新公约下，货代物流行业正面临前所未有的角色重塑与责任升级。 近日，在美国纽约联合国总部，一项重塑全球贸易规则的新公约在第80届联合国大会上获得正式通过。 这份名为《联合国可转让货物单证公约》（下称"NCD公约"）的国际文件，填补了困扰陆路贸易百年的 法律空白，铁路、公路运输中从此有了具备"物权凭证"属性的可转让货物单证（NCD），可以像海运提 单一样用于银行融资和货物转让。 中国是这项革命性公约的提案方和主要推动者。随着中欧班列货运的蓬勃发展，传统的铁路运单因 其"不可转让性"已成为贸易便利化和金融创新的瓶颈。公约的达成可被视为全球贸易"一单到底""货物 与单证并行"的物权化时代的开启。 在众多新机遇中，一个拥有几百年历史的行业正面临前所未有的角色重塑与责任升级——货运代理业。 这把新规则铸就的"权柄"对该行业来说意味着什么？ 国际货运代理协会联合会（FIATA）法律事务咨询委员会（ABLM）主席、招商局集团有限公司首席合 规官杨运涛深度参与了公约起草的全过程。他称，无论对运输、贸易、保险还是银行业，公约都将起到 显著的促进乃至革命性的推动作用。 从"中国实践"到"全球规则" 公约的诞生，源于中欧班列等陆路贸 ...

Core Viewpoint - The resignation of Zong Fuli marks a significant shift in the management structure of Wahaha Group, transitioning from family control to a more diversified governance model involving state-owned shareholders and professional management [1][3]. Management Changes - Zong Fuli officially resigned from her positions as legal representative, chairman, and general manager of Wahaha Group, with 31-year-old Xu Simin, a legal expert, taking over [1][3]. - Zong Fuli's departure is characterized as a calm and deliberate decision, having submitted her resignation in September and completed the necessary approval processes [3]. Strategic Implications - Xu Simin's appointment signals a shift in focus from market competition to compliance and legal challenges, reflecting the current core issues facing Wahaha [7]. - The absence of Zong Fuli at the 2025 sales meeting, where Xu Simin represented the company, indicates a new direction for the group amidst ongoing turmoil [4]. Ownership and Control Issues - Zong Fuli's exit is attributed to the complex historical ownership structure of Wahaha, where she faced challenges in consolidating management and ownership [8]. - Key conflicts revolve around trademark ownership and equity control, particularly with the largest shareholder, state-owned "Shangcheng Culture and Tourism," holding 46% of shares, limiting Zong Fuli's ability to make unilateral decisions [9]. - The third-largest shareholder, the "Employee Shareholding Association," holding 24.6% of shares, adds further uncertainty to the control dynamics, especially following the passing of Zong Qinghou [10]. Legal and Compliance Challenges - Zong Fuli's team has escalated legal complaints regarding slow court proceedings, highlighting the intensity of the struggle for control [11]. - The inability to resolve internal disputes over equity and trademarks may have prompted Zong Fuli's strategic retreat from management to mitigate legal risks [11]. New Ventures - Zong Fuli's resignation does not signify her withdrawal from the business landscape; instead, she is shifting her focus to her own company, Hongsheng Beverage Group, which is evolving from a Wahaha contractor to an independent entity [12]. - The launch of the new brand "Wawa Xiaozong" reflects her strategy to establish a distinct identity separate from Wahaha, with plans to fully utilize this brand by 2026 [13][15]. - This transition suggests a potential dual-track future for the company, with the traditional Wahaha under state control and Zong Fuli's new ventures representing a more agile and risk-oriented approach [15].

Core Viewpoint - The real estate market in China is experiencing a significant downturn, with a comprehensive decline in second-hand housing prices across 70 major cities for the first time since the housing reform in 1998, indicating a critical shift in the market dynamics [1] Group 1: Price Trends - In September, second-hand housing prices in 70 cities fell by 0.83% month-on-month and 5.2% year-on-year, with Beijing and Shanghai experiencing declines of 6.1% and 5.8% respectively [1] - Certain second-tier cities, such as Zhengzhou and Harbin, saw year-on-year price drops exceeding 8% [1] Group 2: Sales and Construction Activity - The sales area of commercial housing decreased by 18.7% year-on-year in the first three quarters, while new construction area dropped by 25.3% [1] - Real estate developers have seen investment growth rates decline for 12 consecutive months [1] Group 3: Policy Responses - The "recognizing house but not loan" policy introduced in early September aims to stimulate demand by lowering down payment ratios, potentially releasing around 1.2 trillion yuan in purchasing power [1] - The People's Bank of China provided 300 billion yuan in funds to policy banks to stabilize the industry chain through investment multiplier effects [1] - Over 200 regulatory measures have been implemented across various regions since the beginning of 2025, including the removal of purchase restrictions in 39 cities and tax incentives in 22 cities [1] Group 4: Regional Disparities - There is a notable regional disparity in the real estate market, with core cities in the Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta showing stronger price resilience, while resource-based and third- and fourth-tier cities are facing significant challenges [3] Group 5: Impact on Related Industries - The ongoing decline in the real estate market has adversely affected related industries, with the construction materials sector's value added decreasing by 7.2% and home appliance retail sales dropping by 12.5% from January to September [5] - Local government revenue from land sales has decreased by 18.3% due to falling land transfer income [5] Group 6: Market Transformation - Experts believe the real estate market is transitioning from a "high leverage, high turnover" model to a "refined, service-oriented" approach, with projections indicating that property management and related services could form a trillion-yuan market by 2026 [7] - The adjustment in the real estate market is seen as both a cyclical necessity and a required phase for transforming development models [7] Group 7: Policy Direction - The government is gradually returning to the essence of housing as a livelihood issue, emphasizing the need for stable policies and supply-side structural reforms to foster new growth points [9]

Core Insights - The story of Ying Bu illustrates the consequences of broken promises and shifting allegiances in the context of power struggles during the early Han Dynasty [1][3][4] - Liu Bang's failure to uphold his commitments to his generals led to a breakdown of trust, ultimately resulting in rebellion and conflict [5][8][21] Group 1: Historical Context - Ying Bu, initially a loyal general under Xiang Yu, switched allegiance to Liu Bang after feeling neglected and threatened by Xiang Yu [1] - Liu Bang's rise to power involved a series of betrayals against his former allies, including the execution of prominent generals like Han Xin and Peng Yue [5][6][14] Group 2: Trust and Betrayal - Liu Bang's initial promise to his generals was to grant them kingships after defeating Xiang Yu, but he later reneged on this agreement, leading to widespread discontent [5][8] - The perception of Liu Bang's actions as a "Ponzi scheme" highlights the erosion of trust among his former allies, who felt their contributions were disregarded [6][7][8] Group 3: Consequences of Actions - Ying Bu's rebellion was a direct response to Liu Bang's repeated violations of trust, as he believed his position was increasingly precarious [21] - The dual standards applied by Liu Bang, favoring his own family while eliminating former allies, contributed to the eventual downfall of his regime [14][15][21]

AI创业的黄金时代，也是尸横遍野的修罗场，别让你的梦想死于现金流断裂。 风口之下，99%的AI创业者，都倒在了没算清这本"账"上。 一、什么是"估值生意"？ "估值生意"的本质，说白了就是一场关于"未来梦想"的大型拍卖会。 创业者站在台上，激情描绘着一个技术颠覆世界、用户蜂拥而至、最终垄断市场的宏伟蓝图。投资者们 则竞相出价，赌的就是这个描绘中的未来能成真，而且能成得特别大、特别快。 支撑这个梦想的核心逻辑，在于追求那种"赢家通吃"的网络效应——用户越多产品越好用，产品越好用 用户就越多，最终形成难以撼动的垄断地位；或者押注于某种革命性的技术突破，一举改变行业规则。 但这场美梦有个残酷的前提：它需要源源不断的巨额资金来喂养。 在AI这个领域，这场"估值游戏"的门槛高得吓人，训练强大的AI模型就像养一只吞金兽，算力（那些贵 得要命的显卡和服务器）、海量的数据、以及顶尖人才的薪水，每一项都是天文数字。 而且，AI不是一锤子买卖，模型需要像手机系统一样不断升级迭代，这又是个无底洞。 尤其在像ChatGPT那种"基础大模型"的层面，规则更残酷，只有最顶尖的少数玩家能活下来并通吃大部 分利益，其他人连汤都喝不上热乎的。 ...

Core Viewpoint - The discussion led by Professor Lin Yifu emphasizes the resilience and potential of the Chinese economy, countering the "China collapse theory" with data and insights on growth prospects and structural reforms [2][3]. Economic Growth and Development - From 1978 to 2024, China's average annual GDP growth rate is 8.3%, making it the only major economy without a systemic financial crisis during this period [2]. - By 2024, China's per capita GDP is projected to exceed $13,000, nearing the World Bank's high-income threshold [2]. - Lin Yifu categorizes China's development into two phases: the first focused on heavy industry, which laid the foundation but caused efficiency losses, and the second, post-1978, which shifted to labor-intensive industries, enabling rapid industrialization [2]. Reform and Innovation - The dual-track system is presented as a rational choice during the transition period, balancing economic stability with market development [2]. - China's gradual reform approach has created a 40-year growth miracle, contrasting with the "shock therapy" faced by many transitioning economies [2]. Future Growth Potential - Using a model based on the 2019 Sino-U.S. technology gap, China is expected to maintain an 8% growth potential until 2035, with actual growth rates projected between 5% and 6% [3]. - By 2049, even with a reduced potential of 6%, actual growth rates of 3% to 4% are still anticipated [3]. - Key supporting factors for this growth include an annual influx of 11 million university graduates, a large domestic market of 1.4 billion people, and a comprehensive industrial system [3]. Strategic Outlook - Lin Yifu envisions a future where China's GDP reaches half of the U.S. level, fundamentally altering the technology dependency dynamics between the two nations [3]. - He advises maintaining strategic focus amidst current trade tensions, asserting that China's innovation capabilities will ultimately strengthen its economic position [3]. Structural Challenges and Solutions - To address consumption challenges, Lin Yifu suggests increasing the share of resident income, enhancing social security, and promoting common prosperity [4]. - The integration of new urbanization and rural revitalization strategies is expected to unleash significant domestic demand potential [4]. Academic Perspective - Lin Yifu's balanced approach combines rational analysis of achievements with acknowledgment of structural issues, reflecting an objective academic stance [5]. - The ongoing dialogue and updates to his work illustrate the commitment to understanding and navigating the complexities of the Chinese economy [5].