1. Report Industry Investment Rating No relevant content provided. 2. Core Views of the Report - The US GDP growth rate is expected to slow marginally in the second half of 2025, with a low probability of recession. The growth rate gap between the US and non - US economies will continue to narrow. Q3 is relatively cautious, while Q4 and 2026 are moderately optimistic [2][50]. - The US CPI is expected to rebound in Q3 and then decline from Q4 to early 2026. However, recent Middle - East geopolitical risks bring uncertainties to the energy - inflation chain [50][61]. - Globally, there is no macro - environment for demand - inflation - inventory to rise. The employment situation is marginally weakening, and the consumption demand in the second half of the year may not be strong. The manufacturing and inventory cycles may improve slightly, but the space is limited [3]. - If the tariff policy remains stable and geopolitical risks are controllable, there may be a combination of moderate interest rate cuts (1 - 2 times) and moderate fiscal stimulus (tax cuts) in the US in the second half of the year, which may drive the macro - economy positively, but this depends on the situation [3]. - The US dollar index will remain weak in the second half of the year, but the decline rate is expected to slow down, with a target of 95 [3]. - The allocation of 10Y US Treasury bonds may reach its peak in Q3 this year. Looking forward to the second half of the year and 2026, the target yields of 10Y US Treasury bonds are set at 3.95% and 3.42%. There are entry points for long - term US Treasury bond allocation in the second half of the year, and opportunities for a "bullish steepening" of the US Treasury bond curve in Q4 [3]. 3. Summary by Related Catalogs 3.1 2025 H1 Overseas Macroeconomic Main Logic and Major Asset Performance Review 3.1.1 2025 H1 Overseas Macroeconomic Main Logic - The macro - economic cycle in 2025 was predicted to be relatively stable and decline moderately compared to 2024. The US quarterly - on - quarterly annualized rate was expected to decline in H1 and rebound in H2. The inflation continued to decline, and employment weakened moderately [6]. - In Q1, there were differences between the expected and actual US policies. The US economic momentum declined marginally, while non - US economic momentum rebounded. US asset valuations were high, and the core sectors of the US stock market declined [7]. - In Q2, the 4.2 reciprocal tariffs exceeded expectations and then entered an "exemption period" and a "negotiation period". The "stagflation trade" was formed and then eased. The "US exception" was reversed, and the "de - dollarization" trade was strengthened [8]. - Tariff shocks: In Q1, the intensity of tariffs was lower than expected, and in Q2, it suddenly increased and then declined marginally. The average US tariff rate reached a peak of about 26.8% in early April and then stabilized at around 13.45%. The tariff shock had a negative impact on non - US demand and increased US cost - inflation [9]. - Economic momentum: The US economic momentum declined marginally since H2 2024. In Q1 2025, the net export item was a major drag on GDP, but domestic consumption showed resilience. The data showed a structure of "weak expectations and strong reality" [17]. - Dual goals: In H1, there were significant differences between inflation expectations and reality, as well as between long - term and short - term inflation. The actual CPI growth rate was stable, while inflation expectations were strong [20]. - Relative strength: The growth rate gap between the US and non - US economies was narrowing, which was an important fundamental background for the reversal of the "US exception" and the "de - dollarization" narrative. Non - US economies were stronger than the US in terms of economic data surprises [23]. 3.1.2 H1 Major Asset Performance Review - The first half of the year was divided into two stages around April 2. Q1 was characterized by trading the expectation difference after the implementation of Trump 2.0 policies, with the reversal of the "US exception" and the rebound of non - US valuations. Q2 was characterized by the decline of tariff shocks and the rebound of risk assets [27][30]. - In terms of major asset performance, risk assets first declined and then rose, non - US assets were stronger than US assets, valuation repair was faster than demand repair, and supply factors led to differences in commodity performance [35]. 3.2 2025 H2 Overseas Macroeconomic Outlook 3.2.1 Core Conclusion - The US GDP growth rate will slow marginally in H2, with a low probability of recession. The growth rate gap between the US and non - US economies will continue to narrow. Q3 is relatively cautious, while Q4 and 2026 are moderately optimistic [50]. - Inflation will be affected by supply - side shocks in H2, with a rebound in Q3 and a decline from Q4 to 2026. However, Middle - East geopolitical risks bring uncertainties to energy inflation [50]. - Globally, there is no macro - environment for demand - inflation - inventory to rise. The employment situation is marginally weakening, and consumption demand may not be strong in H2. The manufacturing and inventory cycles may improve slightly, but the space is limited [50]. 3.2.2 Economic Growth - The US GDP growth rate is expected to slow marginally in H2, with a low point in Q4. The US economic growth rate gap with the eurozone will continue to narrow. The financial conditions index may face resistance in further improvement, which may lead to a decline in real - time GDP momentum in Q3 [53][54]. 3.2.3 Inflation Trend - The US CPI growth rate is expected to rebound in Q3 and reach its peak in Q4, then decline until 2026. Middle - East geopolitical risks may lead to an increase in energy inflation. In the long - term, if the geopolitical - energy - inflation situation is controllable, there may be an opportunity for inflation to return downward [61][63]. 3.2.4 Cycle Positioning - There is no strong demand cycle globally. Employment may receive positive contributions from consumer and business confidence improvement and seasonal factors, but key sectors may remain weak. Consumption demand may not be strong, and there are uncertainties in the "抢进口" and "抢补库" behaviors. The manufacturing and inventory cycles may improve slightly in H2, but the space is limited [74][84][95]. 3.2.5 Tariff Impact - After the Sino - US Geneva Joint Statement, the US average tariff rate on China decreased, and the average tariff rate on the rest of the world also declined. The probability of further tariff escalation between the US and China is low, but there is high uncertainty in the US - RoW tariff policy. Tariffs still have a negative impact on demand - cost [102]. - From the perspective of supply - chain dependence and tariff cost bearers, "embargo - level" tariffs are not realistic. The US "抢进口" and inventory replenishment have certain characteristics, and the impact of tariffs on prices may be reflected in July [103][112]. 3.2.6 Fiscal Policy - The "One big, beautiful bill" may have different impacts in different time dimensions. In the 10 - year dimension, its impact on long - term US Treasury bonds is limited. In the 3 - year dimension, it may increase the interest rate center. In the 3 - month dimension, it may drive the interest rate up in the short - term [122]. - Stable tariff revenue can offset fiscal expenditure to some extent, but the tariff rate needs to balance tax revenue, trade, and economic stability [133]. 3.2.7 Monetary Policy - The Fed is expected to have 1 - 2 interest rate cuts this year, possibly in September, October, or December. In Q3, the Fed's tone may be hawkish, while in Q4, interest rate cuts may be implemented, and the expectation of interest rate cuts in 2026 will be opened. The Fed's interest rate cuts may be greater than those of other central banks in 2026, which may lead to a weakening of the US dollar index in the medium - term [137][138][139]. 3.3 2025 H2 Major Asset Performance Outlook 3.3.1 2025 H2 US Dollar Index Outlook - The view of a weak US dollar is maintained. In H2, the US dollar index will remain weak, but the decline rate will slow down, with a target of 95. The driving factors will change from valuation regression to the convergence of the growth rate gap between the US and non - US economies and the increase in the hedging demand for US dollar assets [150]. - In the medium - to - long - term, the US dollar is overvalued, and the driving factors for its strength are weakening. The "US exception" in the FX market is reversing, and the US dollar is expected to return to its equilibrium level [151][152][155].

当市场中的避险情绪上升，比如当美国总统特朗普忽然宣布对全球大部分国家征收关税时，股市整体都会下跌，绝大部分股票都会受其影响而被抛售。哪怕 一个公司的业绩和进出口贸易无关，其价格也会被大盘带动而下跌回撤。在这个时候，有些投资者会觉得他需要一些"避险资产"，或者"投资保险"，来保 护他的投资组合，维持他的理智，帮助他在价格暴跌时不至于被迫出售那些长期看好的股票。 那么问题来了：哪些资产可以帮助投资者达到"保险"的功能呢？ 第一个选项是 政府国债 。 这里的国债，主要指那些信用评级比较高的发达国家政府国债，比如美国、英国、澳大利亚、德国等。由于发行这些国债的国家政府信用评级比较高，市场 对他们比较信任，几乎不用担心他们像阿根廷政府那样违约，因此这些国家的政府国债是很多投资机构最青睐的"保险资产"之一。 前摩根士丹利策略师 Stephen Jen 曾提出过一个金融理论，叫做 美元微笑曲线 ，来解释美元在不同经济环境下为何能表现强势的现象。在全球风险上 升、经济衰退或金融市场动荡时，投资者寻求 " 避险资产 " 。美元因其全球储备货币地位以及美国国债市场的深度和流动性，被认为是最安全的资产。此 时，资本流入美国，美元升 ...

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the importance of safe-haven assets during times of market volatility, highlighting government bonds, gold, and the US dollar as key options for investors seeking to protect their portfolios from downturns [1][2][6]. Group 1: Government Bonds - Government bonds, particularly from high-credit-rated developed countries like the US, UK, Australia, and Germany, are favored as safe-haven assets due to their reliability and low default risk [2][3]. - In economic downturns, central banks typically lower interest rates, which increases bond prices and provides investors with a protective function [2][3]. - The current yield on US 10-year government bonds is approximately 4.3%, offering decent returns while maintaining their role as a safe asset during market turmoil [3]. Group 2: Gold - Gold is highlighted as another significant safe-haven asset, especially during crises, as it is perceived to resist inflation due to its finite supply [4][5]. - Over the past year, gold prices have increased by around 50%, indicating its appeal during uncertain times [5]. - However, gold's price volatility poses risks, as it can spike during crises but may also decline sharply once the crisis subsides, necessitating careful timing by investors [5]. Group 3: US Dollar - The US dollar is recognized as a classic safe-haven asset, benefiting from its status as the global reserve currency and the depth of the US Treasury market [6][7]. - The "dollar smile" theory explains that the dollar appreciates during both economic downturns and periods of strong US economic performance, making it a reliable asset in various conditions [6][7]. - Concerns about the dollar's status as a safe-haven asset arise from geopolitical tensions and potential shifts in global economic dynamics, which could undermine its reserve currency status [7]. Group 4: Diversification Strategy - The article emphasizes that no single asset can guarantee protection against losses, advocating for a diversified investment approach to mitigate risks and achieve smoother returns [8]. - Investors are encouraged to maintain a long-term perspective and avoid being overly influenced by short-term market fluctuations [9].

(图片由豆包AI生成 关键词 暴风雨中的城市) 本周， 全球金融市场见证了一系列具有划时代意义的事件。 美国贸易战正式"开打"，但整个过程却没有之前外界预料般的猛烈；欧洲历史性转变，在出台天量刺激的同时，"伦敦协议"闪亮登场；中国科技历史性破局 还在继续，阿里发布媲美DeepSeek R1性能的开源模型，成本仅1/10。 在瑞银看来，随着欧洲朝着军事独立于美国的方向迈进， "海湖庄园协议"正让位于"伦敦协议"。 如果欧洲国家指示目前流向高回报美国资产的大量储蓄转向支持本土国防和基础设施资产，那么欧元区储蓄盈余流向美国的趋势可能会减弱，欧元美元汇率 可能会结构性走高， 欧元最终可能崛起为一种替代储备资产，与美元展开竞争。欧洲国家则可能进一步加强经济一体化，推动全球经济格局的多极化发 展。 历史性的贸易战 据央视报道，当地时间3月3日本周一，美国总统特朗普表示，美国对墨西哥和加拿大商品征收25%的关税将于3月4日生效。对等关税将于4月2日开始征 收。 但在美股经历周一巨震后， 商务部长卢特尼克4日出来"灭火" ，其表示特朗普可能会在关税问题上与墨西哥和加拿大达成某种折中的方案，如果遵守"美国- 墨西哥-加拿大协定 ...