美国商务部工业与安全局（BIS）发布了一项 临时最终规则（IFR） ，对《出口管理条例 尽职调查要求 新规为出口商、再出口商和转让方创设了一项 积极义务 ，要求他们必须确定交易方的所有权 结构。 临时通用许可证（TGL） 为减少对现有交易的冲击，BIS同步发布了 临时通用许可证（TGL） ，有效期为 60天。该 TGL授权以下两类交易： 这项新规标志着美国出口管制从针对"明确列名实体"的"精准打击"，转向覆盖整个企业集团 的"穿透式监管"。它极大地增加了全球企业的合规负担，要求其对交易伙伴进行更深层次的 股权穿透核查。对于涉及跨国供应链的企业来说，立即审查合作伙伴的股权结构变得至关重 要。 （EAR）》进行了修订。此规则的核心是引入了一项名为" 关联方规则（Affiliates Rule） "的50%所有权标准。 该规则规定，任何由以下清单中的实体 直接或间接、单独或合计拥有50%或以上所有权 的外 国实体，将自动受到与其所有者相同的出口管制限制： 1. 实体清单（Entity List） 2. 军事最终用户清单（Military End-User List, MEU List） 3. 根据EAR §744. ...

台湾地区贸易监管机构在周二的一份声明中表示，目前对销往南非的大部分芯片均要求预先审批。此前 比勒陀利亚（南非行政首都）试图降低台北驻南代表处层级，并强制其从首都迁出，之后台湾地区做出 了上述决定。 台湾地区官方数据显示，去年其向南非出口的、被纳入此次出口限制清单的半导体相关产品，价值约 400 万美元。 南非外交部发言人克里斯平・菲里（Chrispin Phiri）表示，南非重申其与台湾地区的关系 "不具政治 性"。"南非是铂族金属（如钯）的重要供应国，而这类金属对全球半导体产业至关重要。当前我们的经 济外交正从根本上改变我们参与全球价值链的方式。" 菲里补充道，作为非洲最大经济体，南非打算摆脱资源开采型经济模式，转向战略性增值经济模 式。"这意味着在本土发展高端产业，将原材料转化为高附加值产品。这一转型将为全球打造更具韧性 的供应链，同时为南非释放高端、可持续的增长潜力，并创造就业机会。" 台湾地区对输往南非的芯片实施出口限制，对销往这个非洲国家的大部分芯片要求预先审批。 台湾地区贸易监管机构表示，此前南非试图降低台北驻南代表处的层级，并强制其从首都迁至约翰内斯 堡，台湾地区随后做出了这一决定。 台湾地区国 ...

制裁已显成效：俄利率高达17%，通胀持续攀升，融资渠道与财政收入萎缩，战争经济濒临 极限。欧盟强调，将继续施压直至俄方同意与乌克兰进行公正和谈。 （Rosneft）和天然气工业石油公司（Gazpromneft）被全面禁止交易，其他相关企业面临资 产冻结。欧盟还将追查第三方违规购油行为，包括中国境内的炼油厂、石油贸易商等。 2、金融漏洞：新增俄罗斯及第三国银行的交易禁令，首次将加密货币平台纳入限制，禁止加 密货币交易，并严控与俄替代支付系统关联的外资银行及特殊经济区实体交易。 3、技术封锁：新增对俄军事工业复合体的直接出口限制，45家俄境内及第三国企业被列入清 单，重点切断无人机等关键技术获取渠道。 过去一个月，俄罗斯持续升级对乌克兰的袭击规模，面对俄方行动，欧盟以新一轮制裁作为 回应。 本次制裁聚焦三大领域： 1、能源领域：禁止俄罗斯液化天然气（LNG）进入欧洲市场，并将原油价格上限降至47.6美 元/桶。新增118艘"影子船队"船舶至制裁清单，总数超560艘。俄罗斯石油公司 同步推进资金支持：欧盟正利用被冻结俄资产的现金余额，向乌克兰提供"赔偿贷款"（资产 本体不动），待俄支付赔款后乌方偿还贷款，具体方案将 ...

Group 1 - The U.S. Treasury Department has imposed its largest sanctions to date against the Iran-backed Ansar Allah organization (Houthi movement), targeting 32 individuals and entities, as well as four vessels involved in global illegal fundraising, smuggling, and arms procurement activities [1][2] - The sanctions are part of a broader strategy to exert maximum economic pressure on Iran and its proxy forces, aligning with the revised counter-terrorism authorization under Executive Order 13224 [2] - The Houthi movement has been identified as a significant threat to U.S. personnel and assets in the Red Sea, with attacks on regional allies and international maritime security [1][2] Group 2 - Chinese suppliers have been implicated in providing weapon manufacturing materials to the Houthi movement, including Hubei Chica, which supplied large quantities of chemical precursors for missile and explosive production [3] - Shanxi Shutong, controlled by Ying Li, has been accused of delivering tens of thousands of tons of chemical precursors used in missile engine and explosive manufacturing [3] - Shenzhen Shengnan has been identified as a logistics company that transported dual-use electronic components to Houthi shell companies in Yemen, facilitating the production of drones and other weapon systems [3] Group 3 - Yiwu Wan Shun has been recognized as a shell procurement company established by the Houthis in China, coordinating large-scale purchases of drone components and dual-use items since 2021 [4] - The company has been linked to key Houthi members, including Ibrahim Al-Nashiri, who have used it to procure industrial equipment for Houthi operations [4] Group 4 - Guangzhou YK has been accused of assisting in the transportation of dual-use components and military supplies to support Houthi weapon development [5] - Guangzhou Nahari, a shipping company, has been identified as responsible for procuring dual-use items in China and transporting them to Houthi-controlled areas under the guise of legitimate goods [5] - Al-Hammadi Company has been implicated in procuring and transporting dual-use components from China to support Houthi military actions, with its operations overseen by Yemeni nationals in China [5]

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the recent escalation of conflict between Russia and Ukraine, highlighting the significant airstrikes by Russia and the subsequent international responses, including potential sanctions from the U.S. and the EU. Key Developments - Russia launched its largest airstrike against Ukraine since the beginning of the conflict, resulting in at least four deaths and damage to government buildings in Kyiv. The strikes also targeted energy facilities, causing localized power outages [1]. Sanction Movements - Trump indicated readiness to implement a "second phase" of sanctions against Russia following the airstrikes. The EU's special envoy, David O'Sullivan, is coordinating with the U.S. for a transatlantic sanctions strategy. EU leaders are closely working with the U.S. on new sanctions [2]. - The U.S. has not yet joined the EU, UK, and Canada in efforts to lower the price cap on Russian oil to $47.60 per barrel. Trump has imposed high tariffs on Indian imports citing the purchase of Russian oil as a reason [2]. Positions of Various Parties - Russia's Kremlin spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, stated that no sanctions could force Russia to change its established position, which includes demands for Ukraine to accept Russian control over occupied territories and disarmament [3]. - The Ukrainian government emphasized that limiting profits from Russian oil sales is the only way to weaken Russia's war funding and called for increased air defense support from allies [3]. European Concerns - Italy's Defense Minister, Crosetto, questioned the effectiveness of sanctions, arguing that while Europe may not buy Russian gas, other regions continue to do so. He suggested that unless sanctions are expanded to other countries, Putin will still have alternative options [4].

Group 1 - The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has imposed sanctions on Guangzhou Tengyue Chemical Co., Ltd for its involvement in the production and sale of synthetic opioids to U.S. citizens [1] - The company also sells dangerous analgesic chemicals that are commonly used as diluents and mixed with synthetic opioids and other illegal drugs [1] - OFAC has sanctioned representatives Huang Xiaojun and Huang Zhanpeng for coordinating the shipment of these illegal drugs and diluents to the U.S. [1] Group 2 - In August 2023, Guangzhou Tengyue agreed to sell one kilogram of nitazene to a U.S. buyer, assuring that the package would pass through U.S. customs [1] - Despite a court indictment in October 2024, the company continued its operations and coordinated the sale and shipment of another analgesic, metonitazene, to U.S. customers in early 2025 [1] - A report from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in January 2024 highlighted the addictive nature of nitazene, which can lead to respiratory depression and potentially death [2] Group 3 - The National Institute on Drug Abuse reported an increase in the presence of a chemical called xylazine, commonly referred to as "tranq," which is often used as an adulterant in synthetic opioids [2] - Xylazine does not respond to naloxone (Narcan), increasing the risk of death from overdose [2]

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the U.S. sanctions imposed on individuals and entities involved in North Korea's IT worker fraud schemes, which are used to generate revenue for the regime's weapons programs [1][2]. Group 1: North Korea's IT Workers as Revenue Tools - North Korea is violating U.S. and UN sanctions by utilizing IT workers to generate funds for its illegal weapons programs, including weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile projects [2]. - These IT worker teams employ forged documents, identity theft, and false identities to infiltrate legitimate businesses in the U.S. and allied countries, with the North Korean government intercepting a significant portion of their earnings [2]. - The revenue generated from these activities has reportedly amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars, with some IT workers secretly implanting malware in corporate networks to steal sensitive proprietary data [2]. Group 2: Details of the Sanctioned IT Worker Network - The sanctioned IT worker network includes a North Korean trading company, a Chinese front company, and two individuals facilitating funding for the North Korean regime [3]. - Vitaliy Sergeyevich Andreyev, a Russian citizen, has been providing payment facilitation for the sanctioned Chinyong Information Technology Cooperation Company, which is linked to the North Korean Ministry of Defense, and has assisted in transferring nearly $600,000 since December 2024 [3]. - Kim Ung Sun acts directly or indirectly on behalf of the North Korean government [3]. - Shenyang Geumpungri Network Technology Co., Ltd is identified as a Chinese front company for Chinyong, generating over $1 million in profits for the North Korean entities since 2021 [3]. - Korea Sinjin Trading Corporation is a North Korean enterprise under the sanctioned DPRK Ministry of People's Armed Forces General Political Bureau, receiving directives from government officials regarding the international deployment of IT workers [3].

Core Viewpoint - The U.S. has terminated the "national emergency" regarding Syria, leading to the removal of the Syria sanctions regulations from the Federal Register, which is expected to allow financial institutions to operate in Syria [1]. Group 1: Key Administrative Order - On June 30, 2025, President of the United States issued Executive Order 14312, which outlines the regulations for lifting sanctions on Syria, published in the Federal Register on July 3, 2025 [2]. - The initial sanctions were established in May 2004 under Executive Order 13338, which froze the assets of specific individuals and prohibited the export of certain goods to Syria [2]. Group 2: Historical Context - The sanctions were imposed due to Syria's support for terrorism, occupation of Lebanon, development of weapons of mass destruction, and actions undermining U.S. efforts in Iraq, which were deemed a significant threat to U.S. national security [3]. - The goal of the new order is to remove sanctions against Syria while maintaining restrictions on terrorist organizations and individuals involved in human rights violations or chemical weapons activities [4]. Group 3: Specific Measures - Effective July 1, 2025, the national emergency declared under Executive Order 13338 will be terminated, and several related executive orders will be revoked [4]. - The revisions to Executive Order 13606 will remove references to Executive Order 13338, while the anti-terrorism and non-proliferation authorizations related to Iran will remain in effect, but those concerning Syria will cease due to the termination of the national emergency [4].

Group 1 - The U.S. Treasury's OFAC has imposed sanctions on Greek citizen Antonio Magaritis and his network of companies, as well as nearly a dozen vessels involved in Iran's shadow fleet, to disrupt Iran's oil exports and weaken its funding for advanced weapons programs [1] - The sanctions are part of ongoing efforts to target Iran's oil sales and are based on relevant executive orders [1] Group 2 - The following companies and vessels involved in transporting Iranian oil to China have been sanctioned: - Ozarka Shipping - FZCO, operating vessels VICTORY ARI and SONDOS, both transporting Iranian oil products to China [2] - Changbai Glory Shipping Ltd. from the Marshall Islands, with the vessel LAFIT, which has transported over 4 million barrels of Iranian oil to Chinese customers since March 2025 [2] - Regal Liberty Limited from the British Virgin Islands, with the vessel GIANT, which transported approximately 2 million barrels of Iranian oil to China in early 2025 [2] - U Beacon Shipping Co., Limited from Hong Kong, with the vessel ADELINE G, which recently transported over 1 million barrels of Iranian oil and has done so multiple times since July 2022 [2] - Hong Kong Hangshun Shipping Limited with the vessel KONGM, which has transported millions of barrels of Iranian oil to various locations in China since early 2025 [2] - Ares Shipping Limited from Hong Kong, with the vessel ARES, which has transported nearly 10 million barrels of Iranian oil [2]

Core Viewpoint - China is considering a significant policy shift by reviewing a roadmap for the use of stablecoins linked to the renminbi, aiming to enhance the internationalization of the currency [1][2]. Group 1: Policy and Regulatory Developments - The State Council of China is expected to review and potentially approve a plan to expand the global use of the renminbi, which includes measures to address the development of stablecoins in the U.S. and guidelines for risk prevention [2]. - The potential use case for a renminbi-backed stablecoin includes facilitating cross-border trade and payments with certain countries [2]. Group 2: Market Position and Competition - The entry of China into the stablecoin market could enhance the competitiveness of the renminbi against major global reserve currencies like the U.S. dollar and the euro [3]. - As of June, the renminbi ranks as the sixth most active currency in global payments, accounting for approximately 2.9% of the total global payment volume [3]. Group 3: Stablecoin Market Dynamics - Dollar-backed stablecoins dominate the market, holding nearly 98% of the total market capitalization of stablecoins, which amounts to $288 billion [6]. - The global concern regarding the influence of dollar-backed stablecoins has prompted various jurisdictions, including China, to consider their own stablecoin initiatives [6]. - In June, officials from the People's Bank of China acknowledged the transformative potential of emerging technologies like stablecoins in the global payment system, increasing calls for regulatory approval of renminbi-backed stablecoins [6].