编辑：W 曾经有专家预测，只要二孩政策开放，那中国新生儿就会蹭蹭的往上涨，结果被现实狠狠的打了脸，因 为这位专家根本就没有考虑到当下老百姓最需要的是什么。 中国的生育率低下，总人口眼瞅着就要被隔壁的邻居给比下去了，新一代的劳动力越来越少，很多人都 在着急，如今国家终于找到了关键点——住房。 为什么说生育率低的关键点在于住房？国家是如何调整住房的？ 失衡的家庭资产负债表 "世界人口第一大国"的头衔易主了，当这顶戴了几十年的帽子被印度摘走，比网络上短暂的唏嘘更需要 我们注意的是现实中那日渐稀薄的出生率。 曾经我们总觉得"人多"是与生俱来的底气，仿佛只要政策的大门一开，二孩、三孩就会像春笋一样冒出 来。但现实是，这并不是一场简单的"想不想生"的意愿调查，而是年轻人对生娃的恐惧无法战胜，为什 么恐惧？当然是没钱了。 被视为财富象征的房子正演变成卡住年轻人生育咽喉的最大障碍，而国家近期的密集动作，从保障性住 房的全面铺开到房地产市场逻辑的深层重构，说明了现在官方已经透了这笔"生育账"的死结：不把被房 子掏空的钱袋子补上，人口的红利就无从谈起。 把目光聚焦到那些本该是生育主力的30岁左右人群身上，你会发现，"低欲望"其实 ...

Core Viewpoint - The "14th Five-Year Plan" period is crucial for China's high-quality development, facing multiple challenges such as macroeconomic changes, demographic shifts, and employment issues, necessitating systematic responses from institutional design and resource allocation [4] Group 1: Macroeconomic Trends - Current macroeconomic patterns show a "failure of traditional rules," where short-term shocks and long-term structural factors interact, complicating the relationship between inflation and unemployment [5] - The aging population is a long-term factor that suppresses inflation, raising concerns about its impact on economic vitality [5] Group 2: Competition and Economic Efficiency - "Involution" in competition leads to a decline in potential growth rates, slowing productivity growth and reducing investment returns, resulting in a contraction of market size [6] - Over-investment in traditional sectors delays the transition to new growth drivers, causing a series of negative effects including weak CPI and declining employment quality [6] Group 3: Demographic Challenges - The dual pressures of low birth rates and rapid aging are significant challenges during the "14th Five-Year Plan" period, with the total fertility rate falling below replacement levels since 1992 [8] - The aging population increases the old-age dependency ratio, straining pension fund sustainability and creating a demand for elderly care that the current supply system struggles to meet [8] Group 4: Consumption Dynamics - The demographic structure negatively impacts consumption potential, with younger populations decreasing and older individuals having limited consumption capacity due to low labor participation and insufficient social security [9] Group 5: Employment Market Characteristics - The employment market is characterized by new forms of employment, with 310 million individuals in urban self-employment and private sectors, and 200 million in flexible employment as of 2023 [10] - Labor mobility is becoming more localized, which may hinder overall productivity growth [10] Group 6: Policy Recommendations - The focus should shift from merely expanding the economy to improving income distribution, addressing urban-rural income disparities, and enhancing social equity [13] - Investment should transition from physical assets to human capital, emphasizing education and health to foster sustainable economic growth [14]

Core Viewpoint - The cancellation of the VAT exemption on contraceptives, effective January 1, 2026, marks the end of a 30-year policy aimed at controlling population growth, reflecting a significant shift in national population policy from control to encouragement of childbirth [1][4][8]. Group 1: Historical Context - The policy of family planning emerged in the 1970s due to rapid population growth, with contraceptives included in the public health service system to ensure accessibility [3]. - In 1994, contraceptives were officially exempted from VAT, further reducing costs for the public and supporting the goal of controlling population numbers while improving population quality [3][4]. - Over the past 30 years, the exemption has been closely tied to family planning efforts, with over 500 million yuan allocated annually for the procurement and distribution of contraceptives [3]. Group 2: Policy Shift - The gradual relaxation of birth restrictions, including the introduction of the two-child and three-child policies, indicates a shift from population control to encouraging childbirth [4][5]. - The decision to cancel the VAT exemption is seen as a response to the declining birth rate, which fell to 1.07 in 2022, significantly below the replacement level of 2.1 [4][5]. Group 3: Economic Implications - The removal of the VAT exemption will require manufacturers and sellers of contraceptives to pay a 6% VAT, potentially increasing government revenue [7]. - The change in policy is expected to signal a reduction in reliance on contraceptives and promote a more supportive environment for childbirth, aligning with broader strategies such as birth subsidies and extended maternity leave [5][7]. Group 4: Societal Impact - The end of the VAT exemption reflects a fundamental change in public attitudes towards family size, moving from a focus on quantity to a more rational and diverse approach to family planning [7]. - The cancellation of the exemption symbolizes a transition in population governance, emphasizing the need for a focus on population quality, structure, and distribution in response to new demographic challenges [7][8].

Core Insights - Liang Jianzhang, founder of Ctrip and a professor at Peking University's Guanghua School of Management, warns that if China does not intervene in its population issues, India's population could be three times that of China in forty years [1][4][17] - The decline in China's population began after reaching a peak of 1.41 billion in 2022, with projections indicating a further decrease to 1.40828 billion by 2024, marking three consecutive years of negative growth [6][7] - The birth rate in China has dropped to 6.77‰, with predictions suggesting that the number of newborns could fall below 7 million by 2025, exacerbating the already low total fertility rate [7][12] Population Trends - In 2024, the number of newborns is projected to be 9.54 million, while deaths could reach 10.93 million, resulting in a net population decrease of 1.39 million [7] - The total fertility rate in China has been below 1.0, leading to significant demographic challenges, including a shrinking labor force [7][8] - By 2050, China's labor force is expected to decline from 800 million to 750 million, impacting economic foundations [8] Economic Implications - The reduction in the working-age population will lead to rising labor costs, challenging the competitiveness of traditional manufacturing sectors in China [7][12] - Liang Jianzhang emphasizes that innovation relies on a sufficient number of young people, and a decline in this demographic could hinder technological advancement [10] Aging Population - The proportion of individuals aged 60 and above in China has surpassed 21% and is projected to exceed 30% by 2035, creating immense pressure on the pension and healthcare systems [13] - The social security system may face funding shortages due to the increasing elderly population [13] Comparative Analysis - Japan serves as a cautionary example of delayed action on population issues, having faced negative growth and severe aging since the mid-1990s, despite various government interventions [15] - In contrast, India has a younger population with a fertility rate of 2.05, which is nearly double that of China, positioning it for potential economic advantages in the coming decades [17][19] Societal Factors - Economic pressures, time constraints, and changing social attitudes are significant factors contributing to the reluctance of young people in China to have children [21][23] - Women face particularly difficult choices between career and family, compounded by societal expectations and workplace discrimination [23] Proposed Solutions - Liang Jianzhang advocates for reforms that support families willing to have children, including financial assistance, improved education and healthcare systems, and changes to workplace culture [25] - A societal consensus on the importance of addressing population issues is crucial for creating a favorable environment for childbirth [25]

Core Insights - Liang Jianzhang emphasizes the urgent need for China to address its population issues, predicting that by 2063, India's population could be three times that of China's if current trends continue [1][11][12] Population Trends - In 2022, China's total population decreased by 850,000, marking the first natural decline since 1961, with a birth rate of 1.18 [2][4] - The downward trend continued in 2023, with a population reduction of 208,000, bringing the total to approximately 1.4 billion [2][4] - Projections for 2024 suggest a further decline, with the population potentially dropping below 1.4 billion by year-end [2] Labor Force and Aging Population - China's labor force is currently over 800 million, expected to decrease by 5 million by 2025 and potentially drop to 750 million by 2050 [4] - The proportion of individuals aged 60 and above is projected to reach 21.5% by 2024 and exceed 30% by 2035 [4][11] Factors Contributing to Low Birth Rates - High costs of child-rearing, including housing, education, and healthcare, are significant deterrents for young couples considering having children [4][5] - The legacy of the one-child policy has resulted in a skewed gender ratio, further complicating marriage and family formation [5] Comparison with India - As of 2023, India's population surpassed China's at 1.42 billion, with a projected growth to 1.44 billion in 2024 [7][9] - India's fertility rate, while declining, remains above China's, supported by cultural factors and less stringent population control measures [7][9] - The demographic structure in India, characterized by a high proportion of young people, provides a robust labor force [7][9] Economic Implications - The demographic shift poses risks to China's economic competitiveness, as labor shortages and rising wages may drive manufacturing and investment to countries like India and Vietnam [9][11] - The aging population and declining birth rates threaten the sustainability of social security systems and innovation capacity [11][12] Conclusion - The widening population gap between China and India presents a significant challenge for China's future economic and international standing, necessitating immediate policy interventions [1][11][12]

Core Insights - The South Korean government reports that in 2024, the population aged 70 and above will surpass the population aged 20 to 29 for the first time, highlighting significant demographic shifts due to low birth rates and an aging population [1] Population Statistics - In 2024, the population of individuals in their 20s is projected to be 6.302 million, a decrease of 193,000 from the previous year, marking the largest decline across all age groups [1] - The population aged 70 and above is expected to reach 6.543 million in 2024, which is the first instance since 1925 that this age group exceeds the population of those in their 20s [1] - The largest age group in 2024 will be individuals in their 50s, totaling 8.713 million, followed by those in their 40s at 7.809 million and those in their 60s at 7.791 million [1] Societal Trends - South Korea is facing significant demographic challenges, with societal changes and economic pressures leading many young people to delay or forgo marriage and childbirth [1] - The acceleration of aging in South Korean society is evident, with projections indicating that by the end of 2024, over 20% of the total population will be aged 65 and above, marking the transition into a "super-aged society" [1]

Core Insights - The South Korean government reports that in 2024, the population aged 70 and above will surpass the population aged 20 to 29 for the first time, highlighting significant demographic shifts [1] - The population of individuals in their 20s is projected to be 6.302 million in 2024, a decrease of 193,000 from the previous year, marking the largest decline among all age groups [1] - The population aged 70 and above is expected to reach 6.543 million in 2024, a historic milestone since the commencement of related statistics in 1925 [1] Population Structure - The largest age group in 2024 will be those in their 50s, totaling 8.713 million, followed by those in their 40s at 7.809 million and those in their 60s at 7.791 million [1] - The demographic changes are attributed to societal shifts, including changing views on marriage and childbearing, as well as economic challenges such as high housing prices [1] Aging Society - By the end of 2024, the proportion of the population aged 65 and above is expected to exceed 20%, indicating that South Korea has entered a "super-aged society" [1]

Core Insights - South Korea is experiencing a slight rebound in its birth rate after years of decline, with a 7.2% increase in newborns from January to July 2023 compared to the previous year, marking the highest growth rate since 1981 [1] - The total fertility rate reached 0.8 in July 2023, and if the current trend continues, the birth population is expected to grow for two consecutive years by the end of 2023 [1] Birth Rate Trends - South Korea's birth rate has been declining for over 60 years, with a record low of 0.72 in 2023, making it one of the lowest globally [3][4] - The number of newborns in 2023 was only 230,000, less than one-third of the peak in the 1970s, with Seoul's fertility rate at a mere 0.59 [3][4] Economic and Social Factors - High housing costs and education expenses are significant economic pressures for young South Koreans, leading many to choose to have fewer or no children [4] - The rapid transition from an agricultural to an information society has altered cultural values, with increased female education leading to delayed marriage and childbirth [5] Gender Roles and Family Dynamics - The traditional expectation for men to be the primary breadwinners contributes to a sense of helplessness among young men, leading to a phenomenon known as the "three abandonments" generation [6] - Young people are increasingly prioritizing personal quality of life over traditional family responsibilities, with many delaying marriage and childbirth for career advancement [6] Policy Responses - The South Korean government has implemented various policies to address low birth rates, including financial incentives for families, parental leave, and childcare support [9][10] - Direct economic support includes a one-time birth subsidy of 2 million KRW per newborn and monthly allowances for childcare [10][11] Challenges Ahead - Despite government efforts, the low birth rate poses a long-term social crisis, with predictions of a significant decline in the working-age population and increased pressure on the social security system [8][9] - The current fiscal deficit exceeds 86 trillion KRW, raising concerns about the sustainability of increased financial support for birth and childcare policies [14]

Core Insights - South Korea's birth rate has shown signs of improvement for the first time in nearly a decade, with a projected increase in newborns to 238,000 in 2024, marking a 3.6% year-on-year rise and a total fertility rate of 0.75 [2][10] - Despite recent positive trends, South Korea's birth rate remains the lowest globally, and long-term projections indicate a significant demographic crisis, including a potential halving of the population by 2100 [2][3][10] Population Crisis - South Korea has been grappling with ultra-low fertility rates for over 20 years, with the total fertility rate dropping below 1.3 and reaching a record low of 0.59 in Seoul [1][2] - The declining birth rate has led to school closures and a shrinking military recruitment pool, with projections indicating a 58% reduction in eligible conscripts over the next 50 years [2][3] Economic and Social Pressures - High housing costs and education expenses are significant barriers for young families, with private education expenditures consuming over 20% of household income [4] - The rapid transition from an agricultural to an information society has altered cultural values, leading to delayed marriage and childbearing among women, with the average age of first-time mothers now at 33.4 years [5][6] Policy Responses - The South Korean government has implemented a comprehensive five-year plan to address low birth rates, including direct financial support for families, parental leave policies, and housing incentives [7][8][9] - Financial support includes one-time birth grants of 2 million KRW per newborn and monthly allowances for childcare, with total public spending on child-related subsidies exceeding 280 trillion KRW over the past two decades [7][8] Challenges to Sustained Improvement - The recent uptick in birth rates is closely tied to rising marriage rates, but historical trends suggest that this may not lead to a long-term reversal of declining birth rates [10][11] - The current policies primarily focus on childbirth rather than comprehensive support for child-rearing, particularly in secondary and higher education, which may limit their effectiveness [10][11] Need for Broader Reforms - To effectively address the demographic crisis, South Korea must undertake deep social, economic, and cultural reforms, including promoting gender equality and improving workplace conditions [12] - Learning from successful international models, such as Sweden's family-friendly policies and France's public childcare systems, could provide valuable insights for South Korea [12]

Group 1 - The article highlights the contrasting demographic challenges faced by East Asia and Europe, with East Asia experiencing a "population avalanche" due to declining birth rates, while Europe manages to maintain population balance through immigration policies [1][3][5] - East Asian countries like South Korea, Japan, and China are witnessing alarming birth rates, with South Korea having the lowest global fertility rate and predictions indicating a significant population decline in the coming decades [1][5] - In contrast, Europe has successfully utilized immigration to offset declining birth rates, with 6 million immigrants entering the EU in 2023, particularly benefiting countries like Germany and Spain [3][4] Group 2 - The article discusses the cultural challenges arising from immigration in Europe, including identity politics and social unrest, as seen in incidents like the riots in Paris and the rise of far-right movements in Germany [4][5] - It points out that East Asia's homogeneous societies face significant barriers to large-scale immigration, making it difficult to replicate Europe's immigration strategies [5][6] - The underlying issue is the clash between modern individualism and traditional family structures, which affects birth rates and societal stability in both regions [5][6] Group 3 - The article suggests that the demographic shifts may indicate a cyclical pattern in human civilization, where Europe historically managed population pressures through colonialism and now through immigration, while East Asia faces the consequences of its previous population advantages [6] - It emphasizes that while policies can influence birth rates, the fundamental challenge remains in reconciling modern values with demographic sustainability [6] - The conclusion stresses the importance of learning from Europe's immigration experiences to avoid cultural conflicts and to address the impending demographic crises in East Asia [6]