作者 | 闲彦 编辑 | 小白 全球贸易乱哄哄，特朗普的关税政策搅得投资者不得安宁，而他本人的一大政策就是死守传统能源、 对清洁能源说不。 比如他主张放松对油气开采的监管，个人的标志性口号"Drill, baby, drill!"（钻吧，宝贝，钻吧！）无 疑既想讨好油气领域的老金主们，又寄望这一政策能够压低油价，为通胀降温继而降息创造条件。 整整10年，杀不死你的，让你更强大。 50美元一桶，这是特朗普幕僚彼得·纳瓦罗给的目标价。 但是，能成为金主，智力自然是在线的，尤其是经历过自2014年以来的原油价格大跌甚至负油价，哪 怕是头猪，也该学到风险控制。 人教人，教不会，事教人，一次就够，尤其是记忆还热乎的时候。 美国的页岩油气开发商经过"生死劫"和各种兼并重组，早就转化成为一部部活脱脱的赚钱机器，现金 流成为核心考虑。 也因此，这类资产获得了包括巴菲特在内的诸多长期投资者的热烈追求。无他，便宜，黑乎乎的油就 是白花花的钱。 除了满足必要的资本开支、少见的并购机会，以及调整资本结构（还债），剩下的都分给股东，这就 是old money最喜欢的，不像是典型科技公司，全都拿去做回购，哪怕是持续高估。 在特朗普的号召 ...

Group 1 - The core viewpoint of the article highlights the complexities and uncertainties surrounding mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the A-share market, where many companies have restructuring potential but few succeed due to negotiation difficulties and changing market conditions [1][2] - Companies may issue restructuring announcements to boost stock prices without genuine intentions to restructure, leading to speculative trading and increased market volatility [1][2] - Successful restructurings often result in significant stock price increases, but these gains may lack fundamental support, leading to rapid declines if the restructuring fails [1][2] Group 2 - The case of Shuangcheng Pharmaceutical illustrates the risks, as its stock price surged from 4 yuan to 40.98 yuan following a restructuring announcement, only to plummet back to around 8 yuan after the deal failed [2] - Another example involves a ST company that saw its stock rise from 1.5 yuan to 9.6 yuan due to bankruptcy restructuring news, but the lack of progress in the restructuring process led to a significant drop in stock price [2] - Statistics show that 13 companies terminated their M&A processes in May alone, indicating a trend of failed restructurings that negatively impact stock prices [3]

Core Viewpoint - The resignation of Zhang Hongwei from the position of chairman and executive director of United Energy Group is a significant event following the regulatory penalties imposed on him for financial misconduct related to the "Oriental System" [3][4][6]. Group 1: Zhang Hongwei's Resignation and Its Implications - Zhang Hongwei will resign from his roles at United Energy Group by the end of June, following a penalty of 10 million yuan and a lifetime ban from the securities market due to violations of securities laws [3][6]. - The resignation may raise concerns about the stability of the management team at United Energy Group, potentially leading to stock price volatility and affecting the synergy among companies within the "Oriental System" [4][8]. - Zhang's departure from multiple listed companies, including Minsheng Bank and United Energy Group, indicates a significant shift in the leadership structure of the "Oriental System" [7][8]. Group 2: Financial Misconduct and Consequences - The Oriental Group was found to have inflated its revenue by 16.13 billion yuan and costs by 16.073 billion yuan from 2020 to 2023, leading to severe public backlash and regulatory scrutiny [6]. - The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has stated that financial fraud severely harms investor interests and will enforce strict penalties for such misconduct, including potential delisting for companies involved in major violations [5][6]. - The Oriental Group is currently undergoing restructuring due to various debt issues and has already been delisted, indicating a broader impact on the financial health of the "Oriental System" [8]. Group 3: United Energy Group's Business Performance - United Energy Group operates in oil and clean energy sectors, with significant projects in regions such as the Middle East and North Africa, and is the largest foreign oil and gas producer in Pakistan [10]. - The company reported a net loss of 1.707 billion HKD in 2023, but projected a revenue of 17.523 billion HKD in 2024, reflecting a year-on-year growth of 28.9% [10]. - The stock price of United Energy Group experienced a dramatic decline, dropping from approximately 0.6 HKD to 0.26 HKD in June 2024, representing a 55.83% decrease and a market value loss of nearly 8.8 billion HKD [10].

登录新浪财经APP 搜索【信披】查看更多考评等级 出品：新浪财经上市公司研究院 文/夏虫工作室 随着年报季收关，不少上市公司却出现会计差错。据wind数据统计，2025年已经会计差错更正公司数量 超40家。 对于出现会计差错的公司我们该如何看待？所谓会计差错更正，根据相关定义，即指由于没有运用或错 误运用以下两种信息，而对前期财务报表造成遗漏或误报。需要指出的是，同样是财务列报错误，相比 会计舞弊，会计差错则属于非故意过失。 然而，近年部分财务造假公司却滥用会计差错，以会计差错更正之名掩盖财务造假舞弊之实。如众所熟 知的康美药业，300亿现金会计差错最终被证实财务黑洞；东方集团滥用总额法巨额财务造假，暴雷前 夕以会计差错之名进行调整等等。 基于上述背景，我们将对会计差错公司进行系列复盘，看看其背后隐藏何种风险。 泰豪科技会计差错不仅是信披违规？ 在去年财报中，公司也出现会计差错调整，其主要由于投资公司失控导致差错调整。 2024年12月17日晚间，公司发布公告，因信息披露不规范、财务核算不及时等问题，公司近日收到江西 证监局出具的行政监管措施决定书，对泰豪科技采取责令改正的监管措施，对杨剑等四人采取出具警示 ...

Core Viewpoint - The article highlights the increasing complexity and prevalence of financial fraud in listed companies, particularly focusing on the role of third parties in facilitating these fraudulent activities [2][4][18]. Group 1: Overview of Financial Fraud - The annual "5.15 National Investor Protection Day" serves as a reminder of the severe consequences of financial fraud, exemplified by the Zijing Storage case, which affected 17,000 investors and involved compensation of 1.086 billion yuan from four intermediary institutions [2]. - Since 2020, over 60% of administrative penalties by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) for income fraud have involved transaction fraud, with more than 600 third-party entities implicated in 58 cases of transaction fraud [4][6]. Group 2: Evolution of Fraud Techniques - Financial fraud has evolved from simple accounting manipulations to systemic fraud that encompasses entire business processes, as seen in cases like Gome Communications and Oriental Group [5][10]. - Transaction fraud is characterized by the fabrication of non-existent transactions and manipulation of transaction processes, posing a more direct threat to market trust compared to traditional accounting manipulations [6][10]. Group 3: Role of Third Parties - Third parties, including customers, suppliers, and shell companies, play a crucial role in orchestrating financial fraud, with an average of over 10 third parties involved in each fraudulent case [11][12]. - The involvement of third parties often includes hidden relationships and the creation of complex transaction structures to obscure fraudulent activities, as demonstrated in various cases [12][13][14]. Group 4: Legal and Regulatory Challenges - Despite the high-pressure stance of the CSRC against financial fraud, third parties often escape significant legal repercussions, leading to a lack of accountability in the broader fraud ecosystem [18][19]. - The current legal framework does not adequately address the roles of third parties in financial fraud, resulting in a cycle of low risk and high reward for those involved in fraudulent activities [23]. Group 5: Recommendations for Improvement - There is an urgent need to enhance legal regulations and establish a comprehensive accountability mechanism for all parties involved in financial fraud, including third parties [23].

Core Viewpoint - The article highlights the systemic issue of financial fraud in listed companies, particularly focusing on the role of third-party entities in facilitating such fraud, which has become increasingly complex and hidden from regulatory scrutiny [1][11]. Summary by Sections Financial Fraud Cases - The article discusses notable financial fraud cases, such as the Zijing Storage case, which affected 17,000 investors and involved compensation of 1.086 billion yuan from four intermediary institutions [1]. - Since 2020, nearly 70% of the cases punished by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) for revenue fraud involved transaction manipulation [2]. Types of Fraud - Transaction fraud has evolved into a primary method of revenue manipulation, accounting for approximately 70% of total fraud cases [3]. - The article categorizes fraud into two main types: transaction fraud, which involves fabricating non-existent transactions, and accounting manipulation, which distorts existing transactions [2][3]. Role of Third Parties - The involvement of third parties in financial fraud is significant, with an average of over 10 third-party entities participating in each fraudulent case, totaling 686 third parties across 58 cases [4][5]. - Third parties include related parties, real customers, and shell companies, often collaborating to create a façade of legitimate business transactions [6][7]. Legal Accountability - Despite the critical role of third parties in facilitating fraud, they often escape severe legal consequences, with only a small fraction facing penalties [9][10]. - The article emphasizes the need for a comprehensive legal framework to hold third parties accountable, as current penalties are insufficient to deter fraudulent behavior [11]. Market Implications - The prevalence of third-party involvement in fraud reflects deeper issues within market governance, including low legal risks and high incentives for fraudulent activities [8][10]. - The article calls for urgent reforms to enhance investor protection and ensure that all parties involved in financial fraud are held accountable [11].

出品：新浪财经上市公司研究院 文/夏虫工作室 核心观点：众泰汽车众泰汽车自重整以来业绩并未好转，整车0产量疑似又陷入生产停滞。至此，我们 疑惑的是，公司经营可持续性有无实质性改善，公司成功摘帽背后是否有猫腻？为何公司摘帽后为何对 相关应收款大幅计提坏账，而非重整期处理？公司重整前后负债率为何反差较大背后又是否藏财技？值 得注意的是，公司出现少计提负债等情形。 随着年报季收关，不少上市公司却出现会计差错。据wind数据统计，2025年已经会计差错更正公司数量 超40家。 对于出现会计差错的公司我们该如何看待？所谓会计差错更正，根据相关定义，即指由于没有运用或错 误运用以下两种信息，而对前期财务报表造成遗漏或误报。需要指出的是，同样是财务列报错误，相比 会计舞弊，会计差错则属于非故意过失。 然而，近年部分财务造假公司却滥用会计差错，以会计差错更正之名掩盖财务造假舞弊之实。如众所熟 知的康美药业，300亿现金会计差错最终被证实财务黑洞；东方集团滥用总额法巨额财务造假，暴雷前 夕以会计差错之名进行调整等等。 基于上述背景，我们将对会计差错公司进行系列复盘，看看其背后隐藏何种风险。 陷入持续亏损 整车生产疑似陷入停滞 ...

Group 1 - Xiamen Bank disclosed its 2024 annual report, revealing the execution status of performance clawbacks for the first time, with a total deferred salary balance of approximately 0.62 million yuan [2] - The bank has determined performance clawbacks for 188 individuals, totaling 3.7012 million yuan, while deferring the payment of 6.022 million yuan in risk deferred compensation for 2024 due to unresolved risk events [2] - The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) announced that Dongfang Group's financial information from 2020 to 2023 was severely misleading, involving a cumulative inflated revenue of 16.129 billion yuan and inflated operating costs of 16.074 billion yuan over four years [2] Group 2 - Xiamen Bank initiated legal proceedings to recover loans from Xiamen Yinxiang Oil Co., Ltd. (Yinxiang Oil), which has defaulted due to overdue payments and significant economic disputes [3] - The bank's lawsuit includes five requests, such as repayment of principal and interest, exercising priority rights over collateral, and holding Xiamen Yinxiang Group and Dongfang Group jointly liable for repayment [3] - Yinxiang Oil was previously a key client for Xiamen Bank's manufacturing loans, ranking first among the bank's top ten manufacturing loan clients at the end of 2017, 2019, and mid-2020 [3]

Core Viewpoint - The increasing regulatory penalties and disclosures from listed companies are exposing the significant issue of false trading as a method of financial fraud, revealing a growing trend in the scale and duration of such activities [1][2]. Group 1: Characteristics of False Trading - False trading is characterized by the creation of a financial maze through circular transactions or fund lending, leading to financial fraud that reflects a combination of uncontrolled capital operations, ineffective internal controls, and audit failures [1][2]. - Recent cases show that the scale of transactions has increased, and the duration of concealment has lengthened, indicating new trends in false trading practices [1][3]. - The case of *ST Jinguang highlights that the company has been involved in false trading since at least 2018, with fraudulent activities persisting for over seven years [3][4]. Group 2: Regulatory Response - Regulatory bodies, including judicial, state-owned assets, and securities authorities, are intensifying their crackdown on false trading, with many A-share companies now prioritizing compliance in this area [1][10]. - The state-owned enterprise system has issued strict guidelines prohibiting various forms of false trading, emphasizing a zero-tolerance approach to violations [10][12]. - Companies are increasingly incorporating self-checks and financial audits focused on false trading into their compliance frameworks, as seen in the practices of companies like China Zhongche and Datang Telecom [10][11]. Group 3: Financial Implications - False trading practices have been linked to significant financial misreporting, with companies like Dongfang Group inflating revenues by over 16.1 billion yuan from 2020 to 2023 [3][9]. - The phenomenon of financing-type false trading has emerged, where companies use trade as a facade for lending funds, often leading to legal disputes and financial losses for involved parties [8][9]. - The pressure to meet performance metrics, especially in state-owned enterprises, drives the motivation for engaging in false trading, as it can artificially enhance revenue and improve financial statements [9][12]. Group 4: Audit and Compliance Challenges - Auditors are increasingly scrutinizing transactions for signs of false trading, focusing on the commercial substance of trades and the legitimacy of revenue recognition [11][12]. - The involvement of financial companies as "reservoirs" for funds has raised concerns about the potential for misuse in false trading schemes, prompting companies to enhance their disclosure practices regarding financial flows [5][6]. - The need for improved regulatory frameworks and investor protection mechanisms is emphasized to prevent the recurrence of financial fraud in the future [12].

Core Viewpoint - The delisting of *ST Dongfang represents not only a failure of a single company but also a stress test for the market ecology and regulatory system in China, highlighting the issues that arise from the rapid growth of private enterprises [1] Group 1: Company Background and Financial Issues - *ST Dongfang, once celebrated as the "first private listed company in Northeast China," ended its journey at a price of 0.36 yuan per share, marking a significant event in the new delisting regulations era [3] - The company experienced a remarkable stock price increase of 420% over three years after its reverse merger in 2018, but this façade of prosperity quickly unraveled [3] - In 2022, *ST Dongfang reported a suspicious 87% increase in net profit to 320 million yuan, while accounts receivable surged by 214% to 2.87 billion yuan, indicating a disconnect between reported profits and actual cash flow [3][4] Group 2: Fraudulent Activities and Regulatory Failures - The company was found to have inflated revenue by 16.13 billion yuan through fictitious contracts and fraudulent documentation, accounting for 47% of its total disclosed revenue [4] - The audit firm, Dahua, which had been auditing *ST Dongfang since 2011, issued unqualified opinions during the years of fraud, raising questions about its role in the deception [7] - Despite multiple inquiries from the exchange regarding the company's business logic, *ST Dongfang provided vague responses, indicating a breakdown in regulatory oversight [8] Group 3: Consequences and Future Outlook - Following its delisting, *ST Dongfang faces significant challenges, including 4.6 billion yuan in overdue debts and a 2 billion yuan funding gap for a project [9] - Over 5,000 investors have registered for compensation claims, with the potential for a new legal framework to hold the actual controller and audit firm accountable [9] - The delisting serves as a reflection of the contradictions within China's capital market reform, emphasizing the need for a return to fundamental investment logic based on genuine value creation [9][10]