24日，彭博社引用所谓市场参与者的话称，尽管中国增加了稀土磁铁等重要矿产的交付，但美国工业界 仍无法获得足够的稀土原料，用于稀土永磁材料的生产和加工。这是因为中国在精炼加工和永磁体制造 方面，一直掌控着全球供应链的核心地位，拥有88%的精炼产能和90%的钕铁硼永磁体供应。中国此前 依法实施的出口管制措施，既保障了自身的安全，又履行了国际义务，同时在满足合规民用需求方面， 仍然留有足够的空间。 美国清楚这些物资对其国防安全的重要性，但在民用供应恢复后，依然急于向中国寻求支持，实际上是 想延续对中国战略资源的单方面依赖，而避免自己承担供应链建设的责任和成本。长期以来，中国稀土 行业面临着巨大的污染治理成本，并且曾长期陷入有量无价的困境。初级稀土产品低价出口，反而要高 价进口最终制成的产品，导致价值链的大部分被外国企业占据。即便如此，中国仍然坚守多边贸易原 则，并在保障全球民用产业链稳定方面发挥着不可或缺的作用。 美国政府多年来一直推动供应链去中国化，试图重建本土的稀土生产能力，但由于技术和成本等多方面 的原因，进展十分缓慢，短期内无法摆脱对中国精炼产能的依赖，甚至有些美国本土开采的稀土还需要 运送到中国加工。同时 ...

2025年4月，中国对多种重稀土物项启动出口管制，这一动作迅速传导到了大洋彼岸。 美国一听，急了，立马喊出口号：自主、自强、自给自足，誓要摆脱对中国稀土的"依赖症"。 从白宫到五角大楼，从法案到资本，美国政府和企业一窝蜂扑向了"稀土独立"这条赛道。 如今，8个多月过去了，这场声势浩大的"去中国化"计划到底跑得有多快、走得有多远？ 白宫拍板，财政"下场" 这一次，美国政府的态度可以说是前所未有的坚决，过去几十年，美国一直说要减少对中国稀土的依 赖，但更多停留在口头上。这一次不一样，特朗普政府不再是打打政策"擦边球"，而是直接开始砸钱， 自己成了企业的金主。 行政命令一签，把增加矿产供应列为国家安全任务，接着又启动法律调查，为后续可能的贸易保护打下 基础，更关键的是政府不再只是出补贴，而是变成了真正的投资者。 国防部直接买下MP Materials公司的股份，还承诺未来十年稳定价格、包销产品，等于告诉企业：你先 干，亏了我兜着。 这种做法在美国不多见，以前是企业跑政策，现在是政府拉着企业一起上，稀土产业链变成了"国家项 目"，不仅是资源问题，更是政治问题。 就连锂矿、钴矿这些和新能源挂钩的领域，也被纳入了"战略投 ...

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the ongoing trade dynamics between China and the United States regarding rare earth elements, highlighting that while China has resumed exports of processed rare earth products to the U.S., it continues to restrict the export of key rare earth elements essential for high-end manufacturing and defense applications [1][19]. Group 1: Rare Earth Elements vs. Processed Products - Rare earth elements are a group of 17 unique elements known for their scarcity and difficulty in extraction, while processed rare earth products are the end or semi-finished materials created through various refining and synthesis processes [3][5]. - High-performance rare earth permanent magnets, which are critical in modern industrial applications, particularly in defense and high-end manufacturing, rely on specific rare earth elements like neodymium and praseodymium [7][11]. Group 2: Impact on U.S. Defense Industry - The U.S. defense sector heavily relies on high-performance rare earth permanent magnets for various applications, including advanced military equipment like the F-35 fighter jet, where the absence of these materials could hinder production [9][19]. - The U.S. Department of Defense has previously indicated that shortages of rare earth elements pose potential risks to missile production, with current stockpiles only sufficient for a few months [17][19]. Group 3: China's Strategic Export Restrictions - China's decision to maintain export restrictions on key rare earth elements is a targeted strategy aimed at the vulnerabilities within the U.S. industrial chain, particularly affecting the production of high-performance, high-temperature magnets used in advanced military equipment [13][15]. - Despite the resumption of processed rare earth product exports, U.S. companies that depend on elements like dysprosium find themselves unable to meet core production needs for high-end equipment [21][29]. Group 4: U.S. Efforts to Rebuild Supply Chain - The U.S. has attempted to restructure its rare earth supply chain by forming partnerships with countries like Australia and Malaysia, but these efforts have yet to yield tangible results [24]. - The U.S. Geological Survey has identified China's dominance in the rare earth sector as a potential threat to U.S. national security, prompting the government to support domestic rare earth companies through tax incentives and direct investments [26][28]. Group 5: Conclusion on Trade Dynamics - China's approach in this trade scenario serves as a new model for global mineral trade negotiations, balancing its core interests while leaving room for cooperation, complicating the U.S. position in the ongoing trade conflict [30].

12月25日，俄罗斯卫星通讯社报道称，彭博社引述官方和市场人士的说法，尽管中美两国达成了协议，中国恢复向美国出口稀土制品，可是对一些重要的稀 土元素依旧设有限制。 比如，某些美国公司拿不到金属镝或者它的氧化物。 这到底是咋回事呢？中国的限制对美国造成了啥影响？美国拿到稀土制成品后，想再弄到它的原材料，究竟是为什么呢？ 得先说一句，稀土和稀土制品可不是一回事哦，比如那种高性能的稀土永磁体，它的核心成分可是钕、镨这类稀土元素，所以人家都习惯叫它"稀土永磁 体"。 像那种高性能的钕铁硼磁体，可是很多尖端行业的关键配件，比如常用在国防、军工，还包括高端制造业啥的。 我们和美国谈妥的协议，就是直接把一些高性能的磁体供应过去，避免美国那边的一些工业陷入停产的境地。 但就是没有把那些重要的稀土元素直接出口到美国。 像美国媒体提到的镝金属或它的氧化物，这玩意儿可是做高性能磁铁的必备材料，属于那种极其关键的"配料"。要是没有镝或它的氧化物，美国实际上就别 想搞出符合各种需求的顶级磁体了。 中国出口到美国的磁铁，基本上都是加工好、加了镝的高端磁体，已经是成品状态了。 美国想单独进口镝，可中国却对这个设限了。 这一下子限制对美国到 ...

稀土概念股走低，USA Rare Earth跌超6%，Critical Metals跌5.8%，MP Materials跌2.6%。消息面上，特 朗普在圣诞夜下令对尼日利亚实施空袭，标志着美国与这一西非最大经济体的紧张关系急剧升级。分析 指出，虽然反恐是公开的理由，但此次行动背后交织着复杂的经济利益链条，目标可能在直指尼日利亚 石油自主能力和稀土矿产。(格隆汇) ...

Core Viewpoint - The global geopolitical landscape is increasingly complex, with ongoing international conflicts, intensified strategic competition among major powers, and a surge in sanctions and export control measures, significantly raising compliance thresholds for cross-border transactions and complicating corporate compliance management [1][2]. Group 1: Overview of Global Sanctions and Trade Control Policies - The number of global sanctions and sanctioned entities is at a historically high level, indicating a trend towards institutionalization of international sanctions activities [1]. - The article outlines the core policy dynamics in the field of global economic sanctions and trade controls for 2025, focusing on major economies like the US, EU, and China [2]. Group 2: US Economic Sanctions and Export Control Policies - In 2025, the US continues to tighten economic sanctions and export controls, enhancing oversight of sensitive technologies and strategic industries while allowing for some flexibility in implementation timelines to ease short-term compliance burdens [3]. - A new "Interim Final Rule" was introduced, requiring higher standards of due diligence for the export of advanced computing integrated circuits, expanding the scope of controlled items [4]. - The introduction of the "50% ownership rule" in export controls signifies a shift from a targeted approach to a more comprehensive one, impacting multinational companies with complex ownership structures [5][6]. - The integration of economic sanctions and export controls is becoming more pronounced, with both areas increasingly serving similar strategic objectives [7]. Group 3: EU Economic Sanctions and Trade Control Policies - The EU has intensified sanctions against Russia, expanding the scope to include third-party entities that assist in evading sanctions, reflecting a more systemic approach to sanctions [8][9]. - The EU's export control policies are increasingly aligned with international multilateral frameworks, emphasizing compliance with international obligations and enhancing cooperation among member states [10][11]. - Recent updates to the EU's dual-use item control list include new technologies and materials, indicating a proactive stance in regulating sensitive technologies [12]. Group 4: UK Economic Sanctions and Trade Control Policies - The UK has strengthened its sanctions against Russia, particularly in traditional energy and emerging technology sectors, while enhancing oversight of evasion behaviors [13][14]. - The UK has revised its Export Control Order to align more closely with international export control mechanisms, reflecting a commitment to maintaining consistency with major partners [16]. Group 5: China's Economic Sanctions and Trade Control Policies - China has introduced significant policies in economic sanctions and export controls, transitioning from a defensive posture to a more proactive and strategic approach [17]. - The implementation of the "Counter-Sanctions Implementation Regulations" marks a key step in operationalizing China's counter-sanctions law [18][19]. - China has actively utilized unreliable entity lists and export control lists, indicating a more frequent and systematic use of these tools in response to foreign sanctions [21]. - Recent announcements regarding export controls on critical materials and technologies reflect a substantial upgrade in China's export control framework [22][23]. Group 6: Future Outlook on Compliance with Economic Sanctions and Export Controls - The compliance environment for businesses is expected to become more complex and multifaceted, with rising costs associated with adapting to frequently changing regulations [25]. - Companies will need to integrate compliance into their internal controls and develop robust governance frameworks to navigate the evolving landscape of international sanctions and export controls [28][29]. - The demand for legal services related to cross-border disputes and compliance strategies is anticipated to increase as businesses face heightened risks from sanctions and export controls [26][27].

[Table_Main] 行业研究|有色金属 证券研究报告 有色金属行业双周报 2025 年 12 月 26 日 [Table_Title] 能源金属领跑，白银价格大幅上涨 ——有色金属行业双周报 [Table_Summary] 报告要点： 行情回顾：近 2 周申万有色金属指数上涨 0.99% 近 2 周（2025.12.8-2025.12.19），有色金属行业指数上涨 0.99%， 跑赢沪深 300 指数，在 31 个申万一级行业中排名第 7。能源金属 （5.58%）、金属新材料（0.88%）、贵金属（2.19%）和小金属（4.07%） 均有不同程度上涨。 金属价格：能源金属领跑，白银价格大幅上涨 截至 12 月 19 日，COMEX 黄金收盘价为 4369.70 美元/盎司，近 2 周 上涨 3.34%；沪金收盘价为 979.90 元/克，近 2 周上涨 1.96%。COMEX 白银收盘价为 67.40 美元/盎司，近 2 周上涨 14.62%；LME 铜现货结 算价为 11,845.00 美元/吨，近 2 周上涨 1.72%；LME 铝现货结算价 为 2,896 美元/吨，近 2 周上涨 1.08%；黑 ...

Group 1 - The US and China have reached a ceasefire agreement, but competition remains, with the US planning to increase tariffs on Chinese semiconductor products by June 2027 [1][3] - The US Trade Representative's office announced the end of the 301 trade investigation into China's semiconductor industry, indicating a temporary concession [1][3] - The Chinese Ministry of Commerce has expressed strong opposition to the US tariffs on semiconductors, urging dialogue to resolve issues and emphasizing mutual respect and cooperation [3][11] Group 2 - Despite the ceasefire, key rare earth products remain difficult to obtain, which is critical for both high-end and low-end chip production [4][6] - The timing of the tariff increase is strategically aligned with the US's efforts to secure rare earth supply chains and diversify sources away from China [8][9] - The US's delay in implementing semiconductor tariffs until 2027 serves as a buffer to maintain the ceasefire with China while bolstering its own rare earth industry [11]

尽管今年10月美国与中国就解除对稀土供应限制达成协议，但中国仍然限制向美国提供生产永磁材料所需的稀土元素。根据彭博社12月24日的报道，该消息 来源于市场参与者的透露。 诺维昂磁业公司的联合创始人斯科特·邓恩指出，除了中国之外，全球其他地区的年产永磁材料的能力约为5万吨。然而，中国以外地区的稀土矿产资源远不 足以支持如此大的生产规模。 12月18日，中国商务部新闻发言人何亚东就稀土相关出口管制的最新情况做出回应。何亚东表示，自从实施稀土出口管制以来，中国相关主管部门已向出口 商进行了政策解读，并随着经验的积累，部分中国出口商已经达到了申请通用许可的基本要求。据了解，目前已有部分中国出口商提交的通用许可申请已获 得批准。 报道中提到，多位消费者、制造商、政府官员和贸易专家表示，尽管中国已增加了成品（主要是永磁材料）的供应量，美国工业仍然无法获得生产这些产品 所需的原材料，而这正是美国政府的一项重要优先事项。 ...

在非烟非能工业突破上发力。在稳定烟草、能源基本盘的同时，加快培育非烟非能工业新增长点，发展 壮大生物医药、新材料、先进装备制造、电子信息、绿色食品加工等非烟非能工业，力争"十五五"末非 烟非能工业占规上工业比重进一步提升、撑起云南工业的"半壁江山"，推动产业结构优化、产业体系韧 性和整体效能显著增强。 云南省委十一届九次全会审议通过的《中共云南省委关于制定云南省国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年 规划的建议》，把"打好产业转型升级攻坚战，构建具有云南特色优势的现代化产业体系"摆在12项重点 工作任务的第一条，提出要坚持把发展经济的着力点放在实体经济上，坚持智能化、绿色化、融合化方 向，坚持大抓产业、主攻工业，坚持以资源换产业、以园区聚产业、以口岸促产业，一体推进"三大经 济"，有序提升制造业比重，着力打造全国重要的清洁能源基地、战略性有色金属产业基地、高原特色 现代生态农业基地、金字招牌的世界旅游目的地，以产业转型升级促进全省经济高质量发展。 云南省发展和改革委员会党组书记、主任陈明表示，从3个重点聚焦把握构建具有云南特色优势的现代 化产业体系：重点聚焦绿色铝、硅光伏、磷化工、有色和稀贵金属等领域，做强做优做大资 ...