铁矿石长期按美元计价，寡头供给叠加周期波动，买方常年处弱势。中国钢铁在高产状态下利润被压至 极低，2024年行业利润率不足1%的数据虽刺眼，却揭示了定价权的实质影响：上游在成本二十多美元/ 吨时能卖到百美元以上，价差并未转化为下游效率提升，而是沉淀为矿山超额收益。 话语权改变往往需要结构变量。集中采购把"多头买家"变成"一个声音"，中矿集团代表的份额接近 40%，谈判筹码集中化，报价体系自然更接近真实供需。资本纽带则把现金流绑定到人民币：贷款以矿 偿、股权持有、远期合约配合，货币与商品的耦合度提升，结算习惯就能迁移。备用产能是压舱石，几 内亚西芒杜的高品位储量与规划产能，等同于在桌边摆上一把"可执行的第二选项"。 九天之内，澳洲矿业巨头从强硬要价到接受人民币结算，铁矿石这个全球最"硬"的大宗品，突然改了规 矩。并非偶然的胜利，而是二十多年产业链整合、资本布局与备用产能逐步到位后的临门一脚。2025年 的节点意义远超一笔交易：定价权与结算权正在从美元单轨走向多元货币竞合，真正牵动的是钢铁、基 建、制造业的成本曲线与通胀预期。 价格谁说了算，决定产业利润往哪儿流 产业端的连锁反应更直观。钢厂原料端的定价锚更稳定， ...

不久前，澳大利亚铁矿石巨头必和必拓低头认输，宣布从今年第四季度起，对华铁矿石现货交易的30%将以人民币结算。这一看似简单的结算方式变化背 后，是中国首次在全球大宗商品定价权上取得的重大突破，更是一记砸向美元霸权的重锤。 回顾过去二十多年，中国钢铁行业在铁矿石谈判桌上吃尽了苦头。全球铁矿石市场被澳大利亚必和必拓、力拓和巴西淡水河谷三大巨头牢牢掌控，形成了坚 固的卖方垄断联盟。2008年，三大矿商随便抛出一个"矿场检修"的理由，就能让铁矿石价格翻两倍多；即便后来中国钢企试图集体谈判，对方也根本不屑一 顾。原因很简单——中国80%以上的进口铁矿石都依赖这三巨头，根本没有讨价还价的筹码。 那段时期的数据令人心酸：国外矿商的利润率常年超过100%，巅峰时甚至达到150%，而中国钢企的利润率最低时仅有0.71%。在如此悬殊的利润分配下， 国内多少小钢厂凄惨倒闭，幸存下来的也只能在盈亏线上苦苦挣扎。 被动挨打的局面必须改变，但破局需要智慧和耐心。中国采取的第一步，也是最重要的一步，就是终结国内钢企"各自为战"的局面。曾经，国内钢厂为了抢 夺有限的铁矿石货源，不惜互相抬价，结果让外国矿商坐收渔利，笑得合不拢嘴。直到国家出手整 ...

此前必和必拓在谈判中态度强硬，不仅拒绝人民币结算，还要求在当前市价基础上加价，然而，中国凭借多重反制筹码迅速破局。 其一是促进供应的多元化，几内亚芒杜铁矿于2025年投产，年产量1.2亿吨，品质可替代澳洲矿。其二是金融工具支撑，中国推出以人民币计价的"北铁指 数"，依托大商所铁矿石期货基差贸易模式，进一步削弱了普氏指数影响力。所以在供需格局逆转的背景下，必和必拓最终于10月初同意以人民币结算，避 免了长期订单流失，看得出来，中方又胜一局。 就在中方宣布，暂停采购澳大利亚必和必拓铁矿石后，不到一周时间，中方的"卡脖子"策略，就取得了明显效果。最近，澳方矿产巨头点头同意，用人民币 进行结算，此举不仅让人民币国际化进程迈出了关键一步，另一方面，也标志着在铁矿石贸易中，中国长期缺乏定价权的局面，将得到扭转。 按理来说，中国作为最大买家，一直以来都没有议价权，这很奇怪，不过中方只用了一招，就拿到铁矿石定价权。就在一周前，中方出手了，中国矿产资源 集团宣布暂停采购以美元计价的必和必拓铁矿石，包括已到港未清关的货物。 而中国拿到铁矿石议价权，根源在于打破了国内钢企"各自为战"的局面。2022年成立的中国矿产资源集团，整合了 ...

中国矿产资源集团，也就是那个传说中的CMRG，直接给国内的钢厂下了通知：暂停购买澳大利亚必和必拓（BHP）所有用美元结算的海运铁矿石。 这消息一出，国外媒体都炸了锅。英国一家叫潘穆尔利伯伦姆的投行，他们有个分析师叫汤姆普赖斯，说了一句特别到位的话："这事要是放在十年前，中 国是绝对不可能这么干的。" 嘿，你还别说，这位英国哥们儿算是看到点子上了。十年前的我们，哪有这个底气？那时候，国内的钢厂那叫一个散，上百家企业各买各的，就像一群去菜 市场买菜的大妈，人家卖菜的说多少钱就多少钱，你连个讲价的余地都没有。必和必拓、力拓这些国际巨头，手握全球七成以上的矿，眼睛就盯着我们这个 最大的买家，价格想怎么涨就怎么涨。 我记得很清楚，有几年那铁矿石价格跟坐了火箭似的，一天一个价。咱们的钢厂辛辛苦苦炼一吨钢，利润薄得像刀片一样，结果大部分钱都让上游的矿老板 给赚走了。根据中钢协的数据，就今年（2025年）上半年，我们整个钢铁行业利润加起来还不到500亿人民币，你再看看必和必拓，同期净利润高达102亿美 元！ 这对比，简直是触目惊心。说白了，咱们这么大的钢铁产业，几乎成了给他们打工的。 那个时候，我们能怎么办？没办法。经济要发 ...

Core Viewpoint - China has successfully gained pricing power over iron ore, marking a significant shift in the global iron ore market dynamics [1][3][18] Group 1: Background and Context - The struggle for iron ore pricing power between China and Australia has been ongoing for four years, with China being the largest iron ore importer globally [3][5] - Historically, Australia has dominated iron ore pricing, leading to perceived unfairness in international trade, especially given the significant dollar-denominated transactions [3][5] Group 2: Recent Developments - In August 2023, a major disagreement arose between Chinese and Australian companies regarding the pricing and currency for iron ore transactions, with China demanding RMB settlement and a price benchmark of $80 per ton [5][12] - Following the breakdown of negotiations, China announced a suspension of all iron ore imports from Australia's BHP, marking a significant escalation in the trade conflict [6][9] Group 3: China's Strategic Position - China's current high inventory levels and reduced domestic demand for iron ore provide it with leverage, allowing it to pause imports without immediate concern [9][11] - Other suppliers, such as Brazil's Vale and Australia's Fortescue Metals Group, are willing to accept RMB for transactions, further strengthening China's position [11][12] Group 4: Outcome and Implications - BHP has since agreed to settle iron ore trades in RMB starting from the fourth quarter, indicating a significant concession [12][14] - This shift means that approximately 70% of global iron ore trade will now be conducted in RMB, effectively granting China greater control over pricing [14][18] - The establishment of the China Mineral Resources Group has facilitated a unified procurement strategy, allowing China to negotiate from a position of strength [15][17] Group 5: Future Outlook - The successful negotiation is seen as a precursor to China potentially reclaiming pricing power over other commodities, challenging the dominance of the U.S. in global commodity pricing [18][20]

国庆假期，别人忙着过节，我们却在国际大宗商品市场上，扔下了一颗重磅炸弹。 消息很简单，也很直接：中国，暂停进口澳大利亚矿业巨头必和必拓，用美元计价的铁矿石。 澳大利亚总理阿尔巴尼斯火速表态，说这事儿"令人失望"。整个澳洲财经圈都炸了锅，全世界的媒体都把目光死死盯住两个字：美元。 一次看似突然的贸易风波，怎么就让一个躺在矿车上的国家，吓得坐不住了？这背后，又是一盘下了多久的棋？ 这碗饭，吃了二十年窝囊气 想搞明白我们为啥要掀桌子，你得先知道过去二十年，我们在这张饭桌上，到底受了多少气。 全球铁矿石市场，一直有个特别魔幻的现象。 中国是全世界最大的买家，全球七成的出口铁矿石，都运到了我们的港口。 按理说，买家就是上帝。我们这种级别的，应该是"上帝中的上帝"。 我们下游的钢厂呢？去年重点钢企的平均利润率，你猜多少？可怜的0.71%！ 可现实呢？别说上帝了，我们简直就是案板上的鱼肉，任人宰割。 宰我们的那把刀，叫"普氏指数"。 这名字听着挺唬人，其实玩法简单粗暴。 普氏的分析师，每天给几十个矿老板、钢厂打打电话，问问价，然后找个最高的买家报价和最低的卖家报价，套进一个模型里，价格就出来了。 全球三大矿山——巴西淡水河 ...

中国终于主动"掀桌子"了。 10月1日，就在中国人开开心心地度假旅游的时候，国际大宗商品市场爆出了一个大消息， 中国停止购买澳大利亚必和必拓以美元计价的铁矿石，甚至连已经装船的也暂缓接货，只保留人民币结 算的交易通道。 中国为何突然对澳矿"亮红牌"？ 因为，中国要拿回属于买家的真正定价权。 按理说，作为全球最大的买家，我们应该拥有绝对的话语权。但很遗憾，在过去的二十多年里，我们却 长期扮演着"冤大头"的角色。 由于普氏指数作为主流定价机制，其形成依赖于矿商和钢厂的报价，而非行业正常供需和平衡利润率。 这种定价机制导致上下游利润分配严重失衡。澳大利亚矿业公司开采成本仅18-24美元/湿吨的铁矿石， 卖到价格高达100美元以上，利润率超过150%。 相比之下，2024年中国重点钢铁企业平均销售利润率仅为0.71%。澳大利亚每年出口约10亿吨铁矿石， 利润达200亿美元，而中国生产约10亿吨钢铁，利润仅30多亿美元。 面对如此困局，痛定思痛之后，国家层面开始布局，用的全是堂堂正正的"阳谋"，分2步走实现破局。 第一步，整合内部，一致对外。 从二十一世纪初开始，我国就持续推进钢铁行业的兼并重组，例如将武钢、宝钢合并成 ...

Core Viewpoint - Recent actions by China regarding strategic mineral resource management have garnered significant attention, indicating a potential shift in its pricing strategy in the global commodities market [1][7]. Group 1: China's Actions in Mineral Resource Management - On September 30, 2023, it was reported that China Mineral Resources Group requested domestic buyers to suspend purchases of BHP's iron ore cargo priced in USD, causing a stir in international raw material markets [2][4]. - On October 9, 2023, China's Ministry of Commerce announced export controls on rare earth-related technologies and items, further emphasizing its strategic approach to resource management [5]. Group 2: China's Position in the Global Market - China is the largest consumer of iron ore globally, importing 1.237 billion tons in the previous year, which is nearly five times the amount imported two decades ago, accounting for approximately 75% of global seaborne iron ore imports [8][9]. - Despite being a major buyer, China has historically lacked pricing power, often forced to accept prices set by suppliers, particularly Australian mining giants [9][11]. Group 3: Historical Context of Pricing Power - From 2003 onwards, China has been the largest buyer of Australian iron ore but has been subjected to unfavorable pricing mechanisms, such as the "first-mover-follow" pricing strategy employed by major mining companies [11][12]. - Significant price increases have been imposed on China, with instances of price hikes reaching as high as 96.5% in 2008, reflecting the lack of negotiation power [13][16]. Group 4: Industry Consolidation Efforts - The fragmentation of Chinese enterprises in the commodities market has contributed to its weak pricing power, prompting the establishment of the China Mineral Resources Group in 2022 to consolidate procurement efforts [21][24]. - The group has initiated centralized procurement for iron ore, representing a significant shift from the previously fragmented purchasing approach of over 600 steel companies [25][26]. Group 5: Future Outlook and Global Infrastructure - China's pursuit of global pricing power in commodities is not aimed at economic hegemony but rather to secure fair benefits for its economic development, especially in light of a new global infrastructure cycle [34][40]. - The anticipated infrastructure investments in the Middle East and emerging economies present opportunities for China to leverage its position in the iron ore and rare earth markets, which are critical for construction and new energy projects [35][39].

Core Viewpoint - The global iron ore trade is experiencing significant shifts as Chinese buyers suspend the acceptance of BHP's dollar-denominated iron ore, while Rio Tinto readily accepts transactions in RMB, indicating a strategic pivot in the market dynamics [1][3]. Group 1: Company Responses - Chinese buyers have set the condition for resuming purchases to be the acceptance of a "floating price + RMB settlement" model, leading to disappointment from Australian Prime Minister [3]. - Rio Tinto has agreed to the new RMB settlement terms, while BHP remains the only Australian miner insisting on dollar-denominated transactions [3][10]. - BHP's shareholder structure, dominated by American capital, influences its strategy to maintain the dollar system, creating a financial "dollar umbilical cord" that complicates a shift to RMB [10][12]. Group 2: Market Dynamics - China's deep integration with Rio Tinto is evident, as the company derives 57.4% of its total revenue from the Chinese market, making its decisions heavily reliant on Chinese market sentiments [6][8]. - In 2023, Rio Tinto's procurement from China reached a record $4.2 billion, highlighting the strong business ties that dictate its strategic choices [8]. - The emergence of the China Mineral Resources Group in 2022 has consolidated China's previously fragmented purchasing power, allowing for a more unified approach in negotiations [15][17]. Group 3: Future Supply and Pricing Power - The anticipated production from Guinea's Simandou iron ore, with reserves exceeding 5 billion tons, is expected to significantly impact market supply by the end of the year [19]. - Brazil's Vale has raised its annual production targets, contributing to a shift from a seller's market to one characterized by oversupply, with an expected global production increase of over 66 million tons this year [20]. - China's ultimate goal is to establish a pricing system based on RMB for iron ore, aiming for a comprehensive integration of spot, futures, and index pricing [22][26]. Group 4: Broader Implications - The shift towards RMB settlement is part of a broader strategy to reclaim pricing power in the commodities market and reduce reliance on the dollar, which has historically subjected Chinese steel companies to external monetary policies [22][24]. - The growing trend of local currency settlements is not isolated, as seen in various global markets, indicating a significant shift in the landscape of international trade [28]. - The Australian economy, heavily reliant on iron ore exports to China, faces a critical decision: to adapt to the new RMB settlement norms or risk losing market share to competitors like Brazil and emerging African sources [30][32].

Core Viewpoint - The global commodity market is experiencing unprecedented turbulence due to China's sudden shift in iron ore procurement strategies, signaling a significant transformation in the resource game and altering the balance of power in global trade [1][14]. Group 1: Historical Context - For two decades, the pricing power in iron ore trade has been dominated by three major mining groups, leaving China, the largest importer, in a passive position during negotiations [3][5]. - China's massive procurement volume has not translated into pricing power, leading to compressed profits for steel mills and increased cost pressures due to currency fluctuations [3][5]. Group 2: Changes in Pricing Mechanism - The shift from long-term contracts to index-based pricing has introduced volatility and speculation in iron ore prices, complicating China's ability to unify its purchasing strategy [5][11]. - The establishment of the China Mineral Resources Group in 2022 marks a pivotal change, allowing Chinese steel companies to consolidate their purchasing power and begin to challenge the pricing dominance of sellers [5][11]. Group 3: Strategic Developments - The upcoming production of the Simandou iron ore mine in Guinea is a crucial part of China's overseas resource strategy, providing a stable supply of high-grade iron ore [7][11]. - The push for transactions in RMB instead of USD represents a direct challenge to the existing global commodity settlement system, enhancing China's financial sovereignty and elevating the RMB's status in international markets [7][14]. Group 4: Market Reactions - The suspension of purchases from BHP by the China Mineral Resources Group has led to a freeze in new contracts among domestic steel mills and traders, causing significant disruptions in the global market [9][11]. - Australia's economy, heavily reliant on iron ore exports, faces severe challenges as it struggles to pivot to alternative markets amid declining demand [9][16]. Group 5: Broader Implications - The shift in China's procurement strategy is not merely a commercial negotiation but a fundamental reshaping of the global resource landscape, challenging the long-standing seller-dominated market [14][18]. - The emergence of buyer alliances is expected to drive changes in pricing power across various sectors, indicating a critical moment for rewriting international trade and financial rules [16][18].