导读：2020年至今，我们和东方红资产管理的周云做过三次访谈，每一次都能感受到他价值体系的进步。 2020年3月第一次访谈，周云展现了他对低估值投资的长期信心。这一套投资框架，在之后的这些年中一直未变，是他最底层的投资逻 辑。 2022年12月第二次访谈，周云提出了成功的投资不仅需要理解估值，也要倾向市场的声音，价值和市场并不矛盾，都有自己的内在规 律。 2025年5月第三次访谈，周云谈到了用质量做排除法，大家一致认可的高质量未必能带来好的长期回报，但可以把市场后50%到60%的 低质量公司剔除。 在最新的这一次访谈中，我们剔除了周云此前提过的投资框架部分，更多展现了他的一些新思考： 第一层思考：为什么独立是一种很强的竞争优势？因为人性的底层就会从众，即便是在显而易见的事实面前。周云用著名的"阿希实 验"为例，阐述了人性的弱点。从以小为美，到只买龙头，资本市场没有永恒的真相，只有新的共识替代旧的共识。拉长看，周云能不断 战胜沪深300，很重要的部分就是没有追涨杀跌。 第二层思考：如何把质量和估值结合在一起。即便好公司和好价格难以同时出现，但买好公司依然是周云追求的。他把质量作为一种排 除法，剔除一大批低质量的 ...

General Overview - The company is named Suzhou Recodeal Interconnect System Co., Ltd., established according to the Company Law of the People's Republic of China [3] - The company was registered on June 5, 2014, and listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange's Sci-Tech Innovation Board on July 22, 2021, with a total registered capital of RMB 205.674335 million [3][4] Business Objectives and Scope - The company's business objective is to enhance management efficiency and maximize economic benefits for shareholders [6] - The business scope includes research, production, and sales of electronic components, optical connectors, sensors, charging equipment, and related technical services [6] Share Structure - The company's total share capital is 205.674335 million shares, all of which are ordinary shares with a par value of RMB 1 per share [7][8] - The company prohibits providing financial assistance for the purchase of its shares, except under specific circumstances [8] Shareholder Rights and Responsibilities - Shareholders have rights to dividends, attend meetings, supervise management, and transfer shares [11] - Shareholders holding more than 5% of voting shares must report any pledges of their shares to the company [39] Shareholder Meetings - The company holds annual and extraordinary shareholder meetings, with specific procedures for calling and conducting these meetings [17][18] - Shareholder proposals must be submitted in writing and can be made by shareholders holding more than 3% of shares [21] Voting and Resolutions - Resolutions at shareholder meetings can be ordinary or special, with different voting thresholds required for each type [74][75] - Special resolutions are required for significant corporate actions such as capital changes, mergers, and amendments to the articles of association [76] Related Party Transactions - Related shareholders must abstain from voting on matters involving related party transactions to ensure fairness [78][79] - The company must disclose the voting results of non-related shareholders for transparency [78]

Core Viewpoint - The recent release of the "Opinions on Improving the Modern Enterprise System with Chinese Characteristics" emphasizes the role of capital markets in enhancing corporate governance and encourages the introduction of institutional investors holding more than 5% of shares as active shareholders, which is significant for improving governance and investment value in listed companies [1] Group 1: Current Market Situation - The phenomenon of shareholders holding 5% of shares, which constitutes a "shareholding increase," is not common in the A-share market, with only 85, 49, and 71 instances from 2022 to 2024, respectively, compared to over 5,000 listed companies [1] - This lack of active shareholders leads to a dominance of major shareholders in decision-making processes, often skewing benefits towards them and leaving minority shareholders' rights inadequately protected [1] Group 2: Conditions for Becoming an Active Shareholder - To become an active shareholder, two key conditions must be met: a long-term capital foundation, requiring a shareholding of at least 5%, and the ability and willingness to engage in governance [2] - Active shareholders, unlike retail investors, possess professional research capabilities and resources, allowing them to influence corporate governance effectively [2] Group 3: Institutional Support for Active Shareholders - To better support the introduction of active shareholders, institutional improvements are necessary, including stronger protections for shareholder proposal and director nomination rights, and optimizing voting rights collection channels to reduce participation costs [3] - Additionally, policy adjustments in tax and transaction fees could provide further incentives for active shareholder involvement [3]

Core Viewpoint - The regulatory authorities in China are intensifying their scrutiny of the misuse of funds by listed companies, particularly focusing on the actions of major shareholders and actual controllers who exploit company resources for personal gain [1][2][3]. Regulatory Actions - The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has introduced new rules requiring listed companies to promptly demand the return of misappropriated funds and disclose the reasons for such actions, their impact on the company, and the rectification plans [1][2]. - As of May 28, 2023, there have been 48 administrative measures or penalties against 37 companies related to fund misuse, including warnings, fines, and orders for correction [1][2]. Enforcement Against Major Shareholders - The regulatory bodies are targeting the "key minority," which includes major shareholders and executives who engage in fund misappropriation, with a focus on both direct and indirect methods of fund occupation [2][3]. - Specific cases, such as the reprimand of ST Dongshi for failing to return 106 million yuan of raised funds, illustrate the ongoing enforcement actions against individuals involved in fund misuse [2][3]. Accountability Mechanisms - The regulatory framework emphasizes that misappropriated funds must be returned, with strict deadlines for rectification and potential delisting for non-compliance [4][5]. - Companies are encouraged to utilize legal measures, such as lawsuits and asset freezes, to recover misappropriated funds, ensuring the protection of minority shareholders [5][6]. Independent Oversight - Independent directors are actively involved in urging management to recover misappropriated funds, as seen in the case of ST Changkang, where independent directors issued a reminder to address fund occupation issues [6]. - The China Securities Investor Services Center is promoting collective and derivative lawsuits to enhance investor protection and ensure accountability for fund misuse [6].

Core Viewpoint - The article emphasizes the importance of improving corporate governance in Chinese listed companies as a foundation for high-quality economic development, highlighting the introduction of measures to enhance the modern enterprise system in China [1][2]. Group 1: Capital Market and Corporate Governance - The "Opinions" document outlines three key requirements for the capital market: introducing institutional investors with a holding ratio of over 5% as active shareholders, strictly implementing the independent director system, and improving information disclosure in corporate governance [2][3]. - The capital market plays a crucial role in enhancing corporate governance through strict regulation, transparency, and the influence of stock price fluctuations on company value, which encourages better governance practices [3]. Group 2: Active Shareholder Participation - The introduction of institutional investors as active shareholders is seen as a significant institutional innovation, aimed at addressing the long-standing issue of dominant shareholders potentially harming minority shareholders' interests [4]. - Institutional investors are expected to actively participate in corporate governance, exercising their voting and inquiry rights to optimize company strategies rather than merely acting as passive financial investors [4][5]. Group 3: Independent Director System - The "Opinions" propose strict enforcement of the independent director system, including the establishment of audit committees with a majority of independent directors and dedicated meetings for independent directors [6]. - To enhance the independence of directors, it is suggested to broaden the nomination scope for independent directors beyond the board's nomination committee, allowing shareholders with over 1% holdings to nominate candidates [6]. Group 4: Information Disclosure Improvement - The "Opinions" aim to enhance the information disclosure system in corporate governance, focusing on transparency and reducing information asymmetry by requiring detailed disclosures of related transactions and significant risks [7]. - Improved information disclosure is expected to empower investors, particularly minority shareholders, to make informed judgments about company value and reduce the potential for opaque operations [7].

民生证券股份有限公司 深圳证券交易所： 根据《证券发行上市保荐业务管理办法》、 《深圳证券交易所上市公司保荐工 作指引》、 《深圳证券交易所创业板股票上市规则》、 《深圳证券交易所上市公司自 律监管指引第 2 号——创业板上市公司规范运作》等有关规定，作为天力锂能集 团股份有限公司（以下简称"天力锂能"或"公司"）首次公开发行股票并在创 业板上市的保荐机构，民生证券股份有限公司（以下简称"民生证券"或"保荐 机构"）对天力锂能进行了 2025 年度持续督导培训。现将培训情况报告如下： 一、培训基本情况 关于天力锂能集团股份有限公司 时间： 2025 年 5 月 12 日 培训方式：现场授课与自学讨论相结合的方式 保荐机构通过现场授课以及线上远程会议的方式对上述培训对象进行了培 训，培训内容主要为上市公司治理结构、董监高的任职、忠实勤勉义务和责任等 文件，对上市公司治理结构相关法律法规、董监高的义务与责任等问题进行重点 解读，同时结合近期监管处罚案例对相关法律责任进行了阐释。 三、培训总结 本次持续督导培训的工作过程中，天力锂能参训人员认真学习并充分沟通， 积极配合。持续督导人员对公司董事、监事、高级管理人员、 ...

些管 文/王兆寰 5月26日晚间，中国证监会有关负责人对外表示，中国证监会一直高度重视上市公司的公司治理监管，上市公司规 范发展的内生动力不断提高，规范运作水平持续提升，回报投资者意识显著增强。 下一步，中国证监会不断完善上市公司治理规则，推动出台上市公司监督管理条例，加大对组织指使造假、资金 占用等违法行为的打击力度，进一步发挥独立董事作用，鼓励机构投资者积极行使股东权利，激发公司治理内生 动力，促进上市公司健全中国特色现代企业制度，持续提升公司治理水平。 近日，中共中央办公厅、国务院办公厅公开《关于完善中国特色现代企业制度的意见》（下称"《意见》"）。 《意见》强调，要发挥资本市场对完善公司治理的推动作用。强化控股股东对公司的诚信义务，支持上市公司引 入持股比例5%以上的机构投资者作为积极股东。严格落实上市公司独立董事制度，设置独立董事占多数的审计委 员会和独立董事专门会议机制。完善上市公司治理领域信息披露制度，促进提升决策管理的科学性。 证监会有关负责人在接受记者提问时指出，上市公司是经济高质量发展的重要微观基础，是探索完善中国特色现 代企业制度的重要力量。资本市场公开透明，强化约束和激励，要求上市公司 ...

中海油能源发展股份有限公司 独立董事工作制度 中海油能源发展股份有限公司 独立董事工作制度 第一章 总 则 第一条 为进一步完善中海油能源发展股份有限公司(以 下简称"公司")的治理结构，促进公司规范运作，保护中小 股东的利益，根据《上市公司治理准则》《上市公司独立董 事管理办法》（以下简称"《独董办法》"）、《上海证券 交易所上市公司自律监管指引第 1 号——规范运作》等法律、 法规、规范性文件和《中海油能源发展股份有限公司章程》 (以下简称"《公司章程》")的规定特制定本制度。 第二条 本制度适用于中海油能源发展股份有限公司。 第二章 一般规定 第三条 公司独立董事是指不在公司担任除董事外的其 他职务，并与公司及其主要股东、实际控制人不存在直接或 者间接利害关系，或者其他可能影响其进行独立客观判断的 关系的董事。 第四条 独立董事对公司及全体股东负有忠实与勤勉义 务，独立董事应当按照法律、行政法规、中国证券监督管理 委员会(以下简称"中国证监会")规定、证券交易所业务规 则和《公司章程》的要求认真履行职责，在董事会中发挥参 与决策、监督制衡、专业咨询作用，维护公司整体利益及保 护中小股东的合法权益。 第五 ...

中航证券有限公司 关于 蜀道投资集团有限责任公司 要约收购 四川宏达股份有限公司 之 二〇二五年五月 第一节 释义 《中航证券有限公司关于蜀道投资集团有限责任公司 本意见、本持续督导意见 指 要约收购四川宏达股份有限公司之 2025 年一季度持续 督导意见》 本持续督导期 指 2025 年 1 月 1 日至 2025 年 3 月 31 日 蜀道集团参股公司天府春晓受让蓉城 51 号集合资金信 托计划等 10 个信托计划合计共 93.15%的信托受益权， 本次要约收购/本次收购 指 进而间接控制名嘉百货信托计划所持有的上市公司 报告书、 《要约收购报告书》 指 《四川宏达股份有限公司要约收购报告书》 宏达股份、上市公司 指 四川宏达股份有限公司 收购人、蜀道集团 指 蜀道投资集团有限责任公司 宏达实业、一致行动人之一 指 四川宏达实业有限公司 天府春晓、一致行动人之二 指 四川天府春晓企业管理有限公司 一致行动人 指 天府春晓、宏达实业 四川发展 指 四川发展（控股）有限责任公司 四川省国资委 指 四川省政府国有资产监督管理委员会 四川信托 指 四川信托有限公司 蓉城 51 号集合资金信托计 四川信托有限公司— ...

江苏苏博特新材料股份有限公司 江苏苏博特新材料股份有限公司 2024 年年度股东大会会议议程 会议召开方式：现场会议和网络投票相结合 现场会议时间：2025 年 5 月 20 日上午 9 点 30 分 现场会议地点：南京市江宁区醴泉路 118 号江苏苏博特新材料股份有限公司 会议召集人：公司董事会 会议主持人：毛良喜先生 出席人员：公司股东、董事、监事、高级管理人员、公司聘请的律师及其他 相关人员 网络投票时间：2025 年 5 月 20 日采用上海证券交易所网络投票系统，通过 交易系统投票平台的投票时间为股东大会召开当日的交易时间段，即 9:15- 日的 9:15-15:00。 现场会议开始前由工作人员统计现场与会股东及股东代表人数和所持股份 数。主持人宣布会议开始，同时报告出席现场会议的股东及股东代表人数和所持 有股份数及比例。选举现场会议监票人、记票人。 一、会议审议并表决以下事项： 投票股东类型 序号 议案名称 A 股股东 非累积投票议案 案 交易 交易 授信额度的议案 二、现场参会股东对审议内容进行记名投票表决 三、工作人员收集现场表决票 四、根据网络投票及现场计票结果，对表决情况进行汇总 五、宣读 ...