公开披露授权 2025年8月 2025/145 能源与采掘全球业务知识笔记系列 清洁氢能共享基础设施 对清洁氢发展问题的研究通常集中于 底线。 生产端。为储存和运输而建设和使用的基建需要更多关注。需要评估的议题包括系统设计、运营、集成和所有权； 市场设计和治理；以及规划。本篇Live Wire考察了关于氢能枢纽基建的案例研究和文献，重点强调了共享基建的优 势。考虑到氢能生产和基建的广泛性，重点放在可再生氢能的生产上，用于国内使用，以及转化为氨气后用于出口 。 公开披露授权 公开披露授权 公开披露授权 因此，世界银行正收到越来越多的与氢能基础设施和氢能枢纽相关的请求。 这包括为出口氢或氢衍生物（如氨）而扩建或开发港口或港口码头，以及巴 西、印度、毛里塔尼亚、纳米比亚、巴拿马和南非的相关基础设施。 到2050年，全球与氢能基础设施相关的投资总额可能在1.5万亿至5万亿 美元之间（氢能委员会 2022年；帕拉迪诺 2023年；ESMAP等人 2024 年）。 非洲。活动范围从法律和监管框架的评估到技术经济研究和基础设施投资的 融资。 到2050年的氢气整体投资需求高度不确定，因为其规模和时间取决于许 多因素。这些因 ...

在巴西多样化担保机制对于吸引基础设施私人投资至关重要。坚强的担保增强了法律安 全性并降低了感知风险，使新的投资者和国际金融家更容易进入市场。这反过来又促进 了竞争并降低了融资成本。鉴于公共实体提供预算担保的财政能力有限，采用创新的风 险缓解解决方案对于推动项目并营造更具吸引力和竞争性的私人投资环境变得至关重要 。在这种情况下，修订会计规则将多边发行的担保归类为或有负债，将允许更有效地利 用有限的财政空间并支持其更广泛的采用。 公开披露已获授权 巴西基础设施项目的稳健保证系统 2025年6月 巴西交通部门备忘录 玛雅·迪亚斯·梅洛，埃德普·科瓦柳克·席尔瓦和乔安娜·摩尔 致谢： 这份笔记是巴西可持续与韧性交通物流项目（P179908）一系列分析与咨询成果之一，该 项目在比安卡·比安奇·阿尔维斯（交通实践经理，拉丁美洲和加勒比地区）和路易斯·阿尔贝托·安 德烈斯（基础设施项目组长，巴西）的指导下进行。团队感谢同事费比安诺·西尔维奥·科尔巴诺（ 高级经济学家）、莱昂纳多·西尔维拉·多纳斯塞普西昂（高级财务管理专家）和阿贝尔·洛佩斯·多 德罗（高级交通专家）的建设性同行评审。 公开披露已获授权 公开披露已获授权 公开 ...

Economic Performance - Cambodia's economy shows strong but uneven performance, with manufacturing and services growth driven by stable exports, particularly in garments and tourism[35] - Agricultural sector employment remains significant, supporting 3.1 million jobs, but its contribution to GDP growth is limited, only 0.2 percentage points in 2024[36] - Total rice production increased by 11.0% in 2024, but structural challenges persist, including reliance on weather conditions and price volatility[36] Trade and Investment - Exports to the US, especially garments, remain strong, with a year-on-year growth of 11.6% in Q1 2025, contributing significantly to consumer confidence[38] - Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows are primarily from China, accounting for 65.5% of total net FDI, while domestic investment approvals have sharply declined by 96.7% year-on-year[39][43] - Total goods exports reached $26.673 billion in 2024, with a significant contribution from the garment, travel goods, and footwear sectors[43] Inflation and Monetary Policy - Inflation rose to 3.7% in March 2025, driven mainly by food price increases, while broad money supply growth reached 19.0%[38] - The banking sector reported a non-performing loan (NPL) rate of 7.9% by the end of 2024, indicating deteriorating asset quality[40] Fiscal Policy and Public Debt - Central government revenue increased by 11.2% year-on-year in Q1 2025, primarily due to significant growth in VAT and non-tax revenues[40] - Public debt remains low at 25.9% of GDP as of the end of 2024, with a projected fiscal deficit of 2.7% of GDP for 2025[41] Social Impact and Inequality - Economic recovery has been uneven, with household consumption per capita growing by 8% from 2021 to 2023, but disparities exist between income groups[42] - The poorest 20% saw a 7% increase in consumption, while the wealthiest 20% experienced a 10% increase, highlighting income inequality[42]

Investment Rating - The report does not explicitly provide an investment rating for the healthcare sector in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Core Insights - The DRC aims to achieve Universal Health Coverage (UHC) by 2030, but faces significant challenges due to limitations in budget execution and allocation, leading to a reliance on household and donor funding rather than government support [5][23] - Government health budget execution rates are low, with an average execution rate of 47.6% from 2016 to 2020, significantly below the overall government spending average of 80% [39][40] - The health budget is heavily skewed towards personnel costs, which account for 60% of total health budget expenditures, limiting the ability to execute other spending categories [53] Summary by Sections 1. Health Financing Background - From 2016 to 2021, household payments and donor contributions accounted for over 80% of total healthcare spending, while government financing ranged from 10% to 16% [23][24] - Total healthcare spending was estimated between $19 and $22 per capita from 2013 to 2019, far below the $86 per capita needed for UHC [24] 2. Health Budget Execution - The average execution rate of the health budget was 47.6% compared to the initial budget allocation, with significant variations across budget categories [39][40] - The execution rate for personnel costs was 103%, while other categories, such as provincial allocations and hospital funding, had execution rates below 20% [40][41] - In 2019, only six out of over fifty departments achieved budget execution for operational costs, highlighting severe inefficiencies [45] 3. Public Financial Management Controls in Health Expenditure - The report identifies a lack of integration between strategic planning and budget preparation, leading to challenges in resource allocation [58] - Budget management rules are often ignored, with some agencies systematically overspending their allocations, which reduces available resources for other departments [55][72] - The procurement process is cumbersome, leading to delays and inefficiencies in budget execution [56][68] 4. Good Practices and Bottlenecks - The establishment of a tripartite health-budget-finance committee aims to monitor budget execution and improve coordination among stakeholders [70] - Key bottlenecks include unrealistic revenue forecasts, a highly centralized budget execution process, and a lack of respect for budget management rules [72][73]

Investment Rating - The report does not explicitly provide an investment rating for the industry analyzed Core Insights - Bogotá has utilized the valorization levy as a mechanism to finance urban transport projects, capturing increased land value resulting from infrastructure improvements [13][14] - The report highlights the historical context and legal framework that has enabled Bogotá to effectively implement land value capture strategies [50][51] - The analysis of various valorization programs from 1995 to 2018 reveals both successes and challenges in financing urban development through this levy [21][62] Summary by Sections Introduction - The introduction outlines the significance of land value capture in financing urban growth, particularly in cities with limited public resources [12][20] Literature Review - The economic foundation of land value capture is discussed, emphasizing how transport projects can justify the betterment levy by increasing mobility and land value [26][41] - The betterment levy is defined as a one-time payment by property owners benefiting from infrastructure improvements, contrasting it with recurring property taxes [42][44] Legal Foundations - Colombia's legal framework for valorization dates back to 1921, allowing municipalities to capture value from infrastructure investments [50][51] - The report details the evolution of laws governing the valorization levy and its implementation in Bogotá [53][54] Programs Financed Through the Valorization Levy - The report analyzes five key programs (1995, 2005, 2010, 2013, and 2018) that utilized the valorization levy, detailing their objectives, funding amounts, and outcomes [62][73] - The 2005 Mega Valorization Program is highlighted as a significant initiative, covering a wide range of transport projects across the city [73][74] Evolution of Tax Revenue - The report examines the evolution of tax revenue in Bogotá, including the impact of the valorization levy and congestion charging on overall fiscal health [6][27] - It emphasizes the importance of a well-structured cadaster for effective tax collection and the relationship between property values and the betterment levy [46][48] Lessons for Other Cities - Bogotá's experience with the betterment levy offers valuable lessons for other developing cities seeking to finance transport projects through value-capture instruments [16][21]

Investment Rating - The report does not explicitly provide an investment rating for the transport resilience financing industry Core Insights - The report emphasizes the urgent need for investment in resilient transport infrastructure in low- and middle-income countries, with a potential return of US$ 4 for every US$ 1 invested [24] - It highlights the significant gap in adaptation financing, with adaptation finance in 2022 amounting to only US$ 63 billion, compared to US$ 1,150 billion for mitigation finance, indicating a need for increased focus on adaptation efforts [49] - The report outlines a roadmap for mobilizing funding and engaging the private sector to enhance transport resilience, suggesting that innovative approaches and strategic partnerships are essential [20][34] Summary by Sections Executive Summary - Transport infrastructure is vulnerable to climate risks, which can lead to severe economic and social impacts [23] - Investing in resilient infrastructure is crucial for adapting to climate change, particularly in developing countries [24] - The report identifies challenges in securing funding for resilience projects, including the difficulty in measuring benefits and the imbalance between mitigation and adaptation financing [26][27] Climate Finance Facilities - The report identifies 42 climate finance facilities, with only a few explicitly prioritizing transport resilience [74][75] - It notes that most facilities offer grants, with limited options for loans or equity [80] Public Funding Mechanisms and Tax Measures - The report reviews 33 public funding mechanisms, finding that while many support the transport sector, few explicitly address resilience [84][90] - It identifies 29 tax measures that could potentially raise revenue for transport resilience investments, including infrastructure levies and carbon taxes [97][99] Barriers, Opportunities, and Interventions for Promoting Private Sector Participation - The report discusses barriers to private sector participation in climate-resilient transport, including the need for better data and transparency [107] - It emphasizes the importance of stakeholder engagement and the need for tailored solutions to promote private sector involvement [107]

Investment Rating - The report does not explicitly provide an investment rating for the industry Core Insights - The total direct economic damage from the March 28, 2025 earthquake in Myanmar is estimated at US$10.97 billion, which is approximately 14 percent of Myanmar's GDP for the financial year 2024/25. The damage estimate ranges between US$6.24 billion and US$15.82 billion due to considerable uncertainty [23][19][21] - The earthquake has significantly impacted over 17 million people, with reported fatalities of 3,655 and over 198,000 displaced individuals. The event is characterized as one of the most impactful seismic occurrences in Myanmar's history [20][56] - The GRADE methodology utilized for damage estimation combines earthquake damage modeling, catastrophe risk modeling, and assessments of capital stock value across various sectors [21][64] Summary by Sections Executive Summary - The report summarizes the direct economic damage to buildings and infrastructure caused by the earthquake, providing critical insights for response and recovery planning [19] - The assessment does not include losses or needs related to the disaster [19] Introduction - The earthquake struck central Myanmar, affecting key regions including Nay Pyi Taw and Mandalay, during a period of internal conflict and humanitarian crisis [31][32] - The event is noted as the strongest recorded seismic event in Myanmar since 1912 or possibly 1839 [51][29] Damage Estimation Methodology - The GRADE assessment follows a rapid estimation approach to assess direct economic impacts, focusing on physical assets [64] - The methodology includes hazard analysis and exposure modeling to estimate damage accurately [68][70] Key Findings - Residential buildings accounted for the highest damage at US$4.97 billion, followed by non-residential buildings at US$2.63 billion and infrastructure damage at US$3.36 billion [23][24] - Mandalay, Sagaing, and Bago regions were the most severely impacted, representing 82 percent of the total damage [23][24] - Recovery and reconstruction costs are expected to exceed direct damage estimates, necessitating targeted recovery strategies [26] Impacts on Population - Affected households in the most impacted areas could experience consumption losses of up to 25 percent, particularly among socioeconomically vulnerable groups [26] - The earthquake has caused extensive damage to cultural heritage, with over 9,643 religious structures affected [60]

Investment Rating - The report does not explicitly provide an investment rating for the industry Core Insights - Jobs are a primary mechanism for poverty reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), accounting for two-thirds of the decline during the last period of rapid progress (2009-14) [4] - LAC generated approximately 27 million net new jobs over the past decade, with job growth rates comparable to other global regions [4][30] - The labor market is expected to become less dynamic in 2025 due to downgraded economic growth projections [7] Summary by Sections 1. Trends and Projections - Employment creation and earnings growth were instrumental in reducing poverty rates to prepandemic levels [5] - Labor market performance has stabilized at historical rates of approximately 2 percent year-over-year since Q3 2023 [6] - Job creation is projected to decline slightly to 1.6 percent year-to-year in 2025 [7] 2. Labor Market Structure - The working-age employment rate increased by 1.3 percentage points to 58.9 percent in 2024, while unemployment dropped from 8.5 to 6.2 percent [37] - Youth unemployment fell by over 5 percentage points since 2016 but remained high at 14 percent in 2024 [38] - Labor informality rates declined by 2.3 percentage points to 42.1 percent of workers from 2016 to 2024 [52] 3. Labor Incomes - Labor market incomes exhibited limited gains with an annualized growth of 0.3 percent from 2016 to 2019 [61] - In 2024, earnings rose by at least 3 percent across most socioeconomic groups, but workers with low educational attainment experienced only 0.8 percent growth [62] - Gender earnings disparities remained stagnant, with women earning on average about 22 percent less than men [62] 4. Sectoral Reallocations - Structural transformation has been slow, with inconsistent reallocation of workers toward higher-productivity sectors [90] - Employment has shifted toward higher-productivity sectors in some countries like Brazil and Mexico, while others like Argentina and Bolivia have seen increases in low-productivity sectors [93]

Investment Rating - The report does not explicitly provide an investment rating for the industry under study Core Insights - The export promotion policy in Pakistan, specifically the Duty Drawback of Taxes (DDT) scheme, had a small overall impact on textile exports but caused significant reallocation among products, favoring traditional garments eligible for higher rebate rates [4][10][11] - For every US$1 spent on the DDT scheme, only US$1.1 in additional exports was generated, indicating limited effectiveness [10][41] - The scheme led to strategic misreporting at the border, although this had a minor overall impact on recorded exports [11][62] Summary by Sections Introduction - The paper discusses the shift in industrial policy from protectionist to export-oriented strategies, highlighting the ongoing debate about the effectiveness of export promotion policies [8][9] Export Promotion and Performance - The DDT scheme is a key export promotion policy for Pakistan's textile sector, which constitutes 55% of total exports. The budget for the scheme increased significantly post-2014, reaching about 1% of the total federal budget during 2017-2020 [9][20][25] Data and Methodology - The study employs product-level data and synthetic control methods to analyze the impact of the DDT scheme, comparing eligible and non-eligible products [9][27][35] Results - The DDT scheme resulted in a 1.9% average annual increase in textile exports from 2015 to 2019, primarily driven by high-rate garment exports, while lower-rate and non-eligible products experienced a decline [41][44] - The overall effect of the scheme was small, with significant negative impacts on lower-rate products counterbalancing the positive effects on higher-rate products [41][44] Mechanisms and Additional Results - The analysis indicates that shifts in the composition of exporters, with new entrants less likely to focus on lower-rate products, contributed to the observed export changes [52][54] - Capacity constraints faced by firms limited their ability to expand exports of high-rate products without reducing lower-rate product exports [55][61] - The report suggests that larger exporters benefited more from the DDT scheme, while smaller exporters faced challenges due to increased competition [61]

Investment Rating - The report indicates an upward revision of the international poverty line to $3.00 per person per day in 2021 purchasing power parities (PPPs), reflecting a significant increase of around 40% from the previous line of $2.15 [12][44]. Core Insights - The report highlights that recent improvements in survey methodologies have led to an increase in measured consumption in many low- and lower-middle-income countries, prompting upward revisions of national poverty lines [3][9]. - The net effect of these methodological changes and new survey data has resulted in an increase in global extreme poverty by approximately 125 million people in 2022, with a notable shift of poverty from South Asia to Sub-Saharan Africa [3][13]. - The international poverty line is now based on the median national poverty line of low-income countries, which has been significantly revised due to improved data quality and timeliness [12][66]. Summary by Sections Introduction - The report discusses the use of updated purchasing power parities (PPPs) and new survey data to establish new poverty lines for global poverty monitoring [7]. Data - The analysis incorporates 2021 PPPs and over 2,400 income and consumption surveys from 172 countries, covering more than 97% of the global population [28][30]. Setting Poverty Lines - The international poverty line is defined as the median harmonized poverty line of low-income countries, now set at $3.00, with corresponding lines for lower-middle and upper-middle-income countries updated to $4.20 and $8.30, respectively [40][41]. Changes in Global Poverty Lines - The report identifies four main sources of changes in global poverty lines: price changes from PPPs and CPIs, underlying national poverty lines, income classification changes, and the number of countries with available data [59][60]. Conclusion - The report concludes that the increase in the international poverty line is primarily driven by new poverty lines from low-income countries, reflecting improved survey methodologies rather than an increase in poverty aspirations [66].