#中国断供日本军事工业遭斩首#【中国军号：#中国为何对日发出严厉管制禁令#？防止日本军国主义借 尸还魂】#中国制裁下日本军事没米下锅# 1月6日，商务部发布2026年第一号公告，明确加强对日本两 用物项出口管制，核心内容可概括为三个"禁止"：禁止所有两用物项对日本军事用户出口；禁止对日本 军事用途出口；禁止对一切有助于提升日本军事实力的其他最终用户及用途出口。 这份清单的详尽程度与发布时机表明，中方的管制绝非象征性表态，而是经过周密评估、具有明确针对 性的系统性行动。它既符合国际通行的防扩散原则，也清晰传递出一个信号：中国将以实际行动，阻断 日本军国主义复活的技术可能。 【断供即废功！ 尖端装备制造能力遭精准狙击 】 本次出口管制措施，并非泛化的经济制裁，而是对日本军事工业体系的一场"外科手术式"的精准打击， 矛头直指其核心命脉——高性能材料供应链。 举个具体例子，中国掌控全球85%的钐钴磁体产量，钐钴永磁体因其高磁能积和优异的耐高温性能，被 广泛应用于卫星姿态控制、航天器惯性导航、雷达波导管聚焦装置等。美国国防部报告曾指出，稀土永 磁体是F-35战斗机、弗吉尼亚级潜艇、战斧导弹及多种雷达系统的关键部件。并且 ...

但中国没按剧本走。没公开拦截，没制造海上冲突，反而直接锁死美国军工供应链。中国收紧了稀土、精密加工设备和关键电子元件的出口，军民两用物资 直接升级管控。美国军工产业有个致命软肋：高度依赖中国供应链。ATACMS导弹里的稀土永磁体、雷达组件，很多都得靠中国生产。现在，美国军火商私 下反馈，交付周期拉长，替代方案成本高得离谱，部分关键部件甚至彻底断供。 美国军工企业股价短期涨了，订单数据好看，但内部成本压力像滚雪球一样大。有企业向政府紧急报告，说关键部件找不到稳定来源，生产线都卡住了。这 不是战场上的事，而是供应链的慢性消耗。中国这招，不吵不闹，却让美国军工体系运转效率被持续侵蚀。 美国这次军售，表面是威慑，实际是清库存、秀政治姿态。但中国用产业反制，直接改变了成本结构。美国想用军事前推制造压力，中国却用经济手段让对 方每一步都付出真实代价。美国军工企业正被自己制造的"威慑"反噬，成本越来越高，而中国没动一枪一炮，就让对手的行动变得昂贵而艰难。 图文作者引入成长激励计划 美国突然一票装船420枚ATACMS导弹和82套海马斯系统，直奔东南沿海！这可不是虚张声势，而是实打实的对台军售。但中国没在海上硬碰硬，也没在舆 ...

24日，彭博社引用所谓市场参与者的话称，尽管中国增加了稀土磁铁等重要矿产的交付，但美国工业界 仍无法获得足够的稀土原料，用于稀土永磁材料的生产和加工。这是因为中国在精炼加工和永磁体制造 方面，一直掌控着全球供应链的核心地位，拥有88%的精炼产能和90%的钕铁硼永磁体供应。中国此前 依法实施的出口管制措施，既保障了自身的安全，又履行了国际义务，同时在满足合规民用需求方面， 仍然留有足够的空间。 美国清楚这些物资对其国防安全的重要性，但在民用供应恢复后，依然急于向中国寻求支持，实际上是 想延续对中国战略资源的单方面依赖，而避免自己承担供应链建设的责任和成本。长期以来，中国稀土 行业面临着巨大的污染治理成本，并且曾长期陷入有量无价的困境。初级稀土产品低价出口，反而要高 价进口最终制成的产品，导致价值链的大部分被外国企业占据。即便如此，中国仍然坚守多边贸易原 则，并在保障全球民用产业链稳定方面发挥着不可或缺的作用。 美国政府多年来一直推动供应链去中国化，试图重建本土的稀土生产能力，但由于技术和成本等多方面 的原因，进展十分缓慢，短期内无法摆脱对中国精炼产能的依赖，甚至有些美国本土开采的稀土还需要 运送到中国加工。同时 ...

12月25日，俄罗斯卫星通讯社报道称，彭博社引述官方和市场人士的说法，尽管中美两国达成了协议，中国恢复向美国出口稀土制品，可是对一些重要的稀 土元素依旧设有限制。 比如，某些美国公司拿不到金属镝或者它的氧化物。 这到底是咋回事呢？中国的限制对美国造成了啥影响？美国拿到稀土制成品后，想再弄到它的原材料，究竟是为什么呢？ 得先说一句，稀土和稀土制品可不是一回事哦，比如那种高性能的稀土永磁体，它的核心成分可是钕、镨这类稀土元素，所以人家都习惯叫它"稀土永磁 体"。 像那种高性能的钕铁硼磁体，可是很多尖端行业的关键配件，比如常用在国防、军工，还包括高端制造业啥的。 我们和美国谈妥的协议，就是直接把一些高性能的磁体供应过去，避免美国那边的一些工业陷入停产的境地。 但就是没有把那些重要的稀土元素直接出口到美国。 像美国媒体提到的镝金属或它的氧化物，这玩意儿可是做高性能磁铁的必备材料，属于那种极其关键的"配料"。要是没有镝或它的氧化物，美国实际上就别 想搞出符合各种需求的顶级磁体了。 中国出口到美国的磁铁，基本上都是加工好、加了镝的高端磁体，已经是成品状态了。 美国想单独进口镝，可中国却对这个设限了。 这一下子限制对美国到 ...

2025年12月22日，观察者网披露的消息点破了这层窗户纸——这个所谓"硅和平倡议"，根本不是什么和平合作的象征，而是冲着中国稀土供应链来的。 《南华早报》说得更直接：这压根就是一个以切断中国关键矿产影响力为目标的联盟。 美国拉起"硅和平"这面旗，表面是奔着关键技术合作去的，骨子里却是一场赤裸裸的战略围堵。 日本、韩国、以色列、新加坡这些亚洲国家纷纷加入，看似阵容齐整，实际上各怀心思，谁也不是真心要跟着华盛顿一条道走到黑。 这个联盟的成员名单，乍看确实不弱。 日本有精密制造的底子，韩国握着半导体制造的核心命脉，澳大利亚坐拥大量未开发的矿产资源，新加坡靠物流和金融体系撑起全球供应链节点，荷兰手握 全球唯一的极紫外光刻机技术。 把这些资源拼在一起，理论上能搭起一套绕开中国的高端技术产业链。 但问题恰恰就出在"理论上"三个字上。 理论再漂亮，碰上现实利益，立马碎一地。 美国想拿这些国家当棋子，可人家不是木偶，更不是任人摆布的工具。 高市早苗领导下的日本政府一边配合华盛顿表态，一边悄悄扩大对华稀土永磁体进口。 李在明主政的韩国更清楚，本国芯片产业七成以上的封装测试依赖中国长三角的配套体系。 他们加入联盟，更多是应付美 ...

在越南与美国达成协议，接受对美出口商品征收20%的关税，并全面向美国开放市场后，柬埔寨和印度尼西亚也纷纷与美国签署了贸易协定。这一系列协议 的达成，反映了美国在重塑区域贸易规则方面的战略目标，同时也意味着美国的霸权进一步渗透到全球各地。柬埔寨通过与美国的协定，成功将原定的49% 惩罚性关税降低至20%；而印尼则通过签订价值340亿美元的协议，向美国企业优先开放了镍矿资源。这些动作显示出美国在全球经济格局中的新一轮布 局，尤其是在东南亚地区。 在此情况下，美国要求柬埔寨建立全流程的溯源体系，确保每批出口商品符合严格的原产地标准。对于依赖我国34%纺织原料的柬埔寨来说，这无疑是一个 巨大的挑战。柬埔寨的本土生产成本因此增加了8%到12%，大大压缩了企业利润。此外，柬埔寨与美国签署的协议中还附带了强制采购美国农产品的条 款，预计会对柬埔寨的稻米出口造成冲击，并使当地农民的收入面临严重下降。这些因素使得柬埔寨在与美国的合作中处于不利地位，实际上这是出于无奈 的选择。 同样，印度尼西亚与美国签署的340亿美元协议也充满了隐忧。印尼是全球最大的镍矿生产国，其资源储量占全球的24%。通过向美企开放镍矿优先采购 权，印尼将自 ...

Core Viewpoint - The European Union (EU) is adjusting its diplomatic tone towards China, aiming for a more conciliatory approach to ensure smooth negotiations on critical materials like rare earths and chips, driven by the reality of dependency on Chinese supply chains [1][5]. Group 1: EU's Diplomatic Shift - The EU has requested its officials to lower the rhetoric when discussing China to avoid tensions that could disrupt negotiations on essential materials [1]. - This shift in tone is not indicative of a policy change but rather a pragmatic response to the challenges posed by supply chain dependencies [3][5]. - The EU's strategy reflects a dual approach of softening language while maintaining stringent policies against Chinese industries, indicating a complex relationship [5][8]. Group 2: Supply Chain Dependencies - China dominates the global rare earth permanent magnet production, making it difficult for European industries, such as electric vehicles and wind power, to disengage from Chinese supplies [1][10]. - The average approval time for mining projects in Europe is over 20 times longer than in China, leading to significant delays and environmental disputes [3]. - The semiconductor sector is facing similar challenges, with recent actions by the Dutch government causing panic in the European automotive industry due to potential supply chain disruptions [3][10]. Group 3: EU's Policy Measures - The EU has implemented several restrictive measures against China, including subsidy investigations targeting Chinese renewable energy companies and pushing for the removal of Huawei and ZTE equipment [3][5]. - The cancellation of tax exemptions for small packages from China is a targeted move against specific e-commerce platforms [3][5]. Group 4: China's Strategic Position - China has improved its rare earth processing efficiency by 20% and is diversifying its investments in lithium resources across Southeast Asia and Latin America, reducing reliance on any single market [9][11]. - The Chinese market's size and resilience provide companies with flexibility, while exports to Southeast Asia and the Middle East continue to grow [10][11]. - China's approach to the EU has been characterized by measured responses, such as slowing down rare earth approvals after the ASML incident, signaling a warning without escalating conflict [11]. Group 5: Future Outlook - The EU's internal political dynamics, including the rise of far-right parties advocating for decoupling from China, complicate the potential for a unified and pragmatic approach [6][8]. - The EU's dual strategy of soft rhetoric and hard actions may lead to more complex negotiations and could undermine trust with China [8][13]. - A shift towards recognizing mutual dependencies and focusing on cooperative areas could open new opportunities for both parties, but continued adversarial views may hinder progress [13].

Core Viewpoint - General Motors (GM) is instructing thousands of suppliers to eliminate reliance on the Chinese supply chain by 2027, aiming to enhance supply chain resilience and reduce dependency on China for critical components [4][5][16]. Group 1: General Motors' Strategy - GM has been working on increasing supply chain resilience for years, focusing on local sourcing of components [5]. - The company has initiated efforts to secure domestic semiconductor supply chains, evidenced by a long-term agreement with GlobalFoundries to reserve capacity for critical chips [10]. - GM is investing in local resources for battery raw materials, including a nearly $950 million joint venture with Lithium Americas to develop a lithium mine in Nevada [11][13]. - The company is also establishing partnerships for cobalt and nickel supplies, aiming to build a reliable supply chain within North America and allied nations [11][13]. - GM's strategy includes reducing reliance on Chinese processed materials, particularly in rare earth elements, which are crucial for electric vehicles [13][14]. Group 2: Ford's Position - Ford's electric vehicle battery technology heavily relies on Chinese suppliers, including a partnership with CATL for LFP battery technology in Michigan [18][19]. - Regulatory scrutiny has arisen regarding Ford's collaboration with CATL, prompting the company to seek additional partnerships with North American lithium suppliers [24][25]. - Ford's sales in China have decreased, with 2024 projections showing a drop to 440,000 units, while still achieving $600 million in profit due to exports [36][37]. Group 3: Market Dynamics and Trends - Both GM and Ford have not increased investments in China like their Japanese and German counterparts, with GM's market share in China declining from 12-13% pre-pandemic to 8-9% in 2023 [30][32]. - The ongoing U.S.-China trade tensions are reshaping the automotive supply chain, pushing companies to localize production while still relying on Chinese components due to cost advantages [41][44]. - The evolving international landscape will have significant implications for global automotive supply chains and corporate strategies in the coming years [44].

Core Insights - The EU is increasingly anxious about the rare earth situation following the US-China trade talks, leading to frequent meetings with Chinese representatives to seek favorable outcomes [1][3] - The establishment of a "special communication channel" between the EU and China indicates a strategic shift in the EU's approach to rare earth issues, with a focus on expediting the processing of applications from European companies [1][3] Group 1: EU's Rare Earth Strategy - EU Trade Commissioner Šefčovič revealed that over half of the approximately 2,000 applications submitted by European companies since China's rare earth export controls were implemented have been approved [1][3] - The EU aims to develop local resources in Estonia, but the timeline for production is estimated to take 5 to 8 years, highlighting the urgency of securing immediate supplies from China [3][4] - The EU's green transition, particularly in the electric vehicle and wind energy sectors, is heavily dependent on rare earth materials, with demand projected to triple by 2025 [3][6] Group 2: China's Position and Strategy - China's rare earth industry benefits from a complete supply chain, allowing it to convert raw materials into high-value products, creating a dual barrier of technology and resources [6][7] - The Chinese government emphasizes "fair trade" in its dealings, indicating that compliance with regulations is necessary for companies seeking to access rare earth supplies [7][9] - The establishment of the "special channel" is seen as a mutual benefit, with the EU needing stable supplies for its green transition and China seeking to maintain its market dominance [9][12] Group 3: Geopolitical Implications - The EU's reliance on China for rare earths reflects a contradiction in its strategy, as it previously aligned with the US against China but now seeks cooperation in critical resource areas [6][10] - Internal divisions within the EU regarding its approach to China may provide China with leverage in negotiations, as different member states have varying priorities [12][10] - The ongoing rare earth competition is characterized as a resource, technology, and regulatory battle, with the potential for future conflicts if the EU does not reciprocate China's cooperation [15][12]

Group 1 - The U.S. government is providing a total of up to $1.4 billion in funding to Vulcan Elements, a domestic rare earth magnet manufacturer, to support the construction of a factory with an annual production capacity of 10,000 tons of rare earth magnets [1][2] - The funding includes a $620 million loan from the Department of Defense, $50 million in equity from the Department of Commerce, and $550 million from private investors [1][2] - Rare earth permanent magnets are critical for various applications, including F-35 fighter jets, missile guidance systems, electric vehicles, and wind turbines, with China controlling over 90% of the high-end rare earth permanent magnet market [1][4] Group 2 - The funding is part of the expanded budget authorized by the 2022 CHIPS and Science Act, which initially focused on semiconductor manufacturing and research but has now extended to the development and processing of critical minerals [2] - The U.S. Department of Commerce emphasized that over-reliance on a single country for rare earth magnets poses potential risks, while the Pentagon highlighted the need to rebuild self-sufficiency in the defense supply chain [2] Group 3 - Despite the support for Vulcan, the company still relies partially on overseas sources for rare earth materials, particularly from Australia and Africa, making complete self-sufficiency unrealistic in the short term [6] - The U.S. has faced a long-standing gap in rare earth mining and processing capabilities, with China dominating the global supply chain, controlling approximately 70% of rare earth mineral production and over 90% of high-end rare earth permanent magnets [4][6] Group 4 - Vulcan Elements raised $65 million in a recent funding round to expand its rare earth magnet production and signed a five-year supply agreement with ReElement Technologies for thousands of tons of rare earth oxides starting in 2026 [8] - The rare earth oxides supplied by ReElement will come from outside China, utilizing a different processing technology that is significantly cheaper than the long-term purchase agreement prices with the Department of Defense and MP Materials [8] Group 5 - MP Materials, another U.S. rare earth company, plans to achieve record production of 563 tons of praseodymium-neodymium oxide by Q1 2025 and aims to commercialize neodymium-iron-boron magnets by the end of 2025 [6] - MP Materials has also received a $50 million advance payment from downstream customers for neodymium-iron-boron magnets [6] Group 6 - Lynas Rare Earth, an Australian company, is advancing its projects and has successfully produced its first batch of dysprosium oxide in Malaysia, while facing challenges due to tariffs imposed by the U.S. and China [11] - Lynas is negotiating new sales agreements with customers and shifting to a direct pricing strategy, moving away from reliance on price indices based in China [11] Group 7 - The U.S. rare earth strategy includes international cooperation, with MP Materials signing an agreement with Saudi Arabia's Maaden to establish a vertical rare earth supply chain in the country [13] - This project aims to reduce production costs and challenge China's competitiveness in the rare earth sector by leveraging Saudi Arabia's low energy costs and favorable geographic location [13] Group 8 - Recent export control measures by China have significantly impacted rare earth prices, with dysprosium oxide prices in Europe skyrocketing from $283 per kilogram to $850 per kilogram following export restrictions [15] - The U.S. Secretary of Commerce stated the necessity for the U.S. to rebuild its manufacturing base and secure core materials to ensure the proper functioning of technology [15]