Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the evolving U.S. policy on semiconductor exports to China, highlighting two key statements made by U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo that reflect a shift from a comprehensive blockade to a more targeted control strategy [1][3][5]. Group 1: First Statement Context - The first statement occurred between April and August 2025, during which the Trump administration continued its comprehensive blockade on semiconductor exports to China. Raimondo stated that the U.S. would not sell high-quality products to China, even limiting third-tier products, with the core aim of making Chinese companies dependent on U.S. technology [1]. - This statement was made shortly after the U.S. government suspended NVIDIA's export license for the H20 chip to China, indicating a continuation of the "one-size-fits-all" tech blockade strategy aimed at stifling China's industrial upgrade [1]. Group 2: Second Statement Context - The second statement was made in mid-August 2025, after the Trump administration approved NVIDIA's export license for the H20 chip. Raimondo adjusted her stance, suggesting that the U.S. would sell products to China that were "just enough" for their needs, aiming to make developers dependent on U.S. technology stacks [3]. - This change in policy was marked by NVIDIA and AMD agreeing to pay 15% of their sales revenue from China to the U.S. government in exchange for the restoration of export licenses, indicating a shift from "comprehensive blockade" to "precise control" [3]. Group 3: Implications of the Statements - Both statements were made through CNBC, showcasing the U.S. government's use of mainstream financial media as a tool for public discourse. The ongoing blockade has led to significant risks for companies like NVIDIA, which face potential market share losses in China [5]. - The performance breakthroughs of domestic Chinese chips, such as those from Huawei and Cambrian, have rendered the blockade increasingly ineffective, forcing the U.S. government to reconsider its strategy [5]. Group 4: Future Strategies - To achieve the goal of providing products that are "just enough" without exceeding limitations, the U.S. is likely to accelerate the implementation of a "chip governance mechanism." Reports suggest that NVIDIA's chips may soon include tracking and remote shutdown features, potentially enforcing geographical restrictions on their use [5][6]. - The U.S. may also strengthen the binding effect of the CUDA system, which is relied upon by over 4 million developers globally. This could involve limiting access to high-level API interfaces and delaying critical updates, creating a dependency trap for Chinese companies in AI model training [6]. Group 5: Speculative Measures - There is speculation that China may require all imported chips to undergo "backdoor clearance" certification, enforcing mandatory technical reviews on critical components. Companies that refuse to comply could be placed on an "unreliable entity list," creating a regulatory deterrent [7].

Core Viewpoint - The U.S. government is reportedly embedding location trackers in certain products to prevent advanced chips from being transferred to China, which aligns with the previously proposed "on-chip governance mechanism" that includes tracking capabilities [1] Group 1 - The U.S. government is taking measures to address the issue of advanced chips being shipped to China by incorporating tracking devices into specific products [1] - The concept of embedding "backdoors" in chips is highlighted, indicating a method of surveillance and control over chip distribution [1] - Chip industry professionals have confirmed that the tracking feature is a form of "backdoor" implementation [1]

Core Viewpoint - The U.S. government is reportedly embedding secret tracking devices in certain tech products using AI chips to monitor products potentially being shipped to China [1][5][10]. Group 1: Tracking Mechanism - The installation of such tracking devices may only require administrative approval, and companies like Dell and AMD are believed to be aware of this but have not commented [5]. - Currently, the U.S. government has not added tracking devices to individual chips, as this requires more complex technology involving embedded signaling software [10][11]. - The "on-chip governance mechanism" proposed by the U.S. includes tracking and positioning functions, which can be seen as a form of embedding "backdoors" [13][30]. Group 2: Technical Capabilities - The U.S. has considered a systematic approach to embedding "backdoors" in AI chips, allowing for functionalities such as license locking, tracking, usage monitoring, and usage restrictions [14][30]. - The H20 chip, specifically, is not considered safe, advanced, or environmentally friendly, with its overall computing power being only about 20% of the standard H100 version, and a 41% reduction in GPU core count [36][37]. - The energy efficiency of the H20 chip is approximately 0.37 TFLOPS/W, which does not meet the required standard of 0.5 TFLOPS/W for energy-saving levels [37]. Group 3: Government and Industry Relations - The U.S. government has previously indicated that companies cooperating with them to install "backdoors" could be exempt from export controls, particularly for "low-risk customers" in China [34]. - A recent meeting with NVIDIA regarding the H20 chip's security risks indicates ongoing scrutiny and regulatory pressure from the Chinese government [15].

Core Viewpoint - AMD and Nvidia have obtained semiconductor export licenses to China under unprecedented conditions, requiring them to pay 15% of their revenues from chip sales in China to the U.S. government [3][4]. Group 1: Export Licenses and Conditions - Nvidia and AMD received export licenses for their H20 and MI308 AI chips, respectively, with the condition of revenue sharing with the U.S. government [3]. - This revenue-sharing agreement is unprecedented, as no previous U.S. company has agreed to such terms for export licenses [3]. - The U.S. government has not yet decided how to utilize the funds collected from this revenue sharing [3]. Group 2: Security Concerns and Criticism - Chinese state media criticized Nvidia's H20 chip, claiming it poses security risks and may contain "backdoors" that could allow remote shutdown [4][5]. - Nvidia denied these allegations, emphasizing the importance of cybersecurity and asserting that their chips do not contain backdoors [4]. - The Chinese National Internet Information Office has raised concerns about potential vulnerabilities in the H20 chip and requested Nvidia to provide proof regarding its safety [6]. Group 3: Technical Limitations of H20 Chip - The H20 chip is criticized for being less advanced than its standard version, the H100, with only about 20% of the overall computing power and 41% fewer GPU cores [7]. - The energy efficiency of the H20 chip is also questioned, as it reportedly achieves only 0.37 TFLOPS/W, below the 0.5 TFLOPS/W threshold for energy-saving levels [7]. - The article suggests that consumers may choose not to purchase the H20 chip due to its perceived lack of safety, advancement, and environmental friendliness [8].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the security risks associated with the H20 chip from Nvidia, particularly focusing on the potential for backdoors and the implications of U.S. government policies regarding chip exports to China [3][4][24]. Group 1: Security Risks and Backdoors - The National Internet Information Office of China recently addressed Nvidia regarding security risks related to the H20 chip, suggesting concerns over potential backdoors [3]. - Nvidia's response emphasized that the chip does not contain backdoors, referencing the historical "Clipper chip" incident as a cautionary tale [4][6]. - A recent U.S. legislative proposal led by Congressman Bill Foster aims to mandate U.S. chip companies to incorporate backdoors in export-controlled chips, indicating a shift in policy towards more overt government control [8][10]. Group 2: Technical Aspects of Backdoors - Backdoors can be categorized into hardware and software types, with hardware backdoors being physical circuits left during design or manufacturing, while software backdoors involve implanted instructions in software [11][12]. - The H20 chip's power management module could theoretically implement a remote shutdown feature by embedding a circuit that triggers under specific conditions, such as usage time or environmental factors [14][15]. - The potential for software-based backdoors exists through updates to the CUDA ecosystem, which could allow for tracking and data collection functionalities [16][17]. Group 3: U.S. Government Control Mechanisms - The U.S. government has proposed a "chip governance mechanism" to coordinate chip design and production, ensuring compliance with national security requirements [19][20]. - This mechanism includes features such as license locking, tracking, usage monitoring, and usage restrictions, which could effectively control the deployment of chips like the H20 [20][23]. - Reports indicate that Nvidia's AI chips already possess many of the functionalities required for this governance mechanism, raising concerns about their safety and reliability for foreign markets [21][23]. Group 4: Performance and Environmental Concerns - The H20 chip is deemed not only unsafe but also technologically inferior, with only about 20% of the performance of its standard counterpart, the H100, and a 41% reduction in GPU core count [27]. - Environmental efficiency is also a concern, as the H20's energy efficiency ratio is approximately 0.37 TFLOPS/W, failing to meet the required 0.5 TFLOPS/W for energy-efficient GPUs [28]. - Given its lack of safety, technological advancement, and environmental compliance, the H20 chip is not considered a viable option for consumers [29][30].

Core Viewpoint - Nvidia has stated that its chips do not contain "backdoors," specifically referencing the "Clipper chip" incident from the past [1][3]. Group 1: Historical Context - In 1992, AT&T introduced a hardware device for secure voice transmission, which led to government dissatisfaction and the introduction of the "Clipper chip" containing a "cryptographic backdoor" for government access [3]. - The "Clipper chip" faced widespread resistance and was terminated within three years, leading the U.S. government to adopt a more discreet approach regarding "backdoors" in technology [3]. Group 2: Current Legislative Actions - In May 2023, U.S. Congressman Bill Foster proposed legislation requiring U.S. chip companies to include "backdoors" in export-controlled chips, asserting that the technology is mature and feasible [4][6]. Group 3: Technical Feasibility of Backdoors - There are two types of backdoors: hardware and software. Hardware backdoors involve physical modifications during chip design, while software backdoors involve embedded instructions in software [6]. - The Nvidia H20 chip can theoretically implement a "remote shutdown" feature through its power management module, which could be triggered under specific conditions [6][8]. - Another method for a hardware backdoor involves modifying the H20 chip's firmware to restrict functionality based on certain conditions, such as geographic location [8]. Group 4: Software Ecosystem and Backdoors - The CUDA ecosystem, used by over 4 million developers, could potentially facilitate the activation of backdoors through software updates, allowing for tracking and data collection [9][11]. - The U.S. aims to maintain AI dominance through both hardware and software ecosystems, necessitating other countries to develop independent alternatives [11]. Group 5: On-Chip Governance Mechanism - The U.S. government has proposed an "on-chip governance mechanism" to coordinate chip design and production, which includes features like license locking, tracking, usage monitoring, and usage restrictions [12][14]. - Many leading chip manufacturers, including Nvidia, already possess the necessary functionalities for this governance mechanism, although some may not yet be activated [14]. Group 6: Concerns Regarding Nvidia's H20 Chip - The H20 chip is considered unsafe for China, as it lacks advanced features and has only about 20% of the performance of its standard counterpart, the H100 [17][20]. - The H20 chip's energy efficiency is approximately 0.37 TFLOPS/W, failing to meet the 0.5 TFLOPS/W standard set by China's green development initiatives [18][19]. - Given its lack of safety, advancement, and environmental compliance, the H20 chip is deemed a poor choice for consumers [20][21].

Core Viewpoint - Nvidia has stated that its chips do not contain "backdoors," specifically addressing the "Clipper chip" incident from the past [1][2]. Group 1: Historical Context of Backdoors - In 1992, AT&T launched a hardware device for secure voice transmission, which led to government dissatisfaction and the introduction of the "Clipper chip" containing a "backdoor" for government access [3][4][5]. - The "Clipper chip" faced significant resistance and was terminated within three years, leading the government to adopt a more discreet approach regarding "backdoors" [6]. Group 2: Current Legislative Developments - In May of this year, U.S. Congressman Bill Foster proposed legislation requiring U.S. chip companies to include "backdoors" in export-controlled chips [8]. - Foster, with a background in chip design, asserted that the technology to implement such features is mature and feasible [9]. Group 3: Technical Feasibility of Backdoors - There are two main types of "backdoors": hardware and software [12][20]. - Using Nvidia's H20 chip as an example, a hardware "backdoor" could be implemented through the power management module to enable remote shutdown capabilities [13][14]. - Software "backdoors" can be activated through updates to the CUDA ecosystem, which is widely used by developers globally [16][18]. Group 4: Implications of Backdoor Mechanisms - The "backdoor" mechanisms can facilitate tracking and remote disabling of chips, raising concerns about information security [19][23]. - The U.S. has developed a "chip governance mechanism" to coordinate chip design and production, ensuring control over AI chips [24][29]. Group 5: Concerns Regarding Nvidia's H20 Chip - The H20 chip, which is being exported to China, is considered unsafe due to its limited performance compared to the H100, with only about 20% of the overall computing power and a 41% reduction in GPU core count [33]. - The H20 chip's energy efficiency is also subpar, with a measured efficiency of 0.37 TFLOPS/W, failing to meet the required standards [37]. - Given its lack of advancement, environmental sustainability, and safety, the H20 chip is not seen as a viable option for consumers [40].