瓦德富尔外长此前已经多次公开批评中国。10月中旬，他在纪念德国与日本友好关系的会议上表示，中国一方面宣称要捍卫多边主义和国际机构，另一方 面却容忍朝鲜逃避国际制裁，并在南海无视国际海洋法。他还批评中国支持俄罗斯对乌克兰的侵略，认为这是中国为维护自己霸权而做出的战略选择。他 表示："中国一直在帮助俄罗斯维持战争机器的运转。" 对此，中国外交部发言人郭嘉昆回应道，世界上只有一个中国，台湾是中国的一部分，中华人民共和国政府代表整个中国，立场明确、准确，不容任何自 定义的解释。随即，德国外交部宣布取消了外长的访华行程，但没有明确表示是谁取消了访问，仅表示德国对此感到遗憾，理由是中国在俄乌战争中扮演 着重要角色。 原定于26日访问中国的德国外交部长瓦德富尔，计划就稀土问题展开讨论。行前，他在接受记者采访时强调，德国对一中政策的立场没有变化，但解释权 应由德国掌握，其中也包括拒绝暴力改变现状。 外长访华行程的取消与俄乌冲突有何关系呢？显而易见，德国外交部的发言人可能是想引导公众情绪，因为欧盟国家已经普遍接受了美国对中国的指控， 认为中国在帮助俄罗斯恢复经济。德国外长通过将中国与俄乌战争联系在一起，实际上是煽动欧洲民众对中 ...

前几天，欧盟峰会闭门会议上，法国总统马克龙突然放出一句狠话：如果我国继续限制稀土出口，欧盟得考虑动用"核选项"，也就是 那部最近刚生效的《反胁迫工具法案》。 这个说法听着像是要摊牌了，但真要细看，既不像摊牌，更不太像威胁，反倒像是法国急了，想借机敲一敲中国的门，同时在欧盟内 部刷点存在感。 这事儿得从头说起。2023年下半年，我国开始对一些关键矿产进行出口管制，其中就包括稀土。这些稀土可不是普通矿石，它们是制 造电动车、高端芯片、导弹、风力发电设备等"高精尖"产品不可缺的"原材料明星"。 全球的稀土开采，中国手里就握着三分之一的储量，但供应却长期占了九成以上，基本是"世界工厂"兼"世界仓库"。 问题就在这儿。我国稀土虽然产量大，但这些年也付出了不小的代价：土地被挖得千疮百孔，水土污染严重，老百姓怨声载道，矿区 一片狼藉。于是，国家出手了，开始依法加强监管，控制盲目出口，完善审批制度。说白了，不是不卖，是不能再随随便便地卖。 但这一收紧，欧洲那边就坐不住了。尤其是法国总统马克龙，立马跳出来，在2023年10月的欧盟峰会上放话："我们已经忍无可忍，如 果中国继续限制稀土出口，我们得考虑启动《反胁迫工具法案》。" ...

最近法国总统马克龙突然对中国摆出了"硬碰硬"的架势。中国刚给欧洲"开小灶"放宽稀土出口审批，转头马克龙就在欧盟峰会上放话， 要动用贸易界的"核选项"制裁中国。 一、稀土这点事，欧洲为啥急得跳脚？ 先得说说"稀土"这东西。别看名字带"稀"，它可不是普通泥土，而是造芯片、新能源汽车、战斗机的关键材料，堪称"工业维生素"。中 国作为全球稀土储量和加工能力最强的国家，对稀土出口进行合理管控，总得按需分配，不能谁要就随便给吧？ 按理说，中国对欧洲够意思了。商务部长王文涛都明说了，对德国、法国这些国家的稀土出口"特事特办"，审批一路绿灯。这待遇，连 美国都羡慕得直搓手。可马克龙呢？转头就在欧盟峰会上放了句狠话："中国要是继续管稀土，欧盟就用最强贸易工具反击！" 这"最强贸易工具"，指的就是2023年底生效的《反胁迫工具法案》。简单说，这法案能通过限制投资、削减知识产权保护来"制裁"它认 为"搞胁迫"的国家，被业内称为贸易界的"核选项"——平时供着当威慑，真要用起来，那就是撕破脸的节奏。马克龙这话一出，不少网 友都乐了："刚吃完中国给的糖，转头就举棍子？这操作有点迷。" 二、"磋商"是幌子？欧盟一边谈判一边制裁中企 但欧洲 ...

Group 1 - The trade agreement between the US and EU, while appearing as a truce, is characterized as an "asymmetrical" deal where the EU commits to significant future energy purchases and investments in exchange for a relatively lenient tariff environment [3][5] - The agreement includes a commitment from the EU to purchase up to $750 billion in energy products from the US over the coming years, alongside an additional $600 billion investment commitment, which is seen as a substantial benefit for the US [5] - The agreement does not signify the end of US-EU trade disputes but may herald a new round of negotiations, as evidenced by past tensions and tariff threats from the Trump administration [5][7] Group 2 - The EU's negotiating position appears weak due to its own economic challenges, as retaliatory tariffs could harm European consumers and specific industries, particularly in countries like France and Italy [7] - There are significant discrepancies in the interpretation of key details of the agreement, particularly regarding tariffs on steel and aluminum, indicating a lack of true consensus on core issues [8] - The agreement highlights Europe's vulnerability due to over-reliance on a single trade partner, raising concerns about the need for strategic autonomy and diversification of trade relationships [11]

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the recent developments in the trade negotiations between the United States and the European Union, highlighting the EU's decision to impose counter-tariffs on US products amounting to €93 billion (approximately ¥780 billion) in response to US tariffs [2][5]. Group 1: EU's Counter-Tariff Measures - On July 24, the EU member states voted to implement counter-tariffs on US products totaling €93 billion, which includes a combination of two lists of retaliatory tariffs [2][5]. - The first round of tariffs, approved in April, targeted US goods worth approximately €21 billion, including soybeans, motorcycles, and jeans [5]. - The second list, valued at around €72 billion, focuses on high-value industrial products such as aircraft, automobiles, and electrical equipment [5]. Group 2: US-EU Negotiation Dynamics - Prior to the EU's decision, President Trump indicated that the US was engaged in serious negotiations with the EU, suggesting a potential agreement [6][13]. - However, the White House later dismissed reports of a nearing agreement as speculation, emphasizing that no trade deal would be confirmed unless announced by Trump [3][15]. - The article notes that the EU's approach may have shifted from negotiation to a more aggressive stance, indicating a willingness to respond firmly if an agreement is not reached [11]. Group 3: Implications of the "Counter-Coercion Tool Act" - The "Counter-Coercion Tool Act," effective at the end of 2023, allows EU member states to retaliate against third countries that exert economic pressure on them [8][9]. - This act could potentially impact US service industries that currently enjoy a trade surplus with the EU, including digital service providers like Amazon and Microsoft [10]. Group 4: Comparison with Japan's Trade Agreement - The article highlights that the US recently reached a trade agreement with Japan, which included a 15% tariff rate, and suggests that the EU could learn from Japan's approach to secure favorable terms [17][19]. - Japan's agreement involved a significant investment fund of $550 billion aimed at US investments, which was a key factor in obtaining lower tariffs [18][19].