Core Viewpoint - The potential nomination of a new Federal Reserve Chair by Trump raises concerns about the independence of monetary policy, which could lead to increased risks of stagflation, heightened fiscal worries, a weakened dollar, capital flight, and a possible sell-off in U.S. stocks, bonds, and the dollar [1][6]. Candidate Profiles - Three main candidates for the Federal Reserve Chair are Waller, Hassett, and Walsh. Waller is a current Fed governor with a dovish stance and close alignment with Trump's views, which may raise questions about central bank independence [2][3]. Hassett, former NEC director, has significant economic policy experience but lacks monetary policy expertise [2]. Walsh has a diverse background in finance and government but has not served in Trump's administration [2]. Additional Candidates - Other potential candidates include current Fed officials and former government economists, with Milan emerging as a dark horse due to his advocacy for policies that could undermine Fed independence [4][5]. Nomination Process - The nomination process typically takes 3-6 months, with an average of 4 months from nomination to appointment. If Trump announces a candidate by September-October, it may raise concerns about his urgency in establishing a "shadow Fed" [5]. Potential Impacts of Reduced Independence - If a MAGA-aligned candidate is appointed, it could lead to: 1. Increased stagflation risks, reminiscent of Nixon's interference in the 1970s [6]. 2. Heightened fiscal concerns due to rising debt and deficits, potentially exacerbating fears of a debt crisis [6]. 3. A weakened dollar and capital flight as the Fed's credibility diminishes, prompting investors to seek alternative assets [6]. 4. A potential sell-off in U.S. equities, bonds, and the dollar, reflecting market sensitivity to Fed independence [6].

Domestic Macro - Demand Side - The travel market is heating up during the summer, with domestic flight numbers averaging 14,500 per day, a 13.08% increase month-on-month and a 2.28% increase year-on-year[2] - Retail sales of passenger cars reached 571,000 units in the first two weeks of July, a year-on-year increase of 5.7%, but a month-on-month decrease of 6.7%[2] Domestic Macro - Production Side - The average operating rate of blast furnaces decreased by 0.3 percentage points to 83.35% as of July 20, while the operating rate of coke ovens fell by 0.94 percentage points to 72.93%[2] - The operating rate of asphalt plants increased by 6.58 percentage points to 32.4%, indicating significant growth in real estate infrastructure[2] Price Performance - As of July 18, the average wholesale price of pork rose by 0.2% week-on-week, while the average wholesale price of 28 monitored vegetables fell by 0.09%[2] - The PPI showed a decline in oil prices, with WTI and Brent crude oil prices dropping by 1.44% and 1.05%, respectively[3] Fiscal and Investment - This week saw the issuance of special government bonds increase significantly, with 123 billion yuan in new special bonds and 1,315 billion yuan in new special bonds (excluding debt relief) issued, marking a notable acceleration in issuance[3] - The cement shipment rate has rebounded, indicating an increase in construction activity, particularly in water conservancy and public facilities projects[3] Overseas Macro - The U.S. inflation rate for June was 2.7% year-on-year, with core inflation at 2.9%, indicating manageable inflation levels despite tariff impacts[4] - The U.S. "GENIUS Act" and other cryptocurrency-related bills have passed the House, supporting the development of private sector digital currencies and reinforcing the dollar's position[3]

Group 1: Economic Outlook - A significant increase in pessimism regarding the global economic outlook has been observed among central banks, with a shift from expectations of a soft landing to a belief that stagflation is the most likely scenario [2][3] - Concerns over U.S. policy uncertainty have intensified, with 74% of respondents indicating that the potential impact of the Trump administration's trade and international alliance policies has overtaken geopolitical issues as the primary risk [2] Group 2: U.S. Dollar and Reserve Currency Status - Despite 80% of respondents predicting that the U.S. dollar will remain the world's reserve currency, there is a notable trend towards diversification, with the euro and renminbi gaining attention [4] - Approximately 29% of central banks plan to reduce their investments in U.S. assets in the near future, reflecting a gradual decline in the attractiveness of dollar-denominated assets [3][4] Group 3: Gold as a Preferred Asset - Gold continues to be a primary target for global central banks, with 52% planning to increase their gold holdings in the coming year, and 67% believing it will be the best-performing asset class by the end of the decade [5][6] - Since the end of 2022, gold prices have surged over 100%, leading to a significant acceleration in gold purchases by central banks, particularly after the freezing of Russian foreign exchange reserves [6][7] Group 4: Concerns Over U.S. Political Environment - Two-thirds of central bank reserve managers express concerns about the independence of the Federal Reserve, fearing that political interference may undermine its ability to set monetary policy effectively [3] - The political environment in the U.S. is seen as a barrier to investment in dollar assets, with 70% of central banks indicating that it has hindered their investment decisions, a figure that has more than doubled from the previous year [7]

Core Viewpoint - The future status of the US dollar depends on both the US economy and policies, as well as the developments of other major currencies and their issuing countries, indicating a potential shift towards a more competitive multi-currency system [1] Group 1 - The confidence in the US dollar has seen a decline in the market [1] - A transition from an over-reliance on the dollar to competition among major currencies could provide better constraints and incentives for the policies of major currency issuers [1]

Group 1: Dollar Cycle and Economic Impact - The dollar cycle reflects the relative strength of the U.S. economy and global investor portfolio adjustments, with a strong U.S. economy leading to dollar appreciation and increased capital inflows[1] - In 2025, the dollar is expected to enter a short-term correction due to the negative impact of Trump 2.0 on the U.S. economy, which may undermine investor confidence in the dollar[1] - The dollar's share in the international monetary system may decline as global economic multipolarity increases and countries diversify their reserve assets[1] Group 2: Economic and Inflation Forecasts - U.S. GDP growth is projected at 2.9% in 2023, decreasing to 1.4% in 2025, while PCE inflation is expected to stabilize around 2.8%[2] - The Eurozone's GDP growth is forecasted to be 0.4% in 2023 and 0.8% in 2025, with CPI inflation expected to decrease from 5.5% in 2023 to 2.1% in 2025[2] - The U.S. federal funds target rate is anticipated to be 5.33% in 2023, dropping to 4.00% by 2025[2] Group 3: Dollar Index and Its Influences - The dollar index, which is a weighted average of the dollar against six major currencies, has seen significant fluctuations, with a long-term upward trend since 2008[3] - The euro/dollar exchange rate, which accounts for nearly 60% of the dollar index, has a decisive influence on its movements, with a correlation of 0.7 to 0.8 with U.S.-Eurozone interest rate differentials[3] - The dollar index is expected to decline to around 97 by the end of 2025 due to trade wars and narrowing economic growth differentials between the U.S. and Eurozone[3] Group 4: Market Dynamics and Investor Behavior - Market risk preferences significantly affect capital flows, with a tendency for funds to return to dollar assets during risk-off periods, strengthening the dollar index[1] - The anticipated Trump 2.0 trade war may lead to a decrease in the allocation of dollar assets by international investors, exacerbating the dollar's depreciation[1] - The dollar's dominant position in international payments and reserves remains intact, despite fluctuations, with its share in global reserves projected to be 57.8% by 2024[1]

Group 1: Global Currency System and Dollar Status - The recent sell-off of dollar assets is viewed as a short-term phenomenon, and despite a decline in trust, the dollar's dominant position in the global currency system remains difficult to challenge [4] - New currencies like the euro, renminbi, and Special Drawing Rights (SDR) are unlikely to gain widespread acceptance in the short term, as the formation of reserve currencies requires long-term accumulation of national economic strength [4] - The transition from a unipolar to a multipolar global currency system requires significant changes in the economic field, which is still a distant goal [4] Group 2: Development of Digital Renminbi - Public acceptance of digital renminbi depends on its advantages over existing payment methods; without unique benefits, it may struggle to gain popularity [5] - The success of digital renminbi in international markets faces challenges similar to those in China, where entrenched payment methods like credit cards hinder the adoption of alternatives [5] - Market forces should drive the development of digital renminbi, with widespread adoption occurring only when businesses find it more convenient and cost-effective than traditional banking [5] Group 3: Internationalization of Renminbi - The path to renminbi internationalization is long and challenging, with non-convertibility and strict capital controls being the main obstacles [7] - Despite China's significant role in global trade, the current economic environment is not conducive to opening capital accounts and achieving full convertibility of the renminbi [7] - Long-term, as China's economy continues to develop, issues surrounding renminbi convertibility and capital flow will gradually be resolved, leading to its important position in the global currency system [7]

Core Viewpoint - The forum discussed the need for a restructured global financial system in the face of rising geopolitical uncertainties and the importance of multilateralism to address global challenges [5][10][12]. Group 1: Global Financial Cooperation - The forum featured discussions among experts on the importance of multilateralism and the need for a diversified global financial order to address current challenges [3][5]. - Lord Mark Malloch-Brown emphasized the crisis in international order due to unilateral actions by the U.S. and the need for countries like China and Europe to actively promote multilateralism [5]. - Erik Berglof highlighted the necessity for a new multilateralism that reflects the current geopolitical landscape, advocating for cooperation between Europe and developing countries [8]. Group 2: Economic Imbalances and Domestic Demand - Professor Shi Kang pointed out that addressing global economic imbalances requires multilateral coordination and that China should focus on domestic demand rather than relying solely on external markets [10]. - The need for China to stimulate domestic consumption and create demand was emphasized as a key task for 2025, alongside the importance of economic reforms and industry upgrades [10]. Group 3: Currency Dynamics and Financial Stability - Massimiliano Castelli discussed the potential for the euro and renminbi to gain prominence as global reserve currencies, while the dollar remains the primary safe-haven asset [12]. - The discussion included the gradual reduction of dollar asset holdings by global central banks and institutional investors, indicating a shift in currency dynamics [12]. - Marc Uzan stressed the importance of regional cooperation and the establishment of new rules in rebuilding the international financial system [15].

Core Viewpoint - The European Central Bank's Governing Council member Knot stated that the dollar remains irreplaceable in many functions, and the prospect of undermining the dollar's status is still far off [1] Group 1 - The dollar's dominance in global finance is emphasized, indicating its critical role in various economic functions [1] - The statement suggests that any potential shift away from the dollar's supremacy is not imminent, reinforcing the current financial landscape [1]

【环球时报特约记者 甄翔】从比尔·盖茨到蒂姆·库克，再到摩根大通的首席执行官杰米·戴蒙，连日来， 美国的科技巨头、华尔街精英纷纷对巴菲特决定今年年底前卸任以及对关税冲突的批评做出回应。当地 时间3日，一年一度的伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东大会在美国内布拉斯加州举行。该年会是分析经济形 势、盘点市场走势的重要年度经济活动。此次年会正值全球经济受关税政策影响增长乏力之际，因而尤 为受到关注。现年94岁的巴菲特在年会收官讲话中正式宣布他将于年底卸任公司首席执行官，届时他的 副手阿贝尔将成为公司新的掌舵人。同时，他罕见地对当前的关税冲突提出批评，并对美国政府的赤字 和美元地位表示担忧。 巴菲特年底卸任的消息引发多方关注。巴菲特于1965年收购了当时还是一家纺织厂的伯克希尔·哈撒 韦，并在几十年间将公司打造为一个横跨多个产业、总资产高达万亿美元的巨头。在巴菲特掌舵下，伯 克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东的年化收益率基本是标普500指数的两倍，而其本人也由此被称为"股神"。 巴菲特在年会上发声，明确表示"贸易不应该成为武器"，针对全世界征收惩罚性关税是"重大错误"。美 国全国公共广播电台（NPR）3日报道称，巴菲特是否会就贸易冲突及其 ...

Group 1 - Deutsche Bank reports that despite a recent market recovery, foreign investors remain cautious about U.S. assets, with a significant slowdown in capital inflows observed over the past two months [1][4] - The report indicates that the capital inflow into the U.S. is either rapidly slowing down or experiencing a substantial reduction in investment, posing challenges to the dollar's status as a dual-deficit currency [1][4] - Historically, the U.S. has been a strong magnet for foreign capital, but recent trends suggest a potential shift, with concerns about a mass withdrawal of foreign investors from the U.S. market following trade policy announcements [4][5] Group 2 - The report highlights a notable trend of sustained selling in ETFs, with investors pulling back from both equity and bond markets, indicating a lack of confidence in U.S. assets [5] - Deutsche Bank's strategist has revised the dollar forecast downward, attributing this to weakened foreign investor willingness to finance U.S. trade and budget deficits due to current economic policies [5] - Predictions suggest that by 2027, the euro to dollar exchange rate may rise from approximately 1.14 to 1.30, while the dollar to yen rate could decrease from about 142 to 115 [5]