中国有三大 "名骂" 之称：楼市、股市与国足。 今年不可以骂了，因为楼市再跌就要伤筋动骨 ，稳楼市已经是政策的不二选择，专家也开始唱响中国楼市，一向对楼市悲观的姚洋表示为房地产是 "永恒的 朝阳产业"；林毅夫说是 "永远的支柱产业"。 但经济学的词典中没有 "永恒" 这个概念，它研究的是相对性。 顺便提一下 "6 亿栋" 这个概念， 这个数据中的 90% 是农村房屋。按吉屋网的估算，中国目前纯商品房约 1.5 亿至 1.8 亿套，把房改房、保障房、小产权房全部算进来，约 3.74 亿套、370 亿 平方米左右。这个数据是以《第七次全国人口普查》为数据源推算出来的，虽不精确，但避免了 "六亿栋" 的模糊性。 370 亿平方米仍然是一个巨大的数 字。中国城镇常住人口 9 亿多，平均下来人均住房面积超过了 40 平方米。 专家们认为40平方米还有上涨的空间，这就是缺少系统思维的表现，美国人均住房面积 67 平方米，高于中国，然而美国并没有出现泡沫，房价还在涨，为 什么，因为美国和平均收入远在中国之上，如果收入不增加，40平方米就成了边际，平衡才是原理。 2024 年上海房价38.5 倍；纽约 11.0 倍，那么 ， ...

近期，经济学家马光远先生在视频中提出的观点，引发了广泛的讨论。他光远先生认为，中国的高房价绝大部分 是合理的，只有少数城市的房价确实过高，导致整个房地产市场出现了问题。 针对这种复杂的局面，马光远的"少数城市得病"比喻，还是有些启发性的。它提示，应当摒弃"一刀切"的调控思 路，转而采取差异化的精准调控策略。对于真正存在泡沫风险的城市，应当严格执行限购、限贷政策，遏制投机 需求；而对于房价基本合理的城市，则应保持政策的连续性和稳定性，避免误伤刚需。 马光远先生称，从宏观经济角度而言，中国楼市的价格形成机制，确实有其内在的逻辑。过去20多年，由于城镇 化进程进程加快，大量人口从乡村向城市迁移，特别是向一线城市和核心二线城市转移。人口流动带来了巨大的 住房需求，而土地资源的稀缺，又决定了供给的有限。楼市供需关系的紧张，自然推高了大城市的房价。例如， 北京、上海、深圳等一线城市，因其优质的教育、医疗、就业资源，吸引了大量高素质人才聚集，房价的上涨， 在一定程度上反映了这些城市资源的高度集聚效应。 应该认识到，房地产不仅是一个经济问题，更是一个重要的民生问题。高房价带来的社会焦虑，不容忽视，年轻 人因购房压力而推迟结婚 ...

Core Viewpoint - The focus of future fiscal revenue and expenditure may be on maintaining deficits, standardizing tax collection, supplementing local financial resources, and resolving hidden debts [2][3][18] Fiscal Revenue and Expenditure Overview - In the first eleven months of 2025, the national general public budget revenue was 200,516 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 0.8%, while the expenditure was 248,538 billion yuan, up 1.4% year-on-year [5] - In November, the broad fiscal expenditure showed a year-on-year decline of 1.7%, a significant narrowing of the decline by 17.5 percentage points compared to October, while the broad fiscal revenue fell by 5.2%, further declining by 4.6 percentage points from October [2][6] Revenue and Expenditure Dynamics - The divergence in fiscal revenue and expenditure is partly due to base disturbances and the ongoing drag from land finance [11][19] - The government fund revenue in November saw a year-on-year decline of 15.8%, although the decline was narrowed by 2.6 percentage points compared to October [24][29] - The general fiscal expenditure budget completion rate in November was 8%, lower than the five-year average of 8.4% [38] Support for Fiscal Expenditure - The 5,000 billion yuan local special bond limit and the implementation of financial tools have become important supports for broad fiscal expenditure in November [15][49] - The government fund expenditure turned positive in November, reaching a growth of 2.8%, significantly improving from a negative growth in October [38][49] Future Fiscal Strategy - The fiscal revenue strategy for 2026 may focus on maintaining necessary fiscal deficits and addressing local fiscal difficulties while encouraging local governments to actively manage debts [18][19]

Overview of Equity Finance - Equity finance has rapidly expanded in scale, becoming a crucial method for local governments to enhance fiscal revenue and support industrial development[4] - In 2024, China's general public budget revenue, government fund budget revenue, and state capital operation budget revenue are projected to be CNY 21.97 trillion, CNY 6.21 trillion, and CNY 0.68 trillion, with growth rates of 1.3%, -12.2%, and 0.6% respectively[5] Regional Distribution and Investment Trends - By the end of 2024, a total of 2,178 government guidance funds have been established nationwide, with a total target scale of CNY 12.84 trillion, reflecting a 25% increase from CNY 6.16 trillion in 2021[9] - The proportion of equity investment-related expenditures in total fiscal expenditures increased from approximately 0.99% in 2021 to 1.46% in 2024, indicating a growing weight of equity finance in the fiscal system[9] Case Studies of Different Cities - Hefei, as a technology innovation city, has established a fund matrix exceeding CNY 156 billion, focusing on new energy vehicles and integrated circuits, achieving significant returns through strategic investments[16] - Foshan, a manufacturing cluster city, has created a fund system with a total scale of no less than CNY 1.2 trillion, focusing on advanced manufacturing and technology upgrades, with over 60% of investments in these areas[17] - Yulin, a resource-based city, has developed a fund cluster of nearly CNY 10 billion, focusing on green transformation and product value enhancement in traditional resource industries[19] Challenges and Recommendations - Challenges include unclear identification of industrial advantages, insufficient market-oriented operations, and imbalances between risks and returns[20] - Recommendations for improvement include establishing a scientific evaluation system for industrial advantages, enhancing market-oriented operational mechanisms, and perfecting risk-return balance mechanisms[21]

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the contrasting perceptions of wealth and financial stability among different demographics in China, highlighting the significant increase in savings despite a general feeling of financial distress due to declining real estate values [1][2][11]. Group 1: Wealth Perception and Real Estate Impact - Many high-income families have experienced a drastic reduction in net worth due to falling property values, leading to increased financial pressure and a shift in spending behavior [4][12]. - A typical high-income family in Nanjing saw their property values halved, resulting in a significant increase in their loan-to-asset ratio, which heightened their financial stress [4]. - The perception of wealth has shifted from feeling affluent to facing a mid-life crisis as income stagnates or declines, causing individuals to become more cautious with their spending [4][12]. Group 2: Savings Trends - Since 2022, there has been a rapid increase in household savings, while loan growth has been minimal, indicating a shift in consumer behavior towards saving rather than spending [5][8]. - The net savings in China have surged dramatically, with an increase of 42 trillion yuan in just four years, surpassing the total savings accumulated over the previous 70 years [9]. - This increase in savings is not necessarily indicative of a wealthier population but rather reflects a general reluctance to spend and invest due to economic uncertainty [11][19]. Group 3: Economic Implications - The rise in savings without corresponding consumption can lead to reduced investment opportunities and job losses, further exacerbating economic stagnation [11][22]. - The article suggests that while some individuals have profited from investments in sectors like technology, the overall sentiment among the population remains one of financial distress [12][22]. - The disparity in financial situations among different groups highlights a divided economic landscape, where some thrive while many struggle [22].

经济学家温铁军曾一针见血地指出："买房的人，并不一定是住房子的人。" 这句话道出了中国房地产市场的一个关键现实，也解释了为何在房屋存量已经 严重过剩的情况下，开发商仍然热衷于大规模建设新房。 其次，地方政府鼓励开发商拿地建房，土地财政依赖是重要推手。 许多地方政府高度依赖土地财政收入。 若开发商停止拿地建房，土地出让金收入将大幅 减少，进而影响地方财政收入。 这将直接关系到公务员工资、基础设施建设等重要支出。 因此，各地政府通常会采取各种措施鼓励开发商积极拿地建房。 这不仅能够刺激当地GDP增长，还能解决大量就业问题。 在地方政府的推动下，即使存量房过剩，开发商也难以停下建设的脚步。 第三，投资需求旺盛，催生了炒房客群体。 近年来，银行存款利率持续走低，而生活成本却不断攀升。 在这种背景下，许多资金充裕的人将房产视为投资 增值的手段，他们买房并非为了自住或出租，而是将其作为一种投机筹码，等待房价上涨后再伺机出售。 这种投机行为使得房地产市场始终难以摆脱投资 属性。 要想让房地产市场回归居住属性，就必须通过征收房产税等手段，增加房屋持有成本，抑制投资需求。 征收房产税不仅能够缓解地方政府土地财政 收入减少的压力 ...

点击【樱桃大房子】关注并 一方面，1-10月国有土地使用权出让收入24982亿元，同比下降7.4%。 可能单说7.4%，大家没感觉。但要知道，卖地收入可是地方政府的"钱袋子"，占地方政府性基金预算本级收入的比重很大。它一感冒，整个经济可能都要 跟着打喷嚏，直接影响地方基金收入整体下降3.3%。 另一方面，全国政府性基金预算支出却高达80892亿元，同比大幅增长15.4%。 是不是觉得很分裂？一边是卖地收入这个进水口在缩小，另一边是预算支出这个出水口在猛增。 这感觉就像，家里工资收入明明少了，但房贷、车贷、孩子学费的支出却不减反增。钱从哪来？缺口怎么补？ 今天，咱们就把这个"财务清单"掰开，讲清楚我们正站在怎样的节点上。 为什么会出现这么分裂的数据？ 近日，财政部发布2025年1—10月财政收支情况，其中有一组数据极具对比性。 卖地收入下降7.4%，是趋势，不是偶然。数据显示，2024年全国土地出让金收入为48699亿元，较2021年的高峰时期（8.7万亿元）已经下滑了44%。 原因也很简单： 销售端淤塞，市场预期下降，老百姓捂着钱包，不买房了。 房企集体躺平，房子卖不动，销售回款速度减缓，拿那么多地干什么？ ...

Revenue and Expenditure Trends - National general public budget revenue increased by 0.8% year-on-year from January to October 2025, while expenditure rose by 2%[3] - Government fund budget revenue decreased by 2.8% year-on-year, with expenditure increasing by 15.4%[3] - In October, general public budget revenue grew by 3.2% year-on-year, with central and local revenues increasing by 2.3% and 4.0% respectively[6] Tax Revenue Insights - Tax revenue saw a year-on-year increase of 8.6% in October, with a seasonal growth of approximately 79% compared to September, marking the highest level in five years[8] - Personal income tax revenue experienced an "abnormal" growth of 24.9% month-on-month, significantly exceeding the average growth of 9.6% from 2021 to 2024[8] - Non-tax revenue declined sharply, with a year-on-year decrease of 33% and a month-on-month drop exceeding 53 percentage points[19] Expenditure Challenges - General public budget expenditure fell by 9.8% year-on-year in October, a significant drop compared to the previous year's growth of 3.1%[23] - Local government expenditure decreased by nearly 12% year-on-year, while central government expenditure only declined by about 1%[24] - Social welfare and employment expenditures faced considerable pressure, with a month-on-month decline of 39.4%[27] Land Sales and Fiscal Impact - Land sales revenue in October was recorded at 268 billion yuan, a 27.3% year-on-year decline, marking the lowest level in five years[32] - The downturn in the real estate market has severely impacted local government finances, with land sales contributing 81% to local government fund revenue[37] - Broad fiscal revenue turned negative, with a year-on-year decrease of 0.6% in income and a 19.1% drop in expenditure[34]

武汉姑娘杨晴，去年刚考上事业单位捧上"铁饭碗"。 明年要结婚的她，被10月刚出的购房补贴勾得心痒痒： 经开区新政出台新政，对刚需、改善买房都有补贴，要是跟同事一起团购，最高能拿十几万奖励！ "这是不是抄底的好时候？" 杨晴跟男友掰着手指头算，自2024年5月以来，救市政策已经来了两轮，2025年这波是第三波了。 不光武汉，平顶山、东莞、中山这些城市，10月都扎堆出了买房补贴政策。 可看着身边朋友年初买的房年中就跌了20万，她又犯了嘀咕： 第三波救市来了，房价真能上涨吗？ 今天咱们就把这事说透，别让你跟杨晴一样，花了钱还后悔！ 救市玩真的！各地撒钱抢人买房 我们不得不说，这轮救市，地方政府真是把"诚意"撒在了明面上，不再是不痛不痒的"放松限购"，而是真金白银的补贴。 长沙最直接，7月就出台"以旧换新"补贴，卖掉旧房一年内买新房，最高能补3万，按新房总价1%算； 多子女家庭更划算，生了二孩及以上的，买房算套数时直接减一套—— 首先，楼市还在"L型"底部趴着。 2025年前两个月看着有点回暖，可到了二季度又凉了下去，新房卖不动，二手房降价也没人要。 房企更惨，近四年淘汰了一大批，现在能撑着的基本是央国企，中小房企要 ...

Core Viewpoint - The debate over whether there is an oversupply of housing in China continues, with significant existing residential stock that could accommodate around 6 billion people if each unit housed ten individuals, while at least 14 million new homes are built annually, indicating a substantial supply [1][3] Group 1: Reasons for Continued Construction by Developers - Developers are trapped in a debt crisis, compelling them to continue acquiring land and building new projects to maintain access to bank loans, as halting construction would jeopardize their financial viability [5][7] - Local governments rely heavily on land finance, which drives developers to continue land acquisition and construction to sustain local fiscal health and support public spending [7][9] - The presence of speculative investors, or "house flippers," who purchase properties not for residence or rental but as investment assets, keeps the market active despite the oversupply of housing [9][10] Group 2: Market Dynamics and Policy Implications - The current real estate market is largely speculative, necessitating effective measures to guide it back to a rational state focused on housing needs, such as the introduction of property taxes to increase holding costs [10] - Despite the apparent oversupply of existing housing, the continuous influx of new properties into the market raises questions about the underlying motivations of buyers, as highlighted by the economist's assertion that "those buying homes are not necessarily the ones living in them" [10]