Group 1 - The core viewpoint is that Japan's reliance on the U.S. and its strategic miscalculations are leading to significant economic and geopolitical challenges, while the integration with China's economy presents a potential path for recovery [1][2][4][12] - Over 32,000 Japanese companies in China, with 78% stating they will not withdraw, indicate a strong commitment to the Chinese market, as seen in the actions of companies like Shiseido and Toyota [1] - Japan's automotive industry faces severe threats from both Chinese electric vehicle competition and U.S. tariffs, with a projected trade deficit with China reaching $42.4 billion in 2024 [2][6] Group 2 - Japan's economic structure is deteriorating, with a significant reliance on the U.S. leading to unfavorable trade agreements, exemplified by the humiliating terms of the U.S.-Japan tariff negotiations [6] - The Japanese government is increasing its defense budget, with plans to deploy advanced military capabilities in response to perceived threats from China, reflecting a shift in its defense strategy [9] - The potential for economic revitalization exists through deeper integration with East Asia, particularly through the RCEP and a proposed free trade agreement among China, Japan, and South Korea, which could unlock significant market opportunities [12]

Group 1: Impact of Geopolitical Factors on Global Economy - The global economy is experiencing a slowdown in globalization and an increase in regionalization due to complex geopolitical situations, with innovation and technology development becoming key for sustainable growth amid uncertainty [1][2][3] - The 2007-2008 financial crisis marked a significant turning point in globalization, revealing deep-seated issues in the global financial system and prompting a reevaluation of the sustainability of economic integration [3][4] - Geopolitical fragmentation has a measurable negative impact on global GDP, estimated at approximately -0.4% for a one standard deviation negative shock, peaking within one to two years [7][8] Group 2: Sectoral and Regional Disparities - Different sectors experience varying degrees of impact from geopolitical factors, with industries closely tied to global markets (e.g., manufacturing, finance, wholesale and retail) facing the most severe disruptions [8][11] - Emerging economies, such as those in Southeast Asia and Latin America, are more vulnerable to external shocks due to their reliance on global market openness and cross-border capital flows [8][11] - The spillover effects of geopolitical factors are most pronounced in the US-EU bloc, while the China-Russia bloc exhibits more regional impacts with limited international market influence [7][8] Group 3: Innovation as a Response to Geopolitical Risks - Increasing innovation capacity and industrial autonomy is crucial for mitigating geopolitical risks and enhancing resilience against global uncertainties [2][11] - Industries exposed to higher external political risks tend to exhibit greater innovation activities, driven primarily by the private sector rather than government or academic institutions [11][12] - The interaction between trade barriers and political risks significantly promotes innovation, particularly among medium-innovation firms that are sensitive to external risks [12][14] Group 4: Future Outlook for Emerging Markets - Enhancing technological innovation and industrial transformation is essential for emerging markets to improve economic performance and international competitiveness [14] - Economies that can achieve technological advancement and industrial upgrades within a regional framework are likely to excel in future global competition, achieving high-quality sustainable growth [14]

Group 1 - The core issue of the article revolves around the new battleground of energy security in the context of US-China relations, highlighting the shift from traditional economic conflicts to global energy dynamics [1][5] - US Treasury Secretary's statement about including China's oil imports from Russia and Iran in negotiations signifies a strategic move to leverage energy procurement as a bargaining chip in US-China talks [1][3] - China's significant reliance on Russian and Iranian oil, accounting for over 30% of its imports, poses a potential risk to its energy security if US sanctions are enforced [3][6] Group 2 - China is unlikely to compromise under US pressure, as energy security is a critical issue tied to national security and social stability [5][9] - The US aims to reshape the global energy landscape by targeting China's energy ties with Russia, seeking to weaken their cooperation and maintain US dominance in the energy market [5][9] - China is diversifying its energy sources, reducing dependence on any single supplier, and strengthening ties with oil-producing nations like Saudi Arabia and Iraq [6][8] Group 3 - The rise of BRICS nations, including Russia, India, and Brazil, indicates a collective response to US pressure, potentially leading to a new economic bloc that challenges US-led global economic order [8][9] - China's energy strategy is closely linked to its economic cooperation with BRICS countries, emphasizing a trend towards "de-dollarization" [8] - The long-term implications of US sanctions may inadvertently escalate tensions between the US and China, affecting global economic stability and the future energy landscape [9]

Report Summary 1. Report Investment Rating The document does not mention the industry investment rating. 2. Core Viewpoint The report provides a weekly update on the US crude oil and refined oil markets, including price, inventory, production, demand, and import/export data. It also list recommended and suggested companies in the oil and gas sector [2][3]. 3. Summary by Section 3.1 Crude Oil Weekly Data Briefing - **Upstream Company Performance**: The report presents the stock price changes and valuations of major upstream companies, such as CNOOC, PetroChina, and Sinopec, over different time - frames [8][9]. - **Crude Oil Price**: Brent and WTI crude oil futures had weekly average prices of $68.8 and $65.8 per barrel respectively, down $0.3 and $1.2 from the previous week [2][9]. - **Crude Oil Inventory**: US total crude oil inventory, commercial crude oil inventory, strategic crude oil inventory, and Cushing crude oil inventory were 8.2, 4.2, 4.0, and 0.2 billion barrels respectively, with weekly changes of - 337, - 317, - 20, and + 46 thousand barrels [2][9]. - **Crude Oil Production**: US crude oil production was 13.27 million barrels per day, down 100 thousand barrels per day. The number of active oil rigs was 415, down 7, and the number of active fracturing fleets was 174, down 6 [2][9]. - **Crude Oil Demand**: US refinery crude oil processing volume was 16.94 million barrels per day, up 90 thousand barrels per day, and the refinery utilization rate was 95.5%, up 1.6 percentage points [2][9]. - **Crude Oil Import and Export**: US crude oil imports, exports, and net imports were 5.98, 3.86, and 2.12 million barrels per day respectively, with weekly changes of - 400, + 340, and - 740 thousand barrels per day [2][9]. 3.2 This Week's Petroleum and Petrochemical Sector Market Review - **Sector Performance**: The report shows the performance of the petroleum and petrochemical sector and its sub - industries, as well as the performance of listed companies in the sector [13][23]. - **Company Performance**: It details the stock price changes of various upstream companies in the sector over different time - frames, including CNOOC, PetroChina, and Sinopec [24]. 3.3 Crude Oil Sector Data Tracking - **Price**: It analyzes the prices of different types of crude oil (Brent, WTI, Russian Urals, Russian ESPO) and their relationships with other factors such as the US dollar index and copper prices [9][41][46]. - **Inventory**: It examines the relationship between US commercial crude oil inventory and oil prices, and presents the inventory data of different types of US crude oil [48][52][62]. - **Supply**: It tracks US crude oil production, the number of oil rigs, and the number of fracturing fleets [65][67][71]. - **Demand**: It monitors US refinery processing volume and utilization rate, as well as the utilization rate of Chinese refineries [74][75][80]. - **Import and Export**: It shows US crude oil import, export, and net import data [86][87][92]. 3.4 Refined Oil Sector Data Tracking - **Price**: It analyzes the prices of refined oil products (gasoline, diesel, jet fuel) in different regions (US, China, Europe, Singapore) and their spreads with crude oil [10][97][123]. - **Inventory**: It presents the inventory data of US and Singapore refined oil products [142][143][154]. - **Supply**: It tracks the production of US refined oil products [160][161][164]. - **Demand**: It monitors the consumption of US refined oil products and the number of US airport passengers [165][166][169]. - **Import and Export**: It shows the import, export, and net export data of US refined oil products [177][178][183]. 3.5 Oilfield Services Sector Data Tracking It tracks the average daily rates of self - elevating and semi - submersible drilling platforms [192][194][195]. 3.6 Recommended Companies The report recommends CNOOC, PetroChina, Sinopec, CNOOC Energy Technology & Services, Offshore Oil Engineering, and CNOOC Energy Development. It also suggests paying attention to Sinopec Oilfield Service, China Petroleum Engineering & Construction, and Sinopec Mechanical Engineering [3].

Core Points - Indonesia's diplomatic strategy between the US and China has faced significant challenges, leading to a trade agreement with the US that has sparked international trade tensions [1] - The US imposed punitive tariffs of up to 32% on Indonesian goods, which were later negotiated down to 19% after intense diplomatic discussions [3] - The trade agreement allows US goods to enter Indonesia tariff-free while Indonesian products face a 19% tariff in the US, creating an imbalanced trade environment [5] - Indonesia is required to import at least $19 billion worth of goods from the US annually, including $10 billion in energy products, which poses risks to its domestic market [6] - The Indonesian government plans to use US imports for re-export to mitigate losses, but this strategy carries significant risks, including potential impacts on local agriculture and market saturation [7] - The US government promotes the agreement as a means to access Southeast Asian markets, but this claim may overstate Indonesia's market capacity and is driven by strategic interests in nickel resources [9] - China's response includes maintaining anti-dumping duties on Indonesian steel products, signaling a strong stance against perceived discriminatory practices [12] - The trade agreement reflects a complex geopolitical struggle, with Indonesia caught between the US and China, raising concerns about its economic viability and future trade relations [12]

当地时间25日，德国大众汽车集团公布2025年上半年财报。 数据显示，大众汽车上半年营业利润较 去年同期大幅下滑超过30%，同时大众还下调了今年全年的业绩展望。 综合自：央视财经、央视新闻 责编：叶舒筠 校对： 王锦程 大众汽车在报告中称，美国上调进口关税导致公司 面临13亿欧元（约合109亿元人民币 ） 的损失 。此外，软 件等部门的重组费用支出以及与二氧化碳排放法规相关的支出等也影响了公司业绩。 与此同时， 大众汽车还下调了2025年全年业绩展望 ，预计2025年全年销售收入将与上一年持平，低于此前预 测的5%的最高增幅。大众汽车表示，未来，美国政府关税政策存在相当大的不确定性。公司面临的挑战还包括 地缘政治局势紧张、竞争加剧、大宗商品和外汇市场的波动等。 版权声明 证券时报各平台所有原创内容，未经书面授权，任何单位及个人不得转载。我社保留追 究相关 行 为主体法律责 任的权利。 数据显示，2025年上半年，德国大众汽车集团销售收入为1584亿欧元，而去年同期这一数字为1588亿欧元； 上半年，大众集团营业利润为67亿欧元，较去年同期的100亿欧元大幅下降约33%，税后利润更是同比下降超 过38%，至44 ...

Group 1 - The EU leaders' visit to Beijing aims to seek cooperation amidst the backdrop of Trump's global tariff policies, which have had widespread implications for multiple countries [2][3] - Trump's decision to lower tariffs on the EU is seen as a significant concession, with potential agreements resembling those made with Japan, where tariffs could be reduced from 30% or 50% to 15% [3][5] - The EU's strategic significance as one of the world's three major economies means that any consensus reached with China could significantly impact Trump's global tariff strategy [2][8] Group 2 - Trump's recent statements indicate a fatigue with ongoing tariff negotiations, suggesting a readiness to implement a 15% tariff on most countries by August 1 [5][16] - The agreement with Japan, which includes substantial commitments to increase imports of U.S. goods, has faced criticism and may set a precedent for similar demands on the EU, potentially leading to internal dissent within Europe [8][10] - Key EU nations, particularly Germany and France, are resistant to compromising with the U.S., with France's Macron advocating for greater European strategic autonomy [13][16] Group 3 - The evolving geopolitical landscape necessitates that Europe prepares for a more assertive role, as Trump's tariff policies may no longer yield the desired effects [16][18] - The upcoming U.S.-China trade negotiations could further influence the dynamics of global trade and the EU's position within it, highlighting the importance of finding a balance in future negotiations [16][18]

Report Industry Investment Rating - Not provided in the document Core Views of the Report - Last week's view was that the Northern Hemisphere's consumption peak season could support the market to some extent, but the supply pressure would gradually increase later, and the upside space was limited. This week, oil prices fluctuated narrowly, with a slightly stronger trend in the second half of the week due to tariff negotiations and geopolitical factors. The short - term fluctuations are mainly affected by tariff negotiations and geopolitical disturbances, while the long - term view remains bearish due to strong supply and the fading consumption peak season [8]. - The crude oil fundamentals show that the East market's month - spread is strong due to domestic oil storage, and diesel leads the refined oil cracking. The US gasoline demand has slumped during the peak season, indicating poor US consumption ability. The domestic anti - involution has little impact on crude oil, and attention should be paid to the progress of US tariff negotiations and the final tax rates [8]. Summary According to the Directory 1. Weekly Views - Last week's view was that the consumption peak season could support the market, but the supply pressure would increase later. This week, oil prices fluctuated narrowly, with a slightly stronger trend in the second half due to tariff negotiations. The short - term is affected by tariff and geopolitical factors, and the long - term is bearish [8]. - Key points include the strong East market month - spread, weak US gasoline demand, little impact of anti - involution on crude oil, and attention to tariff negotiations [8]. 2. Weekly Highlights - **East - West Market Spread Differentiation**: Western market spreads (WTI and Brent) are falling, while the East market spreads are strong, related to China's imports [12]. - **China's Inventory Increase**: China's crude oil implied inventory from March to June 2025 reached a new high in recent years. The increase is due to price drops and strategic storage, which boosts the East market's month - spread [15]. - **Diesel Cracking Leading**: Diesel cracking leads the refined oil cracking market, with all regional 211 cracking (higher diesel proportion) stronger than 321 cracking [18]. - **Global Spot Cracking**: Diesel cracking is strong, while gasoline cracking is downward, corresponding to weak US gasoline consumption. The long - term supply reduction of Saudi and Russia supports diesel cracking [20]. - **Global Diesel Inventory**: Diesel inventories in the US and China are at multi - year lows, while the inventory in Northwest Europe is neutral, and Singapore's middle distillate inventory is declining [23]. - **US Gasoline Demand**: US gasoline demand slumped during the peak driving season, with inventory being neutral. Low demand at current prices deepens the expectation of poor US consumption in the second half of the year [26]. - **Domestic Anti - Involution**: It has little impact on crude oil supply. If it occurs in refineries, it may be bearish for crude oil but bullish for chemical by - products [29]. - **Tariff Negotiations**: The US has made progress in some tariff negotiations. Attention should be paid to the results and final tax rates, which may affect the US economy and Fed policies [30]. - **North American Hurricane Forecast**: This year's hurricane activity is expected to be 60% above average, which may disrupt supply. Currently, there is no hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico, but there is a potential cyclone [32]. 3. Price, Spread, and Cracking - **Crude Oil Futures and Spot Prices**: Multiple charts show the trends of various crude oil futures and spot prices, including OPEC, WTI, Brent, etc. [35][52] - **Crude Oil Positions**: The positions of WTI and Brent futures and options are presented, including those of management funds, producers, etc. [37][40] - **Crude Oil Futures Structure and Month - Spread**: The futures structure and month - spread of WTI, Brent, Oman, and SC are shown [43][46] - **Cross - Market Spreads**: Cross - market futures and spot spreads, such as Brent - WTI, are presented [49][52] - **Saudi OSP**: Saudi's official selling prices (OSP) for different grades of oil to different regions in August and July are provided, showing price changes [59] - **Refined Product Prices and Cracking**: The prices and cracking spreads of refined products, including gasoline, diesel, etc., in different regions are presented [64][72] 4. Supply - Demand Inventory Balance Sheet - **Global Crude Oil Supply**: The supply of global, non - OPEC, OPEC, and OPEC+ crude oil is shown, with forecasts [85] - **Non - OPEC and OPEC Supply by Country**: The supply of non - OPEC countries (US, Russia, China, etc.) and OPEC countries (Saudi, Iraq, etc.) is presented [88][94] - **Global Rig Count**: The number of oil rigs in the US, Canada, and globally is shown [100] - **Refinery Shutdowns**: The shutdown volumes of CDU and FCC units globally and in different regions are presented [106][108] - **Global Crude Oil Demand**: The demand of OECD, non - OECD, and global crude oil is shown, with forecasts [110] - **Crude Oil Inventory**: The inventories of the US, OECD, and other regions, including commercial and strategic inventories, are presented [119] - **EIA Balance Sheet**: The EIA's supply, consumption, and balance data for 2025 and 2026 are provided [140] 5. EIA Weekly Report and Others - **EIA Weekly Report Main Data**: Data on crude oil production, commercial inventory, refinery utilization rate, etc., are presented [155] - **Supply and Demand Data**: Data on the production of various refined products, refinery demand, terminal demand, and inventory are provided [158][164][167] - **Inventory Data**: Data on crude oil and refined product inventories, including commercial and strategic inventories, are presented [173][176] - **Import and Export**: Not detailed in the remaining content

Report Summary - The report is an asphalt weekly report released by AVIC Futures on July 25, 2025 [2] - The current asphalt fundamentals show a pattern of weak supply and demand. The weekly production and operating rate on the supply side decreased, while the shipment volume on the demand side increased slightly. The decline in factory inventory was lower than the decrease in production, indicating poor sales for refineries, and the social inventory increased slightly, suggesting weak downstream demand [6] - Crude oil currently lacks a core driving factor. Seasonal peak - season consumption demand and improved macro - risk sentiment provide some upward momentum, but OPEC+ continuous production increase suppresses the oil price rebound expectation. It is expected that the oil price will continue to fluctuate widely in a "strong reality, weak expectation" pattern. The asphalt supply - demand contradiction is not prominent, and crude oil fluctuations will dominate the market trend [6] - The trading strategy suggests paying attention to the range of 3550 - 3700 yuan/ton for the BU2509 contract [7] Multi - empty Focus - The multi - factors for asphalt are marginal improvement in supply - demand and low inventory, while the empty factors are lower - than - expected demand and high supply [10] Macro Analysis Trade Agreements - China and the US will hold a new round of economic and trade talks from July 27 - 30 in Sweden [11] - The US and Japan reached a trade agreement on July 23, including issues such as a 15% tariff and supply - chain cooperation [11] - The EU voted to impose counter - tariffs on $93 billion worth of US products on July 24. The EU plans to merge two retaliatory tariff lists into one [11] - US President Trump said on July 23 that the US will impose simple tariffs of 15% - 50% on most other countries [11] Oil Market Forecasts - OPEC maintains the 2025 global crude oil demand growth forecast at 1.29 million barrels per day and the 2026 forecast at 1.28 million barrels per day. It also maintains economic growth forecasts for this year and next year. In June, OPEC's crude oil production increased by 220,000 barrels per day to 27.235 million barrels per day [12] - IEA lowers the 2025 average oil demand growth forecast from 720,000 barrels per day to 704,000 barrels per day and the 2026 forecast from 740,000 to 722,000 barrels per day. It raises the 2025 global oil supply growth forecast from 1.8 million to 2.1 million barrels per day and the 2026 forecast from 1.1 million to 1.3 million barrels per day [12] - The OPEC monthly report is relatively neutral, while the IEA report is relatively pessimistic, maintaining the expectation of crude oil supply surplus [12] Data Analysis Supply - In June, OPEC's crude oil production was 27.237 million barrels per day, a month - on - month increase of 221,000 barrels per day, mainly contributed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. However, it is still lower than the production increase plan [13] - As of July 25, the domestic asphalt weekly production was 516,000 tons, a decrease of 56,000 tons from the previous week. The increase in refinery maintenance plans led to a slight decline in production, but there is potential for a seasonal rebound in the third quarter [15] - As of July 23, the operating rate of domestic asphalt sample enterprises was 28.8%, a decrease of 4 percentage points from the previous statistical period. The decline was more obvious in South China and Shandong. The reasons include refineries adjusting production plans and seasonal demand disturbances [24] Demand - As of July 25, the domestic asphalt weekly shipment volume was 415,000 tons, an increase of 10,000 tons from the previous week. The shipment volume has increased slightly for three consecutive weeks but is still lower than that at the beginning of June, indicating a phased weakening of demand due to southern rainfall [25] - As of July 25, the domestic modified asphalt weekly capacity utilization rate was 14.46%, a decrease of 0.09 percentage points from the previous week. The capacity utilization rate was flat in most regions this week [28] Import and Export - In June, domestic asphalt imports were 375,700 tons, a month - on - month decrease of 22,000 tons (5.51%) and a year - on - year increase of 32.56%. The cumulative imports from January - June were 1.725 million tons, a cumulative year - on - year decrease of 11.53% [35] - In June, domestic asphalt exports were 29,700 tons, a month - on - month decrease of 25,600 tons. The cumulative exports from January - June were 279,300 tons, a cumulative year - on - year increase of 53.36% [38] Inventory - As of July 25, the domestic asphalt sample enterprise factory inventory was 723,000 tons, a week - on - week decrease of 38,000 tons. The decline in factory inventory was lower than the decrease in production, indicating poor sales for refineries [48] - As of July 25, the domestic asphalt social inventory was 1.352 million tons, a week - on - week increase of 33,000 tons. The increase was due to the impact of typhoons and rainfall in the southern region on demand [55] Spread - As of July 25, the domestic asphalt processing dilution weekly profit was - 514.2 yuan/ton, a month - on - month increase of 9.9 yuan/ton. As of July 23, the asphalt - to - crude oil ratio was 54.94, and as of July 24, the asphalt basis was 133 yuan/ton. The asphalt cracking spread declined this week due to the phased weakening of asphalt fundamentals [60]

Core Viewpoint - TSMC's second factory in Kumamoto, Japan, is delayed until the first half of 2029 due to weakened orders from major clients and the need for local traffic improvements [1][2][3]. Group 1: Factory Development Timeline - TSMC's first factory in Kumamoto is set to begin production in late 2024, focusing on 12/16nm and 22/28nm chips, with a monthly capacity of approximately 55,000 wafers [1]. - The second factory's construction is postponed to 2025, with production of 6/7nm chips expected to start by the end of 2027, bringing total monthly capacity across both factories to over 100,000 wafers [1][2]. Group 2: Reasons for Delay - The delay in the second factory's timeline is attributed to a lack of urgent demand for advanced processes from Japanese clients, despite government support for AI initiatives [3]. - TSMC's increased investment in Arizona, totaling $165 billion, is prioritized to meet the strong demand for AI chips in the U.S., impacting the urgency of the Kumamoto factory [3]. Group 3: Financial Aspects - The total investment for both Kumamoto factories is approximately 2.96 trillion yen, with the Japanese government providing up to 1.2 trillion yen in subsidies [4].