1. Report Industry Investment Rating The provided content does not mention the report industry investment rating. 2. Core Viewpoints of the Report - After two years of debt reduction, significant achievements have been made. Local debts are accelerating towards the on - balance - sheet, with fiscal policy taking over from urban investment in 2025. Urban investment focuses on exiting platforms, stabilizing leverage, adjusting structure, and reducing costs to further mitigate risks. After 2028, urban investment bonds are likely to continue to be redeemed at par. Currently, the spread of urban investment bonds is at a low level, and the cost - effectiveness of undifferentiated sinking is not high. It is recommended to select allocation directions based on risk indicators [1]. 3. Summary by Relevant Catalogs 3.1 How Has the Overall Pattern of Local Debt Changed After Two Years of Debt Reduction? - The "front door" is opened wide and the "back door" is blocked, with local debts accelerating towards the on - balance - sheet. Since 2019, the issuance of local government bonds has accelerated, with an annual growth rate of over 15%. The growth rate of urban investment debt has shown a fluctuating downward trend in the past decade, reaching a record low of 3.8% in 2024. By the end of 2024, the proportion of on - balance - sheet government debt had risen to 43.72% [2][15]. - In 2024, the expansion of urban investment slowed down, and in 2025, fiscal policy took over from urban investment. In 2020, the incremental local debt (urban investment + local special bonds) was 10.63 trillion yuan, but the combined increment has not exceeded 10 trillion yuan since then. In 2025, the fiscal deficit increased by 1.6 trillion yuan compared to the previous year. The incremental debt of local governments and urban investment platforms is expected to approach 10 trillion yuan, and the proportion of on - balance - sheet government debt may exceed 45% by the end of the year [3][16]. 3.2 How to View the Urban Investment Risks After 2028? - Risk prevention has become more extensive, evolving from preventing defaults of urban investment bonds to preventing risks of state - owned enterprises. Urban investment is likely to become a state - owned enterprise under the supervision of local state - owned assets supervision and administration commissions, and is unlikely to default on its bonds [20][21]. - From the perspective of assets and liabilities, it is still difficult to completely separate urban investment from local governments. Urban investment still holds a large amount of public - welfare or quasi - public - welfare assets, and the relationship between them remains close [21]. - From the perspective of liquidity, the probability of risk is reduced. After the clearance of hidden debts and the exit from platforms, banks and insurance may open up financing channels for urban investment, and the actual risk may decline [22]. 3.3 What Are the Differences in Urban Investment Financing Among Provinces? 3.3.1 Overall Tightening, with Slight Differences Between Key and Non - key Provinces - The primary issuance review has not been relaxed, and it is difficult for urban investment to increase new financing. Since March 2025, the net financing of urban investment bonds has turned negative. Key provinces have a more significant net outflow, while some non - key provinces such as Shandong and Guangdong still have new increases [23]. 3.3.2 The Proportion of Bank Loans Has Increased, and Some Provinces Are Seeking Increases in Non - standard Financing - As of the end of March 2025, the proportion of bank loans has increased in 18 provinces, with 8 provinces including Ningxia and Hainan having an increase of over 3 percentage points. In non - key provinces, Anhui and Henan have an increase in the proportion of non - standard financing of over 1 percentage point [25]. 3.4 Which Regions Are Facing Increasing Debt Risks? 3.4.1 Macro - level: At the Minsky Moment, the Interest Coverage Ratios of 10 Provinces and Cities Are Less Than 1 - Due to the decline in land sales, although local interest payments have decreased, as of Q1 2025, the government fund revenues of 10 provinces and cities, including Yunnan and Guangxi, have an interest coverage ratio of less than 1 for full - scale debt interest [29][33]. 3.4.2 Micro - level: The Risks in Some Provinces Have Worsened - The debt risks in Henan, Jilin, Anhui, and Hubei have increased compared to before debt reduction. Shandong's overall risk still deserves attention [29]. - In terms of the proportion of risk urban investment platforms, 20 provinces have improved their debt risks, 7 have remained unchanged, and 4 have increased their risks [30]. 3.5 Which Regions Have Achieved Remarkable Results in Debt Reduction? 3.5.1 Debt Reduction Progress - The progress of hidden debt resolution has exceeded half. Jilin, Jiangsu, Shaanxi, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang have at least over 10 cities or districts announcing the full clearance of hidden debts [47]. 3.5.2 Stock Bond Scale - As of August 28, 2025, the stock of urban investment bonds was 15.14 trillion yuan, a decrease of 84.321 billion yuan compared to the beginning of the year. Jiangsu, Hunan, Tianjin, and Guizhou have the largest reduction in the stock of urban investment bonds [53]. 3.5.3 Interest Payments - The interest payments of urban investment bonds in some economically strong provinces and provinces receiving more debt reduction support have decreased significantly. Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Tianjin, Hunan, and Shandong have a large decline in interest payments [56]. 3.6 How to View Urban Investment Bonds from the Perspective of Risk Premium? - By constructing a short - term risk indicator (proportion of risk urban investment platforms) and a medium - long - term risk indicator (risk qualification evaluation score), provinces are classified as follows: - Both indicators cross the line (proportion of risk platforms > 20%, risk qualification evaluation score < 40): Guangxi, Tianjin, Gansu, Inner Mongolia, Henan, Jilin, Yunnan, Qinghai, Guizhou. Caution is needed for these regions [59]. - One of the two indicators crosses the line: Shandong, Tibet, Ningxia, Jiangxi, Chongqing, Shaanxi. It is recommended to adopt sinking + duration control when exploring returns in these 6 provinces [59][61]. - Neither indicator crosses the line: Shanghai, Beijing, Shanxi, Hainan, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Fujian, Hebei, Jiangsu, Xinjiang, Anhui, Heilongjiang, Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan, Liaoning. The overall risk in these regions is relatively low, but the spread is generally less than 50bp, with limited room for exploration [61].

Report Summary 1. Industry Investment Rating No industry investment rating is provided in the report. 2. Core Views - The highlights in 2024 are the significant slowdown in the growth rates of interest - bearing debt and urban investment bonds of urban investment platforms, the remarkable effect of "hidden debt turning into explicit debt", and the convergence of investment and financing intensity [6][8][66]. - Concerns include the need to improve the financing structure, the considerable debt pressure in economically large provinces like Zhejiang and Jiangsu, the reduction of book funds and the decline in the coverage ratio of monetary funds to short - term debt, and the large - scale outstanding project payments from local governments to urban investment platforms and inter - state - owned enterprise transactions [6][8][67]. - In 2025, the focuses of urban investment include the delisting of financing platforms and their subsequent market - oriented transformation, the settlement of overdue enterprise accounts, and the resolution of non - standard products involving the public [9][68]. 3. Summary by Directory 3.1 2024 Urban Investment Debt Resolution Achievements - **Overall Debt Scale and Growth Rate**: The interest - bearing debt and urban investment bonds of urban investment platforms increased slightly year - on - year, with growth rates dropping to the lowest since 2019. The debt growth rate has declined for four consecutive years. The reasons are debt replacement by local government bonds, weakened project financing demand, and strict bond financing policies [13]. - **Provincial Debt Changes**: Six key provinces saw a year - on - year decrease in interest - bearing debt, with Tianjin and Guizhou having the most significant reduction. In terms of bonds, 12 provinces had a year - on - year decrease in urban investment bond scale, with Jiangsu, Tianjin, Hunan, and Guizhou having obvious shrinkage [17][19]. - **Debt Ratio Changes**: The local broad and explicit debt ratios continued to rise, with the explicit debt ratio's year - on - year growth rate reaching a new high in recent years. Since 2021, the growth rate of the explicit debt ratio has been higher than that of the broad debt ratio, in line with the debt resolution idea of "hidden to explicit". Most provinces saw an increase in the broad debt ratio in 2024, except for six provinces [22][25]. - **Financing Structure Changes**: The proportions of bank loans and bonds in urban investment debt both decreased year - on - year, with a combined decrease of 2.2 percentage points. This part of the financing demand may have shifted to high - cost non - standard financing channels [4][27]. - **Debt Maturity Structure Changes**: The proportion of long - term debt increased slightly in 2024, but there is still room for improvement compared with 2019 - 2022 [39]. 3.2 Information Revealed by the Three Financial Statements of Urban Investment Platforms - **Balance Sheet**: The asset - liability ratio of urban investment platforms was basically stable, but the short - term solvency weakened. The coverage ratio of monetary funds to short - term debt decreased, and the government's project payments and inter - state - owned enterprise transactions may still need improvement [5][43]. - **Income Statement**: The operating income of urban investment platforms decreased for the first time in six years in 2024, and the net profit continued to decline. This is related to the tight investment and financing environment and the change in government assessment focus [5][51]. - **Cash Flow Statement**: The net operating cash flow of urban investment platforms deviated from the income statement and increased significantly after turning positive in 2023. The net investment cash flow was continuously negative, and the net financing cash flow decreased by 39% year - on - year, indicating a convergence of investment and financing intensity [5][57][60]. 3.3 Summary and Outlook - **Summary**: The growth rates of interest - bearing debt and urban investment bonds slowed down, the debt scale was effectively controlled, and the investment and financing intensity of urban investment platforms converged [66]. - **Outlook**: In 2025, focus on the delisting and market - oriented transformation of financing platforms, the settlement of overdue enterprise accounts, and the resolution of non - standard products involving the public [9][68].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the challenges and complexities surrounding the transferability of accounts receivable debt certificates issued by urban investment platforms, highlighting the difficulties faced by investors in liquidating these assets in the secondary market [2][16][19]. Group 1: Overview of Accounts Receivable Debt Certificates - Accounts receivable debt certificates are typically issued by urban investment platforms and can be transferred or used to offset debts, representing a new model for these platforms to manage their liabilities [1][3]. - The certificates are backed by the credit of urban investment companies, which investors initially believed would facilitate easier trading in the secondary market [2][3]. Group 2: Case Study of Investor Experience - An investor, Guo Pei, exchanged six properties valued at approximately 6.5 million yuan for accounts receivable debt certificates worth over 11.5 million yuan, believing in their high liquidity due to the backing of a city investment company [7][10]. - Despite the initial optimism, Guo faced significant challenges in transferring the certificates, discovering that they were difficult to sell in the market, leading to a situation where they became "hot potatoes" [2][16]. Group 3: Market Dynamics and Challenges - The market for these debt certificates is characterized by a lack of buyers, with Guo's attempts to liquidate his holdings resulting in no viable offers, reflecting a broader trend where many investors are unable to find buyers for similar certificates [16][18]. - The urban investment company involved, Shengxiang Investment, indicated that the certificates would not be redeemable until 2028, further complicating the liquidity issue for investors [19][20]. Group 4: Regulatory and Structural Insights - The article mentions a regulatory framework aimed at standardizing the issuance and management of accounts receivable debt certificates, which is intended to support small and medium-sized enterprises in obtaining financing and to help urban investment platforms manage their assets [21][22]. - The recent guidelines from the central bank and other departments emphasize the need for better management and oversight of these financial instruments to prevent potential risks associated with their misuse [22][23].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the challenges faced by individuals and companies in trading accounts receivable debt certificates backed by urban investment platforms, highlighting the difficulties in liquidity and market acceptance of these financial instruments [2][3][10]. Group 1: Accounts Receivable Debt Certificates - Accounts receivable debt certificates are issued by urban investment platforms and are intended for transfer or debt settlement, representing a new model for urban investment platforms to alleviate debt [2][3]. - The initial creditor of the certificates is the New Oriental Urban Investment Company, while the debtor is the Inner Mongolia Shengxiang Investment Company, with a maturity date set for November 29, 2028 [2][3]. Group 2: Investment and Exchange Process - An individual named Guo Pei exchanged six properties valued at approximately 650,000 yuan for accounts receivable debt certificates worth over 1,150,000 yuan, believing in the high liquidity of these certificates due to the backing of urban investment companies [4][7]. - The exchange was facilitated by a company named Hongsha Commerce, which promised high returns and a buyback option, further encouraging the investment [4][5]. Group 3: Market Challenges - Despite the initial optimism, Guo Pei found it difficult to transfer the certificates in the secondary market, leading to a realization that they had become "hot potatoes" with no willing buyers [3][9][10]. - Other individuals in similar situations reported challenges in receiving payments on their certificates, indicating a broader issue with the liquidity and marketability of these financial instruments [9][10]. Group 4: Regulatory and Market Context - The article mentions a regulatory framework emerging around accounts receivable electronic certificates, aimed at standardizing and managing these financial instruments to support small and medium enterprises and urban investment platforms [12][13]. - The Central Bank and other departments issued guidelines to regulate supply chain financial services, indicating a move towards more structured management of accounts receivable debt certificates [13].

Core Viewpoint - The debt replacement policy in China is showing significant effectiveness, with over 1.6 trillion yuan of replacement bonds issued by the end of May, achieving over 80% of the annual target of 2 trillion yuan for replacing hidden debts [1][2]. Group 1: Debt Replacement Progress - By the end of May, more than 1.6 trillion yuan of replacement bonds have been issued, with 20 regions, including Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Beijing, completing their annual issuance tasks [2]. - The issuance of replacement bonds has led to a significant reduction in hidden debts, with over 170 regions declaring "full clearance" of hidden debts [2]. - The average cost of financing for debt platforms in Chongqing has decreased by 71 basis points since the implementation of the debt replacement policy [2]. Group 2: Government Financing Platform Exit - The process of city investment companies exiting government financing platforms has accelerated, with 4,680 platforms reduced last year, accounting for over two-thirds of the total reduction [3]. - In the first five months of this year, 72 city investment companies have announced their exit from government financing roles [3]. Group 3: Special Land Reserve Bonds - The introduction of special land reserve bonds has played a role in alleviating debt pressure by supporting the real estate market and addressing mismatches in land investment and cash recovery [4][5]. - City investment companies in Guizhou and Hunan accounted for over 55% of land acquisitions in the first quarter of this year, despite a general decline in land acquisition activities [4]. - The issuance of special land reserve bonds has reached over 120 billion yuan by the end of May, although there is a significant gap between actual issuance and government announcements [5]. Group 4: Future Debt Management Strategies - As the issuance of replacement bonds slows down, experts anticipate an acceleration in the issuance of special new bonds aimed at debt replacement in the second half of the year, with over 500 billion yuan still awaiting issuance [6]. - There is a strong demand for special bonds in key areas such as the real estate market, which is expected to drive increased issuance to support innovation, education, and environmental protection [6]. - Experts emphasize the need for optimized debt management policies, focusing on differentiated strategies at the municipal level to effectively manage hidden debts while promoting economic growth [6].