支出总量的扩张，对统筹用好可用财力提出更高要求。受访专家预计，2026年更大规模的财政支出盘子 将继续保持"早发快用"节奏，以争取在年内实现更多实物工作量。为增强地方可用财力，新的一年既有 必要提高转移支付规模，也要提高转移支付资金效能，推动资金精准直达基层。 财政收入基础更稳 经济发展是财政收入的基础和源泉。明年是"十五五"开局之年，我国经济运行有望保持平稳向好态势， 内需进一步回暖、物价温和回升等因素，都将支撑财政收入恢复性增长。 全国财政工作会议强调，2026年继续实施更加积极的财政政策并提高精准度和有效性。新的一年，我国 经济长期向好的支撑条件和基本趋势没有变，为财政收入平稳增长奠定基础，也为扩大财政支出盘子、 确保必要支出力度创造条件。 近期，多地陆续披露2026年一季度地方政府债券发行计划，目前各地拟发行的新增地方政府债券规模近 1.2万亿元，财政靠前发力的特征明显。受访专家预计，"十五五"开局之年，新增地方政府债券或延 续"早发快用"特征，财政预算资金将靠前拨付。 鉴于新的一年财政收入有望呈恢复性增长态势，以及近两年地方化债成效显著，因收入不及预期或债务 付息压力制约支出发力的情况也将更少发生。 ...

Group 1 - The article discusses the fiscal dimensions of China's economic growth miracle, highlighting various academic theories that explain this phenomenon [2][3][4] - Key theories include Lin Yifu's "Comparative Advantage Strategy," Sachs and Yang Xiaokai's "Industrialization Imitation," Cai Fang's "Demographic Dividend," Zhang Wuchang's "Local Government Competition," and Qian Yingyi's "Fiscal Incentive" [2][3][4][5] - The article emphasizes the importance of understanding China's fiscal system, which shapes government behavior and influences economic development, public goods provision, and regional balance [3][4][5] Group 2 - The evolution of China's fiscal system is divided into three stages: "Unified Collection and Expenditure," "Separate Stoves for Cooking," and "Tax Sharing System" [9][10][14] - The "Unified Collection and Expenditure" stage (1950-1979) was characterized by a highly centralized fiscal management system that limited local government incentives [10][12] - The "Separate Stoves for Cooking" stage (1980-1993) allowed local governments more autonomy but led to issues such as declining central fiscal authority and market fragmentation [11][12][13] Group 3 - The "Tax Sharing System" (1994-present) significantly altered the fiscal relationship between central and local governments, increasing central fiscal revenue's share of total revenue to around 47% [14][30] - This system incentivizes local governments to develop their economies by allowing them to retain a portion of tax revenues, particularly from value-added tax and corporate income tax [24][25][30] - The article argues that the flexibility of the tax-sharing system promotes local economic growth by aligning local government incentives with economic development goals [25][35] Group 4 - The article also discusses the role of transfer payments in balancing regional disparities and stimulating economic growth, particularly in underdeveloped areas [36][41] - Transfer payments have increased significantly since 2000, with general transfer payments rising from 13.44% to 54.03% of total transfers by 2017, indicating a focus on equalizing regional financial capabilities [37][40] - The effectiveness of transfer payments in promoting economic growth is linked to their ability to enhance the development capacity of less developed regions [41][42] Group 5 - The article concludes that the fiscal system's design, particularly the tax-sharing system and transfer payments, is crucial for stimulating local government initiatives in economic development and public service provision [43][44] - It suggests that as China's economy matures, the focus should shift from merely stimulating economic growth to enhancing public service delivery and governance [44]

Core Insights - The four municipalities received significantly higher transfer payments compared to other cities, with Chongqing leading at 249.17 billion, followed by Beijing at 183.43 billion, Shanghai at 118.8 billion, and Tianjin at 88.36 billion [1][3][5] Transfer Payment Analysis - The transfer payment structure includes central and provincial return income, general transfer payments, and special transfer payments, which are crucial for addressing regional fiscal imbalances and promoting equal access to public services [3][4] - The total transfer payments for the four municipalities are substantially higher than those for other cities, with three cities exceeding 100 billion [3][5] - In 2024, seven cities received over 50 billion in upper-level subsidies, with Harbin, Wuhan, Guangzhou, Xi'an, Hangzhou, Changchun, and Hefei receiving 79.93 billion, 78.69 billion, 63.5 billion, 57.33 billion, 56.47 billion, 55.51 billion, and 54.04 billion respectively [5][6] Specific City Insights - Guangzhou's transfer income includes a significant portion from tax returns, indicating a stronger incentive for economically developed regions [5] - Nanjing's upper-level subsidy income was only 25.47 billion, ranking 32nd among the 36 cities, highlighting a disparity where its transfer expenditures far exceeded its transfer income [6] - Wuhan's general and special transfer payment revenues were significantly higher than budgeted, reflecting increased support from central and provincial governments [11]

Core Insights - The Chinese government has been utilizing over 10 trillion yuan in transfer payments to address fiscal imbalances among regions and promote coordinated regional development [1] - Recent audit reports from 28 provinces have highlighted issues with the timely allocation, compliance, and rational distribution of transfer payments, indicating a need for improved regulatory oversight [1][2] Transfer Payment Issues - The overall scale of intergovernmental transfer payments in China is increasing, with central government transfers to localities projected at approximately 100.4 billion yuan for 2024 and 103.4 billion yuan for 2025 [2] - Many local governments are struggling with fiscal imbalances, leading to increased competition for transfer payments, which necessitates a more scientific and rational distribution of these funds [2] - Specific audit findings include: - Gansu's report noted a lack of management regulations for 26 projects and ineffective utilization of project reserves [2] - Hebei's report highlighted delays in revising funding management methods and unreasonable fund allocations affecting 10.74 billion yuan [2][3] Inefficiencies in Fund Allocation - Audit reports from various provinces revealed issues such as: - Shandong's report indicated that funds for smart city initiatives were distributed too broadly, with some eligible enterprises receiving only minimal support [3] - Anhui's report pointed out overlapping objectives among different special transfer payments, leading to inefficiencies [3] - Hunan's audit found that fixed distribution methods did not adequately address the needs of counties with significant fiscal gaps [3] Delays and Idle Funds - Delays in the allocation of transfer payments have been a recurring issue, with reports indicating that some funds were not distributed within the required timeframes, impacting budget execution and fund utilization [4][5] - For instance, Guangdong's audit revealed that 161.61 billion yuan in transfer payments exceeded the allocation deadline, with some delays lasting up to 334 days [4] - Idle funds due to slow project progress were also reported, with Hainan noting 8.04 billion yuan in unspent ecological protection funds [5] Regulatory Improvements - The Chinese government is working to enhance the transfer payment system and strengthen oversight to improve fund utilization efficiency [6] - Recommendations include optimizing the distribution methods for transfer payments, establishing evaluation mechanisms for regional balance, and ensuring timely fund disbursement [7][8] - Local audits have suggested reforms such as clarifying the functions of various transfer payments and implementing dynamic adjustment mechanisms to prevent fund wastage [8]

Core Insights - The Chinese government has allocated over 10 trillion yuan in transfer payments to address fiscal imbalances among regions, aiming for coordinated regional development and long-term national stability [2] - Recent audit reports from 28 provinces have highlighted issues with the timely distribution, compliance, and rational allocation of transfer payments, indicating a need for improved regulatory oversight [2][3] Group 1: Audit Findings - The overall scale of intergovernmental transfer payments is increasing, with central government transfers to localities projected at approximately 100.397 billion yuan for 2024 and 103.415 billion yuan for 2025 [3] - Some provinces reported inadequate management of transfer payment funds, with instances of funds being unallocated or misallocated, such as Gansu's report indicating 26 projects lacked management guidelines [3][4] - Audit findings from Hebei revealed that several funds were not allocated according to management guidelines, affecting the efficiency of fund usage [4] Group 2: Distribution Issues - Reports indicated that some transfer payments were distributed in a "one-size-fits-all" manner, leading to ineffective fund utilization, as seen in Shandong's report where funds were inadequately allocated to qualifying enterprises [4] - Inconsistent distribution methods were noted, with some regions relying heavily on fixed distribution bases, which did not adequately address the needs of counties with significant fiscal gaps [4][5] Group 3: Delays and Idle Funds - Delays in the distribution of transfer payments were common, with Guangdong's audit revealing that 46 central transfer payments exceeded the stipulated time limits, affecting a total of 161.61 billion yuan [5] - Idle funds were reported due to slow project progress and inadequate planning, with Hainan noting 8.04 billion yuan in idle ecological protection funds [6] Group 4: Misappropriation of Funds - Instances of misappropriation of transfer payment funds were reported, with Jilin's audit revealing that 25.45 billion yuan was misused for non-allocated purposes [7] - In Hebei, some local governments were found to have diverted special funds for budget balancing and daily expenses, totaling 7.88 billion yuan [7] Group 5: Regulatory Improvements - The Chinese government is working to enhance the transfer payment system and strengthen oversight to improve fund utilization efficiency [8][9] - Proposed measures include optimizing the distribution methods, establishing evaluation mechanisms for regional balance, and ensuring timely fund allocation in accordance with legal requirements [9][10] - Recommendations from local audits suggest further reforms in the fiscal system to clarify the functions of various transfer payments and improve performance monitoring [10]

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the challenges and inefficiencies in China's intergovernmental transfer payment system, highlighting issues such as improper fund allocation, delays in fund distribution, and misuse of funds, while emphasizing the need for improved regulatory measures and system reforms to enhance the effectiveness of these payments [3][11][12]. Summary by Sections Audit Issues Overview - The scale of intergovernmental transfer payments in China has been increasing annually, with the central government's transfer payments to local governments projected at approximately 100.397 billion yuan for 2024 and 103.415 billion yuan for 2025 [4]. - Many local governments have reported issues with transfer payments, including untimely fund distribution, non-compliance with allocation regulations, and funds being left idle or misappropriated [3][5]. Specific Audit Findings - Various provinces have identified specific problems in their audit reports, such as Gansu's report indicating a lack of management regulations for 26 funds and ineffective utilization of project reserves [5]. - In Hebei, issues included outdated management methods for medical service funds and improper allocation of 10.74 billion yuan, affecting fund efficiency [5][6]. - Reports from Shandong and Anhui highlighted problems with scattered fund distribution and overlapping support content among different projects [6][7]. Timeliness and Utilization of Funds - The article notes that some transfer payments are not distributed in a timely manner, with Guangdong's report showing delays exceeding the stipulated time frame for 46 central and 23 provincial transfer payments, totaling 161.61 billion yuan [7][8]. - Idle funds remain a persistent issue, as seen in Hainan, where 8.04 billion yuan in ecological funds was left unspent due to slow project progress [9]. Misuse of Funds - Misappropriation of transfer payments has been reported, with Jilin's audit revealing that 25.45 billion yuan was misused for budget balancing and loan repayments [10]. - In Hebei, 7.88 billion yuan was improperly allocated to cover regular expenses instead of designated projects [10]. Recommendations for Improvement - Experts suggest that the transfer payment system needs reform to address inefficiencies, including optimizing fund distribution methods and establishing clearer evaluation mechanisms for fund allocation [12][13]. - The government has indicated plans to enhance the regulatory framework surrounding transfer payments, including the development of comprehensive regulations and performance evaluation systems [14][13].

Core Points - The European Union (EU) was formed in 1993, but many Eastern European countries have struggled to benefit from the unified market, often feeling marginalized [2] - Countries like Germany and the Netherlands have leveraged their manufacturing advantages to dominate Eastern European markets, leading to the decline of local industries [4] - The EU's financial support to struggling countries, such as Greece, has been insufficient and hindered by bureaucratic processes, resulting in limited benefits for the local population [4] - There is a clear hierarchical structure within the EU, with wealthier Northern countries benefiting disproportionately compared to Southern and Eastern nations [6] - The high welfare system in Europe is under threat due to rising energy costs, reduced military support from the U.S., and competition from upgraded Chinese manufacturing [6] - Cultural and ethnic differences among EU member states contribute to integration challenges, making it difficult to achieve a unified fiscal and policy framework [9] - The EU faces multiple crises, with Western countries reluctant to share responsibilities and Eastern nations unable to resist economic pressures, leading to a decline in welfare benefits [11] - The current situation in the EU serves as a cautionary tale for other nations, highlighting the importance of self-sufficiency and resilience in the face of external challenges [11]

1. Report Industry Investment Rating No information provided in the content. 2. Core Viewpoints of the Report - The core of the central - local fiscal relationship lies in the division and combination of powers over affairs, financial rights, and financial resources. Currently, there is a prominent mismatch between local financial rights and powers over affairs, leading to structural pressures. Future reforms may focus on cultivating local tax sources, the central government moderately taking back fiscal powers over affairs and expenditure responsibilities, and promoting fiscal system reforms below the provincial level [1][3][6] - Since the reform and opening - up, the central - local fiscal relationship has evolved from the "separate - cooking" system to the tax - sharing system, and then to the reform of powers over affairs and expenditure responsibilities [2] 3. Summary According to the Directory 3.1事权、财权、财力——财政体制三要素 - Powers over affairs determine the scope of action for governments at all levels, with the power of expenditure being the core. Financial rights mainly refer to tax rights and determine the revenue distribution among governments. Financial resources are the fiscal revenues that governments can organize and allocate, and are affected by transfer payments [1][10] - The theoretical understanding of the fiscal system has evolved. From the "two - factor" framework of "combining financial rights with powers over affairs" before the 1994 tax - sharing reform, to the requirement of "matching financial resources with powers over affairs" in 2007, and then to the principle of "aligning powers over affairs with expenditure responsibilities" after the 18th Third Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee [12] 3.2央地财政关系的历史沿革 3.2.1 1979 - 1993年：分灶吃饭体制 - From 1979 - 1984, the "dividing revenues and expenditures, and implementing hierarchical contracting" system was implemented, giving local governments more fiscal autonomy. From 1985 - 1987, the "dividing taxes, verifying revenues and expenditures, and implementing hierarchical contracting" system was adopted, making the fiscal distribution relationship between the central and local governments clearer. From 1988 - 1993, the "six - form fiscal contracting" system was introduced, which further enhanced local fiscal autonomy [15][16][17] 3.2.2 1994年：分税制改革 - The "separate - cooking" system enhanced local government enthusiasm but led to a significant decline in the "two ratios." In 1994, the tax - sharing reform was carried out, with the core being the classification and distribution of taxes, forming a revenue - division system of central taxes, local taxes, and shared taxes. A transfer payment system was also introduced [19][22] 3.2.3 1994—2016年：分税制后央地间税权改革 - After the tax - sharing reform, the central government adjusted the division of financial rights mainly based on tax rights. Reforms were made in income tax, export tax rebates, securities transaction stamp duty, business tax, and value - added tax [23][24] 3.2.4 2016年至今：事权和支出责任改革 - Since 2016, the reform of dividing central and local fiscal powers over affairs and expenditure responsibilities has gradually advanced. Specific plans have been issued for major sub - sectors such as healthcare, education, and science and technology [27][28] 3.3央地财政关系的现状 3.3.1 地方财权与事权不匹配 - In terms of financial rights, the central and local tax revenues are nearly evenly divided. In terms of expenditure responsibilities, local governments bear most of the fiscal expenditures. In 2024, local fiscal expenditures accounted for 86%, while local fiscal revenues accounted for 54%, indicating a prominent mismatch [29][30][34] - From the perspective of the four - account fiscal structure, local governments have a large revenue - expenditure gap in the general public budget and rely on central transfer payments. The revenues and expenditures of government - managed funds and social security funds are mainly concentrated at the local level [37] 3.3.2 结构性的压力 - Local expenditure responsibilities are excessive, and local fiscal expenditures exceed national fiscal revenues. The gap has been widening since 2016, reflecting the structural problem of over - burdened local governments [39] - The expansion of local fiscal deficits mainly relies on central transfer payments. Since 2022, central transfer payments have exceeded central fiscal revenues, and the proportion of transfer payments in central fiscal expenditures and local fiscal revenues has been increasing [43][45] 3.3.3 央地财政关系的国际比较 - Compared with G20 countries, China has a relatively high proportion of local government powers over affairs and a relatively low proportion of central government powers over affairs. In 2022, local fiscal expenditures as a percentage of GDP were 22.28%, while central fiscal expenditures as a percentage of GDP were 21.1% [48] - In sub - sectors such as public services, economic affairs, health, and social security, local governments in China bear relatively heavy expenditure responsibilities [51] 3.4转移支付——财政均衡的纽带 3.4.1 转移支付构成 - Transfer payments include general transfer payments, special transfer payments, and transfer payments for shared fiscal powers over affairs. In 2024, general transfer payments (excluding transfer payments for shared fiscal powers over affairs) accounted for 49.5%, special transfer payments accounted for 8.1%, and transfer payments for shared fiscal powers over affairs accounted for 37.4% [55][56] - General transfer payments are mainly composed of equalization transfer payments, tax rebates, and rewards for county - level basic financial resources guarantee mechanisms. Special transfer payments are mainly used for infrastructure construction, and transfer payments for shared fiscal powers over affairs are mainly used in basic public service fields [59][61][64] 3.4.2 转移支付的区域分布 - Regionally, central and western regions receive significantly more transfer payments than other regions. They also have a higher degree of dependence on transfer payments. In 2024, Sichuan received the largest amount of transfer payments, while economically developed provinces and some less - developed regions received relatively less [66][67][70] 3.5央地财政关系改革的方向 3.5.1 培育地方税源、提高地方财政收入 - The reform of shifting the consumption tax collection link backward and gradually transferring it to local governments is being promoted. The potential incremental revenue from the reform is estimated to be about 20.93 billion yuan, but in the short term, it will have a limited impact on local financial resources [72][73] 3.5.2 中央适度上移财政事权和支出责任 - The central government may moderately take back fiscal powers over affairs and expenditure responsibilities in areas such as higher education, science and technology, public health, and social security to address the mismatch between powers over affairs and financial rights [76] 3.5.3 推进省以下财政体制改革 - Future reforms may include clearly defining fiscal powers over affairs and expenditure responsibilities below the provincial level, rationalizing the revenue relationship among governments below the provincial level, and improving the transfer payment system below the provincial level [78]

Core Viewpoint - The article emphasizes the importance of studying fiscal history to understand the underlying factors that shape modern states and societies, arguing that financial capabilities often determine the outcomes of historical events and conflicts [2][3][12]. Fiscal History Insights - Fiscal history helps to debunk grand narratives about the origins of modern states, highlighting the concept of the "fiscal-military state" as essential [3]. - In the late medieval period, royal finances were limited, relying on unstable sources such as land rents and tariffs, leading to temporary measures for war funding [4]. - The 16th century marked the beginning of a "long war era" in Europe, compelling states to find more stable financing methods [5]. - The Glorious Revolution in England (1688) led to parliamentary control over finances, establishing a national debt system and the Bank of England, which enabled sustained military engagement [6]. - France's fiscal structure was flawed, with tax burdens disproportionately on the common people, leading to high debt costs and eventual state bankruptcy, which contributed to the French Revolution [7]. - During the Napoleonic Wars, Britain leveraged its global capital markets and efficient tax systems to finance prolonged conflicts [8]. Case Studies in Fiscal Capacity - The Crimean War (1853-1856) is framed as a test of fiscal capacity, with Britain and France having established robust debt markets, while Russia's reliance on serfdom and limited domestic capital led to its defeat [9]. - The fiscal crisis in Russia prompted significant reforms, including the abolition of serfdom and the establishment of a modern fiscal and economic system [9]. Broader Implications of Fiscal History - Fiscal history reveals that financial resources directly influence the success of wars and have profound effects on social structures and national identity [12]. - Economic historian Joseph Schumpeter's insights suggest that a nation's fiscal history encapsulates its cultural and social dynamics, providing a clearer understanding of historical developments [12][13]. - Schumpeter posits that modern nations and national identities are shaped by fiscal pressures, indicating that taxation plays a crucial role in state formation [14][15]. Historical Context in China - The early Republic of China faced significant turmoil, attributed to a weak fiscal foundation, with the central government heavily reliant on tariffs and external debts, leading to fragmented political power [16][18]. - The fiscal decentralization trend began in the late Qing dynasty, with local powers retaining tax revenues, which contributed to the political fragmentation observed during the early Republic [17]. - The establishment of the Nationalist government in 1927 aimed to unify fiscal authority, but true fiscal centralization was not achieved until after 1949, with significant reforms occurring in the 1990s [18]. Conclusion - Understanding fiscal history, alongside population history, is crucial for grasping the true pulse of historical developments and societal changes [19].

Core Viewpoint - The article highlights the increasing pressure on China's economy due to the pandemic and geopolitical conflicts, leading to significant fiscal challenges, particularly at the county level, while emphasizing the government's efforts to ensure basic livelihood support through increased transfer payments from the central government [1][2]. Group 1: Fiscal Challenges and Responses - China's economy faces downward pressure this year, exacerbated by repeated pandemic outbreaks and international geopolitical conflicts [1]. - The central government has significantly increased transfer payments to local governments, reaching a record high of nearly 9.8 trillion yuan in 2022, with an increase of approximately 1.5 trillion yuan, marking an 18% growth from the previous year [1][2]. - The fiscal report indicates that the central government's transfer payments are crucial for maintaining basic livelihood support and ensuring the implementation of tax reductions and exemptions [2]. Group 2: Transfer Payment Mechanism - The central government allocated 1.2 trillion yuan in transfer payments specifically to support local governments in implementing tax cuts and ensuring basic livelihood needs [2]. - The transfer payment system is evolving, with a focus on enhancing the efficiency of fund utilization, particularly through a direct funding mechanism that allows for rapid disbursement to local levels [3][4]. - As of mid-year, approximately 3.992 trillion yuan of the 4 trillion yuan allocated for direct funding has been disbursed, achieving a 97.9% distribution rate [4]. Group 3: Impact on Local Governments - Local governments are also enhancing their financial support by coordinating central subsidies with their own resources, particularly focusing on financially weaker municipalities [2]. - The direct funding mechanism has proven effective in alleviating financial pressures at the grassroots level, ensuring that basic livelihood needs are prioritized in budget allocations [5]. - Direct financial support has reached approximately 3,500 billion yuan, benefiting around 680,000 businesses and a total of 2.56 million instances of support [4][5].