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审计委员会不可“当摆设”!中上协新规筑牢A股财务“防火墙”
21世纪经济报道记者雷晨 北京报道 此外,工作指引完整列举8项原属监事会的职权,包括提议召开股东会、向股东会提出提案;接受股东 请求,向执行公司职务时违反法律、行政法规或者公司章程规定给公司造成损失的审计委员会成员以外 的董事、高级管理人员提起诉讼等,为2026年过渡期后取消监事会的架构改革铺路。 程序严格:开会不再"走过场" 针对以往"议而不决""决而不行"的问题,《工作指引》设计了严密的程序规则。 上市公司治理体系正持续优化。 6月6日晚间,中国上市公司协会(下称"中上协")发布《上市公司审计委员会工作指引》(下称《工作 指引》),对上市公司审计委员会的人员构成、履职尽责、监督事项等作出具体性规范化指导意见。 中上协表示,审计委员会是独立董事履职的关键平台,对上市公司财务信息、内部控制、内外部审计工 作等发挥着重要的监督作用。2025年3月28日证监会修订发布《上市公司章程指引》等规则,进一步完 善上市公司治理结构及其运行制度,对审计委员会的职责、职权等进行了优化调整。此次《工作指引》 的出台,旨在为上市公司审计委员会有效运作提供指导和参考,并作为评估和提升审计委员会运作质效 的基础。 记者梳理发现,《工 ...
为规范上市公司审计委员会运作,中上协发布这一工作指引
Bei Ke Cai Jing· 2025-06-06 12:37
新京报贝壳财经讯(记者朱玥怡)6月6日,贝壳财经记者自中国上市公司协会("中上协")获悉,为进 一步规范上市公司审计委员会运作,提升上市公司治理水平,强化对上市公司内部控制、财务信息监督 等方面的监督管理,中上协正式出台《上市公司审计委员会工作指引》("《工作指引》"),对上市公 司审计委员会的人员构成、履职尽责、监督事项等作出具体性规范化指导意见。 审计委员会是独立董事履职的关键平台,对上市公司财务信息、内部控制、内外部审计工作等发挥着重 要的监督作用。2023年12月29日,第十四届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第七次会议修订通过公司法, 2025年3月28日证监会修订发布《上市公司章程指引》等规则,进一步完善上市公司治理结构及其运行 制度,对审计委员会的职责、职权等进行了优化调整。 据悉,《工作指引》是根据新修订的《公司法》《证券法》《上市公司独立董事管理办法》等法律法 规、部门规章、规范性文件和自律规则等要求制定,旨在为上市公司审计委员会有效运作提供指导和参 考,并作为评估和提升审计委员会运作质效的基础。 在2024年年报期间,上市公司独立董事和审计委员会成员积极履职,对于问题公司、风险公司,通过主 动向 ...
上海能源: 上海能源2024年年度股东大会材料
Zheng Quan Zhi Xing· 2025-06-06 09:21
Group 1 - The company has established regulations for the 2024 Annual General Meeting to protect investors' rights and ensure orderly proceedings [1] - The meeting will be held on June 13, 2025, at 13:30, with both on-site and online voting options available [2] - The company’s board of directors consists of 8 members, with a majority being external directors, and has established various committees to enhance governance [3][4] Group 2 - The board has actively held meetings, adhering to legal and procedural requirements, and has made significant decisions regarding company strategy and risk management [5][6] - The company has implemented a strategic planning process that includes long-term and short-term investment plans, which require board approval before execution [5][6] - The board has focused on risk management, enhancing internal controls, and ensuring compliance with regulations [7] Group 3 - The company plans to strengthen its board's functions in strategy formulation, decision-making, and risk management for 2025 [8][9] - The board aims to improve its decision-making process by fostering proactive engagement and optimizing proposals before meetings [10][11] - The company will enhance its supervisory functions and ensure compliance with new regulations, including the revision of governance documents [12][13] Group 4 - The supervisory board has conducted oversight of the company's operations, financial status, and compliance with legal requirements [20][21] - The supervisory board has expressed confidence in the company's adherence to laws and regulations, as well as its operational integrity [22]
中小股东临时提案频现 上市公司治理结构生变
Core Viewpoint - The participation of minority shareholders in corporate governance is increasing significantly in the A-share market, driven by legal enhancements, rising awareness of shareholder rights, and the internal need for improved corporate governance [1][7]. Group 1: Minority Shareholder Proposals - Several minority shareholders have submitted temporary proposals to various companies, including Donghua Energy (2.01% ownership), Hengli Drilling (1.45%), and *ST Jingfeng (1.26%), indicating a trend of active engagement [1][2]. - Companies like ST Kelly and others have also seen proposals from shareholders holding over 3% of shares, although not all proposals have been approved for discussion at shareholder meetings [3][4]. Group 2: Regulatory Changes - The new company law effective from July 1, 2023, has lowered the threshold for submitting temporary proposals from 3% to 1%, enhancing the rights of minority shareholders [5][7]. - Following the regulatory changes, numerous companies have amended their articles of association to reflect the new 1% threshold for proposal submissions [6]. Group 3: Implications of Increased Participation - The active involvement of minority shareholders is expected to improve corporate governance structures by providing diverse perspectives and opinions, thus addressing potential limitations of major shareholders and management [7]. - Minority shareholder proposals can serve as a check on the power of major shareholders and management, promoting fairness and justice in corporate decision-making [7]. - The engagement of minority shareholders is likely to enhance the quality of corporate decisions, as they may bring different expertise and insights to the table [7]. - This trend also reflects greater transparency and democracy in corporate governance, potentially boosting investor confidence and improving the company's reputation in the capital market [8].
东方红资产管理周云:下一个十年值得更加乐观
点拾投资· 2025-06-03 11:42
导读:2020年至今,我们和东方红资产管理的周云做过三次访谈,每一次都能感受到他价值体系的进步。 2020年3月第一次访谈,周云展现了他对低估值投资的长期信心。这一套投资框架,在之后的这些年中一直未变,是他最底层的投资逻 辑。 2022年12月第二次访谈,周云提出了成功的投资不仅需要理解估值,也要倾向市场的声音,价值和市场并不矛盾,都有自己的内在规 律。 2025年5月第三次访谈,周云谈到了用质量做排除法,大家一致认可的高质量未必能带来好的长期回报,但可以把市场后50%到60%的 低质量公司剔除。 在最新的这一次访谈中,我们剔除了周云此前提过的投资框架部分,更多展现了他的一些新思考: 第一层思考:为什么独立是一种很强的竞争优势?因为人性的底层就会从众,即便是在显而易见的事实面前。周云用著名的"阿希实 验"为例,阐述了人性的弱点。从以小为美,到只买龙头,资本市场没有永恒的真相,只有新的共识替代旧的共识。拉长看,周云能不断 战胜沪深300,很重要的部分就是没有追涨杀跌。 第二层思考:如何把质量和估值结合在一起。即便好公司和好价格难以同时出现,但买好公司依然是周云追求的。他把质量作为一种排 除法,剔除一大批低质量的 ...
瑞可达: 苏州瑞可达连接系统股份有限公司章程
Zheng Quan Zhi Xing· 2025-06-03 09:23
General Overview - The company is named Suzhou Recodeal Interconnect System Co., Ltd., established according to the Company Law of the People's Republic of China [3] - The company was registered on June 5, 2014, and listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange's Sci-Tech Innovation Board on July 22, 2021, with a total registered capital of RMB 205.674335 million [3][4] Business Objectives and Scope - The company's business objective is to enhance management efficiency and maximize economic benefits for shareholders [6] - The business scope includes research, production, and sales of electronic components, optical connectors, sensors, charging equipment, and related technical services [6] Share Structure - The company's total share capital is 205.674335 million shares, all of which are ordinary shares with a par value of RMB 1 per share [7][8] - The company prohibits providing financial assistance for the purchase of its shares, except under specific circumstances [8] Shareholder Rights and Responsibilities - Shareholders have rights to dividends, attend meetings, supervise management, and transfer shares [11] - Shareholders holding more than 5% of voting shares must report any pledges of their shares to the company [39] Shareholder Meetings - The company holds annual and extraordinary shareholder meetings, with specific procedures for calling and conducting these meetings [17][18] - Shareholder proposals must be submitted in writing and can be made by shareholders holding more than 3% of shares [21] Voting and Resolutions - Resolutions at shareholder meetings can be ordinary or special, with different voting thresholds required for each type [74][75] - Special resolutions are required for significant corporate actions such as capital changes, mergers, and amendments to the articles of association [76] Related Party Transactions - Related shareholders must abstain from voting on matters involving related party transactions to ensure fairness [78][79] - The company must disclose the voting results of non-related shareholders for transparency [78]
每经热评|支持积极股东积极作为 有效提升上市公司治理水平
Mei Ri Jing Ji Xin Wen· 2025-06-02 12:22
想要成为积极股东,必须满足两个关键条件。 其一,长期持股的资本基础:持股比例达到"举牌线"(5%)是重要门槛。当股东持股达到举牌线,按 照规定需披露资金来源、穿透后的实际控制人、增持股份目的等关键信息,这些信息为其他投资者的决 策提供了重要参考,举牌股东相当于为其他投资者提供了"搭便车"的便利,自身却无法从中受益,只有 通过积极参与公司治理,才能获取理想的投资回报。而且,达到举牌标准后,股份存在限售期,6个月 内不得进行反向操作,持股比例发生变动时也需及时公告,只有具备长期投资心态的资本才能够承受这 样的限制。 其二,主动治理的能力与意愿:相较于散户,举牌股东往往具备专业研究能力和资源整合优势。投票权 是股东参与上市公司治理的关键途径,但对于公众投资者而言,个体投票对股东大会决议的影响力微乎 其微,这使得许多散户放弃行使投票权,导致部分上市公司的股东大会沦为"大股东会"。与之不同的 是,举牌股东通常具备更专业的知识和更丰富的资源,能够积极参与投票。当遇到不符合中小股东权益 的议案时,积极股东能够凭借自身影响力团结众多小股东,对决议结果产生重要影响。 不过,为更好地支持上市公司引入积极股东,还需在制度层面给予更 ...
剑指资金占用顽疾 监管层下重手要求上市公司整改
Core Viewpoint - The regulatory authorities in China are intensifying their scrutiny of the misuse of funds by listed companies, particularly focusing on the actions of major shareholders and actual controllers who exploit company resources for personal gain [1][2][3]. Regulatory Actions - The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has introduced new rules requiring listed companies to promptly demand the return of misappropriated funds and disclose the reasons for such actions, their impact on the company, and the rectification plans [1][2]. - As of May 28, 2023, there have been 48 administrative measures or penalties against 37 companies related to fund misuse, including warnings, fines, and orders for correction [1][2]. Enforcement Against Major Shareholders - The regulatory bodies are targeting the "key minority," which includes major shareholders and executives who engage in fund misappropriation, with a focus on both direct and indirect methods of fund occupation [2][3]. - Specific cases, such as the reprimand of ST Dongshi for failing to return 106 million yuan of raised funds, illustrate the ongoing enforcement actions against individuals involved in fund misuse [2][3]. Accountability Mechanisms - The regulatory framework emphasizes that misappropriated funds must be returned, with strict deadlines for rectification and potential delisting for non-compliance [4][5]. - Companies are encouraged to utilize legal measures, such as lawsuits and asset freezes, to recover misappropriated funds, ensuring the protection of minority shareholders [5][6]. Independent Oversight - Independent directors are actively involved in urging management to recover misappropriated funds, as seen in the case of ST Changkang, where independent directors issued a reminder to address fund occupation issues [6]. - The China Securities Investor Services Center is promoting collective and derivative lawsuits to enhance investor protection and ensure accountability for fund misuse [6].
上市公司治理“三箭齐发” 夯实资本市场高质量发展根基
Zheng Quan Ri Bao· 2025-05-27 17:11
Core Viewpoint - The article emphasizes the importance of improving corporate governance in Chinese listed companies as a foundation for high-quality economic development, highlighting the introduction of measures to enhance the modern enterprise system in China [1][2]. Group 1: Capital Market and Corporate Governance - The "Opinions" document outlines three key requirements for the capital market: introducing institutional investors with a holding ratio of over 5% as active shareholders, strictly implementing the independent director system, and improving information disclosure in corporate governance [2][3]. - The capital market plays a crucial role in enhancing corporate governance through strict regulation, transparency, and the influence of stock price fluctuations on company value, which encourages better governance practices [3]. Group 2: Active Shareholder Participation - The introduction of institutional investors as active shareholders is seen as a significant institutional innovation, aimed at addressing the long-standing issue of dominant shareholders potentially harming minority shareholders' interests [4]. - Institutional investors are expected to actively participate in corporate governance, exercising their voting and inquiry rights to optimize company strategies rather than merely acting as passive financial investors [4][5]. Group 3: Independent Director System - The "Opinions" propose strict enforcement of the independent director system, including the establishment of audit committees with a majority of independent directors and dedicated meetings for independent directors [6]. - To enhance the independence of directors, it is suggested to broaden the nomination scope for independent directors beyond the board's nomination committee, allowing shareholders with over 1% holdings to nominate candidates [6]. Group 4: Information Disclosure Improvement - The "Opinions" aim to enhance the information disclosure system in corporate governance, focusing on transparency and reducing information asymmetry by requiring detailed disclosures of related transactions and significant risks [7]. - Improved information disclosure is expected to empower investors, particularly minority shareholders, to make informed judgments about company value and reduce the potential for opaque operations [7].
天力锂能: 民生证券股份有限公司关于天力锂能集团股份有限公司2025年度持续督导培训情况报告
Zheng Quan Zhi Xing· 2025-05-27 10:24
民生证券股份有限公司 深圳证券交易所: 根据《证券发行上市保荐业务管理办法》、 《深圳证券交易所上市公司保荐工 作指引》、 《深圳证券交易所创业板股票上市规则》、 《深圳证券交易所上市公司自 律监管指引第 2 号——创业板上市公司规范运作》等有关规定,作为天力锂能集 团股份有限公司(以下简称"天力锂能"或"公司")首次公开发行股票并在创 业板上市的保荐机构,民生证券股份有限公司(以下简称"民生证券"或"保荐 机构")对天力锂能进行了 2025 年度持续督导培训。现将培训情况报告如下: 一、培训基本情况 关于天力锂能集团股份有限公司 时间: 2025 年 5 月 12 日 培训方式:现场授课与自学讨论相结合的方式 保荐机构通过现场授课以及线上远程会议的方式对上述培训对象进行了培 训,培训内容主要为上市公司治理结构、董监高的任职、忠实勤勉义务和责任等 文件,对上市公司治理结构相关法律法规、董监高的义务与责任等问题进行重点 解读,同时结合近期监管处罚案例对相关法律责任进行了阐释。 三、培训总结 本次持续督导培训的工作过程中,天力锂能参训人员认真学习并充分沟通, 积极配合。持续督导人员对公司董事、监事、高级管理人员、 ...