更令人脊背发凉的是，这位靠着中国土壤发家的企业家，对着镜头郑重宣称："自1962年入籍美国，我始终是美国 人，别无其他身份！" "如果我们想扼杀他们，中国真的无能为力。"台积电创始人张忠谋在《纽约时报》的专访言论，再次将自己推上舆 论风口。 这番忘恩负义的言论，彻底撕下了他的伪装。讽刺的是，他赖以立足的台积电，从头到脚都刻着中国基因。 1987年台积电刚成立时，不过是个前途未卜的初创公司，根本算不上"天之骄子"。真正让它逆袭成全球巨头，完全 是靠着中国大陆这个"金主"的"强力输血"。 不仅如此，专访中，他还为美国限制大陆芯片的政策站台，断言大陆永无登顶半导体产业的可能。 中美芯片博弈前，大陆每年采购的台积电芯片占其总营收三成以上，华为等企业的大额订单，更是让台积电赚得盆 满钵满，不仅积累起扩张资本，更是攀上了美国这艘大船。 可张忠谋转头就忘了这份恩情，抱着美国大腿配合芯片断供，沦为遏制中国科技的工具。 2020年起，在美国《出口管制条例》的高压下，台积电率先停供华为7纳米及以上先进芯片，这一"釜底抽薪"直接 导致华为高端手机业务陷入停滞。 更过分的是，为换取美国《芯片与科学法案》补贴，台积电斥400亿美元在美 ...

Core Viewpoint - A group of Ukrainian civilians has filed lawsuits against Intel, AMD, and Texas Instruments in a Texas court, accusing them of negligence in allowing restricted chips to be resold to Russia, which were used in attacks that killed civilians in Ukraine, violating U.S. sanctions [1][3]. Group 1: Lawsuit Details - The lawsuits allege that the companies failed to prevent their technology from being used in attacks involving the Kh-101 cruise missile and Iskander-M ballistic missile, resulting in multiple civilian casualties [3]. - The lawsuits are based on incidents that occurred between 2023 and 2025, with claims of dozens of deaths linked to these attacks [1]. Group 2: Company Responses - Intel stated that it does not conduct business in Russia and adheres strictly to U.S. export laws and sanctions, requiring compliance from its suppliers, customers, and distributors [4]. - Texas Instruments and AMD did not respond to requests for comments from Bloomberg [4]. Group 3: Legal Representation and Implications - The lawsuits are being led by attorney Watts, representing 15 Ukrainian families, with the aim to expand the case as more evidence is gathered [4]. - The legal advisor, Dmytro Afanasiev, explained that this is a civil lawsuit, meaning plaintiffs do not have to pay legal fees and will not incur losses if they lose; however, a victory could lead to compensation based on the extent of damages [4]. - The lawsuit aims not only for financial compensation but also to create a deterrent effect, pressuring companies to reconsider their supply chains if they face legal and reputational consequences [4].

Core Viewpoint - Nvidia has officially exited the Chinese market due to U.S. export controls, reducing its market share to 0% after previously being at 50% [1][3]. Group 1: Impact of U.S. Policies - The U.S. government has intensified direct control over domestic companies, which has led to Nvidia's complete withdrawal from China, indicating a significant failure in U.S. strategy [1][3]. - The restrictions on Nvidia's H20 chip exports to China have resulted in a $4 billion drop in sales for the second quarter, as domestic GPU manufacturers quickly captured the market [5][3]. - The U.S. government's approach to industry policy is seen as ineffective, as it has not engaged in such practices for decades, leading to limited acceptance among companies [7]. Group 2: Consequences for Nvidia and the Industry - Nvidia's founder, Jensen Huang, has expressed concerns that U.S. policies may ultimately harm American competitiveness in AI, as the company struggles to maintain its market position amid rising Chinese capabilities [3][10]. - The restrictions have inadvertently strengthened China's domestic chip industry, as the country has successfully developed its own chips in response to U.S. actions [8][12]. - The U.S. strategy of using trade and tariff wars to pressure China has backfired, pushing China towards greater self-sufficiency and independence in technology [12]. Group 3: Future Outlook - The potential for China to surpass the U.S. in AI development is significant, given that approximately 50% of global AI researchers are based in China, along with strong educational institutions and enthusiasm for AI [10]. - The ongoing tensions and trade policies may lead to further isolation of U.S. companies from the Chinese market, which could have long-term implications for the U.S. economy [12].

Group 1 - The U.S. Department of Commerce has initiated an anti-discrimination investigation related to the semiconductor industry, tightening regulations on chip exports and impacting the global supply chain [2][3] - The complexity of the semiconductor manufacturing process makes it difficult for the U.S. to simply relocate production domestically, as many components still need to be sourced from overseas [2][3] - China's response to the U.S. actions includes a reduction in chip imports but an increase in spending on equipment, indicating a push towards self-reliance in semiconductor research and development [2][3] Group 2 - The demand for AI chips is surging, leading to tight advanced packaging capacity, which may result in increased prices for electronic products in the coming year [3][4] - Companies reliant on chips are experiencing significant anxiety, with inventory management becoming a critical issue due to fears of supply shortages [4] - The ongoing U.S.-China semiconductor conflict is likely to leave the global supply chain in a precarious position, with no clear winners emerging from the situation [4]

Core Viewpoint - Huawei has publicly displayed its Kirin chip information on its Pura 80 series smartphones for the first time in four years following a HarmonyOS upgrade, marking a significant moment for the company amidst ongoing challenges from U.S. sanctions [1][3]. Group 1: Kirin Chip and HarmonyOS - The last time Huawei introduced its Kirin chip was during the launch of the P50 series in 2021, where it was noted that due to U.S. sanctions, the Kirin 5G chip could only be used as a 4G chip [3]. - Huawei's smartphone shipments were severely impacted by chip shortages, dropping from a peak of 240-250 million units annually to just over 20 million units during the peak of sanctions [3][5]. - In August 2023, the Kirin chip made a comeback with the Mate60 series, coinciding with Huawei's announcement that HarmonyOS would transition to a single framework, no longer supporting the Android ecosystem [5]. Group 2: Market Position and Future Outlook - Huawei's market share had previously surpassed that of Apple and Samsung, but sanctions led to a significant decline in shipments [5]. - According to IDC, Huawei's smartphone shipments reached 12.5 million units in Q2 2023, giving it an 18.1% market share and marking its return to the top of the Chinese smartphone market for the first time since Q4 2020 [5]. - The company aims to enhance its chip production capacity and improve its ecosystem, with aspirations for HarmonyOS to become a leading operating system globally [5].

Core Viewpoint - The Chinese chip industry has not only survived the sanctions imposed by the U.S. but has thrived, particularly in the mature chip sector, positioning itself as a global leader in this market. Group 1: Impact of U.S. Sanctions - In 2019, the U.S. placed hundreds of Chinese chip companies, including Huawei and Yangtze Memory Technologies, on an "entity list," prohibiting them from purchasing American technology [3] - Despite the restrictions on EDA software, photolithography machines, and advanced process foundries, Chinese chip companies adopted a "fight to the end" mentality, leading to significant advancements during a period of apparent dormancy [3][9] Group 2: Growth in Chip Production - After failing to procure ASML's EUV photolithography machines, China invested 150 billion yuan in new wafer fabs across major cities, resulting in a monthly production capacity increase of 350,000 wafers for mature chips [4] - China has achieved a global leading position in mature process capacity (28nm and above), with projections indicating a 43% market share by 2027 [6] Group 3: Technological Advancements - Chinese companies have made significant strides in chip design software, with firms like Huada Jiutian and Gekun Electronics successfully developing designs for 14nm and above [10] - In chip manufacturing equipment, Shanghai Micro Electronics and Zhongwei have achieved mass production of 28nm photolithography machines and successfully integrated 5nm etching machines into TSMC's supply chain [10] Group 4: Market Dynamics and Competition - The return of Huawei's Kirin chips has pressured Qualcomm, resulting in a loss of approximately 40 million chips sold in China, translating to hundreds of billions in economic losses for Qualcomm [10] - Yangtze Memory Technologies has captured an 8.1% global market share in NAND flash memory, forcing competitors like Samsung and Micron to reduce prices by 50% [10] - Chinese companies like BYD and Unisoc have significantly impacted the automotive chip market, leading to a 60% profit drop for Infineon and NXP [10] Group 5: Export Growth - China's chip export value has surged from 437.2 billion yuan in 2014 to 1.14 trillion yuan in 2024, marking a significant increase and breaking the 1 trillion yuan barrier for the first time [11] - The U.S. strategy to restrict high-end chips has inadvertently allowed China to dominate the mature chip market, with global analysts noting that U.S. sanctions have only strengthened China's position [11]

Core Viewpoint - The U.S. Department of Commerce plans to revoke the blanket exemption for major semiconductor manufacturers like TSMC, Samsung, and SK Hynix, which allows them to use U.S. technology in their factories in mainland China without individual license applications, increasing operational burdens for these companies [1][2]. Group 1: Impact on Semiconductor Manufacturers - The tightening of chip equipment licensing by the U.S. primarily targets China's high-tech industry but adversely affects the operations of global semiconductor manufacturers in China [2]. - China is the largest semiconductor equipment market, accounting for 38% of the global market share in 2024, with U.S. companies like Applied Materials and Lam Research relying on China for 30% to 40% of their revenue [2]. - Samsung's NAND flash factory in Xi'an contributes 30% to 40% of its total NAND production, while SK Hynix's investment in Chinese semiconductor equipment is projected to increase tenfold in 2024, with its Wuxi DRAM factory generating approximately $9 billion in sales, a 64.3% increase [2]. Group 2: Comparison with Rare Earths - The U.S. attempts to equate chip manufacturing equipment with China's rare earth materials management, which is fundamentally flawed as chip equipment is primarily for civilian high-tech industries, unlike rare earths that have military applications [1][2]. - The U.S. strategy to link chip equipment licensing with China's rare earth controls is seen as a mischaracterization of the nature of these resources [1]. Group 3: Global Semiconductor Supply Chain Dynamics - The U.S. does not have absolute control over the semiconductor manufacturing industry, as American chip equipment companies hold only about one-third of the global market share, requiring cooperation from countries like the Netherlands and Japan to enforce restrictions [3]. - The restrictions are catalyzing a "de-Americanization" of the global supply chain, with companies like ASML and Tokyo Electron benefiting from the market gap left by U.S. companies [3]. - Chinese domestic equipment manufacturers are making significant progress, with market share for domestic equipment rising from 16% in 2020 to 28% in 2024, driven by innovations such as the 5nm etching machine validated by TSMC [3]. Group 4: Long-term Implications - The U.S. efforts to completely isolate China from the semiconductor industry are seen as unrealistic, as reversing China's existing capabilities is a significant challenge [4]. - Despite pressures, global semiconductor companies continue to engage with the Chinese market, with firms like NVIDIA launching China-specific GPU versions and maintaining their business scale in China through local R&D [4][5]. - The rapid technological advancements of Chinese equipment manufacturers, achieving over 30% annual iteration rates, are undermining U.S. attempts to disrupt the semiconductor supply chain [5].

Group 1 - The core issue in the US-China negotiations revolves around rare earth elements, with ordinary rare earths being discussed, but military-grade rare earths remain contentious [1][3][12] - The US has not committed to supplying advanced chips to China, citing potential military applications, while China has not agreed to provide military-grade rare earths to the US [3][12][14] - China has agreed to expedite the approval process for non-military rare earth exports to US producers, but with limitations on quantity and time [8][9][12] Group 2 - The distinction between light and heavy rare earths is crucial, with China controlling heavy rare earths that are essential for various industries, including semiconductors and electric vehicles [5][12][14] - The US is heavily reliant on China for heavy rare earths, particularly for military applications, which poses a strategic challenge for the US defense sector [9][12][14] - The negotiations have not resolved the underlying tensions, and both countries are still in a state of strategic standoff, with China gaining more leverage in the current situation [19][21]

Group 1 - The article discusses the contrasting perceptions of victory by Indian and American leaders, particularly Modi and Trump, despite setbacks in military and trade conflicts [1][16][18] - It highlights India's acknowledgment of military losses while maintaining a narrative of victory, showcasing a unique mindset referred to as "winning theory" [5][7][8] - The article critiques Trump's approach to trade negotiations with China, suggesting that his concessions are a result of economic necessity rather than strength [20][22][30] Group 2 - The significance of rare earth resources is emphasized, indicating that control over these resources is crucial for technological advancements in various sectors [34] - The article suggests that any concessions made by China regarding rare earths would be detrimental to its own interests, framing it as a non-negotiable stance [28][36] - It concludes that the U.S. may continue to seek negotiations with China, particularly regarding rare earths, but only if approached with genuine intentions [36]

Core Viewpoint - The U.S. attempts to use its chip technology advantage to impose sanctions on China, aiming to weaken China's semiconductor industry and maintain its technological dominance, but these efforts have inadvertently spurred China's determination to develop its own semiconductor capabilities [1][3][5]. Group 1: Impact of U.S. Sanctions - U.S. sanctions and export controls have not subdued China's semiconductor industry; instead, they have ignited a strong resolve within China to advance its semiconductor capabilities [3][9]. - Bill Gates predicted that unilateral U.S. sanctions would not protect American chip companies but would instead stimulate the rise of Chinese enterprises, potentially harming the U.S. chip industry in the long run [3][5]. Group 2: China's Semiconductor Advancements - In response to U.S. sanctions, China has made significant strides in its semiconductor industry, achieving breakthroughs in chip design, manufacturing, and packaging, with a focus on self-innovation and technology development [5][9]. - Huawei successfully developed its own Kirin chips despite severe restrictions, exemplified by the launch of the Mate60 series, which surprised the global market [7]. - SMIC has also achieved a breakthrough in 14nm technology despite restrictions on importing advanced EUV lithography machines from ASML [7]. Group 3: Future Projections - China's semiconductor self-sufficiency rate is projected to reach 70% within five years, indicating a significant improvement in its domestic production capabilities [10]. - By 2024, China's chip exports are expected to reach new highs, positioning the country as a leading player in the global semiconductor market [10].