一，国衰，民穷——俄罗斯加税 久拖不决，没有胜利希望的俄乌战争，让俄罗斯国衰，民穷，为了继续打下去。 全国人民不得不分摊"战时成本"，最显眼的就是调整增值税， 俄罗斯财政部提了个方案，2026年1月起，这税要从20%涨到22%。 别看只涨了2个百分点，影响一点都不小。增值税是消费环节的税，最后都是消费者扛，跟买东西多花钱一个道理。 有人算过，就这一项，每个俄国家庭一年要多花4.55万卢布，差不多是3950块人民币。 2023年俄罗斯人均货币收入中位数为 36,600 卢布（2831块人民币），一个多月的工资没了。 普京团队明着说钱要用来"搞国防、保安全"，等于直接摊牌：打仗的钱，不够了，老百姓得多出。 其实俄罗斯经济早已是"战时模式"，国防开支占了联邦预算的40%，创下历史新高。 但战时模式还不够，还要加码！ 2025年秋天，俄罗斯人终于明白一个现实：打仗的代价，最终要从自己钱包里掏。传了三年的"越打越有钱"，如今连影子都没了。国家储备快用完了、借 债没人敢借、油价被打压而且卖不出去、影子舰队到处被抓.....而战争这个饕餮继续吞噬着巨额的财富。普京没有办法，只好再苦一苦百姓：加税、涨 价、一样都没落下。 不 ...

没想到的是，中国还没放弃对俄贸易，俄罗斯普京政府却先对美"让步"，近日俄罗斯副外长里亚布科夫表示，已准备好与美国讨论能 源合作，还提到了"萨哈林1号项目"。该项目在2005年启动，由美国埃克森美孚公司占股30%，俄罗斯石油公司占比20%，日本和印度 公司共占比50%。在俄乌冲突后，美企退出了该项目。近期普京签署法令，允许埃克森美孚公司重新获得股份，在外界看来，这是俄 罗斯的一种"让步"，此外美俄在峰会中还提到了能源和商务合作。 在石油资源领域，俄罗斯对美敞开大门有三层因素：一是战时经济，2025年俄罗斯的经济增长放缓，增长预期仅为1.5%，第二季度的 GDP增长率只有1.1%，远低于去年同期。受高利率的影响，俄罗斯央行财政压力巨大，而在西方国家的制裁下，俄能源出口受限，这 种经济领域的"内忧外患"，让普京不得不对美"让步"；二是美俄关系的缓和，美国的武器援助是乌克兰抵抗俄军的最大依仗，欧盟和 北约的对俄行动，同样受美方掣肘，缓和美俄关系，可以为俄罗斯提供难得的喘息之机；三是释放政治信号。美国与俄罗斯的能源合 打不赢中国，美方又想搞"集团作战"吗？面对28国联合重压，中方不退一步，没想到俄罗斯先妥协了，美方要" ...

（文章来源：央视新闻） 匈牙利欧盟事务部长亚诺什·博考当地时间16日在布鲁塞尔表示，匈牙利建议，欧盟应着力与提升竞争 力，而不是引入战时经济，如果不降低能源价格，这一目标将无法实现。 关于乌克兰加入欧盟，博考表示，乌克兰在入盟过程中绕过成员国在法律和政治上都是不可能的，这有 悖于欧盟条约。尽管成员国可主动与非欧盟国家进行商讨，但这不具法律意义。 博考表示，欧盟委员会主席冯德莱恩上周在"盟情咨文"中表示，欧盟应更多介入俄乌冲突，欧盟资金应 更多流向乌克兰。目前，尚不清楚的是，布鲁塞尔将如何应对困扰欧盟的内部问题，例如竞争力不足、 能源价格高企以及住房困难等。 博考指出，与冯德莱恩观点不同，匈牙利认为高昂的能源价格并非源于购买俄罗斯石油和天然气，而是 由欧盟制裁政策缺陷、贸易政策缺陷、产业政策缺陷以及绿色转型造成的。"只要这些领域没有好转， 能源价格就不会下降。" ...

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the severe economic consequences of the ongoing war in Russia, highlighting the increasing financial strain on various sectors, the rising military expenditures, and the paradox of low unemployment amidst widespread business failures [6][9][10]. Group 1: Economic Impact of the War - As of mid-2024, 141,000 legal entities in Russia declared bankruptcy, with manufacturing, construction, and trade accounting for over 70% of these failures [10]. - By the end of 2024, 66% of the labor population had personal debts totaling 38.5 trillion rubles, with a household overdue loan rate of 10.5% in Q1 2025, indicating growing financial pressure [7]. - Despite the collapse of numerous small and medium enterprises, the unemployment rate remained at a historical low of 2.2% in June 2025, raising questions about the accuracy of employment data [9]. Group 2: Military Expenditures - In 2024, Russia's direct defense spending surged to 10.8 trillion rubles, tripling compared to 2021, with total military expenditures reaching at least 13.85 trillion rubles, accounting for 38% of the budget and 7.7% of GDP [10][11]. - The military budget for 2025 is projected to increase by 25% to 13.5 trillion rubles, with total war-related expenditures expected to exceed 16.55 trillion rubles [10][11]. - The total salary expenditure for the military in 2025 is estimated to be at least 39 trillion rubles, reflecting the significant financial burden of maintaining military personnel [13][14]. Group 3: Resource Depletion and Economic Strain - The war has led to a drastic reduction in Russia's arms exports, plummeting from a stable level of $14-15 billion to below $1 billion since 2023, while military equipment imports have surged [20][23]. - The procurement of military equipment from abroad is expected to rise from 180 billion rubles in 2021 to 440 billion rubles by 2025, indicating a reliance on foreign supplies due to domestic production limitations [23]. - The overall military spending in 2025 is projected to exceed 35 trillion rubles, with additional costs for repairs, weapon supplies, and logistics, compounding the economic challenges faced by the country [26]. Group 4: Inflation and Public Sentiment - Inflation in Russia has decreased to 8.8% in 2025, but real wages have declined, with essential food prices rising significantly, leading to a decrease in purchasing power for the populace [36]. - The government has introduced a "war tax" on businesses with annual revenues exceeding 1 billion rubles, alongside increased income tax rates, reflecting the financial strain on the economy [38]. - Public sentiment is shifting as the war drags on, with increasing casualties and declining living standards potentially undermining support for the conflict [44].

Group 1 - The core viewpoint of the articles highlights Europe's strategic preparations for potential conflict with Russia, particularly through the readiness of key ports like Rotterdam for military logistics [1][3] - The European infrastructure is transitioning into a wartime mode, indicating a shift from theoretical discussions to practical implementations of a wartime economy, as emphasized by French President Macron [1][3] - There is a growing consensus among European leaders, including Macron and German Chancellor Merz, advocating for a robust military response and increased defense spending to counter Russian aggression [3][5] Group 2 - Eastern European leaders express concerns that the Russia-Ukraine conflict is merely a precursor to broader Russian expansion, urging NATO to prepare adequately [3][5] - Despite Russia's current military and economic struggles, European nations perceive an opportunity to strategically weaken Russia by providing military aid to Ukraine and enhancing their own military capabilities [5][6] - The long-term objective for Europe is to systematically diminish Russia's ability to project power externally, aiming to reduce it to a regionally focused state that cannot influence European security dynamics [6]

Core Viewpoint - The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, stated that the Russian economy has transitioned into a wartime economy [1] Group 1 - The shift in the Russian economy indicates a significant change in its operational and strategic focus due to ongoing conflicts [1]

Core Viewpoint - The article highlights the economic achievements of the New Fourth Army's Seventh Division during the Second Sino-Japanese War, showcasing how strategic leadership and innovative economic measures led to significant growth despite challenging circumstances [1][19]. Group 1: Historical Context - The Anti-Japanese National United Front was established in the 1930s to resist Japanese invaders, leading to a 14-year struggle that ultimately expelled the invaders from China [1]. - The war severely hindered domestic economic development, with the Communist Party's bases facing significant challenges such as territory loss, troop reductions, and supply shortages [1][3]. Group 2: Economic Transformation - The New Fourth Army's Seventh Division, particularly in the central Anhui region, sought to innovate wartime economics to overcome difficulties and build strength for a prolonged conflict [3]. - By 1945, the Seventh Division had grown from an initial force of fewer than 2,000 to nearly 200,000 troops, controlling over 22,500 square kilometers and serving a population exceeding 3 million [11]. Group 3: Key Figures - Zeng Xisheng and Cai Hui played pivotal roles in creating an economic miracle for the Seventh Division after May 1941, with Zeng serving as the political commissar and Cai overseeing financial matters [5][12]. - Their collaboration was instrumental in transforming the division's economic situation, allowing it to thrive despite initial hardships [5][12]. Group 4: Economic Strategies - Faced with severe financial constraints, Cai Hui implemented measures such as food blockades to monopolize grain trade and proposed public salt industries to stimulate local economies [16]. - By autumn 1944, the financial revenue of the central Anhui base had more than doubled compared to 1942, surpassing 60 million yuan [16]. - The Seventh Division contributed 53 million yuan (equivalent to 26.5 million taels of gold) to support other units, demonstrating its economic strength [17].

Group 1: Economic Performance and Trends - Since the onset of the Ukraine crisis in February 2022, Western sanctions have led to a 2.1% decline in the Russian economy in 2022, but a rebound occurred in 2023 with a growth of 3.6%, and a projected growth of 4.1% in 2024 [1] - The resilience of the Russian economy is notable, with a shift towards a "wartime economy" characterized by military orders and manufacturing expansion [5][6] - The agricultural sector in Russia has seen rapid development, reflecting the state's focus on ensuring public welfare despite sanctions and war [9] Group 2: Global Context and Geopolitical Factors - The current global transformation is marked by a shift from a Western-dominated order to a multipolar world, influenced by significant changes in domestic systems and foreign strategies of major countries [2][4] - The "Trump 2.0" era is seen as a critical backdrop for understanding the global transition, with implications for Russia's economic strategies and international relations [2][5] Group 3: Challenges and Future Outlook - Despite the growth, Russia's economic transformation faces challenges such as a projected slowdown in growth post-2025, ongoing Western sanctions, declining birth rates, and a lack of skilled labor [9][14] - The impact of the U.S. tariff war, although not directly affecting Russia, could have significant indirect effects, particularly through fluctuations in oil prices, which constitute a third of Russia's budget [13][14] - The volatility of the Russian ruble poses additional challenges, as its appreciation could diminish the competitiveness of Russian energy exports [14]

Group 1: Russia's Military and Economic Situation - Russia shows little interest in peace negotiations with Ukraine, despite external pressures and potential new military offensives planned for summer [1] - The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) analyst Jack Watling indicates that Russia's military equipment from Soviet times will be depleted by mid-autumn, limiting its ability to replenish losses [1] - Economic and military pressures within Russia, including sanctions on oil exports and military supplies, may eventually force Russia to negotiate [1] Group 2: Economic Challenges - Russia's economy is under severe strain due to international sanctions and domestic pressures, with inflation reaching 10.2% in April and the central bank maintaining high interest rates at 21% [2] - GDP growth in Russia has sharply declined from 4.5% in Q4 to 1.4% in Q1, indicating a potential technical recession [2][3] - The Russian Ministry of Economic Development predicts GDP growth will drop from 4.3% in 2024 to 2.5% this year, highlighting a loss of economic momentum [3] Group 3: Oil Prices and Revenue Impact - Oil prices have significantly decreased, with Brent crude at $64.94 per barrel and Urals crude at $59.97, leading to a projected 24% drop in oil and gas revenues for Russia [4] - The Russian Finance Ministry has revised its oil price forecast down from $69.7 to $56 per barrel, increasing the budget deficit expectation from 0.5% to 1.7% of GDP [4] - Analysts suggest that continued Western efforts to weaken the Russian economy could lead to a critical decision for Russia regarding the costs of ongoing military engagement [4]