低生育率
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韩国出生人口连续两年回升
Bei Jing Shang Bao· 2026-02-26 16:47
韩国国家数据处周三(2月25日)发布的统计数据显示,韩国2025年出生人口为254457人,为2022年以 来最高水平,同比上升6.8%,还是2010年以来的最大同比涨幅。 数据还显示,韩国2025年总和生育率为0.8,较2024年的0.75明显增加。该指标自2015年的1.24持续下 滑,2023年跌至历史低位0.72,2024年才止跌回升至0.75。 分析指出,这些指标的改善与韩国婚姻数量的回暖同步出现。在政府推出多项减轻育儿经济负担的激励 政策支持下,该国婚姻登记数在经历长期低迷后也开始反弹。 虽然2025年的增幅仍然有限,而且时间尚短,尚不足以断言这是一项长期趋势,但至少表明韩国政府的 部分政策开始见效。 为扭转趋势,2006年至2023年间,韩国在生育激励和家庭支持方面的支出累计约380万亿韩元(约合 2800亿美元)。2025年,政府专门用于应对低生育率的预算达到28.6万亿韩元,同比增加13%。 北京商报综合报道 据了解,韩国政府采取的措施有扩大现金补贴、加强托育服务、住房支持,以及为新生儿家庭提供优惠 按揭贷款等。 25日,韩国首尔,一个家庭推着婴儿车在市中心行走。 另一方面,新冠疫情期间被推 ...
新世代人口研究中心成立
Di Yi Cai Jing Zi Xun· 2026-02-11 18:57
Group 1 - The New Generation Population Research Center has been established in Hong Kong to address the global challenges of declining birth rates and aging populations [2] - The center aims to explore important factors influencing population and fertility issues beyond traditional demographic indicators, including ethics, psychology, sociology, culture, and religion [2][3] - The center is co-founded by researchers in fertility concepts and aims to gather scholars and experts from various fields to collaboratively investigate new pathways for promoting healthy population development [2] Group 2 - The center's research will focus on non-quantifiable factors that have been challenging to measure in policy research, integrating findings from demography, sociology, psychology, and public policy [3] - Planned initiatives include thematic research, academic forums, research reports, and public outreach to foster in-depth discussions on population issues and promote cross-regional academic collaboration [3]
聚焦非量化因素,新世代人口研究中心成立
Di Yi Cai Jing· 2026-02-11 08:00
Core Viewpoint - The establishment of the New Generation Population Research Center in Hong Kong aims to address the global challenge of declining fertility rates and aging populations through interdisciplinary research and collaboration [1][2] Group 1: Research Focus - The center will investigate non-quantifiable factors influencing fertility behavior, such as values, social expectations, cultural environments, and religious beliefs, in addition to economic factors [1] - It aims to create a comprehensive and multidimensional model for population and fertility research by integrating findings from demography, sociology, psychology, and public policy [2] Group 2: Initiatives and Activities - The center plans to conduct specialized research, academic forums, research reports, and public outreach projects to foster in-depth discussions on population issues [2] - It seeks to promote cross-regional academic cooperation and experience exchange among scholars and experts from various fields [2]
社会各阶层生育分化剖析
Xin Lang Cai Jing· 2026-01-19 13:17
Core Insights - The birth rate in China is projected to drop to 7.92 million by 2025, marking the lowest level since the 1950s and entering a phase of "extremely low fertility rate" [3][25] - The decline in birth rates is attributed to various factors, including economic pressures, social inequalities, and changing values among the younger generation [5][39] - The disparity in wealth and opportunities among different social classes significantly influences individual fertility decisions, leading to a pronounced divide in who chooses to have children [27][46] Demographic Trends - The total fertility rate (TFR) in China has fallen to approximately 1.0-1.05, well below the replacement level of 2.1, indicating a structural demographic shift [5][27] - Birth rates have decreased significantly from 17.86 million in 2016 to 7.92 million in 2025, reflecting a rapid decline in population growth [4][26] Educational Impact - Higher education levels correlate with lower birth rates, demonstrating a negative relationship where more educated individuals tend to have fewer children [6][28] - Data from the 2020 census shows that women with higher educational attainment have significantly lower average birth rates, with those holding a doctorate averaging only 0.63 children [7][29] Economic Factors - The rising costs associated with raising children, including housing, education, and healthcare, create substantial financial burdens for young families, discouraging them from having more children [17][40] - The relationship between income and fertility is complex, with low-income families potentially having higher birth rates due to traditional views, while middle-income families face the most pressure and often choose to have fewer children [10][33] Social Dynamics - Urbanization and the breakdown of traditional family structures contribute to lower birth rates, as young families often lack support systems for child-rearing [41][39] - The cultural shift towards individualism and self-fulfillment has diminished the societal pressure to marry and have children, leading to a decline in fertility rates among younger generations [41][42] Psychological Barriers - Young people experience significant anxiety regarding their ability to provide for children, leading to fears of not being able to fulfill the role of a "perfect parent" [42][39] - Concerns about sacrificing personal time and lifestyle for parenting responsibilities further deter young individuals from considering childbirth [42][39] Rural vs. Urban Disparities - Urban areas exhibit lower birth rates compared to rural regions, where traditional views on family and child-rearing still prevail [35][39] - The demographic divide is evident, with wealthier urban populations having fewer children while rural populations maintain higher birth rates [35][46] Conclusion - The interplay of economic, social, and psychological factors creates a complex landscape for fertility decisions in China, with significant implications for future population trends and social structures [46][39] - Addressing these multifaceted issues requires comprehensive policy approaches rather than simplistic incentives to encourage higher birth rates [46][39]
人口告别世界第一?二孩催生无效之后,国家终于朝着住房出手了!
Sou Hu Cai Jing· 2025-12-21 14:18
Group 1 - The core issue affecting China's low birth rate is housing affordability, which has become a significant barrier for young couples considering having children [3][8][12] - The Chinese government is recognizing the need to address housing as a critical factor in boosting birth rates, with recent policies aimed at increasing affordable housing options [8][14][19] - The financial burden of housing is leading to a "low desire" for childbirth among young adults, as they face high debts and living costs that deter them from starting families [10][11][21] Group 2 - The transformation of housing from an investment asset to a basic living necessity is essential for alleviating the financial pressures on young families [14][16] - Current housing policies are focused on providing affordable rental options and breaking the cycle of needing to purchase expensive properties to secure a home [14][17] - The need for comprehensive reforms that address not only housing costs but also the overall financial and social support systems for families is emphasized to effectively increase birth rates [19][23][28]
专访中国社会科学院学部委员蔡昉:“十五五”时期需破解人口转型与就业结构困局 投资重心应从“物”转向“人”
Zheng Quan Ri Bao Wang· 2025-12-04 13:48
Core Viewpoint - The "14th Five-Year Plan" period is crucial for China's high-quality development, facing multiple challenges such as macroeconomic changes, demographic shifts, and employment issues, necessitating systematic responses from institutional design and resource allocation [4] Group 1: Macroeconomic Trends - Current macroeconomic patterns show a "failure of traditional rules," where short-term shocks and long-term structural factors interact, complicating the relationship between inflation and unemployment [5] - The aging population is a long-term factor that suppresses inflation, raising concerns about its impact on economic vitality [5] Group 2: Competition and Economic Efficiency - "Involution" in competition leads to a decline in potential growth rates, slowing productivity growth and reducing investment returns, resulting in a contraction of market size [6] - Over-investment in traditional sectors delays the transition to new growth drivers, causing a series of negative effects including weak CPI and declining employment quality [6] Group 3: Demographic Challenges - The dual pressures of low birth rates and rapid aging are significant challenges during the "14th Five-Year Plan" period, with the total fertility rate falling below replacement levels since 1992 [8] - The aging population increases the old-age dependency ratio, straining pension fund sustainability and creating a demand for elderly care that the current supply system struggles to meet [8] Group 4: Consumption Dynamics - The demographic structure negatively impacts consumption potential, with younger populations decreasing and older individuals having limited consumption capacity due to low labor participation and insufficient social security [9] Group 5: Employment Market Characteristics - The employment market is characterized by new forms of employment, with 310 million individuals in urban self-employment and private sectors, and 200 million in flexible employment as of 2023 [10] - Labor mobility is becoming more localized, which may hinder overall productivity growth [10] Group 6: Policy Recommendations - The focus should shift from merely expanding the economy to improving income distribution, addressing urban-rural income disparities, and enhancing social equity [13] - Investment should transition from physical assets to human capital, emphasizing education and health to foster sustainable economic growth [14]
避孕药明年收税,30年免税终结,一个时代结束了
Sou Hu Cai Jing· 2025-12-03 11:44
Core Viewpoint - The cancellation of the VAT exemption on contraceptives, effective January 1, 2026, marks the end of a 30-year policy aimed at controlling population growth, reflecting a significant shift in national population policy from control to encouragement of childbirth [1][4][8]. Group 1: Historical Context - The policy of family planning emerged in the 1970s due to rapid population growth, with contraceptives included in the public health service system to ensure accessibility [3]. - In 1994, contraceptives were officially exempted from VAT, further reducing costs for the public and supporting the goal of controlling population numbers while improving population quality [3][4]. - Over the past 30 years, the exemption has been closely tied to family planning efforts, with over 500 million yuan allocated annually for the procurement and distribution of contraceptives [3]. Group 2: Policy Shift - The gradual relaxation of birth restrictions, including the introduction of the two-child and three-child policies, indicates a shift from population control to encouraging childbirth [4][5]. - The decision to cancel the VAT exemption is seen as a response to the declining birth rate, which fell to 1.07 in 2022, significantly below the replacement level of 2.1 [4][5]. Group 3: Economic Implications - The removal of the VAT exemption will require manufacturers and sellers of contraceptives to pay a 6% VAT, potentially increasing government revenue [7]. - The change in policy is expected to signal a reduction in reliance on contraceptives and promote a more supportive environment for childbirth, aligning with broader strategies such as birth subsidies and extended maternity leave [5][7]. Group 4: Societal Impact - The end of the VAT exemption reflects a fundamental change in public attitudes towards family size, moving from a focus on quantity to a more rational and diverse approach to family planning [7]. - The cancellation of the exemption symbolizes a transition in population governance, emphasizing the need for a focus on population quality, structure, and distribution in response to new demographic challenges [7][8].
人口学家梁建章警告:如果不尽早干预,40年后印度人口将是中国3倍
Sou Hu Cai Jing· 2025-11-12 07:12
Core Insights - Liang Jianzhang, founder of Ctrip and a professor at Peking University's Guanghua School of Management, warns that if China does not intervene in its population issues, India's population could be three times that of China in forty years [1][4][17] - The decline in China's population began after reaching a peak of 1.41 billion in 2022, with projections indicating a further decrease to 1.40828 billion by 2024, marking three consecutive years of negative growth [6][7] - The birth rate in China has dropped to 6.77‰, with predictions suggesting that the number of newborns could fall below 7 million by 2025, exacerbating the already low total fertility rate [7][12] Population Trends - In 2024, the number of newborns is projected to be 9.54 million, while deaths could reach 10.93 million, resulting in a net population decrease of 1.39 million [7] - The total fertility rate in China has been below 1.0, leading to significant demographic challenges, including a shrinking labor force [7][8] - By 2050, China's labor force is expected to decline from 800 million to 750 million, impacting economic foundations [8] Economic Implications - The reduction in the working-age population will lead to rising labor costs, challenging the competitiveness of traditional manufacturing sectors in China [7][12] - Liang Jianzhang emphasizes that innovation relies on a sufficient number of young people, and a decline in this demographic could hinder technological advancement [10] Aging Population - The proportion of individuals aged 60 and above in China has surpassed 21% and is projected to exceed 30% by 2035, creating immense pressure on the pension and healthcare systems [13] - The social security system may face funding shortages due to the increasing elderly population [13] Comparative Analysis - Japan serves as a cautionary example of delayed action on population issues, having faced negative growth and severe aging since the mid-1990s, despite various government interventions [15] - In contrast, India has a younger population with a fertility rate of 2.05, which is nearly double that of China, positioning it for potential economic advantages in the coming decades [17][19] Societal Factors - Economic pressures, time constraints, and changing social attitudes are significant factors contributing to the reluctance of young people in China to have children [21][23] - Women face particularly difficult choices between career and family, compounded by societal expectations and workplace discrimination [23] Proposed Solutions - Liang Jianzhang advocates for reforms that support families willing to have children, including financial assistance, improved education and healthcare systems, and changes to workplace culture [25] - A societal consensus on the importance of addressing population issues is crucial for creating a favorable environment for childbirth [25]
人口学家梁建章警告:如不尽早干预,40年后印度人口将是中国3倍
Sou Hu Cai Jing· 2025-11-03 14:12
Core Insights - Liang Jianzhang emphasizes the urgent need for China to address its population issues, predicting that by 2063, India's population could be three times that of China's if current trends continue [1][11][12] Population Trends - In 2022, China's total population decreased by 850,000, marking the first natural decline since 1961, with a birth rate of 1.18 [2][4] - The downward trend continued in 2023, with a population reduction of 208,000, bringing the total to approximately 1.4 billion [2][4] - Projections for 2024 suggest a further decline, with the population potentially dropping below 1.4 billion by year-end [2] Labor Force and Aging Population - China's labor force is currently over 800 million, expected to decrease by 5 million by 2025 and potentially drop to 750 million by 2050 [4] - The proportion of individuals aged 60 and above is projected to reach 21.5% by 2024 and exceed 30% by 2035 [4][11] Factors Contributing to Low Birth Rates - High costs of child-rearing, including housing, education, and healthcare, are significant deterrents for young couples considering having children [4][5] - The legacy of the one-child policy has resulted in a skewed gender ratio, further complicating marriage and family formation [5] Comparison with India - As of 2023, India's population surpassed China's at 1.42 billion, with a projected growth to 1.44 billion in 2024 [7][9] - India's fertility rate, while declining, remains above China's, supported by cultural factors and less stringent population control measures [7][9] - The demographic structure in India, characterized by a high proportion of young people, provides a robust labor force [7][9] Economic Implications - The demographic shift poses risks to China's economic competitiveness, as labor shortages and rising wages may drive manufacturing and investment to countries like India and Vietnam [9][11] - The aging population and declining birth rates threaten the sustainability of social security systems and innovation capacity [11][12] Conclusion - The widening population gap between China and India presents a significant challenge for China's future economic and international standing, necessitating immediate policy interventions [1][11][12]
统计:韩国70岁以上人口首超20多岁人口
Xin Hua She· 2025-10-13 02:19
Core Insights - The South Korean government reports that in 2024, the population aged 70 and above will surpass the population aged 20 to 29 for the first time, highlighting significant demographic shifts due to low birth rates and an aging population [1] Population Statistics - In 2024, the population of individuals in their 20s is projected to be 6.302 million, a decrease of 193,000 from the previous year, marking the largest decline across all age groups [1] - The population aged 70 and above is expected to reach 6.543 million in 2024, which is the first instance since 1925 that this age group exceeds the population of those in their 20s [1] - The largest age group in 2024 will be individuals in their 50s, totaling 8.713 million, followed by those in their 40s at 7.809 million and those in their 60s at 7.791 million [1] Societal Trends - South Korea is facing significant demographic challenges, with societal changes and economic pressures leading many young people to delay or forgo marriage and childbirth [1] - The acceleration of aging in South Korean society is evident, with projections indicating that by the end of 2024, over 20% of the total population will be aged 65 and above, marking the transition into a "super-aged society" [1]