Core Viewpoint - Japan is facing a severe population crisis, prompting the government to implement a new "Child and Childcare Support Fund" system to encourage childbirth and support families [4][5][15]. Group 1: Policy Implementation - Starting from April 2026, Japan will introduce a tax ranging from 2,400 to 12,000 yen annually (approximately 120 to 600 RMB) to fund subsidies for families with children [5][6]. - The tax is mandatory and linked to health insurance, affecting both citizens and foreigners, regardless of whether they have children [8][9]. - The policy is being referred to as a "universal fertility tax" rather than a "single tax," as it applies to all individuals [7][10]. Group 2: Demographic Challenges - Japan's total population has decreased from 128 million to 123.8 million over the past decade, with a significant drop in birth rates, falling below 700,000 last year [17][15]. - The country has the lowest birth rate globally and the highest aging rate, with a growing proportion of single-person households, reaching 38% [20][25]. - Predictions indicate that by 2035, half of the population aged 15 and above may be single, with a third of men and a fifth of women potentially never marrying [26][28]. Group 3: Historical Context and Comparisons - Historical precedents for "single taxes" exist, such as in ancient Greece and Rome, and more recently in the Soviet Union, which had similar taxation policies [11][13]. - Discussions around implementing a "single tax" have also emerged in South Korea, reflecting a broader trend in addressing demographic issues [14]. Group 4: Financial Incentives and Support - Japan has invested over 66 trillion yen (approximately 3 trillion RMB) in fertility-related budgets over the past 30 years, with current annual spending around 3 trillion yen (about 150 billion RMB) [31][32]. - Various subsidies are available, including a one-time childbirth allowance of 500,000 yen (about 25,000 RMB) and ongoing childcare support for children aged 0-3 years [33][34]. - Education subsidies cover public and private kindergarten fees, and there are plans for free public high school education starting in 2025 [34][35]. Group 5: Systemic Challenges - Despite extensive financial support, Japan's birth rate continues to decline, indicating that stimulating childbirth is more complex than merely providing financial incentives [37][38]. - The decline in birth rates is a global phenomenon influenced by cultural shifts, high costs of living, and economic stagnation, which are particularly pronounced in Japan [39][40]. - Addressing the issue requires a comprehensive approach beyond financial subsidies, including breaking the cycle of "deflationary economy" and "low-desire society" [42][44].

Group 1 - The Japanese government will implement a "Child and Childcare Support Fund" system starting April 2026, requiring residents over 20 years old without children and earning over 2 million yen annually to pay a monthly fee of 200-1000 yen, with higher earners facing increased fees by 2028 [1][3] - The policy has been met with significant public backlash, with over 60% of citizens opposing it, highlighting the societal tensions surrounding Japan's declining birth rate and the perception of single individuals as financial burdens [1][9] - The policy is criticized for creating a one-way wealth transfer, where single individuals contribute without receiving benefits, while families with children receive subsidies, leading to a societal divide [3][4] Group 2 - Economic pressures, such as rising living costs and stagnant wages, are identified as primary barriers to increasing birth rates, with many young people delaying parenthood due to financial instability [6][11] - The cultural expectation of parental responsibility and the high costs associated with raising children further deter young couples from having children, as the financial support provided by the government is insufficient [6][12] - The increasing rate of lifelong singlehood among Japanese men and women is driven by economic factors, with lower-income individuals being more likely to remain unmarried [7][11] Group 3 - The "single tax" is seen as exacerbating social divisions, with younger generations feeling stigmatized and pressured by the government to conform to traditional family structures [9][14] - Historical examples from other countries, such as South Korea and France, demonstrate that punitive measures do not effectively address declining birth rates, suggesting that structural issues must be resolved first [9][12] - A comprehensive approach is needed to address the dual crises of declining birth rates and an aging population, focusing on work-life balance, intergenerational support, and a supportive environment for families [11][12]

Group 1 - The Japanese government plans to implement a "Child Future Strategy" starting in 2026, requiring all citizens and businesses to pay a "support fund" through health insurance surcharges, with monthly contributions expected to range from 250 to 700 yen by 2028 [3] - The initiative aims to address Japan's declining birth rate, which is projected to fall below 700,000 newborns in 2024, with a birth rate of 1.2, significantly below the replacement level of 2.1 [5] - The strategy includes expanding child allowances and providing educational subsidies to encourage marriage and childbirth among young people [5] Group 2 - In contrast, China faces similar demographic challenges, with a population decrease of 2.08 million in 2023 and a natural growth rate of -0.15‰, alongside a declining birth rate of 9.02 million [5] - The Chinese single population exceeds 240 million, with over 77 million living alone, indicating a significant economic burden on this demographic, which could be exacerbated by a potential "single tax" [6] - China has implemented various measures to encourage childbirth, including the promotion of two-child and three-child policies, extended parental leave, and increased investment in childcare services [7]

Group 1 - The 2024 National Education Development Statistical Bulletin reveals a total of 470,000 schools in China, including 253,300 kindergartens and 152,800 private schools, continuing a decline of over 10,000 schools since 2023 [1] - In the early childhood education sector, the impact of declining birth rates is evident, with 25,330 kindergartens and 35.84 million children enrolled, reflecting a gross enrollment rate of 92.00% [1] - The number of kindergartens decreased by over 20,000 compared to 2023, with a significant drop in the number of inclusive kindergartens from 236,400 to 221,000, a reduction of more than 15,000 [1] Group 2 - The private education sector is facing challenges due to a continuous decline in birth rates, with the number of private schools decreasing from 167,200 to 152,800, a drop of nearly 15,000 [2] - In 2024, there are 46.22 million students enrolled in private schools, accounting for 16.13% of total enrollment, down from 49.40 million in 2023 [2] - The number of private colleges stands at 803, representing 25.75% of all colleges, with a decrease of over 3 million students compared to the previous year [2] Group 3 - The decline in birth rates and total population is directly impacting the private education sector, leading to a shift from rapid expansion to a focus on sustainable growth and differentiation [3] - The number of special education schools increased to 2,396, with 158,200 students enrolled, indicating a growing coverage and support for special education [3] - The number of special education students rose from 155,000 to 158,200, reflecting an upward trend in special education enrollment [3]

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the declining birth rates in Japan, South Korea, and globally, highlighting the economic and social factors contributing to this trend, and suggests measures to create a more supportive environment for families [1][2][4]. Group 1: Declining Birth Rates - Japan's newborns in 2024 are projected to be approximately 686,000, a decrease of 41,200 from 2023, marking the first time since 1899 that the number falls below 700,000, 14 years earlier than expected [1] - South Korea has declared a "population emergency" due to its own declining birth rates, reflecting a broader trend across many countries [2] - The UNFPA reports that the global average fertility rate has dropped from 3.31 children per woman in 1990 to 2.3 in 2024, with 55% of countries below the replacement level of 2.1 children [2] Group 2: Economic Factors Influencing Birth Rates - Economic constraints are a significant factor in declining birth rates, with 39% of surveyed individuals citing "financial limitations" as the primary reason for having fewer children than desired [5] - In South Korea, 58% of respondents identified financial constraints as a key reason for their reluctance to have more children [5] - Other economic concerns include job security (21%), housing issues (19%), and lack of quality childcare services (12%) [5] Group 3: Recommendations for Supporting Families - The report emphasizes the need to alleviate economic burdens to enhance fertility intentions, suggesting measures such as paid parental leave, affordable healthcare, and supportive partnerships [7] - Sweden's new law allowing grandparents to receive compensation for childcare is highlighted as an innovative approach to reduce the burden on young parents [7] - The article advocates for equitable parental leave policies to encourage shared parenting responsibilities, which can improve women's workforce participation and men's involvement in childcare [7] Group 4: Government Initiatives - Japan's government aims to increase the male parental leave rate from 30.1% in 2023 to 50% by 2025 and potentially 80% by 2030, with new benefits for immediate paternity leave [8] - South Korea has seen positive changes in birth rates due to government policies such as extended leave, tax reductions, and housing support, with a notable increase in monthly births for nine consecutive months [9] - The report calls for governments to transform into "fertility enablers" to create an environment where individuals can realize their family planning desires [9]

Group 1 - Japan's newborn population for 2024 is projected at 686,061, marking a decrease of 41,227 from the previous year and the first time it has fallen below 700,000 since 1899 [1][2] - The total fertility rate for Japan in 2024 is 1.15, a decline of 0.05 from the previous year, representing the lowest level since statistics began in 1947 [1][2] - The highest fertility rate is in Okinawa at 1.54, while Tokyo has the lowest at 0.96 [1] Group 2 - The number of deaths in Japan for 2024 is recorded at 1,605,298, the highest in history, leading to a natural population decrease of 919,237, also a record high [1] - The number of marriage registrations in 2024 is 485,063, an increase of 10,322 from the previous year, while divorce registrations rose by 2,081 to 185,895 [1] - The trend of declining birth rates is attributed to factors such as a decreasing young population and the increasing trend of late marriage and childbearing [2]

2024年在日本出生的日本儿童人数同比减少5.7%，降至68万6061人，自有统计数据以来首次 跌破70万人。总和生育率降至1.15，连续3年创新低。远远低于维持人口所需的约2.07…… 日本2024年的总和生育率（显示一名女性一生生育孩子的数量）为1.15。较上年（1.20）下降0.05个百 分点，连续3年创历史最低。远远低于维持人口所需的"约2.07"。以2005年的1.26为底部，2015年恢复到 1.45，2016年以后持续减少。 在日本，未婚生育的人很少，非婚生子的比例仅为2.5%（2023年）。未婚和事实婚姻难以生育和育儿 的社会规范根深蒂固，婚姻数的减少将直接导致出生人数下降。 2024年日本的死亡人数增加1.9%，增至160万5298人，人口自然减少（出生人数与死亡人数之差）为91 万9237人，均创出历史新高。人口自然减少的幅度比上年扩大了7万人。1年内减少了与香川县人口（91 万6000人）相同的规模。 人口急剧减少给日本经济的前景投下阴影。 随着劳动年龄人口（15~64岁）的减少，日本劳动力不足的问题日益严重。迄今为止，通过促进女性和 老年人就业，劳动力人口稳步增长，但日趋无法弥补少子化 ...

Group 1 - The report from Dongwu Securities indicates that the consumption growth rate among the 20-39 age group has significantly declined, contributing to approximately 44% of the overall consumption decrease from 2018 to 2022, compared to a 30.3% increase from 2010 to 2018 [1][5] - The consumption decline is most pronounced in the 20-30 age group, where their contribution to consumption growth plummeted from 13.8% (2010-2018) to just 0.8% (2018-2022) [5][24] - The elderly population (60 years and older) has become the largest contributor to consumption growth, particularly in food and healthcare sectors, contrasting sharply with the declining consumption in entertainment categories like KTV and bars [7][24] Group 2 - The average age in China has reached a median of 40 years, indicating a demographic shift where the primary consumer base will transition from those under 40 to those over 40 in the next decade [10][40] - The report highlights a concerning trend of increasing youth unemployment, which is linked to the decline in consumption among younger demographics, creating a chain reaction affecting overall consumption [5][17] - The elderly population, while contributing significantly to consumption growth, faces challenges as their income and average consumption levels have not kept pace with the rapid aging of the population [29][30] Group 3 - The consumption tendency among the youth has dropped dramatically, with a decline of 46.1 percentage points for the 20-39 age group since 2020, indicating a shift towards more conservative spending behaviors [34][35] - The report suggests that as the population ages and the youth demographic shrinks, businesses will increasingly target consumers aged 40 and above, who tend to be more rational and less impulsive in their spending [27][28] - The overall consumer landscape is changing, with brands likely to shift focus from younger consumers to older demographics, reflecting the broader societal changes in consumption patterns [39][40]

智通财经5月28日电，日本厚生劳动省27日公布的人口动态统计（初值，包含外国人）显示，2025年1至 3月新生儿数（出生人数）为162,955人，较上年同期减少4.6%。少子化趋势未能得到遏制，但较2024年 同期6.4%的降幅（170,804人）有所收窄。2024全年新生儿数创下720,988人的历史新低。厚劳省计划6 月公布仅以日本人为对象的人口动态统计"概数"的2024年新生儿数，有可能首次跌破70万大关。2025年 1至3月婚姻登记数为131,332对，减少3.9%；死亡人数达466,672人，增加5.7%，减去出生人数的人口自 然减少为303,717人。 日本一季度新生儿数同比减少4.6% ...

Core Viewpoint - The book "Can We Still Be Family?" by two Japanese women from "non-traditional families" explores themes of family, intimate relationships, love, marriage, and female growth through their candid dialogues [1][3]. Group 1: Authors and Background - The book features conversations between actress and writer Yayako Uchida and neuroscientist Nobuko Nakano, who share their unique and challenging family backgrounds [1][3]. - Yayako Uchida, daughter of the late actress Kiki Kirin, grew up in a celebrity family marked by her parents' separation before her birth and her father's tumultuous lifestyle [1][4]. - Nobuko Nakano experienced a cold and communicative relationship with her parents, leading to her early independence [1][3]. Group 2: Themes of Relationships - The dialogues reflect on their experiences with family and marriage, revealing the complexities of their relationships and the impact of their upbringing [3][4]. - Uchida married at 19 and had three children, but faced significant differences with her husband, while Nakano's marriage involved a "weekend couple" and child-free lifestyle [3][4]. - The book emphasizes the importance of communication in relationships, contrasting it with the silence that can lead to deeper issues [11]. Group 3: Insights on Parenting and Family Dynamics - The authors discuss the challenges of parenting, highlighting the potential for becoming "toxic parents" due to immaturity and lack of preparation [10][12]. - Nakano notes that the separation between parents and children is a painful yet necessary part of growth, while Uchida reflects on the void left by her parents' passing [9][10]. - The book predicts that by 2024, half of the Japanese population may choose not to marry, reflecting changing societal norms around family and relationships [10][13]. Group 4: Cultural Reflections - The book has resonated with readers in Japan, who find common ground in the authors' experiences, suggesting that non-traditional family backgrounds do not preclude a fulfilling life [13]. - The discussions also touch on societal expectations and the evolving nature of marriage, with younger generations approaching relationships with caution [12][13].