转 载请 注明出处：公众号 lixunlei0722 2024-2025年实施的消费品"以旧换新"政策，中央财政合计安排4500亿元超长期特别国债资金支持，累计发放直达消费者的补贴超4.8亿人次。其中2024 年超1.2亿人次，2025年上半年超2.8亿人次，2025年下半年超0.8亿人次，带动相关商品销售额超过2.6万亿元，直接拉动社会消费品零售总额增长0.6个百 分点。 以上数据反映了该政策的两大显著特征，一方面，以旧换新对消费的拉动功不可没，如果没有这项政策，2025年或难以实现5%的增长；另一方面，该政策 的乘数效应似乎不及预期，且覆盖人群偏少。 自2025年5月起，社会消费品零售总额当月同比增速逐月放缓，12月仅同比增长0.9%；而且，2025年下半年 以旧换新的受益人次数量降至0.8亿。本文探讨如何提高以旧换新的边际效应及扩大受益人口覆盖率、促就业等进行探讨。 "以旧换新"政策经历了 "出台——加力——扩围"过程 2024年7月国务院印发《关于 加力支持 大规模设备更新和消费品以旧换新的若干措施的通知》，明确向地方安排1500亿元左右超长期特别国债资 金，用于支持消费品以旧换新。 2025年则安排 ...

Core Viewpoint - The Producer Price Index (PPI) in China has shown a prolonged period of decline, with a year-on-year decrease of 1.9% reported for December 2025, marking 39 consecutive months of decline since October 2021. This trend raises questions about the underlying reasons for the stagnation in PPI despite significant GDP growth of 250% over the past 15 years [1][2][5]. Group 1: PPI Trends and Historical Context - The PPI has been in negative territory for 111 months from 2012 to 2025, indicating a long-term weakness in price levels despite substantial economic growth [1][2]. - The PPI index, set at 100 in December 2010, remained unchanged by December 2025, suggesting that the index has not increased over the past 15 years [1][5]. - Historical data shows that PPI experienced significant fluctuations, particularly influenced by production material prices, which have seen a cumulative increase of zero over the past 15 years [5][6]. Group 2: Economic Factors Influencing PPI - The 2008 financial crisis led to a surge in PPI due to government investment in infrastructure, but this effect was temporary, and PPI turned negative after March 2012 due to limited demand from final consumption [2][3]. - The divergence between Chinese and U.S. PPI post-2012 can be attributed to rapid capacity expansion in China, leading to a significant drop in export ratios relative to total industrial output [9][10]. - The prices of production materials, particularly in the upstream mining sector, have been volatile, heavily influenced by fluctuations in coal and oil prices [17][20]. Group 3: Demand and Supply Dynamics - The transmission of price changes from upstream to downstream sectors has been hindered by weak demand, particularly in the context of a competitive downstream market where prices are more sensitive to market conditions [23][24]. - Export dynamics play a crucial role in influencing midstream product prices, with a significant portion of revenue from industries like electronics and transportation being dependent on exports [27][28]. - The overall weak demand, especially in real estate, has contributed to a persistent decline in PPI, as seen in the correlation between real estate investment trends and PPI movements [38][39]. Group 4: Recommendations for Economic Adjustment - To address the long-term weakness in PPI, it is essential to adjust the supply-demand relationship, particularly by expanding effective demand through increased income for lower and middle-income groups [45][56]. - Stabilizing the real estate market is highlighted as a critical measure to boost consumption and alleviate overcapacity issues, with a focus on maintaining housing prices to prevent further declines [45][56]. - The government is encouraged to optimize fiscal spending to enhance residents' income, thereby supporting consumption and improving overall economic conditions [56].

Core Viewpoint - In recent years, Chinese export enterprises have shown a clear tendency to "hold foreign exchange without settling." Starting from early 2025, as the RMB enters an appreciation cycle and Chinese assets are revalued, the willingness of enterprises to settle foreign exchange is expected to rebound. The recent RMB exchange rate against the USD has broken through 7.0, and mainstream expectations suggest that the RMB will continue to appreciate, further stimulating enterprises' settlement sentiment and positively impacting liquidity and the market [2][3][12]. Group 1: Settlement Willingness and Scale - The "pending settlement" scale for enterprises is approximately $930 billion, with an expected increase in settlement willingness by 2025. From early 2022 to November 2025, export enterprises accumulated $930 billion in foreign exchange that has not been settled [3][7]. - The settlement rate, which measures the proportion of foreign exchange that enterprises actively convert to RMB, is a good indicator of their willingness to settle. A higher settlement rate indicates stronger willingness [8][10]. - Since early 2025, the settlement rate has improved significantly, rising from a low of 54.4% in February 2025 to a high of 71.2% in September 2025, indicating a shift from "holding foreign exchange" to "steady settlement" [10][11]. Group 2: Factors Influencing Settlement Willingness - Two main factors influence enterprises' willingness to settle: expectations regarding the RMB exchange rate and the comparative returns of holding different currencies. When enterprises expect the RMB to appreciate, they are more inclined to settle early to avoid exchange losses [11][13]. - The attractiveness of RMB assets has increased due to favorable developments in sectors like innovative pharmaceuticals and effective responses to trade tensions, which have boosted risk appetite and improved the performance of Chinese financial assets [13][14]. Group 3: Impact on Liquidity and Market - The settlement of foreign exchange essentially converts foreign assets into RMB deposits, impacting the balance sheets of the central bank, commercial banks, and enterprises. However, the effect on the base currency supply is minimal if commercial banks do not sell the foreign exchange to the central bank [15][20]. - If 20% of the pending settlement is realized by the end of 2026, it could lead to an increase in M1 by approximately 1.3 trillion RMB, contributing about 1.2 percentage points to M1 growth [24][27]. - The increase in M1 is expected to have limited impact on PPI due to insufficient effective demand, and some high-risk enterprises may channel funds into the stock market, providing incremental capital to A-shares [27][28][31].

Group 1 - The core narrative of the market has shifted from "growth" to "competitiveness," driven by external factors such as the U.S.-China tech competition and the need for self-sufficiency in key industries [17][33] - The A-share market has shown resilience despite economic pressures, with the performance of leading companies in global competition being a key driver of market valuation rather than domestic consumption or income growth [18][27] - The current investment logic emphasizes sectors like AI, power, and critical resources, which are experiencing rapid capital expenditure growth, while traditional consumer sectors face challenges [26][28] Group 2 - The divergence between corporate competitiveness and household income growth reflects a broader transformation in the economic structure, where companies are optimizing costs to enhance global competitiveness [28][31] - Historical examples illustrate that market performance can diverge from economic fundamentals, as seen in the U.S. during WWII and China's market in the early 2000s, where investor sentiment and risk premiums played significant roles [9][14][16] - The current market environment suggests that the valuation of leading companies is increasingly decoupled from traditional economic indicators, focusing instead on their long-term competitive advantages [5][8][18] Group 3 - The rise in valuations for sectors like commercial aerospace, AI, and semiconductors reflects a belief in China's ability to compete and innovate in critical areas, despite short-term economic challenges [18][19] - The shift in demand dynamics, particularly in the context of AI and energy infrastructure, is driving a new cycle of investment that differs from traditional recovery patterns [19][24] - The market's focus on a few core assets, which contribute significantly to overall market capitalization, indicates a concentration of value creation in leading firms rather than a broad-based economic recovery [5][8][18] Group 4 - The ongoing adjustments in corporate cost structures and labor compensation models are indicative of a strategic response to global competition, which may lead to increased income volatility for workers [28][31] - The institutional differences between China's centralized policy approach and the more fragmented Western model highlight the advantages of sustained support for key industries in fostering long-term competitiveness [33][34] - The current macroeconomic landscape is characterized by a complex interplay of geopolitical uncertainty, technological competition, and evolving consumer behaviors, necessitating a nuanced investment strategy [35][36]

Core Viewpoint - The article emphasizes the increasing importance of gold as an investment due to its value preservation and hedging properties, driven by monetary expansion and geopolitical tensions [1][4]. Group 1: Gold Investment Attributes - Gold is valued for its two main attributes: value preservation against currency devaluation and as a hedge against unforeseen events, with the saying "in prosperous times, jewelry; in chaotic times, gold" highlighting its role [1]. - The preservation attribute is identified as the primary driver for the continuous rise in gold prices, while the hedging attribute is also significant due to ongoing financial, trade, and technological conflicts among major nations [1]. Group 2: Central Bank Gold Holdings - Global central banks held 12.25 billion ounces of gold in 1964, which decreased to 11.66 billion ounces by 2024, despite significant monetary expansion during the same period [4]. - The price of gold has increased dramatically, from $35 per ounce in 1964 to approximately $2,639 per ounce by the end of 2024, representing a nearly 75-fold increase [4]. - The broad money supply (M2) grew from $0.98 trillion in 1964 to $156.67 trillion in 2024, a growth of 159 times, indicating a much faster expansion compared to gold price increases [4]. Group 3: Gold Reserves and Monetary Policy - By the end of 2024, the market value of central bank gold reserves exceeded $3 trillion, but this still represents a low percentage of global broad money, increasing from 4.3% in 1964 to only 1.9% in 2024 [7][10]. - The share of foreign exchange reserves in total central bank reserves rose from 31% in 1960 to 90% in 2006-2008, then decreased to 77% by 2024, indicating a shift in reserve composition [10]. - The proportion of gold in central bank reserves was 59% in 1964, but it dropped to around 10% from 2000 to 2019, with a slight recovery to 17% by 2024, still below historical levels [10][11]. Group 4: Future Outlook and Recommendations - The article suggests that central banks should continue to increase their gold reserves in response to concerns over U.S. debt and the weakening dollar, which has led to a rise in gold prices since 2022 [13]. - It is noted that China's gold holdings are relatively low, projected to be around 0.74 billion ounces by the end of 2025, representing only 6.3% of global central bank holdings [15]. - The article concludes that to enhance the international status of the Renminbi and optimize reserve structures, China should reduce holdings in U.S. and Japanese government bonds while increasing gold reserves [16].

Core Viewpoint - The A-share market is expected to continue its recovery in 2026, driven by a profound change in risk appetite at the institutional level rather than just profit improvement or liquidity expansion [1] Group 1: U.S.-China Relations - The 2026 U.S. midterm elections may lead to a shift in Trump's focus from governance to political self-preservation, potentially exacerbating the "East rises, West declines" trend [2][5] - Two key windows for potential easing in U.S.-China relations are identified: early-year high-level visits and a possible compromise on trade orders as the midterm elections approach [6] Group 2: Federal Reserve's Easing Path - The nomination of a new Federal Reserve chair in early 2026 is anticipated to be a significant turning point for market liquidity [7] - The first phase involves speculation on the nominee, which could lead to a market rally even if interest rates remain unchanged [10] - A substantial easing phase is expected in the third quarter, contingent on weakening inflation and employment data [10][11] Group 3: Macro Policy - Fiscal efforts in 2026 may see a marginal increase in deficit rates, but the focus will shift to targeted investments rather than broad infrastructure spending [12] - Monetary policy will face dual constraints, balancing liquidity needs with maintaining a strong RMB to uphold national credit asset pricing [12] Group 4: Capital Market Management - A-share market performance is expected to be supported by capital market policies, while Hong Kong stocks may benefit more from economic policies [13][14] - Long-term funds are likely to establish a "policy bottom" through strategic investments, while IPO approvals will remain stringent to manage market pressure [14] Group 5: Resident Funds Entry - The pace of resident funds entering the market is expected to remain slow, transitioning from concentrated entry to gradual allocation [15][17] - Factors influencing this slow entry include the stabilization of real estate prices and cautious attitudes towards income expectations [17] Group 6: Global Technology - The global tech sector, particularly AI, is expected to continue its upward trajectory, but with increased volatility and a shift towards application-based investments [18][21] - The focus will shift from pure computational power to companies with strong cash flow and application capabilities [22] Group 7: Domestic Technology - The investment logic in AI is moving towards application and energy materials, with significant growth expected in humanoid robots and medical AI [22][23] - The regulatory environment may stabilize the earnings of major tech platforms, allowing them to benefit from AI applications [23] Group 8: Anti-Internal Competition - The current anti-internal competition strategy aims to enhance global bargaining power through industry consolidation [24][25] - Strategic metals and renewable energy sectors are highlighted as key areas for investment, benefiting from supply-demand dynamics [25] Group 9: Gold - Gold prices are expected to rise due to geopolitical risks and declining monetary credibility, with a focus on a gradual upward trend rather than a sharp increase [28][30] - The demand for strategic resources like copper and gold is anticipated to grow due to geopolitical tensions and supply constraints [30] Group 10: New Consumption - The trend of low birth rates and the rise of single-person households are reshaping consumption patterns, leading to increased demand for emotional value products [31] - Categories such as pet economy, trendy toys, and AI companions are expected to see significant growth as consumer preferences shift [31]

Core Viewpoint - The GDP growth target for 2026 is expected to remain around 5%, with macro policies focusing on promoting consumption and expanding investment to ensure a good start for the 14th Five-Year Plan [3] Export Performance - China's export performance in 2025 was better than expected, with nominal exports increasing by 5.4% in USD and 6.2% in RMB in the first 11 months. After adjusting for price factors, actual export growth was 7.9% in USD and 9.0% in RMB [4][5] - The strong external demand contributed significantly to China's economic growth, with net exports boosting GDP growth by 1.5 percentage points in the first three quarters of 2025, accounting for 29.0% of the cumulative GDP growth [4] - The expected growth rate for China's exports in 2026 is projected at 3.4% in USD terms, supported by stable US-China tariffs and China's cost advantages [9][28][30] Manufacturing Investment - Manufacturing investment is expected to recover slightly in 2026, from around 1% growth in 2025 to approximately 2% in 2026, driven by resilient exports and policy support for advanced manufacturing [31][46] - The decline in manufacturing investment in 2025 was attributed to "strong supply and weak demand" and trade friction, but the outlook for 2026 suggests a recovery due to improved export expectations and continued policy support [36][46] Real Estate Sector - The direct drag of the real estate sector on the economy is expected to weaken in 2026, with a projected decline in commodity housing sales area of about 5% and a narrowing of the decline in real estate investment to around -11% [55][58] - The real estate sector's recovery will depend on improved consumer confidence and the successful resolution of credit risks among property developers [56][57] Consumption and Investment - Expanding domestic demand is crucial for achieving the 5% GDP growth target in 2026, with a focus on promoting consumption and investment [64] - The government is expected to maintain support for consumption through long-term special bonds, with a funding scale at least equal to the 300 billion RMB allocated in 2025 [66][68] - Infrastructure investment is projected to rebound to 8% growth in 2026, supported by previously announced policies [64]

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the current state of resident capital entering the market, highlighting a trend of "de-leveraging" and cautious investment behavior among residents, contrasting it with previous market cycles where there was more aggressive entry of funds [1][12][16]. Group 1: Resident Capital Behavior - The pace of new account openings has slowed, with November 2025 seeing 2.38 million new accounts, which is significantly lower than the 4.05 million during the 2020 fund craze and the 2.02 million in March 2019 at the start of the last bull market [2]. - The current market activity indicates that the majority of new capital is coming from the activation of dormant accounts rather than new investors entering the market in a panic [6]. - The financing net buying ratio has returned to positive territory, indicating a slight recovery in leveraged funds, but the intensity remains weaker compared to the aggressive net buying seen in 2019-2020 [7]. Group 2: Structural Changes in Investment Preferences - There is a notable shift towards passive investment products, with 72% of new funds issued in 2025 being passive index funds, reflecting a growing preference for lower-cost investment options among residents [11]. - The high management fees associated with actively managed funds have led to a "scar tissue effect" among residents, making them more cautious about investing in equities [12]. - The trend of residents moving towards fixed-term deposits indicates a risk-averse mindset, driven by the negative wealth effect from declining real estate prices [15][16]. Group 3: Insurance Capital and Market Dynamics - Insurance capital has seen a significant increase, with a quarterly growth of 863.99 billion yuan in Q3 2025, indicating a strong entry into the market [26]. - Regulatory changes have facilitated insurance capital's ability to invest in equities, with a projected annual increment of 620 billion yuan in 2026 [28]. - The pressure on the liability side of insurance companies is driving them to seek higher dividend-paying assets to cover the gap between their costs and returns [28]. Group 4: Market Outlook and Seasonal Trends - The upcoming spring season is expected to see a "spring rally," characterized by a structural loosening of funds and increased participation from retail investors, albeit at a more cautious pace compared to previous years [35]. - Historical data shows that the spring season typically favors small-cap and growth stocks, with an average rally of around 15% [38]. - The article suggests that the current market dynamics will likely lead to a more gradual and sustained rally, with specific sectors such as technology and consumer goods expected to perform well [42][43].

Core Viewpoint - The Chinese stock market is expected to rebound strongly in 2025, with the Shanghai Composite Index reaching a ten-year high, while the market structure remains highly differentiated. The article discusses how to seize new opportunities in 2026 from four perspectives: future debate, allocation debate, current debate, and strategy debate [3]. Future Debate - China is unlikely to repeat Japan's lost decades due to its superior innovation capabilities and irreplaceability in the global market. The Chinese economy's rise has diminished Japan's industrial advantages, and the market has shifted from being viewed as "uninvestable" to having "strategic allocation value" [3][9][10]. - The historical context of Japan's economic stagnation post-1990s is contrasted with China's current trajectory, emphasizing that China's innovation in technology and manufacturing is advancing rapidly [7][8]. Allocation Debate - The influx of new capital into the stock market is driven by asset reallocation from residents and financial institutions in a low-interest-rate environment. The real estate market's downturn has transformed it from a source of capital diversion to a driver of stock market growth [4][12]. - High-net-worth individuals and insurance funds are leading this asset reallocation, which is characterized as rational and gradual rather than speculative [12][14]. Current Debate - The article raises concerns about whether AI capital expenditure expectations can be met, highlighting the potential for AI to be a significant technological revolution. However, the high profit margins in the industry may limit the overall economic growth associated with AI [5][19]. - The article discusses the challenges of achieving the necessary revenue growth to support the anticipated capital expenditures in the AI sector, suggesting that the required income increments are substantial compared to the current GDP [20][21]. Strategy Debate - The outlook for 2026 remains positive, but investors should temper their return expectations. The ongoing asset reallocation process is expected to sustain market resilience, with a focus on defensive strategies and identifying opportunities in technology and advanced manufacturing sectors [26][27]. - Specific sectors to watch include: - **Technology**: Continued investment in AI applications and companies that can leverage AI for efficiency [29]. - **Advanced Manufacturing**: Growth in sectors related to AI and robotics, with a focus on domestic cycles and equipment upgrades [30]. - **Consumer**: Identifying resilient companies in traditional sectors that can maintain performance despite broader economic challenges [31]. - **Military**: Anticipated recovery in the military sector as procurement cycles normalize [31]. - **Real Estate**: Looking for structural opportunities in real estate services and resilient developers amid ongoing market adjustments [31].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the challenges and strategies for achieving a reasonable recovery in prices in China, emphasizing the importance of stabilizing economic growth and employment as key policy goals [1][2]. Group 1: Price Trends and Economic Context - The current cycle of low prices in China began in 2012, with PPI entering negative territory and CPI fluctuating between 0-1% since 2022, raising concerns about economic stability [2][5]. - From May 2012, China's PPI diverged from that of Europe and the US, remaining negative for over four years until October 2016, primarily due to structural issues in the economy and a decline in global commodity prices [2][5]. - The increase in China's manufacturing value added as a percentage of global totals from 8.6% in 2004 to 22.3% in 2012 has contributed to an oversupply of goods, while the population share has been declining [2][5]. Group 2: Government Policies and Economic Reforms - In response to diminishing policy stimulus effects post-2012, local governments increased debt levels from 16.3% in 2011 to 23.9% in 2015, leading to an oversupply in the market and necessitating supply-side structural reforms [5][7]. - The years 2016-2017 saw significant supply-side reforms aimed at reducing excess capacity in key sectors like steel and coal, which were identified as major contributors to the prolonged low PPI [5][7]. Group 3: Recent Economic Challenges - The trade tensions initiated by the US in 2018 and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 further exacerbated the situation, leading to a renewed decline in PPI as domestic demand weakened [7][10]. - The current downturn in PPI since October 2022 is marked by a shift from household balance sheet expansion to contraction, indicating a downturn in the real estate sector, which has compounded the issues of oversupply and insufficient demand [10][13]. Group 4: Structural Issues and Future Outlook - The article highlights that the persistent low inflation reflects deeper structural, cyclical, and systemic issues within the economy, necessitating a comprehensive approach to fiscal policy and income distribution reform [13][35]. - The need for targeted fiscal measures to boost consumer demand and stabilize the real estate market is emphasized, as these are critical for achieving a reasonable price recovery [35][50]. - The article concludes that merely relying on monetary policy will not suffice; a strategic overhaul of fiscal spending and income distribution is essential to address the underlying issues of low consumer demand and economic stagnation [53][54].