2025年12月23日，美国国际贸易委员会（ITC）就进口自中国的低克重热敏纸（Lightweight Thermal Paper）第三次反倾销与反补贴日落复审作出产业损害肯 定性终裁。裁定认为，若取消现行反倾销和反补贴措施，在可预见期间内，中国涉案产品的进口将对美国国内产业造成实质性损害，相关贸易救济措施因此 继续维持有效。 此次终裁并未重新设定新的反倾销税率区间，而是延续既有裁定逻辑。根据美国商务部于2025年11月18日发布的第三次反倾销和反补贴快速日落复审终裁结 果，美国方面确认：若撤销现行反倾销措施，中国低克重热敏纸将以高达 115.29% 的倾销幅度继续或再度进入美国市场。这一倾销幅度被作为继续维持反 倾销税令的重要依据。 从案件历史看，低克重热敏纸已成为美国对华贸易救济措施中持续时间较长的代表性产品之一。自2007年美国商务部对中国涉案产品发起反倾销、反补贴调 查以来，该产品已先后经历三次"双反"日落复审，且三次复审结果均支持维持原有贸易限制措施。这意味着，美国市场对中国原产低克重热敏纸的准入门槛 在未来一段时间内仍将保持在高位。 在此背景下，部分出口企业开始重新评估其国际供应链布局。业内普遍关 ...

货物在深圳保税区做转口怎么操作的呢 在国际贸易的舞台上，有一种灵活高效的物流模式，它让货物能够"经停"而不"入境"，巧妙地利用特殊政策区域进行仓储、分拨和再出口，这就是转口贸 易。深圳作为中国重要的外贸窗口，其保税区为这类业务提供了成熟的运作平台。如果你对货物如何在此进行转口操作感到好奇，那么本文将为你梳理出 一条清晰的路径。 首先，我们需要理解核心概念。所谓"转口"，是指货物从出口国运出后，并非直接运往最终目的国，而是先进入一个第三方区域的保税仓库或保税区。在 这里，货物可以享受"保税"状态，即暂不办理进口清关手续，无需缴纳关税和进口环节税。随后，货物再根据新的订单，从这里重新出口运往真正的消费 国。深圳的保税区正是这样一个理想的第三方区域。 那么，具体如何操作呢？我们可以将其分解为几个关键步骤。 一、前期准备与合同筹划 任何顺畅的物流都始于周密的计划。进行转口贸易前，商业层面的安排至关重要。 1.贸易关系确认：你需要与最初的供应商（发货方）和最终的采购商（收货方）分别签订独立的购销合同。这两份合同在商业上是分开的，但货物是同一 批。通常，货物的所有权会在保税区内完成转移。 2.物流方案设计：根据货物的性质 ...

印度财政部税收局发布第35/2025-Customs(ADD)号通报，正式决定对**原产于或进口自中国的冷轧无取向电工钢（CRNO）征收为期五年的反倾销税。该决 定采纳了印度商工部于2025年9月作出的肯定性终裁建议，标志着该产品对印出口正式进入高税监管周期。 根据通报内容，反倾销税税额按生产商区分执行： 武汉钢铁股份有限公司、宝钢湛江钢铁有限公司、宝山钢铁股份有限公司：223.82美元/吨 中国其他生产商/出口商：414.92美元/吨 涉案产品涵盖冷轧无取向硅钢扁平材，不论是否成卷、宽度或厚度，涉及印度海关编码7210、7225及7226项下多项产品。该措施自公告发布之日起生效，有 效期为五年。 冷轧无取向电工钢广泛应用于电机、变压器、新能源设备等领域，是中印贸易中的重要工业原材料。本次反倾销措施落地后，中国出口商在印度市场面临的 直接影响包括： 单吨成本大幅上升，价格竞争力明显削弱 印度进口商清关成本与合规风险同步提高 现有长期订单面临重新议价或转移采购来源的压力 在反倾销措施长期化的背景下，部分出口企业开始评估通过第三国转口贸易方式，重构对印出货路径，以降低政策性成本冲击。 马来西亚转口方案成为重点评估 ...

Core Viewpoint - Dongbai Group has achieved significant stock performance with 7 limit-up days in 14 trading days, indicating strong market interest and potential growth factors driving the stock price [1] Group 1: Stock Performance - The stock reached a limit-up at 9:32 AM today with a trading volume of 696 million yuan and a turnover rate of 7.61% [1] - The stock has shown volatility typical of limit-up stocks, suggesting caution for investors regarding high-risk chasing [1] Group 2: Business Operations - The company's logistics and warehousing business benefits from a core regional network and deep cooperation with JD and SF Express [1] - Dongbai Group operates as an operator of the bonded logistics park in the Fuzhou Free Trade Zone, catering to cross-strait warehousing demands [1] Group 3: Market Factors - Multiple factors, including favorable consumer policies and increased market attention on the retail sector, are contributing to the stock's performance [1]

1. Report Industry Investment Rating No information provided in the content. 2. Core View of the Report - Despite the impact of Sino - US trade frictions this year, China's exports have maintained resilience. From January to October 2025, the US - dollar - denominated export value increased by 5.30% year - on - year, higher than 5.21% in the same period last year. However, the export growth rate may decline slightly next year, with the annual export year - on - year growth rate expected to slow to around 2% and showing a trend of being lower in the first half and higher in the second half [1][3][8]. 3. Summary According to the Directory 3.1 Current Export Support Items - **Regional Perspective**: Amid trade frictions, China's export share to the US and Japan has decreased year by year, while the share to ASEAN, India, Russia, Africa, and Latin America has increased. From January to October 2025, exports to the US dragged down the overall export growth rate by 2.02 percentage points, while ASEAN, Africa, and the EU became the main drivers of export growth, with export growth rates of 14%, 26%, and 8% respectively, and export pulling rates of 2.51%, 1.52%, and 1.14% respectively [11]. - **Product Category Perspective**: Capital goods such as mechanical and electrical products, high - tech products, integrated circuits, automobiles (including chassis), ships, and mechanical equipment are the main categories driving export growth. From January to October 2025, exports of ships, integrated circuits, automobiles (including chassis), and liquid crystal flat - panel display modules achieved double - digit high growth. In contrast, exports of mobile phones, labor - intensive goods, and real - estate - related post - cycle goods showed negative growth, indicating a possible change in China's industrial structure [15]. 3.2 Reasons for Export Resilience 3.2.1 Enterprise Outbound Expansion Drives Exports - From January to October 2025, capital goods exports maintained a high growth rate, with ships and general mechanical equipment driving export growth by 0.4 and 0.1 percentage points respectively. There is a positive correlation between the year - on - year growth of listed companies' overseas revenues and exports, as well as between China's outward direct investment flow and total export year - on - year growth. From 2015 - 2024, the average annual compound growth rate of exports driven by outward investment was significantly higher than that of overall exports (7.6% vs 5.2%), with an average proportion of 5.7% in overall exports and an average pull of 0.7 percentage points on overall exports. Investment in different countries also corresponds to the growth rate differences of exports of different product types to these countries [2][21][27]. 3.2.2 Re - export Trade Affects Export Country Structure - During the trade friction, the US imposed significantly higher tariffs on China than on ASEAN countries, prompting Chinese enterprises to seek Southeast Asian re - export trade to avoid high tariffs. From 2018 - 2019 and during the current trade friction, China's exports to the US decreased significantly, while exports to ASEAN and US imports from ASEAN increased significantly, indicating that re - export trade may have offset the decline in exports to the US to some extent and supported the overall export growth rate [43]. 3.2.3 Demand Growth in Some Importing Countries Supports High Export Growth - Benefiting from the mild economic recovery in the EU, the EU's import growth rate has rebounded. Since the second half of 2024, driven by interest rate cuts, defense, and infrastructure investment, the EU's GDP growth rate has remained at around 1.5%, and the year - on - year growth rate of the industrial production index has been in the positive range since February 2025, driving the EU's import growth rate from - 5% in 2024 to 4% this year. Vietnam's GDP growth rate has continued to rise this year, with the cumulative GDP growth rate in the first three quarters reaching 7.85%. Investment and consumption have also maintained high growth rates, driving China's cumulative exports to Vietnam from January to October to increase by 22.3% year - on - year [47][50]. 3.2.4 Increase in China's Import Share in Africa and Other Regions - From 2019 - 2024, the average annual compound growth rate of Africa's imports was only 5%, but the average annual growth rate of Africa's imports from China reached 10%. China's share in Africa's imports increased from 17.1% in 2019 to 21.6% in 2024, with an average annual increase of 0.9 percentage points. The reasons for the share increase include large - scale infrastructure investment in Africa, high price competitiveness of Chinese export products, zero - tariff policies for 53 African countries, and successful market expansion by Chinese exporters [54]. 3.3 Export Outlook - Although exports have maintained resilience due to multiple factors, the export growth rate may decline slightly next year. The factors supporting export resilience may weaken, and the support for next year's exports may decrease. Using a fitting model to estimate next year's export growth rate, it is expected to slow to around 2% [3][59][62].

Group 1: U.S. Trade Policy and Agreements - The U.S. has implemented a series of tariffs, including a 10% baseline tariff and additional tariffs based on trade deficits, with rates reaching up to 104% for China[14][3] - Since April 2025, the U.S. has engaged in three phases of trade negotiations: exploratory, difficult negotiations, and signing agreements, with significant pressure on trade partners to comply[10][2] - The agreements reached primarily reflect "America First" principles, with countries making concessions on tariffs, investments, and market access[2][1] Group 2: Global Economic Impact - The traditional multilateral trade order is being undermined, leading to a restructured global economic system where trade relations are increasingly determined by national power rather than market forces[2][1] - Economic nationalism and fair trade ideologies are emerging as new narratives in global trade, with countries forming regional alliances to enhance economic resilience[2][1] - Despite U.S. trade pressures, China's economy remains resilient, with a projected increase in foreign trade in the first three quarters of 2025, as other regions fill the gap left by reduced U.S. exports[3][1] Group 3: Risks and Uncertainties - The uncertainty surrounding U.S. tariff policies poses risks, as judicial challenges could lead to significant changes in trade relations[4][1] - The recent U.S.-China economic agreement is merely a framework and does not resolve underlying strategic differences, leaving room for future trade tensions[4][1] - Third-party countries may face pressure to align with U.S. policies, potentially leading to increased tariffs on Chinese products and further complicating China's economic landscape[4][1]

Group 1 - The core viewpoint is that the EU's trade protectionism against Chinese products is intensifying, leading to a high-sensitivity global export environment, with measures expanding in scope, duration, and regulatory detail [1][2][3] - As of October 2025, the EU has implemented 56 anti-dumping and countervailing measures against Chinese goods, amounting to over €46 billion, affecting key industries such as rubber, steel, chemicals, and new energy batteries [1] - The average anti-dumping tax rate ranges from 30% to 70%, with some products exceeding 100%, significantly undermining the price advantage of Chinese manufacturing [1] Group 2 - Southeast Asia is emerging as a new trade hub, with re-export trade growth projected at 43% between 2024 and 2025, with Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam accounting for 68% of this growth [5][6] - Chinese-manufactured goods represent 39% of Southeast Asia's total re-export value, indicating that the region's re-export system is becoming a structural component of the global supply chain [5] Group 3 - The compliance aspect is becoming crucial in Southeast Asia's re-export system, moving away from gray-area practices to a more institutionalized and transparent framework [7] - The implementation of electronic origin certificate systems in regions like Port Klang, Malaysia, enhances operational legality and allows for tax optimization through compliance [7] Group 4 - The EU's trade protection measures are prompting a shift from concentrated exports to a distributed layout in supply chains, with a notable decrease in direct exports from China to the EU [9][10] - The proportion of Chinese exports to the EU directly has dropped from 17.6% to 12.3%, while re-exports via Southeast Asia have increased to 9.8%, with key products being chemicals (27%), electromechanical products (21%), and rubber and plastic products (19%) [10] Group 5 - Future trade barriers from the EU will likely focus on environmental, traceability, and social responsibility aspects, with digital origin traceability systems expected to be widely adopted [12][13] - Southeast Asian countries are adjusting their trade regulatory frameworks to align with EU green certifications and ESG standards, indicating a shift towards compliance and low-carbon management in re-export operations [12][13] Group 6 - The Southeast Asian re-export trade system is becoming a key hub for global manufacturing to navigate trade barriers, emphasizing the importance of compliance, digitalization, and regional collaboration [15] - The combination of compliant re-exports, digital traceability, and regional cooperation will enable Chinese manufacturing to gradually regain its foothold in the European market despite ongoing EU trade protections [15]

Core Points - The United States and Vietnam have reached a trade agreement, maintaining a 20% tariff on Vietnamese goods and considering exemptions for certain products, while Vietnam commits to opening its market and easing import regulations [1] - Vietnam's Prime Minister met with Chinese representatives to explain the agreement with the U.S. and to ensure stable trade relations with China [3][5] - Vietnam is seeking support from China in areas such as railway construction, human resource training, and agricultural imports, indicating a desire for a balanced relationship with both the U.S. and China [3][7] Group 1 - The U.S. will not impose additional tariffs on Vietnam and is considering tax exemptions for some Vietnamese goods as part of the trade agreement [1] - Vietnam has made significant concessions, including allowing U.S. imports and managing re-export trade [1] - The agreement has implications for Vietnam's trade with China, prompting Vietnam to clarify its position to avoid misunderstandings [3][5] Group 2 - Vietnam's Prime Minister expressed gratitude to China for its support and emphasized the need for a healthier trade relationship [3] - Vietnam's request for assistance from China in various sectors indicates a strategic approach to maintain economic stability amid U.S.-Vietnam relations [7] - The interdependence between Vietnam and China highlights the importance of balancing trade relations with both countries to safeguard Vietnam's economic interests [7]

Core Points - Vietnam and the United States reached a trade agreement in July 2025, where Vietnam opened its market to U.S. goods with zero tariffs in exchange for a reduction of U.S. tariffs from 46% to 20% [1][3] - The agreement reflects Vietnam's strategic maneuvering amid U.S.-China tensions, balancing concessions to the U.S. while deepening ties with China [1][5] Unequal Terms - Vietnam committed to zero tariffs on key sectors such as automobiles and medical devices, while the U.S. imposed a 20% baseline tariff on Vietnamese goods, higher than Vietnam's previous average of 9.4% [3] - A controversial 40% punitive tariff applies to goods not meeting the "substantial transformation" requirement, targeting approximately one-third of Vietnam's exports that rely on Chinese components [3][5] Economic Dependence - In 2024, Vietnam's trade surplus with the U.S. reached $123.5 billion, accounting for 27% of its GDP, with the U.S. market absorbing 30% of Vietnam's exports [5] - Domestic political pressures and the need for economic stability ahead of significant reforms in 2025 influenced Vietnam's decision to compromise [5] Industry Restructuring - The U.S. aims to cut off China's export routes through Vietnam, with about 45% of Vietnam's exports to the U.S. consisting of electronic components and textile materials sourced from China [7] - Major brands like Nike and Adidas, which have significant production in Vietnam, saw stock declines following the announcement of the agreement, prompting some companies to diversify production to other countries [7] Southeast Asian Fragmentation - Vietnam's unilateral actions disrupted ASEAN's unified stance, leading to dissatisfaction among member countries and prompting them to adjust their strategies [8] - The competitive dynamics created by the U.S. negotiations have led to a "race to the bottom" among Southeast Asian nations [8] Regional Dynamics - China remains cautious but has not overreacted to Vietnam's agreement, emphasizing that it should not harm third-party interests while accelerating negotiations for a new version of the ASEAN Free Trade Area [10] - Vietnam's production heavily relies on Chinese imports, with 38% of its components sourced from China, complicating any potential decoupling [10]

Core Insights - Goldman Sachs released a research report addressing the recent concerns in financial markets regarding rare earths and tariffs, asserting that China's dominance in the rare earth sector is unlikely to be challenged in the short term and predicting a low probability of the 100% tariff being implemented after the APEC meeting [1] Group 1: China's Rare Earth Export Control - The recent expansion of China's rare earth export controls is a response to the U.S. broadening its "entity list/military end-user list" definition, which now includes a "50% ownership rule" that significantly increases the compliance burden on Chinese companies' trade partners [2] - The new U.S. regulations are seen as a major expansion of export control laws, particularly impacting Chinese enterprises, as evidenced by the Dutch government's takeover of a Chinese-controlled semiconductor company [2] Group 2: Impact on Other Asian Economies - The impact of China's export controls on other Asian economies is expected to be precise and not generalized, with China indicating it will issue export licenses for civilian uses of rare earths while rejecting military-related applications [3] - If China limits rare earth supplies specifically for U.S. defense equipment, the economic impact on Asian economies will be minimal, as their defense-related exports to the U.S. account for less than 0.1% of GDP [4] Group 3: China's Dominance in the Rare Earth Market - China maintains a strong dominance in the rare earth market, controlling key stages of the supply chain, including mining, refining, and manufacturing of rare earth permanent magnets [5] - The U.S. government has invested in expanding its rare earth production capabilities, but these facilities are not expected to be operational until after 2028, leaving China with significant bargaining power in the short term [5] Group 4: Potential Impact of U.S. Tariffs - An increase in tariffs by 20% is estimated to reduce China's GDP by approximately 0.7 percentage points, with the impact of tariffs being non-linear [6] - The high dependency of U.S. importers on Chinese rare earth supplies means that even with significant price increases, it would be challenging for them to quickly switch suppliers [7] Group 5: Possible Paths to De-escalation - Three potential paths for de-escalation exist, though their feasibility varies: unilateral concessions from China, U.S. concessions in exchange for a pause in Chinese controls, or both parties escalating measures to gain negotiation leverage [8] Group 6: Key Upcoming Dates - Key dates to watch include the APEC meeting from October 31 to November 1, where a meeting between U.S. and Chinese leaders may occur, and the deadline for the implementation of U.S. tariffs on November 1 [9]