经济学家温铁军曾一针见血地指出："买房的人，并不一定是住房子的人。" 这句话道出了中国房地产市场的一个关键现实，也解释了为何在房屋存量已经 严重过剩的情况下，开发商仍然热衷于大规模建设新房。 其次，地方政府鼓励开发商拿地建房，土地财政依赖是重要推手。 许多地方政府高度依赖土地财政收入。 若开发商停止拿地建房，土地出让金收入将大幅 减少，进而影响地方财政收入。 这将直接关系到公务员工资、基础设施建设等重要支出。 因此，各地政府通常会采取各种措施鼓励开发商积极拿地建房。 这不仅能够刺激当地GDP增长，还能解决大量就业问题。 在地方政府的推动下，即使存量房过剩，开发商也难以停下建设的脚步。 第三，投资需求旺盛，催生了炒房客群体。 近年来，银行存款利率持续走低，而生活成本却不断攀升。 在这种背景下，许多资金充裕的人将房产视为投资 增值的手段，他们买房并非为了自住或出租，而是将其作为一种投机筹码，等待房价上涨后再伺机出售。 这种投机行为使得房地产市场始终难以摆脱投资 属性。 要想让房地产市场回归居住属性，就必须通过征收房产税等手段，增加房屋持有成本，抑制投资需求。 征收房产税不仅能够缓解地方政府土地财政 收入减少的压力 ...

点击【樱桃大房子】关注并 一方面，1-10月国有土地使用权出让收入24982亿元，同比下降7.4%。 可能单说7.4%，大家没感觉。但要知道，卖地收入可是地方政府的"钱袋子"，占地方政府性基金预算本级收入的比重很大。它一感冒，整个经济可能都要 跟着打喷嚏，直接影响地方基金收入整体下降3.3%。 另一方面，全国政府性基金预算支出却高达80892亿元，同比大幅增长15.4%。 是不是觉得很分裂？一边是卖地收入这个进水口在缩小，另一边是预算支出这个出水口在猛增。 这感觉就像，家里工资收入明明少了，但房贷、车贷、孩子学费的支出却不减反增。钱从哪来？缺口怎么补？ 今天，咱们就把这个"财务清单"掰开，讲清楚我们正站在怎样的节点上。 为什么会出现这么分裂的数据？ 近日，财政部发布2025年1—10月财政收支情况，其中有一组数据极具对比性。 卖地收入下降7.4%，是趋势，不是偶然。数据显示，2024年全国土地出让金收入为48699亿元，较2021年的高峰时期（8.7万亿元）已经下滑了44%。 原因也很简单： 销售端淤塞，市场预期下降，老百姓捂着钱包，不买房了。 房企集体躺平，房子卖不动，销售回款速度减缓，拿那么多地干什么？ ...

Revenue and Expenditure Trends - National general public budget revenue increased by 0.8% year-on-year from January to October 2025, while expenditure rose by 2%[3] - Government fund budget revenue decreased by 2.8% year-on-year, with expenditure increasing by 15.4%[3] - In October, general public budget revenue grew by 3.2% year-on-year, with central and local revenues increasing by 2.3% and 4.0% respectively[6] Tax Revenue Insights - Tax revenue saw a year-on-year increase of 8.6% in October, with a seasonal growth of approximately 79% compared to September, marking the highest level in five years[8] - Personal income tax revenue experienced an "abnormal" growth of 24.9% month-on-month, significantly exceeding the average growth of 9.6% from 2021 to 2024[8] - Non-tax revenue declined sharply, with a year-on-year decrease of 33% and a month-on-month drop exceeding 53 percentage points[19] Expenditure Challenges - General public budget expenditure fell by 9.8% year-on-year in October, a significant drop compared to the previous year's growth of 3.1%[23] - Local government expenditure decreased by nearly 12% year-on-year, while central government expenditure only declined by about 1%[24] - Social welfare and employment expenditures faced considerable pressure, with a month-on-month decline of 39.4%[27] Land Sales and Fiscal Impact - Land sales revenue in October was recorded at 268 billion yuan, a 27.3% year-on-year decline, marking the lowest level in five years[32] - The downturn in the real estate market has severely impacted local government finances, with land sales contributing 81% to local government fund revenue[37] - Broad fiscal revenue turned negative, with a year-on-year decrease of 0.6% in income and a 19.1% drop in expenditure[34]

武汉姑娘杨晴，去年刚考上事业单位捧上"铁饭碗"。 明年要结婚的她，被10月刚出的购房补贴勾得心痒痒： 经开区新政出台新政，对刚需、改善买房都有补贴，要是跟同事一起团购，最高能拿十几万奖励！ "这是不是抄底的好时候？" 杨晴跟男友掰着手指头算，自2024年5月以来，救市政策已经来了两轮，2025年这波是第三波了。 不光武汉，平顶山、东莞、中山这些城市，10月都扎堆出了买房补贴政策。 可看着身边朋友年初买的房年中就跌了20万，她又犯了嘀咕： 第三波救市来了，房价真能上涨吗？ 今天咱们就把这事说透，别让你跟杨晴一样，花了钱还后悔！ 救市玩真的！各地撒钱抢人买房 我们不得不说，这轮救市，地方政府真是把"诚意"撒在了明面上，不再是不痛不痒的"放松限购"，而是真金白银的补贴。 长沙最直接，7月就出台"以旧换新"补贴，卖掉旧房一年内买新房，最高能补3万，按新房总价1%算； 多子女家庭更划算，生了二孩及以上的，买房算套数时直接减一套—— 首先，楼市还在"L型"底部趴着。 2025年前两个月看着有点回暖，可到了二季度又凉了下去，新房卖不动，二手房降价也没人要。 房企更惨，近四年淘汰了一大批，现在能撑着的基本是央国企，中小房企要 ...

Core Viewpoint - The debate over whether there is an oversupply of housing in China continues, with significant existing residential stock that could accommodate around 6 billion people if each unit housed ten individuals, while at least 14 million new homes are built annually, indicating a substantial supply [1][3] Group 1: Reasons for Continued Construction by Developers - Developers are trapped in a debt crisis, compelling them to continue acquiring land and building new projects to maintain access to bank loans, as halting construction would jeopardize their financial viability [5][7] - Local governments rely heavily on land finance, which drives developers to continue land acquisition and construction to sustain local fiscal health and support public spending [7][9] - The presence of speculative investors, or "house flippers," who purchase properties not for residence or rental but as investment assets, keeps the market active despite the oversupply of housing [9][10] Group 2: Market Dynamics and Policy Implications - The current real estate market is largely speculative, necessitating effective measures to guide it back to a rational state focused on housing needs, such as the introduction of property taxes to increase holding costs [10] - Despite the apparent oversupply of existing housing, the continuous influx of new properties into the market raises questions about the underlying motivations of buyers, as highlighted by the economist's assertion that "those buying homes are not necessarily the ones living in them" [10]

Group 1 - The core issue is that a significant drop in housing prices could trigger a series of chain reactions, impacting economic and social stability [4] - Local governments rely heavily on land finance as a key source of revenue, and a sharp decline in housing prices would reduce developers' willingness to acquire land, leading to a sluggish land market and decreased fiscal income [3] - The real estate sector is interconnected with numerous upstream and downstream industries, such as steel, cement, and home appliances, providing many jobs; a collapse in housing prices would directly impact these industries, leading to reduced investment demand and increased unemployment [5] Group 2 - Homeowners may express dissatisfaction due to asset depreciation if housing prices fall significantly, potentially leading to social unrest and legal disputes [5] - A drastic decline in housing prices could exceed the down payment ratio for many buyers, resulting in widespread defaults and increased financial risks for banks [5] - Developers face heightened inventory pressures and increased difficulty in sales if housing prices drop, which could exacerbate the risk of loan recoveries for banks [7] Group 3 - Local governments and developers are reluctant to see a sharp decline in housing prices due to the potential economic and social risks, prompting them to implement various measures to stabilize the real estate market [7] - The fundamental goal of recent adjustments in the real estate market across various regions in China is to prevent drastic fluctuations in housing prices, thereby maintaining overall economic and social stability [7]

Core Insights - The narrative of wealth and destiny in China has been shattered, as exemplified by the "拆二代" (demolition second generation) now delivering food, highlighting the fleeting nature of compensation from property demolition [1][12] - The golden era of real estate has ended, with a slowdown in property prices and a decline in urban expansion, leading to questions about future economic sustainability [3][5] - The reliance on real estate for economic growth has created a precarious situation, where a downturn in the sector could destabilize various industries and employment [7][8] Economic Structure - The past two decades have seen a reliance on land finance to support local development, with real estate driving multiple industries and families accumulating debt [5][7] - The demographic shift, including a declining birth rate and reluctance among youth to marry and have children, poses a challenge to sustaining the real estate-driven economic model [5][8] - The wealth generated from property transactions has not translated into sustainable income for many, leading to a return to financial instability for those who once benefited from demolition compensation [5][10] Future Directions - A shift away from real estate as the primary growth engine is necessary, focusing instead on industrial upgrades, technological innovation, and human capital development [8][10] - There is a need to reform the fiscal system to reduce dependence on land finance and create a more sustainable local revenue model [8][10] - Urbanization should be redefined to ensure equitable resource distribution between urban and rural areas, moving towards urban renewal rather than large-scale demolition [10][12]

Core Viewpoint - The former deputy governor of the central bank, Zhu Min, stated that housing prices are unlikely to rise significantly again, indicating a fundamental shift in the underlying support for housing prices in China [3]. Group 1: Population Structure - The birth rate in China has drastically declined, with the number of newborns dropping from 17.86 million in 2016 to an estimated 9.54 million in 2024, leading to a projected 50% reduction in annual new housing demand over the next 20 years [5]. - The willingness of the 25-30 age group to purchase homes has decreased from 65% to 48% over the past five years, indicating a shift in young people's attitudes towards home buying due to financial constraints [5]. Group 2: Land Finance - The revenue from land sales has halved, dropping from 8.7 trillion yuan in 2021 to 4.87 trillion yuan in 2024, disrupting the traditional cycle of land sales, developer purchases, and bank lending [7]. - The decline in housing demand has led to a halt in the entire real estate chain, affecting local governments, developers, and banks [7]. Group 3: Changing Perspectives - The traditional belief that "having a home means having a family" is being abandoned by younger generations, who are now reluctant to use their family's savings to purchase a home [9]. - The financial burden of homeownership is significant, with a typical family in Beijing needing to gather 1.5 million yuan for a down payment and facing monthly mortgage payments that consume a large portion of their income [9]. Group 4: Economic Implications - There are two conflicting views regarding housing prices: one argues that high prices suppress consumer spending, while the other fears that falling prices will reduce household wealth and consumption [10]. - The government's stance is clear in the "14th Five-Year Plan," which aims to curb real estate speculation and shift focus towards new economic drivers such as electric vehicles and artificial intelligence [10]. Group 5: Future Outlook - Based on international experiences, it is projected that China's housing market may bottom out around 2027, following a similar adjustment period seen in Japan and the U.S. [11]. - Major cities like Beijing and Shanghai may stabilize by 2026, with expected annual price increases of 3%-5%, while smaller cities may face greater adjustment pressures [11]. Group 6: Long-term Transformation - The transition from viewing real estate as an investment to recognizing it as a necessity will involve challenges, including asset volatility for current homeowners and economic uncertainties for potential buyers [12]. - Ultimately, the goal is to ensure that home buying does not deplete family savings, allowing other industries to thrive and contributing to sustainable economic growth in China [12].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the critical state of China's real estate market and the implications for the macro economy, emphasizing the need for a shift in policy and perception regarding housing prices and land finance [2][4]. Group 1: Land Finance and Policy - Land finance is defined as the fiscal mechanism of local governments that possess land transfer and planning rights [4]. - To stabilize the real estate market, it is essential to abandon quantity targets and halt the influx of new land supply, focusing instead on redeeming excess properties [4]. - The current approach of relying on land sales for financing contradicts the central government's strategy of transitioning from incremental expansion to qualitative improvement [4]. Group 2: Impact of Housing Prices - The decline in housing prices primarily affects ordinary citizens rather than the wealthy, as housing constitutes a significant portion of household assets in China [4]. - The homeownership rates are notably high, with urban residents at 96.3% and rural residents at 94.8%, indicating that housing is a critical asset for the majority [4]. - The article argues that rising housing prices can help reduce wealth inequality, contrary to the belief that falling prices benefit the majority [4]. Group 3: Market Structure and Transformation - A dual-track system is proposed, distinguishing between market-driven housing and affordable housing, to ensure both price stability and housing accessibility [5]. - The article suggests that the best source of affordable housing is not new construction but rather the repurchase of excess market housing [5]. - The handling of unfinished projects should focus on rescuing banks rather than merely saving companies [5]. Group 4: Current Market Conditions - The real estate sector is currently in a downturn, with significant declines in new housing sales and investment [7][9]. - From January to August 2023, new housing sales dropped by 4.7% in area and 7.3% in value, while real estate development investment fell by 12.9% [7][9]. - The inventory of unsold properties has increased, with a notable rise in the waiting period for inventory clearance [10][13]. Group 5: Economic Contribution and Future Outlook - The real estate sector contributes approximately 20% to GDP and 40% to fiscal revenue, highlighting its importance to the economy [19][22]. - Despite its significance, the probability of housing prices continuing to rise is deemed low due to oversupply and demographic challenges [23][24]. - The article emphasizes that the real estate market must return to a supply-demand balance, as excessive price increases lead to unsustainable debt levels for developers [28][31].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the contrasting approaches of Guangzhou and the "North-South" cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen) regarding the lifting of housing purchase restrictions, highlighting Guangzhou's aggressive stance compared to the cautious approach of the latter cities [1][4][5]. Group 1: Policy Differences - Guangzhou has announced a complete removal of purchase restrictions by September 30, 2024, aiming to stabilize its declining housing market [2][4]. - In contrast, Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen are taking a gradual approach, with Beijing expected to lift restrictions by August 2025, followed by Shanghai and Shenzhen [2][5]. Group 2: Market Pressures - Guangzhou's decision to lift restrictions is driven by significant market pressure, with a reported decline of over 12% in second-hand home prices within a year and a prolonged inventory turnover period exceeding 24 months in some areas [7][9]. - The reliance on land finance in Guangzhou, which exceeds 40%, has also pressured the city to stimulate the housing market through the removal of restrictions [9][10]. Group 3: Demand Structure - The demand structure in Guangzhou is primarily local, with 75% of housing priced below 5 million, contrasting with the broader appeal of properties in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen to national wealth [10][20]. - The gradual lifting of restrictions in Guangzhou has been accompanied by measures to mitigate speculative buying, such as price registration mechanisms and property tax trials [11][12][13]. Group 4: Future Outlook - While a complete removal of restrictions in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen is likely in the long term, it is deemed difficult in the short term due to the need for multiple conditions to be met [4][25]. - The article suggests that the future approach for these cities will likely involve incremental adjustments rather than an outright removal of restrictions, maintaining a cautious stance to prevent market overheating [26][27].