这场博弈正驱动各国竞相研发从电子废料中高效提取镓的新技术。镓从工业副产品演变为战略焦点表明：在现代科技竞争中，保障资源循环与掌握资源创造 同等重要。布局镓回收产业，已成为各国维护供应链安全、提升战略自主性、塑造未来资源秩序的关键举措。 镓金属回收 镓，这一伴随铝冶炼产生的金属，已成为第三代半导体与高端光电领域不可或缺的战略资源。全球供应链高度依赖中国原生镓生产，凸显其脆弱性。贸易波 动或产能调整都可能冲击半导体、国防及新能源产业，促使各国将镓列为关键原材料，积极推动供应链"去风险化"。 在此背景下，镓回收的战略价值已远超环保与经济层面，直接关系到科技主权与供应链安全。对进口依赖高的国家而言，建立本土回收能力可在断供时维持 关键产业运行，提供战略缓冲，增强整体韧性。 主导回收技术与标准更可能重塑产业权力格局。领先者不仅能占据电子废弃物处理市场优势，还有望制定再生镓的品质与认证体系，掌握类似石油定价权般 的地缘政治影响力。 回收产业的崛起也在改变全球资源流动模式。电子产品消费大国可通过技术将废弃物转化为"城市矿产"，减少对传统资源国的依赖，重构产业链分工。 ...

Core Viewpoint - The extension of the tariff exemption for Chinese goods until November 10, 2026, reflects a complex decision driven by multiple motivations, including domestic economic pressures and long-term strategic considerations [1][10]. Group 1: Background of the Exemption - The extension appears to be a signal of easing trade tensions, but it is primarily a pragmatic decision based on U.S. interests rather than a gesture of goodwill [3]. - Domestic inflation remains a significant concern, with current levels still above the Federal Reserve's comfort zone, making high tariffs on essential goods counterproductive for U.S. consumers and businesses [3]. - The stability of supply chains is crucial, as complete decoupling from China is unrealistic; many U.S. companies recognize the cost advantages and comprehensive supply chain support that China provides [3]. Group 2: Strategic Intentions - The exemption is likely a tactical retreat to buy time for domestic industrial adjustments, as the Biden administration aims to promote re-industrialization and risk mitigation in supply chains [5]. - By setting a two-year exemption rather than a permanent one, the U.S. retains flexibility and leverage for future negotiations with China, allowing for potential adjustments based on strategic assessments [5]. Group 3: China's Perspective - China has responded calmly to the U.S. decision, emphasizing respect for international trade rules and a commitment to its development path [7]. - The Chinese stance is that unilateral tariff measures are detrimental to global interests and ultimately harm the U.S. itself, advocating for dialogue and cooperation [7]. - China aims to enhance its core competitiveness independently of U.S. policies, focusing on high-level openness and leveraging its vast market and robust industrial system for high-quality development [7].

Core Points - The EU has softened its rhetoric towards China in hopes of extending rare earth export licenses from three months to one year, which increases the likelihood of Chinese exports but does not change the dependency of the supply chain [1][2] - China's export licensing system remains a critical element, retaining the authority to review end-users, approve applications, and suspend shipments for security reasons, particularly regarding "military end-use" [2][3] - The diplomatic shift highlights Europe's vulnerability; without domestic refining capacity, the EU must negotiate for resources, falling short of true supply chain "de-risking" [1][3] Industry Insights - The extension of export licenses is seen as a means to provide supply certainty rather than independence, ensuring production continuity but not security [3][4] - The article emphasizes that describing this situation as a "breakthrough" is overly optimistic, as China has not confirmed the extension, and even with annual licenses, there is no guarantee of export volumes [5][6] - China's dominance in the rare earth supply chain is underscored, controlling over 80% of refining capacity and more than 90% of magnet production, while Europe's own capacity remains in a fragile early stage [5][6] Conclusion - The EU's need to soften its stance to secure temporary relief underscores the fragility of Western supply chains, with China's licensing system defining global rare earth flows rather than market competition [6]

Core Points - The U.S. and Australia signed an $8.5 billion rare earth minerals agreement, which is expected to significantly increase U.S. rare earth supplies and reduce reliance on China [1] - The EU was excluded from this agreement, highlighting its vulnerability and dependence on Chinese rare earths for key industries [2] - The EU's previous criticisms of China regarding trade imbalances and subsidies have backfired, leaving it in a precarious position as it seeks to negotiate with China for rare earth supplies [4][9] Group 1 - The U.S. and Australia are collaborating to break China's dominance in the rare earth market, with the U.S. claiming that it will have an abundance of rare earths within a year [1] - The EU's exclusion from the agreement has caused embarrassment and concern, especially as China has tightened its rare earth export restrictions [2] - The EU's reliance on Chinese rare earths for critical industries such as automotive, chips, and wind power poses a significant risk of supply shortages [2] Group 2 - The EU's trade commissioner has reached out to China to negotiate a new mutually beneficial agreement regarding rare earth exports, indicating a shift in tone [4] - China's rare earth production capabilities and complete supply chain control make it difficult for the U.S. and Australia to compete in the short term [6] - The energy supply challenges in the U.S. and Australia further complicate their ability to develop a robust rare earth processing industry [7] Group 3 - The EU's previous alignment with the U.S. against China has led to a passive stance, which is now causing it to seek urgent assistance from China [9] - The EU must address its own issues, such as the electric vehicle anti-subsidy case and semiconductor concerns, to improve relations with China [9] - A pragmatic approach and respect for rules are essential for the EU to secure its industrial supply chains in the context of deep global interdependencies [9]

Economic Impact of Geopolitical Fragmentation - The 2007-2008 financial crisis marked a significant turning point in globalization, leading to increased geopolitical fragmentation since 1975[2] - Geopolitical fragmentation index shows that a one standard deviation negative shock can reduce global GDP by approximately -0.4%, peaking within one to two years[5] - Emerging economies, particularly in Southeast Asia and Latin America, are more severely impacted by external shocks compared to developed regions[5] Sectoral and Regional Variations - Industries closely tied to global markets, such as manufacturing and finance, face the most significant disruptions due to geopolitical risks[5] - The spillover effects of geopolitical factors are most pronounced in the US-EU region, affecting global economic dynamics[5] - In contrast, sectors like agriculture and real estate, which are more localized, experience relatively minor impacts[5] Innovation as a Response to Geopolitical Risks - Higher exposure to external political risks correlates with increased innovation activities, such as patent filings and R&D spending[8] - Private sector initiatives drive innovation in response to geopolitical uncertainties, highlighting the importance of market incentives[8] - Medium-innovation firms, which are sensitive to external risks, tend to increase R&D efforts more than both high-tech giants and low-innovation firms[8] Long-term Implications for Economic Growth - Strengthening domestic innovation capabilities can help mitigate risks associated with global supply chains and enhance resilience[8] - Countries that can achieve technological advancements and industry upgrades within a regional framework are likely to excel in future global competition[8]

Core Viewpoint - The agreement with Japan is part of the U.S. strategy to mitigate risks in supply chains [1] Group 1 - The U.S. Treasury Secretary emphasized the importance of the Japan agreement in the context of supply chain risk reduction [1]