Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the ongoing trade dynamics between China and the United States regarding rare earth elements, highlighting that while China has resumed exports of processed rare earth products to the U.S., it continues to restrict the export of key rare earth elements essential for high-end manufacturing and defense applications [1][19]. Group 1: Rare Earth Elements vs. Processed Products - Rare earth elements are a group of 17 unique elements known for their scarcity and difficulty in extraction, while processed rare earth products are the end or semi-finished materials created through various refining and synthesis processes [3][5]. - High-performance rare earth permanent magnets, which are critical in modern industrial applications, particularly in defense and high-end manufacturing, rely on specific rare earth elements like neodymium and praseodymium [7][11]. Group 2: Impact on U.S. Defense Industry - The U.S. defense sector heavily relies on high-performance rare earth permanent magnets for various applications, including advanced military equipment like the F-35 fighter jet, where the absence of these materials could hinder production [9][19]. - The U.S. Department of Defense has previously indicated that shortages of rare earth elements pose potential risks to missile production, with current stockpiles only sufficient for a few months [17][19]. Group 3: China's Strategic Export Restrictions - China's decision to maintain export restrictions on key rare earth elements is a targeted strategy aimed at the vulnerabilities within the U.S. industrial chain, particularly affecting the production of high-performance, high-temperature magnets used in advanced military equipment [13][15]. - Despite the resumption of processed rare earth product exports, U.S. companies that depend on elements like dysprosium find themselves unable to meet core production needs for high-end equipment [21][29]. Group 4: U.S. Efforts to Rebuild Supply Chain - The U.S. has attempted to restructure its rare earth supply chain by forming partnerships with countries like Australia and Malaysia, but these efforts have yet to yield tangible results [24]. - The U.S. Geological Survey has identified China's dominance in the rare earth sector as a potential threat to U.S. national security, prompting the government to support domestic rare earth companies through tax incentives and direct investments [26][28]. Group 5: Conclusion on Trade Dynamics - China's approach in this trade scenario serves as a new model for global mineral trade negotiations, balancing its core interests while leaving room for cooperation, complicating the U.S. position in the ongoing trade conflict [30].

12月25日，俄罗斯卫星通讯社报道称，彭博社引述官方和市场人士的说法，尽管中美两国达成了协议，中国恢复向美国出口稀土制品，可是对一些重要的稀 土元素依旧设有限制。 比如，某些美国公司拿不到金属镝或者它的氧化物。 这到底是咋回事呢？中国的限制对美国造成了啥影响？美国拿到稀土制成品后，想再弄到它的原材料，究竟是为什么呢？ 得先说一句，稀土和稀土制品可不是一回事哦，比如那种高性能的稀土永磁体，它的核心成分可是钕、镨这类稀土元素，所以人家都习惯叫它"稀土永磁 体"。 像那种高性能的钕铁硼磁体，可是很多尖端行业的关键配件，比如常用在国防、军工，还包括高端制造业啥的。 我们和美国谈妥的协议，就是直接把一些高性能的磁体供应过去，避免美国那边的一些工业陷入停产的境地。 但就是没有把那些重要的稀土元素直接出口到美国。 像美国媒体提到的镝金属或它的氧化物，这玩意儿可是做高性能磁铁的必备材料，属于那种极其关键的"配料"。要是没有镝或它的氧化物，美国实际上就别 想搞出符合各种需求的顶级磁体了。 中国出口到美国的磁铁，基本上都是加工好、加了镝的高端磁体，已经是成品状态了。 美国想单独进口镝，可中国却对这个设限了。 这一下子限制对美国到 ...

这是中国用几十年时间一步步建立起来的优势，如今，中国正通过出口管制展现自己在稀土领域的话语权。 美国很想摆脱对中国的依赖、尽快实现自给自足，但国内复杂的法规却拖慢了脚步。 比如依照《国家环境法》进行环境评估，动辄就要花两年以上，企业根本耗不起。 实际上，问题不在于环保要求本身，而是审批过程充满不确定性，投资者看不到明确的时间表，往往就选择撤资。 更何况，美国就算自己能开采稀土矿产，大部分还是得送到中国加工，然后再买回来用在国防系统里。 这意味着如果未来出现冲突，关键不在于谁第一天的武器更先进，而在于谁能持续供应、在第十天甚至第一百天还能替换和维持装备。 尽管美国从2010年就开始说要减少对中国稀土的依赖，也出台了不少法案，但进展有限。 重建完整的稀土产业链——从材料设计、分离提纯到磁体制造——相当于从零打造一个生态系统，光靠国防的预算远远不够。 更麻烦的是，美国在相关技术专利上已经落后，制度上的低效也拖了后腿。 《华盛顿邮报》指出，中国掌握了全球超过90%的稀土加工产能。 尽管美国声称稀土问题"已经解决"，却仍释放出可能加征关税等信号，显示出其持续的焦虑。 为降低对华依赖，美国正推动本土建设稀土加工中心、扩大 ...

沙特和美国达成了一项协议，内容是美国向沙特提供F-35战斗机，同时双方合作建立一个稀土工厂。这 意味着沙特将成为继以色列之后，中东地区第二个拥有隐身第五代战机的国家。那么，沙特需要为此付 出什么代价呢？首先，沙特王储小萨勒曼承诺向美国投资1万亿美元。其次，沙特要配合美国，建设一 个大型稀土工厂，帮助美国减少对中国稀土的依赖。但问题是，沙特既没有稀土储量，也没有稀土提炼 技术，那么它又如何建立稀土工厂呢？沙美之间的稀土合作，会对中国产生怎样的影响呢？ 沙特和美 国合作建设稀土工厂，确实具有一定的优势。核心优势体现在三个方面。 分，高出约8倍。由于稀土提炼需要消耗大量电力，将稀土工厂建设在沙特能够大幅降低电力成本。此 外，沙特在环保方面也会给予政策支持。沙特有大量荒无人烟的沙漠，污染物可以直接排放到沙海中， 从而避免了环保成本的增加。 最后，沙特可以从美国和日本获取技术支持。美国和日本在稀土提炼方 面拥有一定的技术储备。未来，如果美日能毫无保留地将技术转移到沙特，那么沙特就能够具备一定的 轻稀土提炼能力。然而，问题在于，美国在重稀土提炼方面的能力尚显不足，日本的相关技术仍处于实 验阶段。因此，即便美国和日本的技术 ...

稀土这个话题，如今成了全球各国争夺的焦点。手机、电动车、导弹、风力发电机等科技产品中，稀土几乎无一不依赖它。而到了2025年，全球依然为稀土 的争夺而焦头烂额。美国急得跳脚，俄罗斯手握资源却始终无法大规模开采，而中国则依旧稳步前行，牢牢掌握着稀土供应链。 中国的稀土储量究竟有多少呢？答案是4400万吨。这一数据并非随便说的，而是由美国地质调查局发布的，全球探明储量中，中国占据了接近一半。很多人 认为，单纯依靠丰富的稀土资源，中国就可以称霸全球。但事实上，真正让中国强大的，不仅仅是拥有稀土资源，而是其完备的稀土产业链。从矿石的开采 到高纯度氧化物的提炼，再到磁性材料的制造，这一全链条几乎都在中国的掌控之中，其他国家想复制也难以成功。 再看看美国，它的稀土储量大约只有180万吨，主要依赖的山口矿，储量也快要枯竭。上世纪八九十年代，山口矿曾是全球最大的稀土供应源，但由于环保 成本不断增加、市场价格低迷，最后不得不关停，将加工业务全部外包给中国。如今，美国才意识到问题的严重性，开始尝试重建自己的稀土产业链。虽然 投入了大量资金，得州的分离厂和加州的矿山都开始复产，甚至美国国防部每年还拨出十几亿美元的合同，但到2025 ...

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses China's dominance in the rare earth industry and its strategic moves against the U.S., highlighting the significant increase in the A-share rare earth index and the underlying logic behind it [1]. Group 1: China's Strategic Moves - China has made two significant moves regarding rare earth exports in 2023: the first in April with export controls on certain medium and heavy rare earths, and the second in October, expanding the controls to the entire rare earth industry chain [3][11]. - The April move was described as a "point strike," while the October action was characterized as a "fatal blow" [2]. Group 2: Importance of Rare Earths - Rare earths are not scarce in terms of mineral resources, but the technology to separate and purify them from ores is what is truly scarce [4]. - Rare earths consist of 17 metal elements, with neodymium and praseodymium being crucial for the production of the strongest magnets used in electric vehicle motors and wind power generation [4]. Group 3: China's Technological Advantage - China holds a significant technological edge in rare earth processing, with the ability to achieve a purity of 99.9999% through a method developed in the 1970s [7]. - In contrast, the U.S. and Australia can only achieve a purity of 99.9%, leading to a 60% increase in costs for them compared to China's [9]. Group 4: Market Reactions - The A-share rare earth index has seen a year-to-date increase of over 100% as of mid-October 2023, reflecting market optimism regarding the future of rare earths [15]. - Key companies in the sector, such as Northern Rare Earth and Shenghe Resources, have reported significant profit increases, with Northern Rare Earth's net profit growing by 1952% in the first half of the year [15][17]. Group 5: Future Outlook - As China's supply-side reforms continue and export licensing systems improve, the domestic supply of rare earths is expected to shrink, leading to increased scarcity and price support for rare earth products [19]. - China's strategic position in the rare earth market has evolved since the 2010 supply cut to Japan, and its importance in the U.S.-China rivalry is anticipated to grow [21].

Core Insights - Lynas Corporation has successfully developed a rare earth extraction technology for heavy rare earth oxide dysprosium, becoming the first company to commercialize rare earth processing outside of China, which opens new supply channels for Western countries [1][3] - The company plans to achieve commercial production of another rare earth element, terbium, within six months and has received a $258 million order from the United States, leading to the establishment of a new production facility in Texas [1] Industry Analysis - The announcement has sparked significant reactions from Western media, celebrating it as a major breakthrough against China's dominance in the rare earth sector; however, experts express concerns about the actual impact of this development [3] - The transition from technological breakthrough to mature application requires time, as evidenced by the lengthy process for solid-state battery technology; Lynas's extraction process is still in its early stages, with a target production capacity of only 1,500 tons per year compared to China's 10,000 to 15,000 tons [5] - The global rare earth supply chain heavily relies on China, which accounts for 69.1% of global rare earth production and dominates refining capabilities, with 77% of refining capacity and 91% of refining activities concentrated in China [5] - Even with advancements in extraction technology, the lack of stable raw material supply remains a critical challenge for the industry, as Western countries still depend on China for many rare earth elements [5]

中日关系跌入冰点，美国却一反常态沉默：叫停100%关税，特朗普不想被拖进与中国的对抗？ 中日关系进入急冻期，这是所有人都看见的现实，高市早苗的挑衅让局势一路下坠，中方连续反制让东京坐立难安。 没有高调站队，没有替日本撑腰，没有重复"对华强硬论调"，反而是一种刻意保持距离的沉默。 这种沉默背后，不是冷漠，而是克制；不是无心插手，而是不愿被拖下水。 而就在同一时间，一则来自华盛顿的消息进一步印证了这种微妙变化，特朗普政府突然放缓对半导体征收100%关税的计划，态度前后矛盾，但方向却异常 清晰：美国不愿轻易激怒中国。 在全球政治棋盘上，沉默往往比言语更能说明问题。 而现在的美国，正在用沉默表明它不想为日本的鲁莽买单，更不想让中美关系被东京的冒险玩火逼上不归路。 美国的反常沉默，是从高市早苗把台海问题扯进日本国家安全那一刻开始的。 按照以往的惯性，只要涉及中国与盟友之间的摩擦，美国总会跳出来敲打中国，给盟友撑腰，顺便加几句大道理。 然而，在这场风暴最激烈的阶段，美国却展现出一种罕见的"旁观者姿态"。 然而这一次，美国不仅没有发声，甚至连象征性的"道义支持"都没有给日本。 更诡异的是，美国最近频繁与日本、韩国进行联合军 ...

细看时间点。10月底，中美才在韩国首尔见了一面，算是难得的气氛平和。米舒斯京前脚到中国谈合作，带了一堆意向回国，中俄关系正升温。可普京一转 身，就高调宣布要自己搞稀土，不依赖别人。西方媒体立马兴奋起来，解读是普京对中国起了防心。 表面上像是中俄信任出了问题，但真相不是这么简单。 普京这次下的总统令，火药味很足。要求俄罗斯内阁在12月1日之前，必须端出一份稀土和稀有金属的长期发展路线图。给的时间，一个月。动作这么急， 背后意味就大了。 苏联时代，俄罗斯有完整产业链。苏联解体，经济休克，科研体系崩了，技术断档，工厂荒废。现在俄罗斯能挖矿石，但炼不出高纯度稀土材料。结果是原 矿低价卖出去，再高价买中国的成品。超过90%的稀土产品靠进口，其中70%来自中国。二十年如一日，这局面不急才怪。 乌克兰战事打到现在，普京彻底看明白了。西方的制裁不会停，俄国不能什么都依赖外部，否则命根子掌在别人的手里。绍伊古也说，稀土事关国家存亡。 普京这道命令，就是要把这种存亡焦虑转成行动。 为什么选在这个时间出手？因为全球都在"另起炉灶"。美国急得不行，白宫给了两年时间，要在国内完善稀土产业链，五角大楼直接撒钱给企业。欧盟投了 至少120 ...

Core Viewpoint - The temporary easing of the rare earth issue suggests that the U.S. is determined to build its own rare earth supply chain, with a focus on forming alliances with Western allies to achieve this goal [1][10]. Group 1: U.S. Strategy and Actions - The U.S. has signed agreements with Australia and Japan in the rare earth sector, marking significant progress, but it may be overly optimistic to assume that this will allow the U.S. to overtake China in the short term [3]. - The U.S. aims to diversify its rare earth supply chain, which will take several years, but it can take short-term measures to reduce supply chain risks by enhancing existing capabilities in regions like Australia [3][12]. - The U.S. has set a goal to reduce its reliance on China for rare earths from 80% to 50% by 2030 through initiatives like the "Critical Raw Materials Act" [12]. Group 2: China's Dominance in Rare Earths - China currently supplies 80% of the U.S.'s rare earth imports and 98% of the EU's, highlighting its dominant position in the global rare earth market [8]. - China's technological lead in rare earth processing is attributed to a complete industrial chain developed over decades, supported by government policies [8][4]. - The complexity and cost of separating and purifying rare earth elements present significant barriers for other countries attempting to establish their own supply chains [7][13]. Group 3: Future Outlook - Even with aggressive efforts, the U.S. may take five to seven years to establish a fully functional rare earth supply chain, during which time China could further solidify its position [14]. - The competition in the rare earth sector may intensify once both countries achieve their respective technological advancements in critical areas like semiconductors [14][15].