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外媒热议默茨访华:中国不再是“学生”,德国应乐见
Guan Cha Zhe Wang· 2026-02-26 03:51
【文/观察者网 王恺雯】 2月25日上午,德国总理默茨乘机抵达北京首都国际机场,成为农历马年首位访华的外国领导人。 这是默茨去年5月上任以来首次访华。在欧美盟友关系受到冲击、德国经济持续低迷的背景下,此次访 问被视为德国重新校准对华政策的重要一步。 很多人都注意到默茨对这趟旅程的用心:上周,他专门邀请几名中国问题专家一同用餐,聆听他们的建 议。 2026年2月25日晚,北京,结束访华首日行程,德国总理默茨在北京发表讲话。 IC Photo "我们都比特朗普来得早" "柏林与北京相隔近7500公里。多年来我们一直很乐于跨越这段距离。对我而言,维护并深化我们的外 交和经济关系十分重要。为实现这一目标,我们需要开放的对话渠道。"抵达北京后,默茨在社交平台 X用中文写道。 德国《明镜》周刊称,以缺乏耐心著称的默茨,在大约两个小时的时间里不断追问,做着笔记。与会者 形容,他比前任朔尔茨"听得更认真"。 德国媒体也早早列出陪同默茨访华的企业代表,包括拜耳制药、大众汽车、西门子、阿迪达斯、奔驰、 空客的高管。这个规模,堪称默克尔时代以来之最。 为期两天的访华行程,默茨除了在北京和中国领导人举行会晤,还将前往杭州,到访中国机 ...
德经济学家:当世界第二大和第三大经济体加强合作,将为世界带来什么?
Sou Hu Cai Jing· 2026-02-25 09:55
德国维尔茨堡大学经济学教授、德国经济专家委员会前委员彼得•博芬格2月25日在《中国日报》撰文指出,中 德关系长期建立在比较优势与分工合作之上,是全球经济稳定的重要支点。事实表明,新能源、双向投资与产 业协同不仅有利于中德,也有助于维护多极世界与全球供应链稳定。 文章称,在全球经济的复杂脉络中,中德伙伴关系是联结最紧密的双边关系之一。几十年来,这段关系展现互 利共赢的特征,印证了"现代经济学之父"亚当·斯密关于分工互利的基本观点。 2月25日上午,德国总理默茨抵达北京,开始对中国进行为期两天的正式访问。(新华社图) 在当前地缘政治紧张和保护主义浪潮的冲击的关键时刻,中德关系已不再只是关乎贸易平衡或企业利润,而可 以成为全球稳定的基石。 (英文原文刊发于《中国日报》智享汇栏目 编辑: 王辉 周凤梅 朱萍 中德关系的历史成功源于优势互补。通过直接对华投资和合资企业,德国企业不仅带来资金,还转让技术并建 立高工业标准。作为回报,德国在中国找到了最具活力的增长市场,德国工业巨头和中小企业得以扩大经营规 模,为研发筹集资金,走在世界前列。时至今日,这一传统仍在延续,例如德国化工巨头巴斯夫在广东湛江投 资100亿欧元新建的 ...
美国再加25%关税,特朗普半路开香槟庆祝,中国:抛售700亿美债
Sou Hu Cai Jing· 2026-02-12 01:05
前言 白宫欢庆AI芯片关税大棒落下,以为按下"核按钮"锁死对手未来? 殊不知,大洋彼岸的北京金融街,一场更深远的金融反击已悄然进行:700亿美元美债被静默抛售,这 哪里是贸易战,分明是一场关于美元信用的窒息游戏。 硅谷上空的黑色幽默 让我们先回到那场在华盛顿被视为"胜利"的关税庆典。 现在的硅谷,空气里弥漫的可不是香槟味,而是焦虑烧焦电路板的味道。就在白宫为了"保护本土供应 链"而沾沾自喜时,一张张来自独立机构的财务分析报告,如同冷水泼在了那些科技新贵的脸上。 那个被寄予厚望的25%关税壁垒,在现实的物理世界里撞得粉碎。数据不会撒谎:高达92%的关税成 本,最终并没有像回旋镖一样打在对手身上,而是结结实实地砸在了美国本土进口商的账单里。 你可以想象一下这个画面:一家位于帕洛阿尔托的AI初创公司,原本计划将这季度的预算全部投入大 模型训练,现在却不得不把这笔救命钱划拨给海关账户。对于他们来说,这哪里是保护?这简直是"友 军火力覆盖"。 更讽刺的是物理层面的阻滞。 在这个算力即权力的时代,时间就是一切。但这道行政令,硬生生把原本流畅的物流周期拉长了3-4 周。这三四周的时间,足够竞争对手迭代出一个新的算法版本,而 ...
华尔街面临新风险:欧洲投资者“罢买”美国资产
财联社· 2026-01-25 03:55
Core Viewpoint - Foreign investors, particularly from Europe, have played a crucial role in driving U.S. stock market highs, but increasing tensions in U.S.-Europe relations under President Trump's potential second term may lead to a withdrawal of these key buyers from the market [1][5] Group 1: European Investment Trends - European investors currently hold approximately $10.4 trillion in U.S. stock assets, with over half coming from eight countries previously threatened by tariffs [2][4] - The trend of reducing reliance on U.S. assets has been noted since April 2025 and has accelerated recently, as indicated by Amundi SA's Chief Investment Officer [1][5] - European investors' holdings in U.S. stocks have increased by 91% over the past three years, amounting to about $4.9 trillion, driven by both continued purchases and rising asset prices [6] Group 2: Market Risks and Reactions - The potential for a coordinated sell-off of U.S. assets by European investors is low, but the ongoing threats from Trump have led to increased inquiries from asset managers about reducing exposure to U.S. assets [5][8] - Although direct sell-offs of U.S. stocks have been limited so far, the situation adds a new risk factor to an already historically high U.S. stock market valuation [8] - The Canadian Prime Minister highlighted the need for countries reliant on U.S. financial integration to reconsider their relationships due to the weaponization of interdependence by Trump [9] Group 3: Future Outlook - There is a possibility that the weight of U.S. assets in global asset allocation may be adjusted in the long term, as investors may no longer fully trust the dollar or U.S. assets [10] - The current environment suggests that investors should be cautious about having all their assets exposed to U.S. stocks or the dollar [8][11]
对华贸易战输得彻底,美国人猛然发现,印度一直在给中国送钱
Sou Hu Cai Jing· 2026-01-23 09:39
Core Viewpoint - The ongoing trade war between the US and China has not yielded the expected results for the US, as the trade deficit with China remains significant despite high tariffs and efforts to shift supply chains to countries like India [1][11]. Group 1: US-China Trade Relations - Since the initiation of tariffs in 2018, the US aimed to reduce its trade deficit with China and bring manufacturing back to the US or to other countries [1]. - By 2024, US tariffs on Chinese goods covered hundreds of billions of dollars, yet the trade deficit with China did not significantly decrease, with bilateral trade reaching $582.5 billion [1]. - The Biden administration continued to promote supply chain diversification, particularly through initiatives like the CHIPS Act, but the effectiveness of these measures remains questionable [1]. Group 2: India's Role in the Supply Chain - India has emerged as a potential alternative to China for manufacturing, with significant growth in exports, particularly in sectors like smartphones, where exports reached $6.96 billion in 2024 [2]. - Despite India's rising exports, it remains heavily reliant on Chinese components, with two-thirds of electronic components imported from China [5]. - The trade relationship between India and China is complex, as India's imports from China are growing at a rate twice that of its overall import growth [4]. Group 3: Challenges in Decoupling from China - India's manufacturing sector continues to depend on Chinese parts, with critical components for electronics and pharmaceuticals sourced from China [5][7]. - The trade deficit with China is projected to reach $99.2 billion by 2025, indicating that India's attempts to reduce reliance on China have not yet succeeded [9]. - India's efforts to decouple from China face significant hurdles, including the need for time to build domestic capabilities and reduce dependency on Chinese technology and components [11][19]. Group 4: Future Outlook - The Indian government plans to implement targeted tariffs and incentives to reduce reliance on Chinese imports and enhance local production capabilities [17]. - India is also focusing on building strategic reserves of critical minerals, such as rare earth elements, to support its manufacturing ambitions [19]. - The path to decoupling from China is expected to be long and challenging, with India's industrial position still needing significant improvement to compete effectively [11][19].
突发!美韩将成立稀土合资企业,目标2027年运营,或重构新格局
Sou Hu Cai Jing· 2026-01-17 11:42
Core Viewpoint - The ongoing global competition over rare earth elements is intensifying, particularly in the context of the U.S.-China rare earth conflict, with the U.S. implementing strategic measures following the G7 finance ministers' meeting in January 2026 [1][2]. Group 1: Economic Impact - The G7's decisions have minimal direct economic impact on China, as the related trade volume is relatively low. However, from the perspective of supply chain security, this poses significant challenges for the U.S. and Europe, potentially undermining their high-tech industries reliant on rare earths [2]. - Rare earths are critical resources for sectors such as renewable energy, semiconductors, and military applications, and a disruption in their supply could lead to severe consequences for the industrial base in the U.S. and Europe [2]. Group 2: Collaborative Efforts - A notable example of collaboration is the partnership between South Korea and the U.S., where Korea Zinc announced a joint venture with an American company to secure rare earth material supplies. This venture aims to establish a processing facility with a capacity of 100 tons per year by 2027 [5]. - The joint venture will utilize existing domestic raw materials in the U.S. to produce the necessary rare earth oxides for American manufacturers, showcasing a strategic move to bolster local supply chains [5]. Group 3: Domestic Initiatives - The U.S. government is investing $750 million to assist two domestic rare earth companies in expanding their magnet production capacity, aiming to reduce reliance on China [8]. - Plans are underway to lift the mining ban in Minnesota to activate local copper, nickel, and cobalt resources, addressing supply shortages in the rare earth sector [8]. Group 4: Competitive Dynamics - The U.S. Department of Defense plans to subsidize the price difference for two commonly used rare earth elements, neodymium and praseodymium, at $110 per kilogram, which may inadvertently increase costs for U.S. industries reliant on these materials [10]. - The strategy of creating a "small circle" to exclude China may lead to increased resource prices, negatively impacting the competitiveness of U.S. companies in the renewable energy and semiconductor sectors [10]. Group 5: Strategic Recommendations - To navigate this competitive landscape, it is essential for China to strengthen its rare earth processing technology and develop recycling industries while optimizing its strategic material reserve system [12]. - Expanding multilateral cooperation and addressing slow updates in reserve lists and insufficient commercial reserve vitality are critical for maintaining resilience in the supply chain [12].
特朗普紧急发文,直言美国可能要完,中国或成为其自救的关键
Sou Hu Cai Jing· 2026-01-17 05:35
Group 1 - The current political climate in the U.S. is marked by deep systemic crisis, as indicated by President Trump's alarming statements about the potential collapse of the nation [1] - The Supreme Court is reviewing a significant case regarding the legality of tariffs, which could have a more substantial impact than a localized war, potentially affecting the financial backbone of the U.S. [2] - Trump's reliance on tariffs as a tool for economic strategy has backfired, with the courts ruling that his unilateral tariff actions are unconstitutional, leading to a critical situation for U.S. finances [4] Group 2 - If the Supreme Court upholds the previous ruling, the U.S. may face catastrophic consequences, including the need to refund hundreds of billions of dollars in tariffs and potential claims from global companies, which could total trillions [6] - The economic control measures implemented under the guise of national security have ironically created severe risks to the nation, undermining Trump's foreign policy strategies [7] - The U.S. is experiencing increasing isolation as former allies shift towards cooperation with China, highlighting the fragility of Western unity in the face of shifting interests [8] Group 3 - The U.S. economy's reliance on China is underscored by the significant bilateral trade volume, which reached $688.3 billion in 2024, indicating the critical role China plays in U.S. supply chains [10] - American multinational companies depend heavily on the Chinese market for profits, which is essential for their global operations, suggesting that any reduction in trade barriers could alleviate corporate burdens [12] - The U.S. Treasury's proposed fiscal alternatives will be ineffective without cooperation from China, emphasizing the interdependence of the two economies [13] Group 4 - Recent communications from Trump's team suggest a potential softening of the U.S. stance towards China, indicating a shift from pressure tactics to pragmatic engagement aimed at stabilizing supply chains and economic order [15] - The situation serves as a lesson for those clinging to the notion of unilateral dominance, as the U.S. faces the reality of its diminished capacity to exert power without considering the economic interdependencies with China [17] - The economic relationship between the U.S. and China is characterized by mutual support and interdependence, challenging the narrative of one-sided dominance and highlighting the need for a balanced approach to avoid future crises [18]
特朗普明示“子弹上膛”,收拾伊朗前,他要先给中国来个下马威?
Sou Hu Cai Jing· 2026-01-13 10:38
Core Viewpoint - The article discusses President Trump's announcement of a 25% punitive tariff on all countries engaging in trade with Iran, emphasizing the strategic ambiguity and potential implications for global trade dynamics [1][3][10]. Group 1: Tariff Implications - The punitive tariffs are aimed at countries with "commercial ties" to Iran, creating uncertainty for nations like India and Turkey, which are already managing complex supply chains [5][7]. - This "long-arm jurisdiction" approach simplifies global supply chains into a binary choice, pressuring countries to align with U.S. policies or face tariffs [7][12]. Group 2: U.S.-Iran Trade Dynamics - The significant trade volume between China and Iran is viewed as a challenge to U.S. interests, with the U.S. aiming to disrupt this relationship to reinforce its geopolitical strategy in the Asia-Pacific region [9][10]. - The tariffs could impose hidden costs on Chinese goods, creating a perception that products from China are "tainted" if they are linked to Iranian trade [12][18]. Group 3: Political Context - The timing of the tariff announcement coincides with legal scrutiny over Trump's use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, suggesting a strategy to create a "national security crisis" to bolster his authority [14][16]. - The article posits that Trump's aggressive tariff strategy may backfire, leading to a shift away from dollar dependence and the establishment of alternative economic systems among emerging markets [25][27]. Group 4: Global Economic Response - Countries like Iran have developed mechanisms to circumvent U.S. dollar dominance, including expanding the use of the yuan and barter systems, which could insulate them from U.S. sanctions [21][23]. - The article warns that Trump's tariff strategy may inadvertently accelerate the formation of a parallel economic system that excludes U.S. participation, potentially undermining the established international order [25][27].
中国竟然对日本稀土出口暴涨,高市早苗紧急向美求援,要下台了?
Sou Hu Cai Jing· 2026-01-04 05:20
Group 1 - Japan's Prime Minister, Kishi Sanae, is predicted to resign this year due to increasing internal and external pressures [1] - China's rare earth exports to Japan surged to 304 tons in November 2025, a 34.7% increase from October, marking the highest annual record [5][11] - The increase in rare earth imports is attributed to Japanese companies stockpiling in response to fears of supply disruptions, rather than a rise in market demand [13][15] Group 2 - Japan's manufacturing sector remains heavily reliant on Chinese supply chains, undermining claims of "decoupling" from China [15][16] - The Japanese government has announced a significant increase in the departure tax from 1,000 yen to 3,000 yen, impacting both foreign tourists and Japanese citizens traveling abroad [20][22] - The introduction of new taxes, including a "defense tax," reflects a shift towards fiscal measures to support military ambitions amid economic challenges [24][26] Group 3 - High levels of anxiety are evident in Japan's political landscape, with Kishi avoiding provocative actions such as visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, indicating a lack of confidence [41] - The U.S. military's increased presence in the region adds to Japan's geopolitical pressures, complicating its security situation [39][43] - The combination of corporate panic, capital flight, and public discontent over military funding creates a precarious situation for Japan's economy and governance [47][48]
一个针对中国的联盟成立了,几个亚洲国家已经加入,中国提前把话说明白了
Sou Hu Cai Jing· 2025-12-25 03:23
Core Viewpoint - The "Silicon Peace Initiative" is perceived as a strategic blockade against China, particularly targeting its rare earth supply chain rather than a genuine symbol of technological cooperation [1][2][3]. Group 1: Alliance Composition and Intentions - The alliance includes Japan, South Korea, Israel, Singapore, and others, which appear united but have differing motivations and are not fully committed to U.S. directives [4][5]. - The member countries possess significant resources and capabilities, such as Japan's precision manufacturing and Australia's untapped mineral resources, which theoretically could create a high-end technology supply chain independent of China [5][6]. - However, the practical implementation of this alliance is hindered by conflicting national interests and economic dependencies on China [11][19]. Group 2: Economic Dependencies - Countries like South Korea and Japan have substantial economic ties with China, with South Korea relying on Chinese supply chains for over 70% of its semiconductor packaging and testing [10][17]. - Japan's automotive sales in China account for nearly 40% of its global sales, while Singapore's port activities are heavily linked to China [17]. - The alliance's members face challenges in reducing their reliance on China without incurring significant economic costs, which could lead to increased operational expenses and loss of competitiveness [19][21]. Group 3: Challenges of the Initiative - The initiative has not produced concrete projects or investment plans, remaining largely symbolic with little actual progress [12][13]. - Internal conflicts among member countries, such as disputes over semiconductor materials and pricing of critical minerals, complicate collaboration [19][27]. - The attempt to create a "de-China" supply chain contradicts the established global industrial dynamics, where China's dominance in rare earths is based on decades of industrial development [21][29]. Group 4: China's Position and Response - China controls 60% of global rare earth production and 90% of refining capacity, making it difficult for other countries to replicate this supply chain without significant investment and time [21][23]. - Despite the geopolitical tensions, China continues to engage in international cooperation on rare earth projects, emphasizing a market-oriented approach rather than using its resources as a political weapon [36][39]. - China's ongoing investments in rare earth research and development indicate a commitment to maintaining its competitive edge in this sector [37][41]. Group 5: Future Outlook - The "Silicon Peace Initiative" is likely to remain ineffective unless it addresses the fundamental issue of producing high-performance rare earth materials without relying on China [47]. - The global supply chain is expected to continue evolving based on market dynamics rather than political declarations, with China's role remaining central due to its manufacturing and technological capabilities [45][46].