招股书显示，华大北斗是一家空间定位服务提供商，提供支持北斗及全球主要GNSS系统的导航定位芯 片和模块，同时提供GNSS相关解决方案。2024年，以出货量计，公司在全球GNSS芯片及模组市场排 名第六，市场份额为4.8%。2024年，以收入计，公司排名全球第八，并在GNSS芯片及模组市场的中国 内地企业中排名第三，市场份额约为1.1%。GNSS芯片及模组子市场约占整体GNSS空间定位服务市场 的收入的2.1%。 华大北斗向港交所主板提交上市申请，招银国际、平安证券(香港)为其联席保荐人。 ...

中国北斗以自主可控的全球导航系统通导遥融合，精准赋能千行百业，服务全球发展。 枢纽发力，云南锚定"两亚"合作新坐标 今年9月，由中国企业为印度尼西亚三宝垄至德马克高速项目提供北斗定位工牌与车载监测终端，实现 施工人员安全监管、车辆动态预警，以技术落地助力"一带一路"基建数字化。 记者从近日在云南省昆明市举办的北斗产业创新发展论坛上了解到，我国政产学研用多方携手，正 以"技术落地+场景赋能"为核心，让北斗从"国之重器"变身产业升级"金钥匙"。北斗精准的时空信号穿 越山海，从实验室走向田间地头、跨境通道和水利工程，一项项技术成果正转化为强劲动能，为我国西 南与南亚东南亚数字互联互通和经济社会发展注入持续的科技活水。 技术深耕，国内场景化应用落地生根 在云南曲靖、德宏等地，数百个地质灾害隐患点部署北斗高精度监测设备。这些被周边村民称为"蘑 菇"的装置，在7×24小时毫米级监测边坡位移，守护各族群众的安全。 2023年，曲靖市富源县一处隐患点位移超阈值，系统自动报警，村民及时撤离，次日滑坡未造成损失。 2023年，云南借助北斗成功预警33起灾害，转移627人。 眼下，我国北斗技术的转化应用已在国内形成多点突破，从农业 ...

智通财经APP获悉，据港交所12月19日披露，深圳华大北斗科技股份有限公司(简称：华大北斗)向港交所主板提交上市申请，招银国际、平安证券(香港)为 其联席保荐人。该公司曾于2025年6月11日递表港交所。 | 编纂]項下的[编纂]數目 | : | [编纂]股H股(視乎[编纂]與否而定) | | --- | --- | --- | | [编纂]數目 | : | [编纂]股H股(可予[编纂]) | | [编纂]數目 | : | [編纂]股H股(可于[編纂]及視乎[編纂]與否而定) | | 最高[编纂] | : | 每股H股[编纂]加1.0%經紀佣金、0.0027%證監會交易徵 | | | | 費、0.00565%聯交所交易費及0.00015%會財局交易徵 | | | | 費(須於申請時以港元繳足,多繳股款可予退還) | | 面值 | : | 每股H股人民幣1.00元 | | [编纂] | : | 【编纂】 | 公司简介： 招股书显示，华大北斗是中国一家知名的空间定位服务提供商，总部位于深圳，提供支持北斗及其他主要GNSS的芯片、模组及相关解决方案。公司的研发 团队专攻GNSS技术领域，专注于一体化SoC芯片设计、 ...

Group 1 - The article highlights significant announcements in the stock market, including "suspensions and resumption of trading, shareholding changes, investment wins, acquisitions, performance reports, unlocks, and high transfers" [1] - Important announcements are marked in red to assist investors in identifying investment hotspots and preventing various black swan events, providing ample time for analysis and selection of suitable listed companies [1] Group 2 - The company is involved in commercial aerospace, storage chips, autonomous driving, third-generation semiconductors, and CPO, with its chip products already applied in low-orbit satellite constellations [1] - Another company focuses on controllable nuclear fusion, commercial aerospace, satellite navigation, military industry, and nuclear power, with successful applications in manned space engineering (Tianhe core module of the space station) and orders in the nuclear fission power plant sector [1] - The company is also engaged in autonomous driving and drones, supplying humanoid robot joint modules [1]

"南京卫星协会"微信公众号19日发布《关于12月17日南京区域导航信号异常情况的技术性探讨分析》。全文如 下： 为澄清公众认知误区、解读技术原理与战略价值，南京卫星应用行业协会作如下说明： 一、离线地图无法解决本次导航异常问题 本次导航失灵的核心原因是GNSS卫星信号（含北斗、GPS）受到临时干扰压制，而非网络信号中断，因此下载 离线地图并无实际意义。 从技术原理来看： 1. 离线地图的核心功能是存储地理数据，仅解决"地图显示"问题，无法替代定位信号来源； 2. 手机导航需依赖GNSS卫星信号（至少4颗卫星）解算位置坐标，再将位置信息匹配至地图，定位信号与地图 数据是相互独立的两大系统； 2025年12月17日傍晚，南京部分区域出现导航定位异常现象，引发社会广泛关注。 各会员单位及社会各界： 3. 考虑到美国与欧盟的军事绑定特性，北约体系同样依赖GPS信号频段，这种频段兼容设计构建了重要的战略 威慑——任何针对北斗民用信号的干扰，都将同步影响GPS相关应用，从根本上遏制了恶意干扰的可能性，为 我国民用导航服务筑牢安全屏障。 3. 本次干扰精准针对北斗、GPS民用频段，导致定位信号无法被接收机识别，即便搭载离线 ...

Core Viewpoint - The navigation signal anomaly in Nanjing on December 17, 2025, was caused by temporary interference affecting GNSS satellite signals, not by a network signal interruption [1][2]. Technical Analysis - Offline maps cannot resolve the navigation anomaly as they only store geographic data and do not replace the need for positioning signals [2][3] - Mobile navigation relies on GNSS satellite signals (at least 4 satellites) to calculate position coordinates, making positioning signals and map data independent systems [3] - The interference specifically targeted the civilian frequency bands of Beidou and GPS, leading to unrecognized positioning signals, resulting in navigation failures even with offline maps [3] Strategic Significance - The simultaneous impact on Beidou and GPS signals during the anomaly validates the strategic foresight of China's Beidou system in planning civilian frequency bands [4] - The international satellite navigation spectrum follows a "first come, first served" rule, with GPS having occupied core L-band resources early on, leaving limited quality spectrum for Beidou [4] - The compatibility of Beidou's civilian signal (B1C band) with GPS's civilian signal (L1C band) breaks the spectrum resource blockade and creates a strategic balance, where interference with Beidou also affects GPS applications [4] Military Frequency Resilience - The signal anomaly only affected civilian GNSS frequency bands, while Beidou's military frequencies remained unaffected [5] - Beidou employs a military-civilian frequency separation design, with military frequencies being exclusive and physically isolated from civilian bands [5] - The military system incorporates advanced anti-jamming technologies, ensuring robust resistance to interference and deception, thus maintaining reliable time-space services for national defense and emergency support [5] Context of the Anomaly - If the navigation anomaly was a result of temporary signal control measures for major event security, it falls within standard safety protocols, with signals gradually returning to normal post-event [6] - Reports indicated that multiple navigation software systems experienced failures, leading to delivery delays and operational issues for services like food delivery and bike-sharing [9][17]

Core Viewpoint - The navigation signal anomaly in Nanjing on December 17, 2025, was caused by temporary interference affecting GNSS satellite signals, specifically targeting the civilian frequencies of Beidou and GPS, rather than a network signal interruption [2][3][4]. Group 1: Technical Analysis - Offline maps cannot resolve the navigation anomaly as the core issue is the interference of GNSS signals, which cannot be substituted by stored geographic data [2][3]. - The navigation system requires signals from at least four GNSS satellites to determine location coordinates, indicating that positioning signals and map data are independent systems [2][3]. - The interference specifically targeted the civilian frequency bands of Beidou and GPS, leading to unrecognized positioning signals, resulting in navigation failures even with offline maps [2][3]. Group 2: Strategic Significance - The simultaneous impact on both Beidou and GPS signals during the anomaly validates the strategic foresight of China's Beidou system in planning its civilian frequency bands [3][4]. - The compatibility of Beidou's civilian signal (B1C band) with GPS's civilian signal (L1C band) not only breaks the spectrum resource blockade but also creates a strategic balance where interference with Beidou also affects GPS [3][4]. - This design serves as a deterrent against malicious interference, as any disruption to Beidou's civilian signals will simultaneously impact GPS applications, thereby enhancing the security of China's civilian navigation services [3][4]. Group 3: Military Frequency Resilience - The signal anomaly only affected civilian GNSS frequencies, while Beidou's military frequencies remained unaffected due to their separation from civilian bands [4][5]. - The military system employs advanced anti-jamming technologies, ensuring robust resistance to interference and deception [4][5]. - The independence and resilience of Beidou's military frequencies provide stable and reliable time-space services for national defense and emergency support, unaffected by the civilian signal disruptions [4][5]. Group 4: Industry Response - The Nanjing Satellite Application Industry Association will continue to monitor industry developments and share professional knowledge on satellite navigation technology to enhance public understanding [4][5]. - The association encourages relevant enterprises to participate in discussions and will waive membership fees to facilitate communication between businesses and the government [5].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the navigation signal anomalies that occurred in Nanjing on December 17, 2025, emphasizing the technical reasons behind the issue and the strategic significance of the BeiDou and GPS systems' compatibility. Group 1: Navigation Signal Anomaly - The navigation failure was primarily due to temporary interference suppressing GNSS satellite signals (including BeiDou and GPS), rather than a network signal interruption, making offline maps ineffective [3][4]. - Offline maps only store geographic data and cannot replace the positioning signal source, as mobile navigation relies on GNSS signals from at least four satellites to calculate location coordinates [4]. Group 2: Strategic Significance of BeiDou and GPS Compatibility - The simultaneous impact on both BeiDou and GPS signals during the anomaly validates the strategic foresight of China's BeiDou system's civilian frequency planning [5][6]. - The compatibility of BeiDou's civilian signal (B1C frequency) with GPS's civilian signal (L1C frequency) allows for interoperability, creating a strategic balance where interference with BeiDou also affects GPS, thus deterring malicious disruptions [6]. Group 3: Military Frequency Resilience - The signal anomaly only affected civilian GNSS frequencies, while BeiDou's military frequency remained unaffected due to its separation from civilian frequencies [7]. - BeiDou's military system employs advanced anti-jamming technologies, ensuring robust resistance to interference and maintaining reliable time-space services for national defense and emergency support [7].

Core Viewpoint - On December 17, 2025, a navigation signal anomaly occurred in Nanjing, affecting multiple navigation software systems and causing delivery delays for food delivery services due to the inability to access navigation data [12][18]. Group 1: Technical Analysis of the Navigation Anomaly - The core reason for the navigation failure was temporary interference suppression of GNSS satellite signals (including Beidou and GPS), rather than a network signal interruption, making offline maps ineffective [6][20]. - Offline maps only store geographic data and cannot replace the positioning signal source, as mobile navigation relies on GNSS satellite signals to calculate location coordinates [8][21]. - The interference specifically targeted the civilian frequency bands of Beidou and GPS, leading to the inability of receivers to recognize positioning signals, resulting in navigation drift and lack of data feedback [8][22]. Group 2: Strategic Significance of Beidou and GPS Compatibility - The simultaneous impact on Beidou and GPS signals during the anomaly validates the forward-looking strategic vision of China's Beidou system's civilian frequency band planning [8][22]. - The international satellite navigation spectrum resources follow a "first come, first served" rule, with GPS having occupied core L-band resources early on, leaving limited quality spectrum for Beidou [8][22]. - The compatibility of Beidou's civilian signal (B1C band) with GPS's civilian signal (L1C band) not only breaks the spectrum resource blockade but also creates a strategic balance where interference with Beidou also affects GPS applications [8][22]. Group 3: Resilience of Beidou Military Frequency - It is important to note that the signal anomaly only affected civilian GNSS frequency bands, while Beidou's military frequencies remained completely unaffected [9][23]. - The Beidou system employs a military-civilian frequency separation design, with military frequencies being exclusive and physically isolated from civilian bands [9][23]. - The military system is equipped with advanced anti-jamming technology and adaptive filtering algorithms, providing strong resistance to interference and deception, ensuring stable and reliable time-space services for national defense and emergency support [9][23].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the navigation signal anomalies in Nanjing on December 17, 2025, clarifying the technical reasons behind the issue and emphasizing the strategic significance of the Beidou and GPS systems' compatibility [2][5]. Technical Analysis - Offline maps cannot resolve the navigation anomaly as the core issue is the temporary interference of GNSS satellite signals (including Beidou and GPS), not a network signal interruption [3]. - The core function of offline maps is to store geographic data, which only addresses the "map display" issue and cannot replace the positioning signal source [4]. - Mobile navigation relies on GNSS satellite signals (at least 4 satellites) to calculate position coordinates, and the positioning signal and map data are independent systems [4]. - The interference specifically targeted the civilian frequency bands of Beidou and GPS, preventing the positioning signal from being recognized by receivers, leading to issues like positioning drift and lack of data feedback, making effective navigation impossible [4]. Strategic Significance - The simultaneous impact on Beidou and GPS signals during the anomaly validates the forward-looking strategic vision of China's Beidou system's civilian frequency band planning [5]. - The international satellite navigation spectrum resources follow a "first come, first served" rule, with GPS having occupied core L-band resources early on, leaving limited quality spectrum for Beidou [6]. - Under the framework of the International Telecommunication Union, the compatibility of Beidou's civilian signal (B1C band) with GPS's civilian signal (L1C band) breaks the spectrum resource blockade and creates a strategic balance where interference with Beidou also affects GPS [6]. - Given the military ties of the U.S. and EU, NATO systems also rely on GPS signals, making this frequency compatibility a significant strategic deterrent against malicious interference [6]. Military Frequency Resilience - The signal anomaly only affected civilian GNSS frequency bands, while Beidou's military frequency remains unaffected [7]. - Beidou employs a military-civilian frequency separation design, with military frequencies being exclusive and confidential, physically isolated from civilian bands [7]. - The military system incorporates full digital anti-jamming technology and adaptive intelligent filtering algorithms, enabling precise identification and filtering of interference signals, thus possessing strong anti-jamming and anti-deception capabilities [7]. - The independence and anti-jamming capabilities of Beidou's military frequency provide stable and reliable time-space services for national defense security and emergency support in critical areas, unaffected by the civilian signal interference [7].