过去几十年，中国经济腾飞的秘密是什么？ 关于这个问题的答案，众说纷纭。比较主流的观点之一是：中国经济的发展故事就是一部" 储蓄的奇迹 "。从上世纪八十年代一个普通的发展中国家，到如 今成为世界制造业和出口大国，中国靠的是一种"高储蓄—高投资"的发展模式【1】。道理不复杂：老百姓少消费、多存钱，政府和企业就能拿到足够的资 金搞投资。修路、建桥、盖厂房，GDP自然飞速增长。 这个模式在头二十年确实管用。从九十年代到2000年代，中国GDP年均增速超过10%，而居民收入也以每年6-7%的速度上涨。虽然收入增速比不上 GDP，但在老百姓眼里，口袋确实鼓了不少【1】。就像一个家庭，父母拼命加班挣钱，把大部分钱拿去买房子、装修，孩子的零花钱增加虽然是小头，但 还是比过去多很多，所以短期内也能接受。 问题是，这种模式一旦走到尽头，副作用就会慢慢显现。 储蓄率过高，意味着消费不足，结果是产能必须靠出口来消化 。2007年前后，中国的经常账户 顺差一度达到GDP的10%【1】。这在经济史上非常少见。换句话说，中国生产得比消费得多得多，于是把多余的产能卖到海外。美国和欧洲的消费者成 了"平衡器"，买下了中国的货，也承担了由此带来 ...

在资本市场上，投资者的心态往往复杂又矛盾。2025年的一个鲜明例子是：全球资金继续涌入美股，但同时又拼命对冲美元风险。换句话说，大家愿意买 苹果、微软和英伟达，却不愿意顺带持有美元。 这种"爱股厌币"的现象，背后折射的不是投资逻辑的错乱，而是对美国财政和货币政策的不信任 。 让我们先看数据。今年美元指数下跌超过10%。对于全球储备货币来说，这已经是一次显著的贬值。而与此同时，美股依然是全世界最受欢迎的资产之 一。 图1：美元指数DXY 回顾历史，美元长期以来都是全球的避风港。即使2008年金融危机最严重的时候，全球投资者还是涌向美元。但今天的情况已经变了。美股依然强劲，却 需要靠对冲来维持；美债依然庞大，却需要靠怀疑来支撑。市场的这种错位，本身就是最大的风险。短期内，投资者或许还能"两头占便宜"。但从长期 看，"买股避币"的组合更像是在拆东墙补西墙。美元信誉的动摇，不是市场的小噪音，而是全球资本流动正在发生的深层变化。 注：上图显示，从2025年年初算起，美元指数下跌超过10%。 根据德意志银行的统计， 今年进入美国股市的海外资金中，超过八成都做了汇率对冲 【1】。这种剧烈的转变，几乎可以称得上范式改变。过去 ...

在金融市场里，有些数字是拿来让人看的，有些数字则是拿来糊弄人的。最近，《华尔街日报》曝光了一桩案例，堪称把"数字迷宫"玩到了极致 【1】 。 注：在其最新的年度报告中，Partners Group 私募股权（主基金）把其私募股权投资的成本数据列在了一个长达三页的脚注里。这里展示的是该脚注的第二页。来源：美国证监会SEC。 在过去，私募股权基金（PE）一直是高净值客户和大型机构的专属领域，普通投资者很难接触。但近几年情况正在发生变化。美国政府已经放宽了规则， 允许退休账户（401k）配置私募基金，基金公司也乐于把这类高费用、长周期的产品卖给更多人。 换句话说，PE 正在加速"零售化"。这本来是金融民主化的一部分，听上去挺好。但问题在于，如果产品披露和透明度没跟上，所谓的"民主化"很可能只 是"风险下沉"，最终埋单的还是普通老百姓。 事实上，PE行业里类似的"财技"并不少见。比如有的基金会在二级市场以折价买入别人的基金份额，然后立刻按官方净值重估，当天就能报出几百个百分 点的纸面盈利。Ares私募市场基金就曾在一天之内凭借这种操作，将账面收益提高了12% 【1】。 但至少它还把成本和公允价值放在清晰的表格里，投资 ...

上个月，我那90多岁的爷爷不小心摔了一跤，摔到大腿骨骨折。由于老人家年纪已大，医生觉得做手术风险太高，因此采取静养的保守治疗。我因此回国 待了一周，看看老人，顺便也见了几位朋友。结束国内行程后，我又连续出差，直到今天才有时间把回国一周的所见所闻写下来和大家分享。 老同学L是我认识快30年的好友。当年我们在大学里住一个寝室，可谓好基友。大学毕业后，他进入一家会计事务所做审计，一做就是20多年。他告诉我， 最近他从事务所辞职了，理由很简单：HD事件之后，事务所的处境尴尬，营业额缩减得很厉害，关于公司要裁员的谣言也是满天飞。他觉得再做下去没意 思了，恰逢两个孩子都送去国外读书，他就干脆彻底退出，靠前几年攒下的钱，乐得清闲。我们去了一家网红湘菜馆吃饭。我本来以为在饭点需要排队，结 果压根不用，馆子里始终没坐满。我们俩点了六七个菜，最后根本吃不完，账单才不到150块人民币，还包饮料。结账时，L抢着买单，并笑着说："虽然现 在没工作，但是100多块还是请的起的。" 另一个朋友M是我的中学同学，他的日子就没那么轻松。他在一家国企上班，但工作时间出奇的长，每天9到8（早上9点到公司，晚上8点离开）。由于路 上通勤需要一个多小 ...

在投资这个行当里，人类往往高估了自己的预测能力。无论是华尔街顶级对冲基金经理，还是普通散户，大家都有一个共同的毛病：喜欢折腾，总觉得复杂 的东西更"聪明"、更"高端"。但问题在于，复杂真的能带来更好的回报吗？ 最近《华尔街日报》做了一个有意思的比较【1】，把经典的"60/40组合"（60%股票+40%债券）拉出来，与几个看上去更花哨的"替代方案"对比。结果 让人哭笑不得： 过去25年，60/40的年化回报是 6.89% ，而桥水基金引以为豪的"全天候组合"只拿到 6.49% 。换句话说，付出了更多费用，搞得更复 杂，最后还不如一个最简单的配置。 再看看其他方案。比如"永久组合"，把资产均分成四份（股票、债券、大宗商品、现金），长周期的年化回报只有 4.45% 。而那些强调"安全"的30/70组 合（30%股票+70%债券），25年的年化回报也才 5.55% 【1】。不管包装得多漂亮，结果摆在那儿：60/40反而成了赢家。 这让我想起一个比喻。复杂的投资组合，就像是一桌满汉全席，山珍海味齐上阵，光菜单就能写一大本。但真要论吃饱、管用，一碗热气腾腾的家常面往往 更实在。投资也是一样， 关键不是把菜式弄得多花哨，而 ...

1993年，斯坦福大学的经济学教授约翰·泰勒提出：央行设定利率，大致可以用这样一个等式来描述： 政策利率 = 中性利率 + 通胀缺口 × 系数 + 产出缺 口 × 系数（ i t = r ∗ + π t + 0.5 ( π t − π ∗ ) + 0.5 ( y t − y ∗ )） 。 翻译成大白话就是：物价涨太快？那就加息。经济过热？也得加息。反过来，经济低迷，就该降息。这条公式最大的贡献在于，它用极简单的方式，把美联 储在上世纪八九十年代看似复杂的操作拟合得八九不离十。于是这条规则被奉为圭臬，成了货币政策的"圣经"。 问题在于，到了疫情之后的这几年，美国的现实和这条圣经彻底拉开了距离。2021年到2022年，美国的通胀率一度冲到9%，按照泰勒规则来推算，联邦 基金利率应该飙到11%甚至12%【2】。可现实呢？美联储最高只加到5.5%。简单一减，差了整整5到6个百分点。要是用一些学者更激进的模型估算，差 距甚至接近10个百分点。换句话说，美联储这次干脆把规则撕了个大口子。 更吊诡的是，即便背离了泰勒规则，结果却出人意料地"好"：通胀在没有衰退的情况下掉了下来。加州伯克利大学教授中村绘美在杰克逊霍尔会议上总 ...

Core Viewpoint - The recent performance of the Chinese stock market appears driven by liquidity rather than fundamental improvements, with significant fluctuations indicating a market influenced by capital rather than corporate earnings [2][3][6]. Group 1: Market Performance - As of the end of August, the CSI 300 index had risen approximately 17% year-to-date, but experienced a sharp decline of 3.4% in early September, with the tech sector suffering even greater losses [1][2]. - The increase in margin trading balances by 19% over the past two months, reaching about 2.2 trillion yuan, marks the highest level since 2015, indicating a resurgence of leverage in the market [1][3]. Group 2: Investor Behavior - Current investor behavior reflects a "passive entry" into the market, driven by poor returns from other asset classes, contrasting with the "blind optimism" seen in 2015 when retail investors were actively encouraged to invest [3][4]. - International investors are favoring markets in Japan and Europe over Chinese A-shares, with significant net inflows into these markets while Chinese equity funds saw a net outflow of approximately 1.1 billion dollars in early August [4][5]. Group 3: Profitability Analysis - The average Return on Equity (ROE) for CSI 300 constituents is around 10%, with Return on Assets (ROA) at approximately 1.2% and net profit margins between 11-12%, which are considered low compared to historical averages [4][5]. - Compared to international benchmarks, the ROE for the CSI 300 is lower than that of the S&P 500 (14-18%) and European STOXX 600 (10-12%), indicating a weaker profitability profile for Chinese companies [6][7]. Group 4: Market Sustainability - The sustainability of the current market rally hinges on genuine corporate profitability rather than liquidity-driven momentum, as historical patterns suggest that long-term market strength is tied to consistent earnings growth [6][7]. - The current market environment is likened to a "mahjong parlor" where limited entertainment options lead to continued participation, rather than a strong belief in future profitability [5][6].

Core Viewpoint - The article highlights the underlying economic concerns in the U.S. despite seemingly positive indicators such as a booming stock market and low unemployment rates. It argues that the reintroduction of tariffs and immigration policies as economic tools may lead to more harm than good, echoing historical precedents of limited effectiveness and significant side effects [2][3][4]. Tariffs - Tariffs imposed by the Trump administration on various imports, including steel and aluminum, are intended to protect domestic manufacturing and increase local employment. However, economic consensus suggests that the costs of tariffs are largely passed on to consumers, with a mere 0.2% decrease in overall import prices by 2025 [1][2]. - Tariff revenues for the first eight months of the year amounted to approximately $146 billion, with new policies contributing $88 billion, which is only 0.3% of GDP. This revenue is insufficient to address the 5%-6% fiscal deficit, indicating that tariffs do not effectively mitigate budget shortfalls while simultaneously raising consumer prices [1][2]. Immigration Policies - The article discusses the potential decline in net immigration from approximately 1 million annually to as low as 200,000 by 2025 due to new policies. This reduction threatens the vitality of the U.S. labor market, particularly in sectors like agriculture, construction, and hospitality, which heavily rely on immigrant labor [2][3]. - Approximately 40% of farm workers are undocumented immigrants, and their removal could lead to immediate shortages in agricultural labor, contributing to rising food prices, as evidenced by the recent increase in fresh vegetable prices due to labor shortages [1][2]. Long-term Implications - The U.S. birth rate has fallen below 2, making it impossible to fill labor gaps solely through domestic population growth. A sustained decrease in immigration could lead to stagnation or decline in the labor force, ultimately destabilizing both consumption and production bases [3][4]. - The IMF predicts that prolonged low net immigration could reduce the potential GDP growth rate by 0.3-0.5 percentage points over the next decade, which, while seemingly minor, represents a significant loss of national economic strength when compounded over time [3][4]. Historical Context - Historical examples, such as the McKinley Tariff of 1890 and the Operation Wetback of 1954, illustrate that aggressive tariff and immigration policies may provide short-term relief but often result in long-term economic and political costs. These policies tend to be reversed when their negative consequences become apparent [4][5]. Conclusion - The article concludes that the U.S. economy's reliance on tariffs and immigration restrictions is akin to a factory that neglects innovation and efficiency improvements in favor of short-term fixes. This approach may sustain superficial economic activity but poses increasing risks for long-term growth and competitiveness [5].

今年以来，美股标普500指数涨了10%多，过去十年年均回报更是高达15%【1】。看起来好像谁买谁赚，退休梦想触手可及。我们的大A股表现也不差， 今年以来上证指数上涨了17%做出，指数突破3800点。 但经验告诉我们，越是这种时候，越容易掉进一个陷阱：把市场的高收益当成理所当然，以为退休储蓄不用自己费劲，股市就能替你兜底。其实，这种想法 和"指望买彩票中奖来还房贷"差不多危险。 大多数人对退休的两件事常常想错： 一是觉得投资回报会一直这么好，二是觉得退休以后开销自然会降下来 。前者低估了市场的反复无常，后者则高估了 自己的节俭能力。现实往往比想象残酷得多。 数据来源：WSJ。上图显示，投资回报越低，每年需要节省并存下来的收入比例就越高。 当然，也有人会说："我可以延迟退休，或者承担更高风险。"这两条路在理论上可行，但代价和不确定性更高。延迟退休意味着你得多干几年，健康和工作 环境是不是允许？承担更高风险，股市一旦遇到黑天鹅，你是不是还睡得着觉？相比之下， 老老实实多存钱，反而是最笨但最安全的选择 。 再看支出。很多退休规划指南都会说，退休后一个人的开销大约只需要工作时期的50%-70%。看上去挺合理：不用通勤、 ...

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the "Disposition Effect," a common behavioral bias where investors tend to sell winning stocks too early while holding onto losing stocks in hopes of recovery. A case study from a French brokerage suggests that altering the information environment can help mitigate this bias, leading to better investment decisions and outcomes [2][3][4]. Group 1: Case Study Insights - In 2018, a French brokerage removed visibility of clients' purchase costs and profit/loss data from advisors, allowing only clients to see this information. This change aimed to reduce emotional decision-making related to the "Disposition Effect" [2][3]. - Research from 2016 to 2021 showed that prior to the change, clients were 50% more likely to sell winning stocks than losing ones. Post-change, the likelihood of selling winning versus losing stocks became nearly equal, indicating a significant reduction in the "Disposition Effect" [3][4]. - Clients who frequently communicated with their advisors saw an increase in monthly average returns by 0.2 percentage points, translating to over 2 percentage points annually, demonstrating the financial benefits of the new approach [3][4]. Group 2: Behavioral Insights - The article highlights that the "Disposition Effect" is akin to behavioral habits in daily life, where individuals often hold onto losing investments, hoping for a turnaround, similar to keeping a dying plant [4][6]. - It challenges the notion that financial advisors inherently help clients overcome biases, suggesting that advisors can also transmit their biases to clients. The case study illustrates that the effectiveness of advisors is more about the design of the information environment than their verbal guidance [4][6]. - The findings emphasize that wealth does not guarantee rational decision-making, as clients with an average asset of 3 million euros still exhibited the "Disposition Effect." This suggests that both clients and advisors are influenced by the information they see [6][7]. Group 3: Implications for Investment Practices - The case study indicates that not all biases can be addressed through information suppression, but it effectively demonstrates the power of the information environment in mitigating the "Disposition Effect" [5][6]. - The article suggests that creating a conducive environment for decision-making can lead to better investment outcomes, as emotional responses can be minimized by reducing exposure to triggering information [5][6]. - It concludes that there is no perfect rational investor, but smarter institutional arrangements can help navigate human behavioral weaknesses in investing [6][7].