Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the ongoing trade tensions between the U.S. and China regarding graphite used in lithium battery anodes, highlighting the U.S. Department of Commerce's preliminary anti-dumping duty of 93.5% on imported anode graphite from China, which could lead to a total estimated tariff of around 160% by December 5 [1][2][5]. Group 1: Trade Dynamics - The trade conflict over graphite mirrors the previous tensions over rare earth elements, characterized by a short-term "hit and talk" approach and a long-term structural confrontation [2]. - Both graphite and rare earths are strategic resources for emerging industries, with overlapping applications in sectors such as new energy, aerospace, and military [2]. - The U.S. heavily relies on imports for both graphite and rare earths, with 100% dependence on natural graphite and 90% on spherical graphite, primarily sourced from China [6]. Group 2: Tariff Implications - The anti-dumping tax applies to all anode-grade graphite materials meeting a carbon content requirement of at least 90%, covering natural, synthetic, and mixed forms [3][4]. - The U.S. producers, represented by the American Anode Materials Producers (AAAMP), argue that the current 25% tariff is insufficient to counteract the alleged dumping practices by Chinese suppliers, with claims of dumping margins as high as 920% [5][6]. Group 3: Industry Reactions - The imposition of tariffs has faced opposition from the U.S. electric vehicle industry, including companies like Tesla and Panasonic, due to potential increases in battery costs [7]. - The tariffs are seen as part of a broader strategy that intertwines trade policy with macroeconomic and geopolitical considerations, aiming to elevate the price of Chinese battery products to align more closely with U.S. or allied nations' products [7]. Group 4: Globalization Challenges - The uncertainty surrounding globalization is increasing, with implications for China's lithium battery industry and its international expansion strategies [8].

Group 1 - The core point of the news is that Trump announced a 30% tariff on all goods from Mexico and the EU starting August 1, 2025, as a pressure tactic to negotiate trade terms [1][3][5] - Trump has sent similar letters to over 20 countries, indicating that those who do not negotiate may face tariffs of 15% to 20% [3][5] - The announcement is seen as a significant escalation in trade tensions, potentially leading to a trade war if the EU retaliates with their own tariffs [5][7] Group 2 - The impact on Mexico could be severe, as the 30% tariff would disrupt established trade relationships, particularly in the automotive and agricultural sectors [5][7] - For the EU, the tariffs would affect a wide range of products, including automobiles, machinery, and luxury goods, which could lead to increased prices in the U.S. market [5][7] - Trump's approach is characterized as "extreme pressure," with clear demands for Mexico to combat drug trafficking and for the EU to open its markets [5][7]

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the escalating tensions between the U.S. and South Korea regarding military funding and troop presence, highlighting Trump's demands for increased payments and the potential implications for regional security and alliances [1][3][5][7]. Group 1: Military Funding and Demands - Trump demands South Korea to increase its annual payment for U.S. military presence to $10 billion, threatening to withdraw 4,500 troops if not met [1][3]. - In 2024, South Korea agreed to pay $1.13 billion as "protection fees," but Trump rejected this agreement, insisting on higher payments [3]. - Additional tariffs of 25% on South Korean imports are set to take effect, impacting key sectors like semiconductors and automobiles unless market access is granted [3][5]. Group 2: Strategic Military Movements - The potential withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea may lead to their relocation to Guam, as part of a broader strategy to counter China in the Taiwan Strait [3][5]. - Concerns arise over Guam's military readiness, with simulations indicating a survival rate of less than 40% in the event of conflict [3]. Group 3: Regional Alliances and Reactions - The U.S. actions have strained its long-standing alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, with South Korean lawmakers discussing nuclear armament and public protests against U.S. military presence [5][7]. - Japan and the Philippines are reportedly accelerating their military capabilities, indicating a shift towards self-reliance in defense [5]. - North Korea may exploit the situation to advance its nuclear ambitions, raising fears of an arms race in the region [5][7]. Group 4: Implications for U.S. Hegemony - The article suggests that Trump's tactics reflect a desperate attempt to maintain U.S. dominance, which may ultimately backfire and weaken alliances [7]. - South Korea faces a dilemma of either continuing to pay high "protection fees" or risking U.S. military withdrawal, highlighting the precarious nature of U.S. influence in the region [7].

特朗普发起了新一轮贸易战，全球再度陷入关税的冲击波。 在特朗普发信函给日韩及南非等14国威胁征税之后，当地时间7月8日，特朗普再度威胁称，将对美国进口的药品和铜征收高额关税。这意味着特朗普政府贸 易保护政策或进一步升级。 特朗普插手医药和铜，关税再度升级 特朗普表示，希望通过关税举措，促进医药制药商将制造业务带回美国。特朗普还补充称："如果他们必须将药品和其他相关产品进口到国内，关税将高达 200%。" 很多制药公司一直对关税持反对意见，有分析指出，相关关税可能会推高成本，阻碍在美国的投资，扰乱药品供应链，使患者面临风险。美国药品行业最大 的游说团体美国药品研究与制造商协会（PhRMA）也认为，药品历来被免除关税，因为它们会增加成本并导致短缺。 至于铜方面，特朗普表示，考虑对进口到美国的铜征收50%的附加税。"懂王"的言论对资本市场造成了巨大的冲击。在特朗普发表上述言论后，美国铜价大 幅飙升，纽约商品交易所的铜期合约暴涨。此外，昨夜美国矿业巨头Freeport-McMoRan（FCX.US）的股价盘中一度大涨逾8%，截至收盘涨幅收窄至 2.53%。 值得注意的是，铜乃工业金属之首，从消费电子、汽车、房地产和A ...

二、 本通知自2025年7月6日起施行。 施行之日前，涉上述措施的采购项目已经发布中标、成 交结果公告的，可以继续签订政府采购合同，不执行本通知规定的措施。 根据有关法律法规，经批准，财政部决定在政府采购活动中对部分自欧盟进口的医疗器械采取 相关措施。 现将有关事项通知如下： 一、采购人采购预算金额4500万元人民币以上的医疗器械（具体品目清单见附件）时，确需 采购进口产品的，在履行法定程序后，应当排除欧盟企业（不包括在华欧资企业）参与。对于 参与的非欧盟企业，其提供的自欧盟进口的医疗器械占比不得超过项目合同总金额的50%。上 述措施不适用于仅自欧盟进口的医疗器械能够满足采购需求的采购项目。 附件：具体品目清单 附件: 7月6日，商务部新闻发言人就在政府采购活动中对自欧盟进口的医疗器械采取相关措施答记者 问。 问：我们注意到，欧委会近期出台措施，限制中国企业和产品参与其医疗器械公共采购。中方 于7月6日发布通知，决定在政府采购活动中对部分自欧盟进口的医疗器械采取相关措施。请问 具体品目清单 | 政府采购 | 政府采购品目名称 | | --- | --- | | 品目编码 | | | A02103000 | 心 ...

印度方面表示，美国的保护措施影响了其价值28.9亿美元的出口。 ...

1. Report Industry Investment Rating - The investment rating for lead is bullish [1] 2. Core Views of the Report - After expected adjustments, the supply - demand contradiction this year is relatively reduced, and the import volume may decline, but the market remains in a tight - balance state. The price center of Shanghai lead futures may rise in the second half of the year, with the reference operating range of 16,100 - 18,500 yuan/ton. Based on the expectation of strong supply and demand, it is recommended to focus on unilateral long - position opportunities for Shanghai lead futures. The monthly spread structure may change from C to B, and it is advisable to pay attention to positive spread arbitrage opportunities. There is also an expectation of intermittent opening of the import window, and an interval - trading approach is recommended [4][123] 3. Summary According to the Catalog 3.1 Market Review - In H1 2025, the price centers of Shanghai and London lead futures were significantly lower than the same period in 2024. In Q1, Shanghai lead showed an inverted V - shaped trend due to supply - demand mismatch around the Spring Festival. In Q2, it dropped sharply due to the US tariff increase, then rebounded as the US dollar weakened and overseas structural risks emerged, along with the anticipation of peak - season demand stocking [15] 3.2 Macroeconomic Aspects - Overseas, the Fed's interest - rate cut path is the core variable, affected by trade protection and geopolitical conflicts. A potential rate cut in Q3 may briefly boost London lead, but the rebound is limited by demand. Trade protection may suppress China's lead export demand. Geopolitical risks may increase external - market volatility. Domestically, policy - driven consumption is crucial for lead demand. Although previous consumption - promotion policies had limited effects, future demand may rely more on policy support. Macroeconomic impacts are reflected in the internal - external price ratio [18][19] 3.3 Primary End 3.3.1 Lead Concentrate - Overseas, Q1 2025 lead - concentrate production was lower than expected, with a year - on - year decline of 1.4 million tons and a quarter - on - quarter decline of 3 million tons. The decline was due to factors like lower ore grades, weather disturbances, and mining difficulties. Although there are expectations of increased production from some mines this year, the overall increment is limited, and there are still risks of disturbances in H2. Domestically, lead - concentrate production increased in H1 2025, and imports were high. The annual production is expected to increase by 5 million tons, and the import growth rate is expected to be around 9%. However, the processing fee (TC) may decline in H2 due to tight overseas supply and trade - flow risks [23][33][34] 3.3.2 Primary Lead - Overseas, from January to April 2025, primary - lead production showed a recovery trend, mainly due to the low base in H1 2024. This year, new primary - smelting capacity is limited, and lead concentrate will mainly be consumed through imports. Domestically, from January to June, primary - lead production increased by 9.7% year - on - year. In H2, attention should be paid to the commissioning of new capacities. The annual production growth rate is expected to be around 2% [50][54][55] 3.4 Secondary End - In 2025, the over - capacity of waste - battery processing has intensified, and new capacities are squeezing traditional ones. Recycling merchants have increased their hoarding and advanced the hoarding time. From January to June, secondary - lead production decreased by 4.4% year - on - year. In H2, although there is an expectation of improved replacement demand, waste batteries will remain in short supply, and secondary - smelter profits will be under pressure. Attention should be paid to the possibility of capacity reduction [62][63][68] 3.5 Demand End 3.5.1 Lead Batteries - In H1, battery - enterprise operations were below expectations. In H2, there may be a phased improvement in consumption. In terms of exports, although there was an improvement in H1, the overall annual export demand is expected to decline by 1% [75][100][104] 3.5.2 Domestic Terminal Demand - For electric two - wheelers, production increased in H1, mainly due to consumption - promotion policies. The new national standard and trade - in policies may stimulate demand, but lithium - battery substitution is a long - term risk. For automobiles, production increased in H1, but export may face pressure in H2, and lithium - battery substitution will also affect lead - battery demand. In the communication - base - station and energy - storage sectors, base - station equipment production decreased, while energy - storage demand was strong, and the lead - consumption growth rate is expected to reach 8% [82][87][92] 3.5.3 Overseas Demand - In 2025, overseas lead demand generally recovered, with an increase in Southeast Asia and a decline in India. China's lead - battery exports decreased in H1, and the annual export volume is expected to be under pressure due to factors such as weak overseas demand, high domestic costs, trade protection, and battery - factory expansion overseas [94][100][104] 3.6 Inventory End - In H1, LME lead inventory was high, indicating weak overseas consumption. Domestically, social inventory was at a relatively low level at the end of June. In H2, social inventory may fluctuate widely, and potential delivery risks should be noted due to tight ore supply. There is also a possibility of the import window opening intermittently, and attention should be paid to interval - trading opportunities based on the internal - external price ratio [108][112][121] 3.7 Investment Recommendations - The supply - demand contradiction is expected to be reduced this year, but the market remains in a tight - balance state. The price center of Shanghai lead futures may rise in H2, with a reference range of 16,100 - 18,500 yuan/ton. Unilateral long - position opportunities for Shanghai lead futures are recommended, as well as positive spread arbitrage opportunities for monthly spreads and interval trading based on the internal - external price ratio [4][122][123]

Group 1: Key Events - On June 16, the White House announced a trade agreement between the U.S. and the UK, which includes a quota of 100,000 vehicles per year for U.S. imports from the UK, with a 10% tariff rate [1] - On June 17, the Bank of Japan decided to maintain its policy interest rate at around 0.5% and slow down the pace of bond purchase reductions, currently reducing by approximately 400 billion yen per quarter [2] - On June 18, the Federal Reserve maintained the federal funds rate target range at 4.25% to 4.50%, marking the fourth consecutive meeting without a rate change, while lowering economic growth forecasts for the U.S. [1][2] Group 2: Economic Data - Japan's exports fell for the first time in eight months in May, with exports to the U.S. down 11.1% year-on-year to 1.51 trillion yen, driven by declines in automotive and automotive parts exports [5] - The ZEW Economic Sentiment Index for the Eurozone rose significantly to 35.3 in June, up from 11.6, with Germany's index increasing to 47.5 from 25.2 [5] - U.S. retail sales fell by 0.9% month-on-month in May, the largest decline since March 2023, primarily due to decreased automobile purchases [5] Group 3: Monetary Policy - The Bank of England decided to keep its key interest rate unchanged at 4.25%, citing weak GDP growth and a soft labor market [2] - The yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds decreased by 0.9 basis points, while the yield on 10-year Japanese bonds fell by 1.6 basis points [10] Group 4: Commodity Prices - Brent crude oil prices fell by 3.76% to $75.78 per barrel, while WTI crude oil prices increased slightly by 0.28% to $74.04 per barrel [12] - The CRB Commodity Index decreased by 0.59%, while the Baltic Dry Index dropped by 3.54% [12]

Report Industry Investment Rating There is no information provided regarding the report industry investment rating in the given content. Core Viewpoints - The U.S. is expected to continue the "import rush" from Southeast Asia until mid-June, accelerate the "import rush" from China in June and weaken it in July, and the mild restocking in the U.S. may end in August. The second quarter may see the peak of China's year-on-year export growth rate for the year, followed by a quarterly decline. Under a neutral assumption, China's annual export year-on-year growth rate may be approximately 1.5%. [2][3] - The outcome of China-U.S. tariff negotiations has influenced the pace of the U.S. "import rush" from China. The progress of tariff negotiations between the U.S. and economies with close trade ties to China has a significant impact on China's exports. [17][42] - The export pressure will intensify in the second half of the year, and domestic stable growth policies may be stepped up in the fourth quarter. [64] - "Import rush" will support the short - term U.S. economy, and the market trading contradiction has shifted from tariffs to U.S. fiscal and credit issues. It is recommended to strategically allocate gold and non - dollar assets. [66] Summary by Directory 1. Overview - In April, high reciprocal tariffs between China and the U.S. led shipping companies to reallocate capacity to other routes, causing a slow recovery of U.S. route capacity. The U.S. "import rush" from China is expected to intensify in June and weaken in July. [7][14] - The "import rush" is first reflected in freight rates, and the shipment lags behind freight rates. Since June 3, the daily shipment volume from China to the U.S. has been above 49 ships. [8][9] - The U.S. "import rush" from Southeast Asia may lead China's "re - export rush" to last until mid - June at most. [10][15] - The U.S. weak restocking may end in August. [11][15] - The future trend of China's exports depends on tariff changes in the global trade environment. The main export destinations in 2024 were ASEAN, the U.S., the EU, etc. [12][16] - The progress of U.S. - Southeast Asia negotiations may impact China's re - export of labor - intensive products, and the inertia of EU economic policy decisions may affect Sino - EU trade. [13][16] 2. Imports Rush of the U.S. - The outcome of China - U.S. tariff negotiations affects the U.S. "import rush" from China. During the tariff tension period (April 9 - May 9), the number of fully - loaded vessels decreased. During the tariff easing period (from May 12), it boosted the "import rush". [17][20] - In April, high reciprocal tariffs led to a slow recovery of U.S. route capacity, and in late May, the actual shipping data continued to decline. [25][26] - The U.S. "import rush" from China is expected to end by mid - June, and after mid - June, the incremental volume of China's "re - export rush" through Southeast Asia will be limited. [31][34] - The U.S. may reach the turning point of inventory growth rate in August. [37][38] 3. Tariff Negotiations - China's current export demand may be from backlogged orders, and the future export trend depends on tariff changes. The suspension of Trump's reciprocal tariffs for some economies will expire on July 8. [42][43] - The U.S. has only signed agreements with China and the UK, and the EU - U.S. negotiation progresses slowly. The U.S. increasing steel and aluminum tariffs will pressure the negotiation. [47] - Sino - European relations seem to improve, but the EU's potential restrictions on China and the inertia of its economic policy may affect trade. [48][49] - Japan, Indonesia, India and the U.S. have relatively good negotiation progress, but India's stance has hardened recently. [52][54] - Attention should be paid to the U.S. - Southeast Asia negotiation progress and its impact on China's entrepot trade. [53][55] 4. Different Scenarios - China's exports from May to July will maintain resilience, but the U.S. has increased non - tariff barriers against China, and the Sino - U.S. trade trend is uncertain. [56][62] - Three scenarios are assumed: in the optimistic scenario, China's 2025 export growth rate may be around 3%; in the neutral scenario, it may be around 1.5%; in the pessimistic scenario, it may be around - 2%. [58][63] - The export pressure will intensify in the second half of the year, and domestic stable growth policies may be stepped up in the fourth quarter. [64][65] 5. Asset Outlook - "Import rush" will support the short - term U.S. economy, and the market trading contradiction has shifted. It is recommended to strategically allocate gold and non - dollar assets. The bond market has value for dip - buying after the funding pressure subsides, and the stock market and commodities are expected to fluctuate in the short term. [66][67]

美国白宫：美国计划对英国汽车进口设定年度配额为10万辆，关税税率为10%。 ...