1月12日，港股集体高开，其中恒生指数涨0.55%，报26376.84点，恒生科技指数涨0.88%，报5737.43 点，国企指数涨0.75%，报9116.01点，红筹指数涨0.68%，报4129.13点。 盘面上，大型科技股多数走高，阿里巴巴涨0.27%，腾讯控股涨0.82%，京东集团涨0.87%，小米集团跌 0.21%，网易涨0.37%，美团涨2.84%，快手涨1.47%，哔哩哔哩涨2.06%；贵金属板块多股高开，赤峰黄 金涨4%，紫金矿业涨2.72%；商业航天概念继续活跃，亚太卫星涨超5%；芯片股高开，天数智芯涨超 3%；今日豪威集团登陆港交所，首日高开逾3%。 企业新闻 舜宇光学科技(02382.HK)：12月手机镜头出货量为9559.2万件，同比减少8.9%。车载镜头出货量为747.7 万件，同比增长17.7%。手机摄像模组出货量为3774.4万件，同比减少29.3%。主要受客户年底的库存管 控、圣诞节假期等因素影响。 东方海外国际(00316.HK)：截至2025年12月31日止第4季度的航线收入较去年同期减少17.2%，报20.81 亿美元。总载货量上升0.8%，运载力上升4.5%。整体运载率较 ...

中国稀土公司， 绕开国内管制，向西方继续出口产品这事，说白了，就是拿国家战略安全换自家私利。往根上说，就是资敌行为。 谁能想到，全球最受重视的战略资源之一， 竟然被自家企业绕开管控偷偷卖到了外面去。 而这些 "外面"，恰好就是在近几年频繁对中国科技产业 下绊子的西方国家。 "合规"贸易的伪装 那些被偷偷运出去的东西，可不是地上随便捡的石头，它们是 钕、镝、铽。这几个名字对于普通人或许只存在于化学课本里，但在大国博弈的沙盘上，它 们是构建现代战争机器的 "肌体"。 从能够精准锁定目标的相控阵雷达， 到需要极强爆发力的导弹伺服系统，再到新能源车的心脏电机，甚至是那些翱翔在大气层边缘的航太骨骼，哪一样离 得开高性能 稀土永磁体？ 谁掌握了这些， 谁就在下一代工业革命和军事对抗中握住了主动权。 前言 而中国， 原本是握着这把钥匙的人。根据那些被公认的行业数据，我们不仅仅是脚下的矿多，占据了全球三成多的储量，更可怕的是我们垄断了把 "土"变 成"金"的能力。 从矿山挖出来的原石，到极其复杂的提纯， 再到最终变成高性能的磁材，这条产业链上的绝大多数精炼工序和产能，都在中国手里。这就是西方无论如何 焦虑，都绕不开的 "中国 ...

第三，值得注意的是，美国的笑脸攻势暴露了一个致命的弱点。这里最值得琢磨的是时间线。美国在12月宣布了史上最大规模的对台军售，按理说，这应该 是触及了中国的红线，中国应该迅速采取反制措施才对。但你看到了什么呢？鲁比奥在中国采取任何反制措施之前，竟然先出来表示：中国会一直强大，我 们应该寻求合作机会。这意味着什么？这表明美国已经推测过中国可能的反应，他们最害怕的，就是中国出手减少稀土供应。因此，出现了这种挑衅之后求 饶的局面。这揭示了美国目前的战略困境：他们在台湾问题上进退两难，既要应对国内政治压力，维持对台军售，又害怕中国真的翻脸，切断稀土供应。这 种左右为难的状态，正好证明了中国掌握的筹码远比美国想象的要强大。 首先，我们来看看背后隐藏的精准心理战。许多人可能会疑惑，74吨稀土到底有多大的影响？这么一点量，能对局势产生什么改变？但要知道，高手过招， 往往不依赖蛮力。中国此次的做法，实际上并不是完全切断供应，而是一种提醒式威慑。你看，11月对美国的出口从656吨降到了582吨，减少了11%。这个 幅度正好处在一个微妙的平衡点：既不会引起全球供应链的恐慌，也不会让中国被指责为不守信用，但足以让美国的军工和高科技行 ...

[熊猫]稀土可是中国的王牌之一，光稀土这一资源，直接能卡住全球大多数国家的脖子，但是现在事情 发生了反转？ 12月5日，中国商务部正式发放首批稀土通用出口许可证，其中金力永磁、宁波韵升、中科三环三家龙 头企业获准出口，美国福特汽车赫然出现在获批客户名单中。 就像驯马一样，单纯的关在笼子里那叫禁锢，只有套上了缰绳，这匹马跑向哪里、跑多快，才真正由你 说了算。 要知道稀土的核心，是被称为"工业维生素"的17种金属元素，特别是其中的钕、镨、铽、镝。这些名字 听着晦涩的化学元素，在现实世界里的分量重得惊人。 无论是我们要用的手机、电脑，还是那些看起来高不可攀的F-35战斗机、精确制导武器，亦或是满大街 跑的新能源汽车，只要是跟"现代高端制造"沾边的，缺了它们立刻就会瘫痪。这不仅仅是有没有矿的问 题。 难道持续近一年的稀土战要落幕了？是中方松绑让步，还是另有深层布局？ 当福特汽车那边的消息传过来，说他们成了中国新一批稀土出口许可证的受益方时，不少人的第一反应 是眉头一皱：我们手里这张紧握的"王牌"，怎么突然松手了？ 这种情绪可以理解，但如果仅仅盯着"许可"这两个字看，很容易就会被表象带着跑，而忽略了这背后那 一套堪称教 ...

Core Viewpoint - The acquisition of the Ngualla rare earth mine in Tanzania by China's Shenghe Resources marks a significant shift in the global rare earth landscape, undermining Western aspirations for self-sufficiency in this strategic resource [1][3]. Group 1: Acquisition Details - Shenghe Resources completed the acquisition of Australian Peak Rare Earths for AUD 195 million, securing control over a world-class rare earth mine [1]. - The Peak board rejected a higher offer of AUD 240 million from another investment firm, indicating a strategic preference for Shenghe Resources [3]. Group 2: Importance of Ngualla Mine - The Ngualla mine contains 887,000 tons of high-quality neodymium-praseodymium ore, representing 15% of the world's proven high-quality rare earth resources [5]. - Neodymium-praseodymium is essential for manufacturing permanent magnets, which are critical components in electric vehicles and wind turbines [5]. Group 3: Western Challenges - The former CEO of Peak stated that while they possess resources, they struggle to convert them into products, highlighting a broader issue within the Western rare earth sector [6]. - The lack of a complete industrial chain is a fundamental reason why the West has failed to maintain control over this strategic resource [5]. Group 4: China's Dominance in Rare Earths - China dominates the global rare earth industry, accounting for 58.6% of mining, 85.4% of refining, and 91.6% of permanent magnet production [8]. - This dominance means that 9 out of every 10 permanent magnet motors in electric vehicles rely on Chinese rare earth materials [8]. Group 5: Strategic Insights - China's advantage in the rare earth permanent magnet sector is estimated to be 8-10 years ahead of the West, according to a report by the State Council Development Research Center [10]. - The technical barriers and high costs associated with establishing a complete rare earth supply chain pose significant challenges for Western investors [12]. Group 6: Future Outlook - Short-term reliance on China for rare earths is expected to continue, with predictions indicating that by 2030, 91% of the West's heavy rare earth demand will depend on China [19]. - Establishing a non-Chinese rare earth supply chain could require an investment of USD 120 billion, with product costs potentially increasing by 3-5 times [19]. - Long-term cooperation is suggested as a viable solution, with the potential for rare earths to serve as a bridge for collaboration rather than a tool for competition [21].

Core Viewpoint - China's strategic position in the global rare earth market has evolved from being a low-cost supplier to a rule-maker, leveraging its near-monopoly in heavy rare earth supply to influence global dynamics [3][19]. Group 1: Strategic Importance of Rare Earths - Rare earths have become a central battleground in global resource competition, highlighted by events such as the return of control by Anshi Semiconductor and the EU's urgent consultations with China [3]. - The strategic value of rare earths is underscored by significant profit margins, leading to a thriving smuggling industry that disguises rare earth oxides as common goods [5][7]. Group 2: Supply Chain and Market Dynamics - China dominates the global heavy rare earth supply, accounting for 99% of the market, making it difficult for other countries to achieve self-sufficiency in the short term [7][9]. - The production cost of Chinese rare earths is significantly lower than that of Western counterparts, with prices being only 50% of international industry averages [9]. Group 3: Regulatory and Policy Developments - In response to smuggling and to protect strategic resources, China implemented the Rare Earth Management Regulations in 2024, expanding export controls and requiring approval for products containing even trace amounts of Chinese rare earths [7][11]. - China's regulatory approach is now more nuanced, distinguishing between military and civilian uses, thereby maintaining a balance between security and cooperation [13][15]. Group 4: Global Reactions and Alternatives - The price of dysprosium oxide surged from $250 to $1000 per kilogram, prompting urgent discussions between the EU and China, while the U.S. has resorted to high-priced acquisitions to secure rare earth supplies [11][13]. - Alternative supply chains proposed by countries like Japan and France face significant challenges, including high costs and inefficiencies, making it difficult to compete with China's established dominance [13][15]. Group 5: Long-term Strategic Outlook - China's rare earth strategy transcends simple export limitations, focusing on building a comprehensive industrial ecosystem that integrates supply, processing, and technological advancements [15][19]. - The ongoing competition in the rare earth sector is fundamentally a contest of technological strength and strategic patience, with China maintaining a leading position due to its cost advantages and technological barriers [17][19].

缅甸近5年稀土产量大幅增长，2024年中国超半数进口稀土来自该国，这让美国看到机会。但缅甸稀土 矿区运输条件差，改善基础设施成本高，且中缅经贸联系紧密，中国企业能提供便捷加工服务。此外， 美国此举触动中国地缘安全神经，其"介入计划"阻力重重。更关键的是，全球90%稀土分离产能在中 国，这是长期技术壁垒，美国急功近利低估产业规律。中国需持续保持技术领先、完善产业链，守护 稀|土战|略高地。 美国对中国稀|土领域主|导地位心存不满，在中国调整稀土出|口政策后，急于寻找新供应渠道，特朗普 政|府将目标转向缅甸。据悉，特朗普政|府正内部讨论调整对缅政策，核心是削弱中国稀|土产业链主导 地位，把缅甸稀土纳入美国供应链，还设计2套方案：或促成缅甸|军政|府与克钦独|立|军和|解以介入稀 土开发，或绕开中|央政|府直接与克钦独立|军合作。 ...

Group 1 - China has leveraged its control over rare earth elements to gain significant strategic influence on the global stage, prompting a reassessment of this critical resource by the global industrial sector [1] - The unique value of rare earths lies in their irreplaceability across various important fields, including advanced weaponry, consumer electronics, new energy vehicles, and medical equipment, granting China a unique voice in the global supply chain [1] - The U.S. has softened its stance towards China, with President Trump publicly acknowledging the importance of dialogue and cooperation, reflecting the undeniable influence of rare earths in international relations [1] Group 2 - Inspired by China's strategy, Russia is also reevaluating its rare earth strategy, with President Putin issuing directives for a long-term development plan for the rare earth and rare metal industries [3][4] - Russia aims to establish a fully autonomous rare earth industry chain, reducing dependence on both China and the U.S., which indicates a deep understanding of the global geopolitical landscape [4] - Despite having significant rare earth reserves, Russia's production share is only 1%, primarily due to a lack of strong processing capabilities, leading to a reliance on exporting raw materials for processing abroad [6] Group 3 - The urgency in Russia's focus on rare earths is driven by the observed effectiveness of China's use of rare earths as a strategic tool during the U.S.-China trade war, particularly in the context of renewed U.S.-Russia dialogue [6][8] - Both the U.S. and Russia recognize the critical importance of establishing complete rare earth supply chains, with U.S. Treasury Secretary emphasizing plans to resolve the rare earth dilemma within two years [8] - The competition for rare earths is fundamentally about future technological dominance and industrial influence, with countries like China, the U.S., and Russia vying for strategic resources [10][11]

Core Viewpoint - The article argues that the United States' goal to eliminate dependence on Chinese rare earth metals within two years is unrealistic due to the complexities involved in rare earth extraction and processing [1][2][4]. Group 1: Challenges in Rare Earth Extraction - Extracting rare earth elements is a complex process that requires significant electrical power, which the U.S. lacks compared to China [1]. - The construction of necessary infrastructure for mining and transporting rare earth materials is a time-consuming endeavor [1]. - The separation and purification of rare earths generate hazardous waste, requiring advanced environmental technology that the U.S. currently does not possess [1]. Group 2: Economic Viability and Investment - The Western capital markets prioritize profitability, and without sufficient returns, there is little incentive to invest in the rare earth industry [2]. - Government subsidies would be necessary for the U.S. to develop a competitive rare earth sector against China's low-cost production [2]. Group 3: Political Implications - Trump's announcement serves more as a political maneuver to project a strong leadership image rather than a feasible economic strategy [4]. - The statement aims to simplify complex industrial challenges into a patriotic rallying cry, appealing to domestic audiences while signaling resolve to international allies and adversaries [4]. Group 4: Conclusion on U.S.-China Rare Earth Competition - The article concludes that despite political rhetoric, the U.S. is unlikely to overcome the economic realities and competitive advantages that China holds in the rare earth sector [6].

Financial Data and Key Metrics Changes - Revenue for Q3 2025 was $699 million, a decrease of 13% year-over-year, driven by lower sales volumes and unfavorable pricing for TiO2 and zircon [8][9] - Loss from operations was $43 million, with a net loss attributable to Tronox of $99 million, including $27 million in restructuring charges [8][9] - Adjusted EBITDA was $74 million, representing a 48% decline year-on-year, with an adjusted EBITDA margin of 10.6% [8][11] - Free cash flow was a use of $137 million, including $80 million in capital expenditures [8][9] Business Line Data and Key Metrics Changes - TiO2 revenues decreased by 11% year-over-year, driven by an 8% decrease in volumes and a 5% decline in average selling prices [9][10] - Zircon revenues decreased by 20% compared to the prior year, due to a 16% decrease in price and a 4% decline in volumes [10] - Revenue from other products decreased by 21% year-over-year, but increased by 18% sequentially due to higher sales of pig iron and heavy mineral concentrate tailings [10] Market Data and Key Metrics Changes - The zircon market faced unexpected headwinds, particularly in China, where both pricing and volumes continued to decline [3][4] - Europe, the Middle East, and North America experienced sharper seasonal declines amid market weakness and competitive pressures [9] - Latin America saw typical seasonal uplift, although weaker than expected, while Asia-Pacific growth was muted by competition and a temporary stay on India anti-dumping duties [10] Company Strategy and Development Direction - The company is focused on cost improvement programs, targeting over $60 million in annualized savings by the end of 2025 and $125-$175 million by the end of 2026 [4][20] - Tronox is reinforcing its operational foundation and cash flow management through temporary idling of certain plants and adjusting production rates [4][21] - The company is also advancing its rare earth strategy, with mining operations in Australia and South Africa containing substantial amounts of monazite [7][18] Management's Comments on Operating Environment and Future Outlook - Management noted ongoing challenges from weaker demand, downstream destocking, and heightened competition, but expressed optimism about future sales volumes due to competitors' insolvency proceedings [3][4] - The company expects Q4 2025 revenue and adjusted EBITDA to be relatively flat compared to Q3, driven by weaker pricing but improving volumes [19][20] - Management remains confident in the ability to navigate the current downturn and deliver long-term shareholder value [23] Other Important Information - The company raised $400 million in senior secured notes to enhance liquidity and repay borrowings [5][12] - Liquidity as of September 30 was $664 million, with $185 million in cash and cash equivalents [12][13] - The company returned $20 million to shareholders in the form of dividends in Q3 [14] Q&A Session Summary Question: Impact of anti-dumping measures and market size - Management acknowledged that the Brazil and Saudi Arabia markets are lower than India, but expressed confidence that India's duties will be reinstated soon, which would stabilize volumes [25][27] Question: Rare earths opportunity and refining capabilities - Management confirmed ongoing mining of monazite in Australia and South Africa, with plans for further development in refining and separation through partnerships [30][32] Question: Duration of idling plants and potential permanence - The Fuzhou plant is idled to preserve cash, with decisions on its future dependent on market conditions, while Stallingborough is expected to return to full rates in Q4 [37][39] Question: 2026 earnings potential and cost savings impact - Management indicated that the Sustainable Cost Improvement Program is expected to yield significant savings in 2026, with a focus on operational efficiencies [40][42] Question: Destocking and inventory rebuilding expectations - Management noted that destocking occurred earlier than expected, but anticipated a return to normal buying patterns in Q4, indicating a potential recovery [51][53]