中国企业在这块儿，靠着规模效应和产业链协作，把成本压得死死的，有时候售价甚至低于西方企业的生产价。早从上世纪就开始布局，政策支持加上技术 积累，让中国牢牢掌控全球稀土话语权。 西方国家，尤其是美国，一直为此头疼不已，总想着"去中国化"，摆脱对我们加工环节的依赖。凤凰尾矿这家公司，就是这种战略下的产物，他们从2019年 起步，专注从矿渣和废料中提取稀土，避开传统重污染方式，用熔盐法之类的创新技术，试图在美国本土建起独立链条。 稀土其实在地壳里并不稀缺，钕、镝这些元素到处都有，关键是用在电动车电机、战斗机零件上，缺了不行。可提炼加工这环节，才是真考验功夫。 凤凰尾矿CEO尼克·迈尔斯，以前在波士顿一家基因公司干活，后来拉上材料科学博士托马斯·维拉隆和工程专家安东尼·巴拉东，三人合伙搞起这摊子事儿。 公司起步资金不多，就几千美元，靠孵化器和种子投资勉强维持。 他们不去碰开采那块重资产活儿，而是直接从美国、南美、澳大利亚买原料，专攻最后的精炼冶炼。2023年，他们在马萨诸塞州伯灵顿建起小厂，年产能40 吨，主要出钕和镝合金，卖给汽车和国防客户。 中国手里捏着全球超九成的稀土精炼份额，这是靠着成熟的产业体系和成本把控， ...

高市早苗这位被日本右翼视为希望之光的政客，恐怕即将黯然退场。2026年刚刚开始，关于她撑不到年底的传闻就像一把寒冷的冬日火焰，迅速蔓延至东亚 政坛。高市早苗的下台似乎已成定局，现在的焦点问题就是她究竟如何退出政治舞台。2025年11月，来自中国海关的权威数据显示，中国对日本出口的稀土 磁铁达到304吨，同比增长了约34%，创下全年新高，而与此同时，中国对美国的同类出口量却出现下降。 关键在于上瘾，中国提供的是民用轻稀土，不涉及到军事相关的重稀土。日本的企业看到政策逐渐收紧，急于囤积稀土，以为自己占了便宜，但实际上，他 们已经掉入了中国精心设下的陷阱。稀土是一种你无法割舍的资源，哪怕是再高调的反华言论，一旦缺少了稀土，新能源电动车、军事雷达、导弹制导系统 等高科技产业都会停滞不前。届时，高市将如何继续推动她所谓的强硬路线？ 这一升一降，背后蕴含的战略含义不言自明。这不仅仅是一次普通的贸易波动，更是一场充满战略布局的稀土博弈。日本一方面不断挑起事端，口口声声说 着要实现稀土去中国化，并大肆传播反华言论；另一方面，日本的企业却低头抢购稀土磁铁，几乎以低价将它们运往日本的工厂。看似矛盾的局面，其实背 后有着明确的逻辑 ...

编辑|小圆 中重稀土价格大幅上涨，西方制造业面临供应压力！ 中国欧盟商会预警：欧洲企业稀土库存紧张，数日内若无法补货或面临停产风险； 美国军火商加紧全球采购稀土相关产品，供应短缺问题凸显。 根源很明确——全球90%以上稀土精炼份额被中国掌控，西方"去中国化"突围战，卡在了最关键环节。 稀土短缺引发担忧，核心是其不可替代的战略价值。 作为现代工业"维生素"，新能源汽车电机、隐身战机部件、智能手机芯片等高端制造都离不开钕、镝等 稀土元素，其供应稳定性对全球高端产业发展至关重要。 眼见中国产业链愈发强势，美西方这下是真的坐不住了，急于寻求突围。 稀土元素性质相近且伴生放射性，分离提纯难度极大，特别是高纯度重稀土的分离，一直是全球难题。 这是中国几十年埋头苦干攒下的家底，我们不仅攻克了核心技术，还建成了全球最高效的"采矿—分离 —冶炼—磁体制造"完整生态。 就说内蒙古包头的产业矩阵打造全球领先稀土基地，极致成本控制让中国稀土售价有时低于西方生产成 本。 产业协同层面也持续发力，北方稀土与金龙稀土联手获批年产5000吨分离项目； 总投资4.7亿元计划2026年底建成，将进一步丰富冶炼分离产品种类，强化对中下游新材料产业 ...

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the exaggerated perception of China's dominance in the rare earth market and Europe's dependency on it, suggesting that the reality is more nuanced than often portrayed [3][20]. Group 1: China's Role in Rare Earths - China accounts for over 90% of global rare earth mining and initial processing, which has significant environmental costs that are often overlooked [7][24]. - The importance of rare earths is not just in current trade figures but in the potential disruption of supply chains if access is cut off [9][26]. - Historical actions by China, such as setting export quotas in 2010, have led to increased global awareness of the value of rare earths and have strengthened China's long-term bargaining power [16][18]. Group 2: Europe's Position and Strategy - European imports of rare earths from China are minimal, totaling less than $10 million annually, while Europe exports higher-value rare earth alloys to China [5][22]. - The EU is actively working to reduce dependency on China by establishing rare earth reserves and investing in mining operations in Africa and South America, although challenges remain [22][24]. - The perception that Europe holds a technological advantage is complicated by the fact that China is integral to the assembly and production of high-tech products [11][28]. Group 3: Implications for Global Supply Chains - A disruption in rare earth supplies would not only affect China but would have widespread implications for global manufacturers, including major companies like BMW, Airbus, and Apple [13][14]. - The rare earth industry is characterized by high pollution and low profit margins, making it less appealing for Europe to develop its own mining capabilities [24][26]. - The article suggests that the narrative of "no trump card" in the rare earths debate is more about wishful thinking than an accurate assessment of the geopolitical landscape [20][24].

Core Insights - The U.S. government claims a "major victory" following the recent U.S.-China summit, highlighting four key commitments from China, which is perceived as a retreat by the Chinese side [1] - However, the announcement of a $1.4 billion investment in two U.S. rare earth startups aimed at reducing dependence on Chinese rare earths contradicts this narrative [1][4] - The U.S. Department of Defense's significant financial backing for these companies reveals underlying vulnerabilities in the U.S. defense industrial base, particularly its reliance on Chinese rare earth supplies [3][4] Investment and Financial Moves - The U.S. government and private investors have collectively invested $1.4 billion in two rare earth companies, with $620 million in loans from the Department of Defense and an additional $50 million from the Commerce Department [1] - The investment aims to support a rare earth magnet factory with an annual production capacity of 10,000 tons, highlighting the urgency to establish a domestic supply chain [1][6] - The scale of this investment is notable, as it represents approximately 20% of the global rare earth market, which was valued at $6 to $6.5 billion last year [1] Industry Dynamics - China dominates the rare earth market, accounting for 69% of global extraction and 92% of refining capacity, with a complete supply chain from mining to processing [3] - The U.S. startups, "Firehawk Elements" and "New Element Technologies," face significant challenges due to their limited operational history and workforce, which could hinder their ability to scale production effectively [6][8] - The technology employed by "New Element Technologies" has not been validated for large-scale production, raising concerns about its viability in meeting military-grade demands [4][6] Strategic Implications - The U.S. investment strategy appears to be a reactive measure rather than a proactive solution, indicating a lack of confidence in securing stable rare earth supplies from China [4][8] - The urgency of the U.S. response is linked to upcoming midterm elections, suggesting that political motivations may be influencing defense strategies [4][8] - The ongoing competition in the rare earth sector underscores the importance of technological advancement and supply chain resilience, areas where China currently holds a significant advantage [8]

Core Insights - Rare earths have become a significant leverage for China in the ongoing trade war, while the U.S. is attempting to form a "global critical minerals trading club" to create a supply chain excluding China [1] - Russia has decided to enter the rare earth competition, with President Putin approving a directive to accelerate the establishment of its own rare earth mining and processing industry to reduce dependence on China and the U.S. [1][3] Group 1: Russian Rare Earth Strategy - Putin has instructed the Russian government to approve a long-term development plan focused on the mining and production of rare earth and rare metals by December 1 of this year [3] - The core objective of this plan is to develop a self-sufficient rare earth industry, minimizing reliance on other countries [3] - Rare earths are crucial for Russia's electronics, defense, and automotive sectors, making them a priority for technological development [3] Group 2: Resource Availability and Challenges - Russia has identified 18 rare earth deposits with a total reserve exceeding 28 million tons, positioning it as the second-largest holder of rare earth reserves globally, following China's 44 million tons [5] - Despite the rich reserves, Russia's current rare earth extraction is minimal, with less than 2% of the proven reserves being mined [7] - The extraction process is complicated due to the low concentration of valuable components in many deposits, requiring advanced technology and significant investment [7] Group 3: Political and Technical Hurdles - Russia's rare earth refining technology has lagged since the Soviet Union's dissolution, necessitating substantial investment in talent, technology, and funding to catch up with global standards [7] - The current political climate has made cooperation with the U.S. in the rare earth sector nearly impossible, complicating Russia's ambitions [9] - The country faces the challenge of wanting to achieve a lot while lacking the capacity to support its ambitions, indicating a need for a practical implementation of its plans [9]

Core Viewpoint - The establishment of the CareMag rare earth recycling and refining plant in France represents a significant step for Western countries to reduce their dependence on China for rare earth elements, especially amid the growing demand for electric vehicles and renewable energy technologies [2][10]. Project Overview - CareMag, a subsidiary of the French company Carester, has secured a total investment of €216 million (approximately 1.5 billion RMB) for the project, with funding from both the French government (€106 million) and Japanese entities (€110 million) [3]. - The plant is located in the Lacq industrial area, which was previously a natural gas processing site, and is expected to process 2,000 tons of recycled magnets and 5,000 tons of ore concentrate annually, producing 600 tons of dysprosium and terbium oxides, along with 800 tons of neodymium and praseodymium oxides [5]. Strategic Importance - The project is expected to fulfill 15% of the global demand for heavy rare earths, marking a significant industrialization effort in the West [5]. - The collaboration with Stellantis, a major automotive manufacturer, indicates a commitment to sourcing light rare earths for battery production [5]. Technological and Environmental Aspects - CareMag employs a water-based extraction method with a recovery rate of over 95%, which also allows for the recovery of boron elements, enhancing its environmental sustainability [5]. - The plant's closed-loop water system is designed to minimize wastewater discharge by 90%, although maintaining the required purity levels is technically challenging [10][12]. Market Dynamics - The global rare earth market is heavily dominated by China, which holds 40% of the reserves and produces 70% of the supply, creating vulnerabilities for other countries reliant on imports [7]. - The establishment of CareMag is seen as a strategic move to diversify supply chains and reduce risks associated with reliance on Chinese rare earths [10]. Economic Impact - The project is expected to create 150 jobs with a median salary of €40,000 and contribute 0.5% to the GDP, while also potentially reducing battery costs by 3% for local assembly plants [12]. - Despite the optimistic outlook, the EU's self-sufficiency target for rare earths remains low, with projections indicating only a 2% increase by 2025 [12]. Future Outlook - The CareMag project is viewed as a starting point for Western countries to enhance their rare earth production capabilities, although significant challenges remain in refining and separation technologies [8][13]. - The geopolitical implications of this project are notable, as it may alter the dynamics of the global rare earth market and provide more options for consumers [10][13].

Core Viewpoint - The temporary agreement between China and the U.S. to delay certain rare earth export controls for one year is seen as a short-term relief but ultimately a dangerous gamble for the U.S. [1][12] Group 1: Importance of Rare Earths - Rare earths are essential for modern technology, including smartphones, electric vehicle batteries, missile guidance systems, and chip manufacturing [3][4] - China controls over 90% of global rare earth processing capacity and the entire supply chain from mining to refining, making the U.S. heavily reliant on Chinese resources [3][4][6] Group 2: Technical Superiority - China's advantage lies not just in resource availability but in its advanced processing technology, achieving purity levels that are significantly higher than those of U.S. facilities [4][6] - The U.S. has struggled to develop its own processing capabilities, with domestic production still less than 5% of China's despite significant investments [6][8] Group 3: Global Standards and Influence - China is establishing itself as a rule-maker in the rare earth sector, having implemented international standards that dictate extraction and processing practices [6][10] - This shift in power dynamics mirrors historical precedents like OPEC's influence over oil pricing, indicating a potential restructuring of the global tech supply chain [6][10] Group 4: Western Responses and Challenges - Efforts by the U.S. and its allies to create alternative supply chains have been largely ineffective, with slow progress in domestic production and high barriers to entry in rare earth processing [8][10] - The U.S. has faced significant delays in its "rare earth independence plan," with minimal increases in domestic processing capacity over the past four years [8][10] Group 5: Strategic Implications - The one-year buffer provided by China is viewed as a warning rather than a solution, emphasizing the need for the U.S. to reconsider its approach to trade and technology [12][14] - The ongoing struggle for dominance in the rare earth sector reflects a broader conflict between unilateral hegemony and a multipolar order, highlighting the interdependence of global supply chains [14]

Core Viewpoint - The threat of a 200% tariff on rare earth magnets by the U.S. is largely ineffective against the established global supply chain dynamics, highlighting the strategic importance of rare earths beyond mere trade value [1][15]. Economic Scale - The global trade value of rare earth magnets is approximately $6 billion, significantly smaller than that of copper, which is 1/33 of its size [3]. - China's annual exports of rare earth permanent magnets to the U.S. are about 7,341 tons, constituting only 2.6% of China's total production, indicating minimal economic impact if exports were halted [3]. Strategic Importance - Rare earth magnets are critical across various industries, from electric vehicle motors to missile guidance systems, with a potential economic loss of $150 billion if global supply is disrupted by 10% [5]. - The unique strategic value of rare earths makes the competition over them extend beyond typical trade disputes [5]. Industry Control - China controls 69% of global rare earth mining, 92% of refining capacity, and 98% of magnet manufacturing, establishing a comprehensive industry chain [7]. - China's technological superiority in rare earth separation, particularly with the P507 reagent, is a significant barrier for other countries attempting to replicate this industry [7][9]. Challenges of Supply Chain Shift - The complexity of rare earth technology, environmental regulations, and time costs present substantial challenges for the U.S. to shift its supply chain away from China [9][11]. - Historical attempts by Japan and the U.S. to diversify their supply chains have shown limited success, emphasizing the long-term nature of building an independent rare earth supply chain [13]. U.S. Strategic Concerns - The 200% tariff threat reflects U.S. strategic anxiety in critical mineral sectors, but unilateral sanctions may inadvertently increase manufacturing costs for U.S. consumers [15][20]. China's Countermeasures - In response to external pressures, China is transitioning from merely exporting resources to a more refined control over the entire rare earth industry chain [17][18]. - New export controls on rare earth production equipment and raw materials will further solidify China's position in the global market [18]. Global Interdependence - Major companies like Tesla and Siemens still rely on Chinese rare earth magnets, indicating that a forced decoupling of supply chains could lead to increased costs in green transition and high-end manufacturing [20]. - The challenge for China lies in converting its rare earth advantages into sustained competitive strength through technology iteration and international collaboration [22]. Conclusion - Historical evidence suggests that political attempts to alter supply chains often incur high costs and are unsustainable, advocating for a cooperative approach to supply chain management [25].

Core Insights - China's rare earth magnet exports to the U.S. have sharply declined, coinciding with the U.S. and Australia signing an $8.5 billion "critical minerals agreement" aimed at reducing dependence on Chinese rare earths [1] - The situation reflects a strategic back-and-forth between China and the U.S.-Australia alliance, highlighting the importance of rare earths in global high-tech manufacturing [1] Group 1: U.S.-Australia Alliance - The U.S.-Australia agreement aims to establish a complete rare earth supply chain and counter China's low-price advantage through a "minimum price mechanism" [4] - Despite Australia's rich rare earth resources, it relies on Chinese technology for processing, particularly for separating mid-to-low-end rare earths [5] - The U.S. faces challenges as past environmental issues halted domestic rare earth mining operations, limiting its ability to compete effectively [5] Group 2: China's Dominance - China maintains a significant advantage in rare earth processing capacity, exceeding 300,000 tons annually, making it difficult for smaller players to compete [7] - The timeline for the U.S.-Australia agreement to establish a functional supply chain is estimated to take at least five to ten years, during which China's technology will continue to advance [7] - China's rare earth industry is characterized by a comprehensive control over the entire supply chain, from mining to recycling, with 90% of global processing occurring in China [9] Group 3: Resource Security and Strategic Moves - China is actively investing in new rare earth mines in Africa and collaborating with Russia on Arctic mineral development to enhance its resource security [11] - New regulations proposed by China require approval for the export of products containing even a small percentage of Chinese rare earths, indicating a strategic approach to resource management [11] Group 4: Global Dynamics and Alliances - The U.S.-Australia alliance faces challenges as Australia's economy heavily relies on China, particularly in iron ore exports, complicating any potential decoupling [14] - Other countries, including Germany, continue to increase imports of Chinese rare earths despite publicly supporting the U.S.-Australia initiative [14] - European nations and Japan are seeking cooperation with China, recognizing the importance of rare earths for high-end manufacturing [16] Group 5: Technological Edge and Future Outlook - China's technological superiority in rare earth processing is evident, with 67% of global patents held by China, and its processes being more efficient and cost-effective [18] - Historical precedents show that attempts to shift supply chains away from China have been largely unsuccessful, as seen in Japan's efforts after China's 2010 export restrictions [18] - The ongoing rare earth competition is not merely about resource acquisition but also about who will lead future technological industries [20][21]