Report Industry Investment Rating There is no information provided in the content about the report industry investment rating. Core Viewpoints of the Report The report analyzes the liquidity situation in December 2025 and makes a forecast for January 2026. In December, the central bank actively injected liquidity, and the funds across the year were stable. The monetary policy emphasizes cross - cycle balance and flexible and efficient use of reserve requirement ratio cuts and interest rate cuts. In January, the liquidity gap pressure is relatively large, and the potential disturbances on the bank's liability side may increase in the middle and late months, but the funds fluctuation may be relatively mild, and attention should be paid to the marginal changes in the bank's liability pressure after the increase in fiscal factor disturbances [1][3][4]. Summary According to the Directory 1. December 2025 Funds and Liquidity Review: Active Injection, Stable across the Year (1) Funds Review: Narrow - range Fluctuation Continued In December 2025, the overnight fluctuation range narrowed compared with the previous month, and the 7D funds fluctuation range widened. The overnight funds basically ran stably around 1.28%, and the 7D funds were stable around 1.45% from the beginning of the month to the 23rd, then rose continuously until reaching 1.9821% on the 31st. The overnight and 7D funds did not show an inversion. The funds were loose at the beginning of the month, the central bank carried out 100 billion yuan of 3M repurchase on the 5th, and 60 billion yuan of 6M repurchase in the middle of the month, continuing the "short - term contraction and long - term expansion" operation. At the end of the year, affected by seasonal factors, the 7D funds price fluctuated slightly. The funds across the year were relatively stable [11][12]. (2) Liquidity Review: The Central Bank Actively Injected in December, Continuing the "Short - term Contraction and Long - term Expansion" - **Liquidity Aggregate**: In December, the base money may have increased by 1.7 trillion yuan, with government deposits supplementing about 1 trillion yuan, the central bank's net injection totaling 752.8 billion yuan, and foreign exchange funds continuing to withdraw slightly by 7 billion yuan. After deducting the consumption of excess reserves, the excess reserves at the end of the month may have increased by about 1 trillion yuan, and the excess reserve ratio may be around 1.5%, at a seasonal level. The narrow - sense excess reserve level after deducting reverse repurchases may be around 0.8%, close to the seasonal level [36]. - **Open - market Operations**: In December, the central bank's open - market reverse repurchases slightly increased, with a net injection of 28.19 billion yuan. The MLF was injected with 40 billion yuan and 30 billion yuan matured, with a balance of 6.25 trillion yuan. The net injection of the outright reverse repurchase was 20 billion yuan, with a balance of 6.5 trillion yuan. The central bank also net - bought 5 billion yuan of national debt, carried out 26 billion yuan of treasury time deposits, and 15.94 billion yuan of PSL and other structural tools [46][51][54]. 2. December 2025 Monetary Policy Tracking: Focus on Cross - cycle Balance, Flexibly and Efficiently Use Reserve Requirement Ratio Cuts and Interest Rate Cuts In December 2025, important meetings emphasized "flexibly and efficiently using reserve requirement ratio cuts and interest rate cuts." The overall loosening may be relatively prudent, but the idea of liquidity protection continues. The central bank emphasizes cross - cycle balance to avoid large - scale policy expansion and contraction. The central economic work conference takes promoting stable economic growth and reasonable price recovery as important considerations. The fourth - quarter monetary policy meeting first proposed to "give play to the integrated effect of incremental and existing policies." In a neutral scenario next year, the policy interest rate is likely to be cut once, with a range of 10bp [3][57][63]. 3. January 2026 Gap Prediction: Disturbances May Increase in the Middle and Late Months (1) Rigid Gap: Reserve Requirement Slightly Consumes Excess Reserves, and MLF Maturities Decrease Marginally In January, the increase in general deposits may consume about 32.96 billion yuan of excess reserves. The MLF matures at 20 billion yuan, and the outright reverse repurchase matures at 1.7 trillion yuan (1.1 trillion yuan for 3M and 600 billion yuan for 6M), of which 1.1 trillion yuan of the 3M outright reverse repurchase was renewed on the 7th [69]. (2) Exogenous Shocks: Cash Withdrawal and Non - financial Institution Deposits Consume Liquidity at the End of the Year In January, cash withdrawal and non - financial institution deposits slightly consume excess reserves. Cash withdrawal may consume about 67.87 billion yuan of excess reserves, and non - financial institution deposits may consume about 16.36 billion yuan [71]. (3) Fiscal Factors: A Big Month for Taxation, Coupled with Government Bond Issuance, May Partially Consume Reserves In January, government bond issuance pressure increases. Considering factors such as payment and refund, taxation, and fiscal expenditure, government deposits may consume about 1.2 trillion yuan of liquidity [4][75][76]. (4) Comprehensive Judgment: Stable at the Beginning of the Month, Disturbances May Increase in the Middle and Late Months In January, the liquidity gap pressure is relatively large, but the bank's liquidity level at the beginning of the month may be relatively abundant. Affected by factors such as the maturity of high - interest deposits and the renewal of large - scale certificates of deposit, the potential disturbances on the bank's liability side may increase in the middle and late months. However, considering the current relatively low excess reserve level, the central bank has no intention of large - scale withdrawal, and the Spring Festival is later, so the funds fluctuation may be relatively mild. Attention should be paid to the marginal changes in the bank's liability pressure after the increase in fiscal factor disturbances [4][80].

Core Viewpoint - The Chinese government is accelerating the approval and establishment of new policy financial instruments to boost infrastructure investment and support economic stability in the second half of the year [1][4]. Group 1: New Policy Financial Instruments - Various regions, including Guangzhou and Yibin, are holding meetings to discuss the implementation of new policy financial instruments, with Yibin's scale set at 500 billion yuan [2]. - The new policy financial instruments are expected to be led by policy development banks, similar to the 2022 initiative that established 740 billion yuan in infrastructure investment funds [2]. - The investment focus of these new instruments includes traditional infrastructure as well as emerging sectors like digital economy and artificial intelligence [2]. Group 2: Monetary Policy Support - The new policy financial instruments will be supported by the central bank's PSL (Pledged Supplementary Lending), which aims to address capital shortages in key projects [3]. - The PSL rate was recently reduced from 2.25% to 2%, enhancing the cost-effectiveness of funding for policy development banks [3]. Group 3: Investment Expansion Factors - The National Development and Reform Commission has allocated 800 billion yuan for "two heavy" construction projects this year, with 735 billion yuan of central budget investment already distributed [4]. - The issuance of special government bonds, including ultra-long-term bonds, is set to accelerate, with an increase of 300 billion yuan in the quota compared to last year [4]. - In July, local governments issued a record 616.9 billion yuan in new special bonds, indicating a faster pace of issuance [5]. Group 4: Efficiency in Fund Utilization - There is a strong emphasis on improving the efficiency of fund utilization and accelerating project readiness to ensure quick implementation of new policy financial instruments [6]. - The new policy financial instruments are expected to leverage 1.5 trillion to 2.5 trillion yuan in infrastructure investment, contributing to a projected increase in infrastructure investment growth to 6.0% for the year [6]. - The ongoing issuance of special bonds and local government bonds is anticipated to further support infrastructure investment, particularly in equipment manufacturing and high-tech sectors [6].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the recent improvements in China's manufacturing and non-manufacturing PMIs, driven by export demand and fiscal policies, while highlighting ongoing economic challenges and the need for proactive macroeconomic measures to sustain growth [1][2]. Group 1: Economic Indicators - China's manufacturing PMI rose by 0.2 percentage points to 49.7% in June, marking the second consecutive month of rebound, while the non-manufacturing PMI also increased by 0.2 percentage points to 50.5% [1]. - The new export orders index increased by 0.2 percentage points in June, continuing a two-month upward trend, although it remains in the contraction zone at 47.7% [1]. - The issuance of new special bonds reached approximately 2.1607 trillion yuan in the first half of 2024, a 44.7% increase compared to 1.4935 trillion yuan in the same period of 2023 [1]. Group 2: Policy Responses - The upcoming Politburo meeting at the end of July is seen as a critical observation window for potential adjustments in macroeconomic policies to address export uncertainties and support the 5% growth target [2][4]. - Fiscal policies are expected to remain proactive, with an acceleration in the use of special bonds for key sectors and local economic support [2][4]. - The government may introduce "quasi-fiscal" policy financial tools and increase special bond issuance to support areas such as childbirth subsidies, employment, and service consumption [4]. Group 3: Monetary Policy - The third quarter presents a window for potential interest rate cuts and reserve requirement ratio reductions, with a flexible monetary policy stance indicated by the central bank [5]. - Structural tools will focus on supporting technology innovation and consumption, with targeted funding for key sectors [5]. Group 4: Market Dynamics - The article notes that the "rush to export" effect has contributed to the first half's data, with an estimated pre-emptive export demand of about 1.7% of total exports for 2024 [8]. - The uncertainty surrounding tariff policies is expected to become a norm, with ongoing negotiations likely to prolong the situation [8].

Core Viewpoint - The Chinese government is implementing a series of proactive macroeconomic policies to stabilize the market and expectations, with new policy financial tools expected to be introduced in the second quarter to support foreign trade and effective investment [1][2]. Group 1: Policy Measures - A comprehensive set of financial policies has been released since May 7, with ongoing effects being observed [2]. - The People's Bank of China (PBOC) indicated that new policy tools could be created based on economic conditions and the effectiveness of existing tools [2]. - The new policy financial tools are expected to be led by three policy development banks, focusing on foreign trade, technological innovation, and consumption [3]. Group 2: Financial Tool Innovations - The new policy financial tools aim to support technology innovation, expand consumption, and stabilize foreign trade [4]. - There is an expectation for the introduction of new tools similar to export buyer credit to support foreign trade enterprises amid external pressures [4]. - The National Development and Reform Commission has indicated that new policy financial tools will address capital shortages for project construction [4]. Group 3: Investment Focus - The investment areas for the new policy financial tools may include consumer infrastructure and other key sectors [5]. - The PBOC's recent reduction in the PSL interest rate signals a potential restart and expansion of PSL to provide long-term low-cost funding for policy banks [7]. - Central fiscal support is deemed crucial for the effectiveness of new policy financial tools, with past experiences showing that fiscal subsidies can significantly reduce project funding costs [7]. Group 4: Coordination of Policies - New policy financial tools can be combined with various policies to enhance their effectiveness, such as tax reductions to lower financing costs for enterprises [8].