declining NPL ratio, reaching 3.28 trillion yuan by the end of 2024 and 3.43 trillion yuan by mid-2025, compared to only 0.84 trillion yuan at the end of 2014 [3]. NPL Disposal Methods - Commercial banks are employing various methods to dispose of non-performing loans, including write-offs, asset securitization, and collections. For instance, in 2024, China Merchants Bank disposed of 62.902 billion yuan of NPLs, with 30.401 billion yuan through write-offs, 22.569 billion yuan through asset securitization, and 7.599 billion yuan through collections [6]. Write-Offs - Write-offs are a method where banks remove recognized bad debts from their balance sheets, thus lowering the NPL ratio without affecting current profits if provisions are sufficient. In 2024, write-offs accounted for 48% of all NPL disposals at China Merchants Bank [12]. Collections - Collections involve recovering loans from borrowers, which can occur even after loans have been written off. This process can be conducted internally by the bank or outsourced to collection agencies, utilizing various methods such as phone calls, in-person visits, or legal actions [13]. Debt-for-Asset Swaps - Debt-for-asset swaps occur when borrowers repay loans with non-cash assets like property or stocks. While this reduces NPLs, it introduces risks related to the subsequent sale of these assets, which may not yield expected cash returns [14]. NPL Transfers - NPL transfers involve selling bad loans at a discount to specialized institutions that manage distressed assets. This method allows banks to offload management costs and potentially recover more funds through experienced asset managers [16]. Restructuring - Restructuring is a process where banks modify loan terms for borrowers facing temporary difficulties, aiming to restore their repayment capacity. However, this method does not immediately reduce NPLs and may not be effective if borrowers do not recover financially [18][19]. Securitization - Securitization of NPLs is viewed as a financing method rather than an effective disposal strategy, with further discussion warranted on its implications [20].

Core Viewpoint - The article provides a comparative analysis of Jiangsu Bank and Nanjing Bank, highlighting their strengths, market positions, and financial performance, indicating that Jiangsu Bank has outperformed Nanjing Bank in several key financial metrics and is positioned as the largest city commercial bank in China as of mid-2025 [2][45]. Group 1: Background and Structure - Jiangsu Bank was established in January 2007 through the merger of city commercial banks in ten cities in Jiangsu Province, excluding Nanjing [3]. - Nanjing Bank was founded in 1996, evolving from 39 city credit cooperatives and has undergone several name changes and ownership changes, including foreign investments [4][6]. Group 2: Shareholding Structure - Jiangsu Bank's top shareholders include Jiangsu International Trust Co., Ltd. (6.98%) and Jiangsu Phoenix Publishing & Media Group Co., Ltd. (6.93%), both state-owned enterprises [4]. - Nanjing Bank's major shareholders include BNP Paribas (12.93%) and Nanjing Zijin Investment Group Co., Ltd. (10.92%), with significant foreign investment [6]. Group 3: Capital Market - Both banks are listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, with Jiangsu Bank listed since August 2016 and Nanjing Bank since 2007 [7][8][9]. Group 4: Operational Coverage - Both banks have achieved full coverage across 13 cities in Jiangsu Province, with Jiangsu Bank having 17 branches and 522 sub-branches, while Nanjing Bank has 16 branches and 289 outlets [11]. Group 5: Subsidiaries - Jiangsu Bank has four subsidiaries, including Su Yin Financial Leasing Co., Ltd. and Su Yin Wealth Management Co., Ltd. [12]. - Nanjing Bank has three subsidiaries and also holds stakes in three other companies, indicating a broader business scope [13]. Group 6: Employee Situation - As of the end of 2024, Jiangsu Bank had 20,780 employees, with 20.70% holding master's degrees, while Nanjing Bank had 18,045 employees, with 30.13% holding master's degrees [14]. Group 7: Financial Performance - In 2024, Jiangsu Bank's total assets reached 395.20 billion, with a net profit of 318.43 billion, while Nanjing Bank's total assets were 259.14 billion, with a net profit of 201.77 billion [15]. - By mid-2025, Jiangsu Bank's total assets increased to 478.85 billion, while Nanjing Bank's reached 290.14 billion, indicating Jiangsu Bank's growth trajectory [15]. Group 8: Long-term Trends - Over the past decade, Jiangsu Bank's total assets have consistently been about 1.5 times larger than those of Nanjing Bank, with both banks showing growth [19]. - Jiangsu Bank's operating income has also consistently exceeded that of Nanjing Bank, with a growing margin from 1.18 times in 2016 to 1.61 times in 2024 [21]. Group 9: Asset Quality - Both banks maintain strong asset quality, with non-performing loan ratios below 0.9% and high provision coverage ratios exceeding 300% [18][34]. - Jiangsu Bank's provision coverage ratio has improved significantly from 192.06% to over 350% [35]. Group 10: Compensation and Benefits - Jiangsu Bank's employee costs have consistently been higher than those of Nanjing Bank, with average salaries of approximately 560,000 and 530,000 respectively [42][43].

Core Viewpoint - The article compares two local urban commercial banks in Gansu Province, Gansu Bank and Lanzhou Bank, analyzing their strengths and weaknesses in various aspects such as ownership structure, financial performance, and asset quality [2]. Ownership Structure - Gansu Bank was established in September 2011 through the merger of two city commercial banks, with significant contributions from state-owned enterprises [3]. - The top ten shareholders of Gansu Bank include several provincial state-owned enterprises, with the largest shareholder holding 17.63% [4]. - Lanzhou Bank was formed in 1997 and restructured into a joint-stock bank, with its top ten shareholders primarily consisting of local government and private enterprises [5][6]. Capital Market - Gansu Bank was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in January 2018, while Lanzhou Bank was listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in January 2022 [7][8][9]. Operational Coverage - Both banks have achieved full coverage across all 14 cities in Gansu Province, with Gansu Bank having a larger number of branches and a significant presence in rural areas [10]. Subsidiaries - Gansu Bank controls a village bank, while Lanzhou Bank has a financial leasing company under its umbrella [11][12]. Employee Situation - As of the end of 2024, Gansu Bank has 4,595 employees, with 9.01% holding master's degrees, while Lanzhou Bank has 4,280 employees, with 11.57% holding master's degrees [13][14]. Financial Performance - In 2024, Gansu Bank's total assets were 414.71 billion, while Lanzhou Bank's were 486.29 billion, indicating Lanzhou Bank's superior scale [15]. - Lanzhou Bank's operating income and net profit in 2024 were significantly higher than those of Gansu Bank, with net profit being 3.24 times greater [15]. - Both banks have seen fluctuations in their financial performance over the years, with notable declines in profits in 2019 [23][24]. Asset Quality - Lanzhou Bank has better asset quality indicators, including lower non-performing loan ratios and higher provision coverage ratios compared to Gansu Bank [16][34]. - Both banks' asset quality is below the national average for commercial banks, indicating ongoing challenges [41]. Business Structure - The majority of both banks' revenue comes from net interest income, although this proportion has decreased in recent years [26]. - Gansu Bank's loan-to-asset ratio has increased over the past decade, while Lanzhou Bank's has remained stable [27]. Salary and Benefits - Lanzhou Bank has higher employee costs and average salaries compared to Gansu Bank, despite having fewer employees [38][42].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the current state of personal housing loans in China, highlighting the significant role of major banks in this sector and the rising non-performing loan (NPL) rates due to a sluggish real estate market [2][3][4]. Group 1: Personal Housing Loan Balances - As of June 2025, the total personal housing loan balance in China reached 37.74 trillion yuan, with the top eight banks accounting for 73.17% of this total [2]. - The major banks' personal housing loan balances as of June 2025 are as follows: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) at 6.05 trillion yuan, China Construction Bank (CCB) at 6.15 trillion yuan, and Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) at 4.93 trillion yuan [3][4]. Group 2: Non-Performing Loan Rates - The NPL rate for personal housing loans at ICBC increased to 0.86% by June 2025, up from 0.73% at the end of 2024, marking a significant rise over the past five years [4][5]. - Other major banks also reported NPL rates exceeding 0.7%, indicating a widespread issue across the banking sector [5]. Group 3: Measures to Address NPLs - In response to rising NPLs, banks have increasingly turned to the securitization of personal housing loans as a means to manage these assets [8][11]. - The number of securitization projects has grown from 6 in 2020 to 29 in 2024, with 19 projects already completed in the first half of 2025 [8][13]. - The total amount of personal housing NPLs disposed of through securitization reached 70.11 billion yuan in 2024, with 49.59 billion yuan disposed of in the first half of 2025 [11][14]. Group 4: Impact on Housing Market - The increase in securitization and the corresponding rise in the number of disposed loans suggest that banks may become significant sellers of housing, potentially impacting housing prices negatively [16][26]. - The number of housing units associated with disposed NPLs reached 83,779 in the first half of 2025, indicating a substantial volume of properties being sold off [16][26].