点击小程序查看报告原文 Abstract 摘要 在我们跟踪的三个主要的外汇交易策略中，价值策略取代套息策略，成为了今年迄今为止最好的外汇交易策略。而套息策略继去年第三季度之后，在今年 4月份再度遭遇关税的外生冲击，该策略虽然仍为正收益，但高波动令其性价比在2025年显著回落。套息头寸较大的亚洲货币则在5月份继续面临平仓压 力。趋势策略则成为了三大策略中唯一亏损的策略。美元指数虽然从高位下跌了10%，但做空美元的负carry以及汇率短期波动的不确定性让"追涨杀跌"成 为了收益性相对较差的策略。 2025年迄今为止，全球外汇市场围绕着美国政府政策的各种不确定性展开交易。在1月特朗普正式上任后，美元指数在多重利空的影响下下跌了超过 10%。一季度美元的弱势源自于某些政策支票并未兑现所带来的特朗普交易退坡，而从二季度开始，多重利空继续推动美元破位下行。4月2日之后，我们 认为美元的下跌主要源自3方面的交易：一是关税对美国经济的不确定性的影响。与2018年的中美关税摩擦不同，美元指数与关税不确定性在今年4月之后 呈现反向的相关关系。而欧元、日元、瑞郎是规避关税风险的三个主要的避险货币，相对美元走势强劲。二是对"海湖庄园 ...

Report Industry Investment Rating - Not provided in the content Core Viewpoints of the Report - The bond market in 2025 has entered a state of "low interest rates + narrow spreads + high volatility," and in the second half of the year, there may be two characteristics: the return of the pricing anchor and a favorable period for action from June to August [4]. - External demand expectations are volatile, but the bond market mainly prices domestic demand. The core contradiction in the domestic economy lies in shrinking demand and weakening expectations, with insufficient endogenous economic momentum [4][138]. - The focus of monetary policy in 2025 is different from that in 2023 - 2024, emphasizing seizing opportunities, considering both domestic and external factors, and effectively stabilizing asset prices [5]. - The pricing anchor has returned, and the policy rate determines funds, which in turn price bonds. June - August is a good window for long - position operations in the bond market [7]. Summary by Relevant Catalogs 1. Analysis of the Bond Market Trend from January to Date and Its Macroeconomic Logic - **Market Trends in Different Periods**: In Q1 2025, tight funds and significant bank liability pressure led to a bond market correction; in Q2, repeated tariff expectations and reserve requirement ratio and interest rate cuts caused yields to decline rapidly to a low level and then fluctuate [44]. - **New Features of the Bond Market in 2025**: The central bank's policy rate has become the floor of the money market; short - term bonds perform weakly and are more affected by funds, while long - term bonds have larger fluctuations and are difficult to grasp; the overall fundamentals are stable, but tariff pulses have a significant impact, and the stock and bond markets are greatly influenced by short - term risk preferences [36][43][44]. - **Credit Spreads and Strategies**: The credit spreads of medium - term notes and commercial bank secondary capital bonds have compressed. For credit spreads to return to the low point in August 2024, liquidity easing expectations need to be fulfilled, and liability expansion is required [23][44]. - **Performance of Duration Strategies**: Duration strategies in 2025 have not achieved stable returns, with inconsistent performance in different months [24][26]. - **Asset Returns Reflecting Expectations**: In 2025, the bond market rose while the stock market fell, and the difficulty of bond market timing has increased. Economic pessimistic expectations have been somewhat revised [27][29][32] 2. Changes in External and Domestic Demand and the Core Contradictions in the Bond Market - **External Demand and the "Triffin Dilemma"**: The core of the "Triffin Dilemma" is the long - term coexistence of the global nature of the US dollar's credit and trade deficits. The US faces dual deficits (trade deficit + fiscal deficit), which are more important than tariffs. The US dollar's high valuation affects its export competitiveness, and the demand for US Treasuries is weak, while the supply pressure of refinancing at maturity persists [55][61][138]. - **The "Sea Lake Manor Agreement"**: It aims to restructure global trade through tariffs, weaken the value of the US dollar, and reduce the debt scale and borrowing costs in the US Treasury market. Specific measures may include replacing foreign - held US Treasuries with ultra - long - term zero - coupon bonds and asking countries to cooperate in lowering the US dollar exchange rate [66]. - **US Economic Situation**: US consumer spending has weakened, corporate inventories have increased, and inflation expectations remain high. Tariff impacts may gradually appear in the second and third quarters of 2025, and China's external demand may further decline [67][68][69]. - **Exchange Rate and Domestic Policy**: The exchange rate factor no longer poses a rigid constraint on domestic monetary easing. Short - term "rush to export" supports external demand, but it is likely to decline in the medium term, and the bond market mainly prices domestic demand [77][86][138]. - **Domestic Economic Core Contradictions**: The core contradictions in the domestic economy are shrinking demand and weakening expectations, with insufficient endogenous economic momentum. Demand contraction is characterized by low prices and weak consumption willingness. Expectations are weakening for both residents and enterprises [88][92][138]. - **New and Old Economic Momentum Switching**: The domestic economy is undergoing a switch between new and old economic momentum. The influence of old momentum on the economy is weakening, while the influence of new momentum is accelerating but still has a low proportion [109][112][115]. - **Domestic Policy and Economic Rebound**: Fiscal policy is playing an increasingly active role, and the coordination between monetary and fiscal policies has entered a new stage. However, local governments are still mainly focused on debt resolution. The pressure of asset shortage has been alleviated but not completely eliminated [116][123][138] 3. Central Bank Liquidity: Loose Trading vs. Macro - Prudential Management - **Differences in Monetary Policy Focus**: In 2023, the focus was on reserve requirement ratio and interest rate cuts to support post - pandemic economic recovery; in 2024, it was to promote the transformation of the monetary policy regulatory framework and remove obstacles to interest rate decline; in 2025, it emphasizes seizing opportunities, considering both domestic and external factors, and stabilizing asset prices [5][141][146]. - **Concerns about Liquidity in the Second Half of the Year** - **Reducing Liability Costs**: Deposit transfer disturbances have attenuated; the reset of time deposits may relieve bank liability costs starting from September 2025; if the Q2 research value of the insurance预定 rate remains below 2.25%, the insurance预定 rate may be lowered in Q3 [164][167][175]. - **Reserve Requirement Ratio and Interest Rate Cuts**: There may be a 10 - 20bps interest rate cut in the second half of the year, mainly triggered by the need to support the real estate market. A 50bps reserve requirement ratio cut may be necessary in the second half of the year if the economic data in Q3 are still volatile [180][184]. - **Central Bank Bond Purchases**: The resumption of central bank bond purchases may be approaching, and the purchase intensity may be significant during the second wave of net supply peaks (likely from August to September) [188]. - **Funds Rate Pricing**: The policy rate may become the implicit lower limit of the funds rate [189]. - **Relationship between Loose Trading and Macro - Prudential Management**: In Q1 2025, macro - prudential management played a role in releasing bond market risks, while in Q2, loose trading took precedence. Attention should be paid to whether macro - prudential management will regain the upper hand after the end of loose trading around Q4 [6]. - **Future Monetary Policy Reform Measures**: Consider narrowing the interest rate corridor and reforming the reserve requirement system [6] 4. Return of the Pricing Anchor and the Favorable Period for Action - **Return of the Pricing Anchor**: Open Market Operations (OMO) has become the implicit lower limit of funds, and certificates of deposit (CDs) have become the implicit lower limit of 10 - year Treasury bonds. The conditions for the decline of CDs are likely to be met in Q3 2025 [7]. - **Favorable Period for Action**: June - August is a good window for long - position operations in the bond market. The bond market strategy should focus on liquidity - favorable areas and band - trading opportunities. The yield - to - maturity (YTM) of 10 - year Treasury bonds is expected to be in the range of 1.5% - 1.7% in the next quarter and 1.4% - 1.8% in the next half - year [7]. - **Asset Allocation in the Second Half of the Year**: Convertible bonds > medium - and short - term credit risk - taking > interest rate duration extension in the fixed - income asset allocation in the second half of the year [7]

Core Viewpoint - The weakening of the US dollar is primarily a result of market trading and uncertainty, leading investors to reduce their overweight positions in US assets [1][3] Group 1: Dollar Weakness and Market Reactions - The dollar index has fallen below 100, with Asian currencies appreciating significantly [1] - The so-called "Mar-a-Lago Agreement" has been cited as a catalyst for the weak dollar, suggesting that the dollar has been overvalued due to its status as the world's primary reserve currency [1][3] - UBS's chief economist, Arend Kapteyn, emphasizes that the dollar's weakness is not a deliberate policy but a byproduct of market uncertainty [3] Group 2: US Debt Concerns - Concerns regarding US debt remain, with 10-year and 30-year Treasury yields nearing 4.5% and 5% respectively [4] - The rise in Treasury yields is attributed to high government financing needs and market worries about increasing debt supply [4][5] - Despite rising yields, foreign investors have not reduced their holdings, while local investors are decreasing their positions [5] Group 3: Tax Policy and Fiscal Impact - The new tax policy proposed by Trump is not expected to significantly increase the fiscal deficit, as it is characterized as a "illusionary expansion" rather than a true tax cut [8] - The tax plan aims to extend personal tax cuts and increase standard deductions, while also including significant spending cuts [8] - The plan is projected to reduce taxes by approximately $4 trillion over the next decade, but it also includes substantial cuts to programs like Medicaid [8] Group 4: Trade Negotiation Challenges - Ongoing trade negotiations between the US and EU are critical, with both sides facing significant misalignment in their demands [9] - The US aims to increase tariff revenues, which reached a record high in April, while the EU seeks to lower tariffs to zero [9][10] - The potential for increased tariffs could lead to higher inflation, with estimates suggesting core PCE inflation could rise to 3.5% under current tariff structures [10]

Core Viewpoint - The U.S. government maintains a "strong dollar" policy, dismissing speculations about a shift towards a "weak dollar" or secret currency agreements [1][9][10]. Group 1: Strong Dollar Policy - Stephen Miran, Chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, confirmed the commitment to a "strong dollar" policy, refuting any claims of secret currency agreements during trade negotiations [1][3][4]. - Following Miran's statements, the U.S. dollar index rose by 0.5% to 100.1216 before slightly retreating [2]. - Miran emphasized that the strong dollar is not just about exchange rates but also concerns the stability of the dollar system and its structural advantages as the global reserve currency [10]. Group 2: Trade and Economic Strategy - Miran addressed concerns regarding tariffs, economic deficits, and potential recession, stating that the recent market volatility is expected during policy adjustments [11][13]. - He noted that while companies might delay investments or hiring, this does not indicate an impending recession, but rather a temporary shift in timing [14]. - The administration is engaged in trade negotiations with over 20 countries, expecting to finalize multiple agreements in the coming months, which could significantly boost U.S. exports and help reduce the trade deficit [15]. Group 3: Fiscal Deficit and Tax Policy - Miran criticized the Biden administration for leaving behind a challenging fiscal situation while defending the current fiscal strategy [16][17]. - He argued that fiscal deficits should occur during genuine crises, not during stable economic periods, and that assessments of deficits should consider various factors beyond static evaluations [18]. - Despite market challenges, Miran expressed confidence in the administration's core economic strategy, which focuses on tax reform, deregulation, and energy independence [19][20].

斯蒂芬•米兰认为美元储备地位、美元高估和贸易逆差面临取舍，高估的美元让制造业 竞争力下降，但也维系"美元霸权"。如何改革逆差过大和制造业衰落？ 文丨陈稻田 特朗普的经济顾问委员会主席斯蒂芬•米兰（Stephen Miran）在经济学博士毕业后立刻进入 华尔街做外汇交易，在今年2月份参议院的任职听证会上，他表示这段市场考验让他不再"书 生气"，而是开始"接地气"。在解释为什么他可以胜任总统经济顾问一职时，米兰表示他的普 通家庭背景让他会更关注普通人；而导师费尔德斯坦（曾经是里根的经济顾问）和米兰讨论 论文的时候总是要求说："假想我是参议员，你说的东西要让我能听懂"，米兰表示这个训练 也让他做好了和职业政治家交流的准备。2024年11月大选之前不久，还在一家投资基金担任 策略师的米兰写下了一篇策论文章，讨论特朗普胜选后可能以及应该的各种经济策略、取 舍、以及风险考量，其中详细讨论了名为"海湖庄园协议"的新国际金融体系。很自然，在他 获得重用后"海湖庄园协议"在美国内外都获得了相当的关注。 阅读更多内容请点击下方"阅读原文" （本文由FT中文网提供） 编者荐语： 日本经济新闻社与金融时报2015年11月合并为同一家 ...

以下文章来源于大势看财经 ，作者张一 大势看财经 . 《财经》杂志宏观学术部团队以独立、独家、独到的信念为读者提供原创的宏观政策解读、部委政策动 向、经济趋势前瞻以及名家前沿观察 美国有意无意推动美元贬值的行为对国际金融体系的影响有可能在未来进一步显现，金融市场的巨幅 波动不可避免。 张一 恒泰证券 研究所所长、 首席经济学家 自特朗普再度入主白宫后，其团队推出了一项被称之为"海湖庄园协议"（Mar-a-Lago Accord） 的经济战略构想。该战略构想来自特朗普政府经济顾问委员会（CEA）主席斯蒂芬·米兰（Stephen Miran）于2024年11月撰写的一份题为《重构全球贸易体系使用指南》（A User's Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System）的报告（《米兰报告》）。从特朗普百日施政的结 果看，基于该报告的"海湖庄园协议"构想已经对全球金融、贸易、产业乃至政治格局产生影响。从 趋势看，未来相当长一段时间而不是特朗普执政这四年，相关战略思想都会持续对国际政治经济格局 产生影响。 图表1 美元储备和美元指数对比 该报告主要涵盖三方面内容，一是美 ...

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the implications of a meeting between South Korean and U.S. officials regarding the exchange rate of the Korean won against the U.S. dollar, suggesting potential shifts in currency policy that could lead to a weaker dollar and stronger won [1][2][6]. Group 1: Meeting Details - South Korean Deputy Finance Minister Choi Ji-young met with U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Robert Kaproth on May 5 during the 58th Asian Development Bank annual meeting in Milan to discuss the dollar-won market [1]. - The meeting has sparked market speculation that the Trump administration may prioritize currency issues in upcoming trade negotiations [2]. Group 2: Market Reactions - Following the news of the meeting, the U.S. dollar fell, with the dollar-won exchange rate dropping 1.92% to 1396.77, marking a one-week low [3]. - The Korean won has appreciated approximately 5% against the dollar this year amid a generally weak dollar environment [3]. Group 3: Currency Strategy Insights - Analysts suggest that the discussions between the U.S. and South Korea may indicate a shift in focus from trade to currency, potentially threatening the dollar's stability [7]. - There are concerns that the Trump administration may implement policies encouraging countries to sell dollars to address perceived economic imbalances caused by strong currencies [7][8]. Group 4: Broader Implications - The meeting reinforces previous comments by the Bank of Korea Governor Lee Chang-yong, who indicated that the rise of Asian currencies, including the won, is partly due to U.S. pressure for currency appreciation [8]. - Analysts believe that the discussions could act as a catalyst for further dollar selling, as they may lead to speculation about the inclusion of currency policy in bilateral trade negotiations [7].

Company Highlights - Tencent Holdings reported its fastest growth in three years, with Q1 revenue increasing by 13% year-on-year, driven by record revenue from "Honor of Kings" and significant contributions from AI [11][12] - Hon Hai Precision Industry (Foxconn) saw a 24% year-on-year increase in Q1 sales, with net profit exceeding expectations, benefiting from strong demand for AI servers and preemptive stockpiling ahead of potential US tariffs [11] - Baillie Gifford, a prominent value investment firm, expressed strong confidence in ByteDance, predicting a fivefold return on investment despite uncertainties regarding the company's competitive advantages [16] - Alibaba Cloud is recognized as the only major cloud service provider in China offering substantial GPU capacity to external clients, with expected revenue growth accelerating to 25% in the fiscal year 2026 due to surging AI demand [17] Industry Insights - The global largest IPO is anticipated from CATL, with an upper issue price of HKD 263, having received over 30 times subscription from institutions, potentially raising up to HKD 410 billion (approximately USD 52.6 billion) [16] - The multi-crystalline silicon industry is planning to establish a fund of RMB 70 billion to consolidate excess capacity, aiming to raise prices from RMB 36,000 per ton to a more reasonable range of RMB 45,000 to RMB 60,000 per ton [18] - The sensor market is expected to expand as domestic manufacturers improve technology and the demand for robotics increases, particularly in force sensors which are critical for human-robot interaction [22]

Core Viewpoint - The attractiveness of gold as a safe-haven asset is diminishing due to the temporary suspension of certain tariffs between the U.S. and China, but it is expected to retain its appeal amid ongoing geopolitical and economic uncertainties [1] Group 1: Economic and Monetary Policy Risks - A significant risk facing the economy is the U.S. monetary policy and the independence of the Federal Reserve, especially in light of ongoing pressure from the Trump administration [1] - The Federal Reserve has maintained a neutral policy stance this year, with no immediate plans to lower interest rates despite stable inflation risks [1] - If the independence of the Federal Reserve is questioned, gold may perform well as it is seen as a counter to potentially manipulated fiat currencies [2] Group 2: Gold Price Predictions - Current gold trading prices are significantly below last month's historical high of $3,500 per ounce, but a new support level and record prices are anticipated [2] - The baseline price forecast for gold is projected at $3,610 per ounce by Q1 2026, with an optimistic scenario suggesting it could reach $4,000 per ounce [2] - The demand for gold is expected to remain high due to rising recession and inflation risks, with historical price increases indicating that a rise to $4,000 per ounce is plausible [2] Group 3: U.S. Credibility Issues - The U.S. faces significant credibility issues as a reliable trading partner, even if the global trade war is resolved [2] - The potential implementation of the "Sea Lake Manor Agreement" could lead to a 20% depreciation of the dollar, further increasing inflation beyond optimistic expectations [3] Group 4: Downside Risks and Strategic Asset Status - While there are some downside risks to gold prices, any declines are expected to be limited due to the current environment of uncertainty [4] - Gold is still viewed as a necessary strategic asset, providing a level of protection for investors amid various uncertainties [4]

Core Viewpoint - The article emphasizes the irreversible logic behind the restructuring of the global order and the new investment paradigm, driven by unconventional policies from the Trump administration to address global supply and demand imbalances [3][4][14]. Group 1: Globalization and G2 Imbalances - The globalization process has intensified the trade, production, and debt imbalances between the G2 nations, with the U.S. positioned as the largest consumer and China as the largest producer [9][13]. - Since China's accession to the WTO in 2001, the U.S. has increasingly relied on debt expansion to create demand, leading to continuous trade deficits and external debt accumulation, while China has maintained a trade surplus through its manufacturing capabilities [9][13]. - As major economies move away from high growth, the importance of "efficiency" is yielding to "distribution," indicating a long-term trend towards increased de-globalization [9][13]. Group 2: Restructuring Global Order - The "Mar-a-Lago Agreement" aims to reshape global trade and monetary order through tariffs and the restructuring of U.S. debt, addressing long-standing trade and fiscal deficits while enhancing U.S. export competitiveness [4][11][23]. - Although the full implementation of the Mar-a-Lago Agreement faces significant challenges, understanding its implications is crucial for anticipating future policy directions from the Trump administration [4][11][23]. Group 3: New Investment Paradigm - The new investment paradigm is framed by three macro trading backgrounds: U.S. Treasury yields remaining "higher for longer," Chinese bond yields remaining "lower for longer," and an increase in global risk premium [5][12][25]. - The ongoing trend of de-globalization and isolationist policies under Trump will exacerbate uncertainties in global economic growth and inflation, reinforcing the underlying logic of the new investment paradigm [5][12][25]. - The elevation of the global risk premium will significantly affect the correlation between major asset classes and increase the volatility of global assets, fundamentally altering the existing global asset allocation framework [5][12][25][33].