曾经有专家预测， 只要二孩政策开放，那中国新生儿就会蹭蹭的往上涨，结果被现实狠狠的打了脸，因为这位专家根本就没有考虑到当下 老百姓最需要的 是什么。 中国的生育率低下，总人口眼瞅着就要被 隔壁的邻居给比下去了， 新一代的劳动力越来越少，很多人都在着急，如今国家终于找到了关键点—— 住房。 25个省份实现生育津贴直接发放至个人，2024年参保女职工人均津贴超2.6万元。吉林、江苏等7省实现"生娃基本不花钱"，广州甚至有宝妈分娩后个人仅支 出3.7元。此外，延长产假、 发放育儿补贴、推进托育机构建设等政策也在各地落地。 为什么说生育率低的关键点在于住房？又该如何调整住房？ 高房价成核心梗阻 十几年前，"人口多"还是我国与生俱来的底气，没人会想到 "人口第一"的位置会轻易旁落。联合国 《世界人口展望2024修订版》显示，2023年印度常住人 口达14.29亿，正式超越中国，这一变化背后，是我国日渐稀薄的出生率和持续低迷的生育率。 前言 为了鼓励生育，国家早已多措并举：截至2025年10月， 全国31个省份将辅助生殖纳入医保，惠及超100万人次。 但这些政策在高房价的 "资金黑洞"面前，显得格外苍白。对普通家庭而言， ...

Core Insights - In 2024, China's birth population stabilized at 9.54 million after seven consecutive years of decline, marking a significant turning point in the country's demographic trend [1][2][20] - The maternal and infant consumption market is expanding rapidly, projected to grow from 3 trillion yuan in 2018 to over 7.6 trillion yuan in 2024, and expected to approach 9 trillion yuan by 2027 [1][26] Policy and Support Measures - The Chinese government is implementing various supportive measures, including annual subsidies of 3,600 yuan for children under three years old starting in 2025, along with tax deductions for childcare and education [2][22] - The expansion of maternity insurance coverage to include flexible workers and migrant workers is part of the government's strategy to enhance support for families [2][22] Demographic Trends - The core demographic for pregnancy and childcare is aged 25 to 34, accounting for over 60% of the population, with a notable trend of late marriage and childbearing [2][4] - There is a significant gap between ideal and actual birth rates, with 64.53% of women desiring two children, but only 26.01% having achieved this [3][35] Regional and Generational Differences - Birth rates vary significantly by region, with first-tier cities showing a strong desire for second children, yet actual birth rates remain low [3][31] - Generation Z shows a preference for fewer children, with a higher inclination towards "child-free" lifestyles compared to older generations [3][36] Consumer Behavior and Preferences - The maternal and infant market is characterized by a shift towards rational consumer behavior, with safety, cost-effectiveness, and functionality being key considerations [8][9] - There is a growing reliance on digital platforms for information and services related to pregnancy and childcare, with over 67% of users depending on specialized maternal and infant apps [9][10] Economic Factors Influencing Birth Decisions - Economic stability is viewed as the primary factor influencing birth decisions, with 53.30% of women citing enhanced family economic strength as crucial [4][39] - The demand for government subsidies is particularly high among lower-tier city residents, while higher-tier city residents prioritize economic and service support [44][45]

Core Viewpoint - The article explores the geographical differences in fertility intentions in China, highlighting a cultural divide between the north and south, and a socio-economic divide between the east and west [5][7]. Summary by Sections Cultural and Economic Differences - Cultural differences in China are often framed in terms of north-south contrasts, such as dietary preferences and transportation methods, while economic development is more frequently discussed in terms of east-west disparities [5]. - The eastern coastal regions have advanced significantly in economic openness and modernization, while the western inland areas lag behind due to geographical and historical constraints [5]. Fertility Intentions - The study investigates how geographical differences reflect in fertility-related indicators, specifically ideal and intended number of children, revealing a clear north-south and east-west divide [7]. - Ideal number of children is measured by asking respondents about the most desirable number of children for a family, while intended number of children reflects personal plans for future childbearing [10][11]. Methodology - The research employs a multilevel regression and post-stratification (MRP) method to estimate fertility intentions at the county level, addressing the challenge of data representation at finer geographical scales [15]. - The model predicts fertility intentions for unique demographic groups and adjusts these predictions based on actual population structures to provide more accurate county-level estimates [16]. Findings - The study reveals that the differences in ideal and intended number of children within provinces are comparable to those between provinces, indicating that key factors influencing fertility intentions operate at more localized levels [16]. - The research illustrates the complexity of fertility intentions when viewed through the lenses of culture, economy, and geography, suggesting a nuanced understanding of demographic behaviors in China [16].

Group 1: Cultural and Economic Differences - The article highlights the cultural differences in China, particularly the North-South contrast in dietary preferences, transportation methods, and personality traits, as well as the East-West economic development disparities [1][2] - The Eastern coastal regions are significantly ahead in economic openness, industrial modernization, urbanization, and international integration compared to the Western inland areas, which face geographical and historical constraints [2] Group 2: Fertility Intentions - The research indicates a clear North-South divide in ideal number of children and an East-West difference in intended number of children, reflecting the influence of cultural and socio-economic factors on demographic behaviors [4][5] - Ideal number of children is measured by asking respondents about their perception of the ideal family size, while intended number of children focuses on individual plans for future childbirth, influenced by economic realities and personal circumstances [6][7] Group 3: Methodology and Findings - The study employs a multilevel regression and post-stratification (MRP) method to estimate county-level fertility intentions, addressing the challenge of data representation at smaller geographic scales [10][11] - The results reveal that the differences in ideal and intended number of children within provinces are comparable to those between provinces, suggesting that key factors affecting fertility intentions operate at more micro geographic or social scales [13]

Core Insights - The city of Tianmen is experiencing a "counter-trend rebound" in birth rates, with approximately 7,217 newborns expected in 2024, a 17% increase from 2023, while the national birth population is projected to rise by about 5.8% to 9.54 million [2][4][10] - This increase is attributed to Tianmen's substantial fertility support policies, with over 300 million yuan planned for investment from 2024 to 2026 to encourage childbirth [2][4][11] - However, experts caution that the total fertility rate (TFR) is the key indicator for assessing fertility levels, and the current increase in birth numbers does not necessarily indicate a fundamental improvement in fertility intentions [3][5][10] Policy Measures - Tianmen has implemented several policies to encourage childbirth, including increased maternity leave, financial rewards for families with two or three children, and housing purchase vouchers [4][5] - Families can receive up to 287,188 yuan for having a second child and up to 355,988 yuan for a third child, excluding national-level childcare subsidies [4][10] Demographic Analysis - The increase in birth rates may be influenced by cultural factors, such as the "Year of the Dragon," and a release of pent-up demand for childbirth following the easing of pandemic restrictions [5][10] - The local population's growth is also affected by migration, as families with Tianmen residency may return to register births and claim subsidies, thus inflating local birth statistics [5][10] Statistical Challenges - There are significant challenges in accurately measuring the total fertility rate in Tianmen due to discrepancies in population data sources and the high proportion of migrant workers [6][7] - Current statistics primarily reflect the number of births registered in Tianmen, which may not accurately represent the local population's fertility behavior [6][7] Long-term Considerations - Experts suggest that the observed increase in birth numbers may be a short-term effect rather than a sustainable trend, emphasizing the need for consistent and authoritative data monitoring [3][5][8] - The effectiveness of Tianmen's policies in improving fertility rates on a broader scale remains uncertain, and a more substantial national investment in fertility support is deemed necessary to address the low birth rate issue effectively [10][11]

Core Viewpoint - The article highlights a significant demographic crisis in China, predicting a drastic population decline from 1.4 billion to 580 million in the next 50 years, emphasizing the urgency of addressing this issue [2][18]. Group 1: Population Decline - The prediction by economist Lang Xianping indicates a potential population drop to 580 million in 50 years if current birth rates continue [18]. - The birth rate has been declining sharply, with newborns falling from 1,846,000 in 2016 to 902,000 in 2023, marking a significant decrease [10][14]. - In 2024, the projected number of newborns is 954,000, while deaths are expected to reach 1,093,000, resulting in a net population decrease of 139,000 [16]. Group 2: Aging Population - The elderly population (60 years and above) reached 290 million in 2023, accounting for 21.1% of the total population, indicating a rapidly aging society [20]. - By 2031, it is projected that one in five individuals will be 65 years or older, leading to a significant increase in the old-age dependency ratio [22]. - The old-age dependency ratio is expected to rise from 22.5% in 2023 to 48.8% by 2050, indicating a growing burden on the working-age population [24]. Group 3: Reasons for Low Birth Rates - Young couples cite the high cost of raising children as a primary reason for not having more kids, with expenses for a single child reaching tens of thousands of yuan [29][31]. - The financial burden of housing loans and living expenses leaves little room for additional children, making it increasingly difficult for young families to consider expanding [31]. - The impact of childbirth on women's careers also deters many from having children, as societal pressures and workplace biases create additional challenges [33].

Core Viewpoint - The newly introduced childcare subsidy policy aims to provide financial support for families with children under three years old, with a current annual subsidy of 3600 yuan per child, which many perceive as insufficient given the high costs of raising children in China [4][5][24]. Group 1: Subsidy Details - Starting from January 1, 2025, the government will issue subsidies for children under three years old, with a basic standard of 3600 yuan per child per year [4][5]. - Some regions, like Hohhot, offer additional one-time subsidies, making the total support for a first child up to 20800 yuan [8]. - The expectation is that the subsidy amount may increase in the future, potentially reaching 10000 yuan or more per year [8]. Group 2: Cost of Raising Children - The average cost of raising a child in China from 0 to 17 years is approximately 538,312 yuan, with urban areas like Shanghai and Beijing having even higher costs of 101,000 yuan and 93,600 yuan respectively [20][21]. - The breakdown of costs shows that raising a child involves significant expenses at various stages, with the largest portion incurred during the ages of 6-14 years [23]. - The high cost of child-rearing in China is highlighted by the fact that it is 6.3 times the per capita GDP, which is among the highest globally [21]. Group 3: Societal Attitudes Towards Childbirth - There is a growing sentiment among the public that the current subsidy is inadequate, with many individuals expressing that they would not consider having children for such a small financial incentive [5][6][9]. - The article notes that societal attitudes towards childbirth are influenced by various factors, including economic conditions and personal aspirations, leading to a decline in birth rates [30][31][35]. - The disparity in birth rates between wealthier and poorer populations is evident, with lower-income families often having a higher birth rate compared to their wealthier counterparts [35][49]. Group 4: Policy Implications and Recommendations - The government’s intention behind the subsidy is to provide a safety net for families who wish to have children, rather than to encourage high-income families to have more children [24][27]. - Suggestions for improving the situation include creating a more supportive environment for families, such as enhancing childcare services, providing parental leave, and ensuring access to quality education [67][68]. - The article argues against punitive measures like taxing single individuals, emphasizing the need for positive incentives rather than moral coercion [62][68].

Group 1 - The long-awaited childcare subsidy policy has finally been announced, effective from January 1, 2025, for children under three years old [2][3] - The current national basic standard for the subsidy is 3,600 yuan per child per year, which will be provided until the child turns three [3][8] - Many people express dissatisfaction with the amount, stating it is insufficient to cover basic childcare costs, with some suggesting that even a larger sum would not incentivize them to have children [3][4][5] Group 2 - Some regions are offering additional local subsidies, such as Hohhot, which provides a one-time payment of 10,000 yuan for the first child, totaling 20,800 yuan when combined with the national subsidy [7] - There is speculation that the subsidy amount may increase in the future, potentially reaching 10,000 yuan or more in subsequent years [8] - The average cost of raising a child in China from 0 to 17 years is approximately 538,312 yuan, with urban families in cities like Shanghai and Beijing facing even higher costs of 101,000 yuan and 93,600 yuan respectively [21][22] Group 3 - The subsidy aims to provide basic support for families who wish to have children, particularly benefiting low-income households where the average cost of raising a child is about 126,000 yuan [26][27] - The article highlights that the rising costs of child-rearing are a significant deterrent for many potential parents, with some individuals expressing a desire for much higher subsidies to consider having children [9][19][20] - The discussion reflects a broader trend where individuals in developed regions are less inclined to have children due to financial pressures and lifestyle choices [56][57]

Core Insights - China's total population has been declining for three consecutive years since peaking in 2021, with projections indicating it will fall below 1.4 billion by 2027, 1.3 billion by 2039, and 1.2 billion by 2047 [2][11] - The number of newborns is expected to drop below 9 million by 2025, fall below 8 million by 2028, and potentially dip below 7 million by 2035, with a slower decline in the subsequent decade [10][11] - China entered a deep aging society in 2021, expected to reach an ultra-aging society by 2032, and will match Japan's current aging level by 2048 [14][16] Population Trends - The fertility rate among women aged 15-29 is significantly higher than in Japan and the UK, but the fertility rate for women aged 30-49 is notably low, indicating a need for policies encouraging childbirth among older women [24][25] - The decline in marriage rates is attributed to gender imbalance, with a male-to-female ratio of approximately 115:100 for those born between 2006-2010, which may lead to severe gender disparities in the upcoming decade [33][36] - Educational disparities also contribute to declining marriage rates, as there are more men with lower education levels compared to women with higher education, complicating the marriage prospects for educated women [3][38] Urbanization and Migration - Urbanization rates have slowed, with the average annual growth rate dropping from 1.4 percentage points to about 0.8 percentage points post-2021, while the urbanization rate is projected to reach 67% by 2024 [42][44] - The average age of migrant workers has risen to 43.1 years, with over 30% being over 50, indicating a trend of aging among the workforce and a decrease in population mobility [46][48] - Major urban areas continue to attract population inflows, with cities like Suzhou, Nanjing, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou experiencing significant net population increases [62][64] Economic Implications - The industrial workforce has been declining since 2012, with projections indicating a drop from 2.32 billion in 2012 to 2.13 billion by 2024, highlighting a shift towards the service sector [72][79] - The service sector's share of GDP is expected to rise, with the third sector projected to account for 57% of GDP by 2024, compared to 36% for the secondary sector [69][79] - The aging population and rising dependency ratio will increase demand for services, necessitating a focus on developing the service industry to stabilize employment [80][100]

Group 1: Population Changes and Trends - The total population of China has been decreasing since its peak in 2021, with projections indicating it will fall below 1.4 billion by 2027 and below 1.3 billion by 2039 [2][7] - The number of newborns in 2024 is expected to be 9.54 million, lower than previous predictions, with further declines anticipated in subsequent years, potentially dropping below 9 million in 2025 and 8 million in 2028 [5][6] - China entered a deep aging society in 2021, with expectations to reach super-aged status by 2032, and projections suggest it will match Japan's aging level by 2048 [8][11] Group 2: Fertility Rates and Marriage Trends - Fertility rates among women aged 15-29 are higher than those in Japan and the UK, but rates for women aged 30-49 are significantly lower, indicating a need for policies that encourage childbirth among older women [2][16] - The declining marriage rate is attributed to gender imbalance and educational disparities, with a notable surplus of males in younger age groups and a higher number of educated women than men in higher education [25][30] - The average marriage age in China is lower than in several developed countries, yet the overall fertility rate remains low, suggesting that early marriage does not necessarily lead to higher birth rates [16][17] Group 3: Urbanization and Migration Trends - Urbanization rates are slowing, with the annual growth rate dropping from 1.4 percentage points to approximately 0.8 percentage points post-2021, while the urbanization rate is projected to reach 67% by 2024 [32][36] - The proportion of migrant workers moving across provinces is decreasing, with an increasing average age of migrant workers, indicating a trend towards local employment rather than migration [39][40] - Major urban areas continue to attract population inflows, with cities like Suzhou, Nanjing, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou experiencing significant net population increases, reflecting ongoing urbanization trends [46][51] Group 4: Economic Implications of Population Changes - The share of the secondary industry in GDP is declining, while the tertiary sector is expected to grow, with projections indicating that the tertiary sector will account for 63% of GDP by 2024 [57][59] - Employment in the secondary industry has been decreasing since 2012, with a notable drop in industrial employment numbers expected to continue [59][64] - The aging population and rising dependency ratios will increase demand for services, suggesting a need for policies that support the growth of the service sector [65][70]