Core Viewpoint - The traditional conclusion that a narrowing interest rate differential leads to yen appreciation has become invalid, as the yen remains depreciated despite the narrowing of the US-Japan interest rate gap to its lowest level in three years [2][4]. Group 1: Interest Rate Dynamics - The Bank of Japan is expected to discuss raising policy rates in its upcoming meeting, with a 95% probability of an increase predicted by the market [4]. - The actual interest rate differential has shrunk to its lowest level in two and a half years, yet the yen continues to trade around 155 yen per dollar, similar to the beginning of the year [4][6]. Group 2: Economic Indicators - Japan's current account surplus for January to October reached 27.6 trillion yen, with expectations of setting a new historical high for the year [6]. - Japan has experienced trade deficits for four consecutive years, with a deficit of 1.5 trillion yen recorded for the first ten months of 2025, primarily due to dollar-denominated imports [6]. Group 3: Service Balance and Future Projections - The service balance has shown a significant deficit of 5.6 trillion yen, while tourism income has provided a surplus of 5.4 trillion yen, indicating a precarious balance [6]. - Projections suggest that the digital deficit could exceed tourism surpluses, leading to continued yen depreciation, with estimates indicating a potential increase in the digital deficit to 18 trillion yen by 2035 [6][7]. Group 4: Investment Trends - The introduction of Japan's NISA investment scheme has led to increased outflows, with an average monthly outflow of 690 billion yen since its implementation, significantly higher than previous levels [9]. - The number of NISA accounts is expected to rise from 27 million to around 40 million, maintaining a consistent pressure to sell yen at an annual scale of 10 trillion yen for the next 5 to 10 years [9]. Group 5: Fiscal Policy Concerns - Concerns are growing regarding the impact of fiscal stimulus policies on economic growth and the credibility of the yen, as evidenced by rising credit default swap (CDS) margins for Japanese government bonds [9][10]. - The general account total of the supplementary budget for the fiscal year 2025 has reached a new high post-COVID, raising alarms about fiscal expansion [9].

Group 1 - The core viewpoint of the article highlights a dramatic shift in foreign investment attitudes towards Chinese bonds, transitioning from reduction to increased allocation from 2023 to 2025, driven by multiple market factors [2][4]. - In 2023, foreign investors reduced their holdings of Chinese government bonds by approximately 80 billion yuan due to the aggressive interest rate hikes by the Federal Reserve, which pushed U.S. Treasury yields to a 22-year high of 5.5%-5.7%, significantly higher than China's three-year government bond yield of 2.35% [2][4]. - The turning point began in 2024, with a net inflow of 41.6 billion USD into the Chinese bond market, reversing the previous trend of outflows [4]. Group 2 - By May 2025, 1,169 foreign institutions from over 70 countries held Chinese bonds, with an increase of over 270 billion yuan compared to the end of 2024, indicating a significant return of capital [4]. - Foreign investors are focusing on mid-term, high-liquidity assets, particularly increasing their allocation to 3-5 year government bonds, with a net purchase of 144.9 billion yuan year-to-date [5][7]. - The market anticipates that as China's bonds are included in global indices and capital account openness deepens, the proportion of foreign holdings in Chinese bonds may gradually align with the emerging market average of 15%-20% [7].

Group 1 - Goldman Sachs predicts copper prices may peak at $10,050 per ton by the end of 2025, with an average price adjustment to $9,890 for the second half of 2025 [1] - Morgan Stanley forecasts a 40% chance of recession in the U.S. due to tariff-induced stagflation, lowering the GDP growth estimate for 2025 to 1.3% [2] - Morgan Stanley reports a decline in global demand for long-term assets, predicting 2-year and 10-year U.S. Treasury yields to be 3.50% and 4.35% respectively by year-end [3] Group 2 - Barclays indicates mild selling pressure on the dollar by the end of June, while the euro shows weak signals for a significant rebound [4] - Mitsubishi UFJ suggests the Bank of England may slow its quantitative tightening pace, with potential announcements in September [5] - Bank of America states that since the announcement of tariffs, interest rate differentials are no longer the main driver of the dollar's movement, reflecting structural risks in the U.S. economy [6] Group 3 - French Foreign Trade Bank's survey shows that 41% of respondents view currency depreciation as the main risk of holding cash, with 38% preferring better returns elsewhere [7] - Westpac anticipates the Reserve Bank of Australia may cut rates in July, but emphasizes that this is not a certainty [8] - China International Capital Corporation notes potential recovery in the photovoltaic industry, with a beta opportunity of 30%-50% if expectations improve [5][6]

Core Viewpoint - The report by Bank of America analyst Adarsh Sinha indicates that interest rate differentials are no longer the primary driver of the US dollar's movement since the announcement of comprehensive tariffs by Trump in April [1] Group 1: Factors Affecting the Dollar - The decoupling of the dollar from interest rate differentials reflects structural risk premiums in the US [1] - Contributing factors include rising inflation due to tariffs, weakened economic growth outlook, peak exceptionalism of the US economy, and increasing fiscal deficit risks [1] Group 2: Future Outlook - Interest rate differentials may regain importance in driving the dollar, especially if the Federal Reserve implements more rate cuts sooner than expected [1]