核心观点 风险提示： 1、经贸摩擦和地缘冲突超预期；2、第三方数据失真的风险；3、研报信息更新不及时的风险；4、测算偏差的风险。 正文 下面对中国出口金额占全球的份额进行拆分： 中国出口金额份额=中国出口金额/全球出口金额 =中国出口数量*美元口径中国出口价格指数/（全球出口数量*美元口径全球出口价格指数） =中国出口数量*人民币兑美元汇率*人民币出口价格指数/(全球出口数量*全球出口价格指数) 众所周知，过去几年出口是助力实现中国经济增长目标的重要引擎。但跟直观感受不一样的是，WTO的 数据显示过去四年，只有2024年中国以美元计价的出口同比高于全球平均增速，2022年、2023年和 2025年前三季度（最新数据）中国出口增速反而比全球的低。 观察中国出口金额占全球的份额，也能看到这种反直觉的现象。2015年到2019年，中国出口金额占全球 份额稳定在13%左右。2020年到2025年前三季度，中国的这一份额中枢小幅抬升，但都在14%-15%之 过去几年人民币贬值和出口价格低迷，拖累中国出口金额占全球的份额提升。 众所周知最近几年出 口是拉动中国经济增长的重要动能，但中国出口金额占全球比例，在2021年触及 ...

Core Viewpoint - The appointment of Kevin Warsh as the next Federal Reserve Chairman marks a significant shift in market expectations, moving away from an overly accommodative monetary policy to a more disciplined approach focused on the long-term consequences of financial conditions and the costs of balance sheet expansion [2][3]. Group 1: Warsh's Policy Preferences - Warsh is characterized as a "disciplinarian," emphasizing the importance of the central bank's boundaries and the long-term effects of financial conditions, showing a natural aversion to the normalization of unconventional tools like quantitative easing (QE) [3][5]. - He opposes QE not because he is against easing per se, but because he believes it distorts asset prices and exacerbates wealth inequality. He views the use of QE as a crisis response tool rather than a regular option [5][6]. - Warsh acknowledges the necessity of interest rate cuts but emphasizes that lowering rates does not equate to flooding the market with liquidity. He believes current rates may be 50-100 basis points above neutral rates, which he estimates to be around 3% [5][6]. Group 2: Structural Changes in Monetary Policy - Warsh advocates for a reduction in the Federal Reserve's power boundaries, questioning whether the Fed has taken on too many responsibilities that should not fall under its purview. This suggests a higher threshold for intervention during market turmoil [6][7]. - He criticizes the current "ample reserves" framework of the Fed, proposing a return to pre-crisis methods of controlling the federal funds rate through open market operations rather than maintaining excessive reserves [10][11]. - The market anticipates that Warsh's focus on liquidity could lead to increased volatility in the money market, as interbank liquidity would no longer be unlimited, requiring financial institutions to manage liquidity more actively [11][12]. Group 3: Warsh's Background and Political Context - Warsh's career trajectory—from Wall Street to the White House and then to the Federal Reserve—has shaped his critical perspective on monetary policy and institutional costs associated with unconventional tools [13][16]. - His appointment is seen as a strategic choice by Trump, balancing the need for loyalty and the ability to maintain the Fed's independence while addressing market concerns about inflation and monetary discipline [18][19]. - The upcoming midterm elections in 2026 create additional pressure for Warsh to align with the White House's political objectives, particularly in managing interest rates to avoid exacerbating living costs for voters [20][21]. Group 4: Market Implications - The midterm elections in November 2026 will likely serve as a pivotal point for Warsh's policy implementation, with a focus on gradual reforms rather than aggressive tightening measures [27][28]. - The communication strategy of the Fed under Warsh may shift to reduce the frequency of forward guidance and limit public statements from officials, leading to increased market uncertainty and volatility [27][29]. - Overall, the market is expected to experience heightened volatility as Warsh's cautious approach to interest rate cuts and potential balance sheet reductions unfolds, particularly affecting high-valuation and leveraged assets [29][30].

Core Viewpoint - The article argues that the common belief that the renminbi will depreciate significantly upon achieving free convertibility is misguided. Instead, it suggests that the renminbi is undervalued and should be accelerated in its internationalization process, especially in the context of a weakening US dollar [1]. Group 1: Currency Valuation - Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is used to assess the valuation levels of various currencies, indicating that the market exchange rates of developing countries' currencies, including the renminbi, are generally lower than their PPP rates [2][3]. - The renminbi's market exchange rate was 7.19 against the US dollar in June 2025, while its PPP rate is approximately 3.43, indicating a significant undervaluation [3]. Group 2: Factors Contributing to Undervaluation - The primary reason for the long-term undervaluation of the renminbi is its weak liquidity, which limits its circulation and acceptance compared to other currencies [5]. - The renminbi's international payment share was only 2.89% as of May 2025, ranking it as the sixth-largest payment currency, while the US dollar accounts for over 40% [8][9]. - The geographical concentration of renminbi payments is primarily in Hong Kong, with only 2.9% occurring in the US, highlighting its limited global reach [10][12]. Group 3: Global Reserve Currency Status - The renminbi's share in global official reserves is low, with approximately $249.7 billion as of the end of 2024, accounting for only 2.2% of total reserves, making it the sixth-largest reserve currency [12][15]. - In contrast, the US dollar constitutes about 60% of global reserves, indicating a significant disparity in reserve currency status [15]. Group 4: Implications of Currency Internationalization - Accelerating the internationalization of the renminbi could enhance its global demand and liquidity, potentially leading to an appreciation of its value [31][34]. - The article suggests that increasing the renminbi's share in global reserves from around 2% to 10% could lead to a reduction in M2 growth, as more renminbi would be held abroad [34]. - The need for financial market openness is emphasized as a means to enhance the renminbi's credit rating and international acceptance, which are crucial for its transformation into a strong currency [35].

Core Viewpoint - The "old-for-new" policy for consumer goods, implemented from 2024 to 2025, is supported by a total of 450 billion yuan in long-term special government bond funds, with subsidies reaching over 480 million consumers. This policy is expected to drive sales exceeding 2.6 trillion yuan and contribute 0.6 percentage points to the growth of retail sales of consumer goods. However, the policy's multiplier effect appears to be less than expected, with a declining number of beneficiaries in the latter half of 2025 [1][2][29]. Group 1: Policy Implementation and Financial Support - The "old-for-new" policy has undergone a process of "introduction - strengthening - expansion," with the State Council allocating approximately 150 billion yuan in long-term special government bonds in July 2024 and 300 billion yuan in 2025 to support the initiative [2]. - The number of product categories eligible for subsidies increased from 8 to 12, including new subsidies for digital products like smartphones [2]. Group 2: Sales Impact and Trends - Retail sales growth for five major categories related to the "old-for-new" policy showed an initial acceleration followed by a decline, with significant growth in communication equipment and cultural office supplies, while home appliances and furniture saw negative monthly growth rates [4][14]. - The first full year after the policy's implementation saw a 10% increase in sales for related categories, significantly higher than the 3% growth in the year prior [8][11]. Group 3: Effectiveness and Challenges - The initial impact of the policy was strong, but the growth in retail sales is expected to weaken in the second year due to the nature of durable goods, where consumers may not replace items frequently [15]. - The expansion of eligible products is expected to support continued retail sales growth, particularly in categories like communication equipment and cultural office supplies [20]. Group 4: Automotive Sector Insights - The "old-for-new" subsidy for automobiles has had a limited effect on retail sales, as high vehicle prices and macroeconomic factors significantly influence consumer behavior [24]. - Despite a substantial number of vehicles benefiting from the subsidy, the overall impact on automotive retail sales remains modest compared to other categories [24]. Group 5: Environmental and Safety Benefits - The policy promotes green production and living practices, with significant energy savings and carbon emission reductions achieved through the promotion of low-carbon products and improved recycling systems [27]. - The initiative has also enhanced product safety, with a notable increase in the number of compliant electric bicycles being replaced [27]. Group 6: Future Considerations and Adjustments - The 2026 policy adjustments aim to increase the beneficiary population and improve subsidy effectiveness, including expanding the range of eligible products and standardizing subsidy amounts [28][29]. - There is a need to consider lowering the average price of subsidized products to enhance purchasing willingness among lower-income groups and to shift the focus of the policy towards job creation and income stability [30].

Core Viewpoint - The Producer Price Index (PPI) in China has shown a prolonged period of decline, with a year-on-year decrease of 1.9% reported for December 2025, marking 39 consecutive months of decline since October 2021. This trend raises questions about the underlying reasons for the stagnation in PPI despite significant GDP growth of 250% over the past 15 years [1][2][5]. Group 1: PPI Trends and Historical Context - The PPI has been in negative territory for 111 months from 2012 to 2025, indicating a long-term weakness in price levels despite substantial economic growth [1][2]. - The PPI index, set at 100 in December 2010, remained unchanged by December 2025, suggesting that the index has not increased over the past 15 years [1][5]. - Historical data shows that PPI experienced significant fluctuations, particularly influenced by production material prices, which have seen a cumulative increase of zero over the past 15 years [5][6]. Group 2: Economic Factors Influencing PPI - The 2008 financial crisis led to a surge in PPI due to government investment in infrastructure, but this effect was temporary, and PPI turned negative after March 2012 due to limited demand from final consumption [2][3]. - The divergence between Chinese and U.S. PPI post-2012 can be attributed to rapid capacity expansion in China, leading to a significant drop in export ratios relative to total industrial output [9][10]. - The prices of production materials, particularly in the upstream mining sector, have been volatile, heavily influenced by fluctuations in coal and oil prices [17][20]. Group 3: Demand and Supply Dynamics - The transmission of price changes from upstream to downstream sectors has been hindered by weak demand, particularly in the context of a competitive downstream market where prices are more sensitive to market conditions [23][24]. - Export dynamics play a crucial role in influencing midstream product prices, with a significant portion of revenue from industries like electronics and transportation being dependent on exports [27][28]. - The overall weak demand, especially in real estate, has contributed to a persistent decline in PPI, as seen in the correlation between real estate investment trends and PPI movements [38][39]. Group 4: Recommendations for Economic Adjustment - To address the long-term weakness in PPI, it is essential to adjust the supply-demand relationship, particularly by expanding effective demand through increased income for lower and middle-income groups [45][56]. - Stabilizing the real estate market is highlighted as a critical measure to boost consumption and alleviate overcapacity issues, with a focus on maintaining housing prices to prevent further declines [45][56]. - The government is encouraged to optimize fiscal spending to enhance residents' income, thereby supporting consumption and improving overall economic conditions [56].

Core Viewpoint - In recent years, Chinese export enterprises have shown a clear tendency to "hold foreign exchange without settling." Starting from early 2025, as the RMB enters an appreciation cycle and Chinese assets are revalued, the willingness of enterprises to settle foreign exchange is expected to rebound. The recent RMB exchange rate against the USD has broken through 7.0, and mainstream expectations suggest that the RMB will continue to appreciate, further stimulating enterprises' settlement sentiment and positively impacting liquidity and the market [2][3][12]. Group 1: Settlement Willingness and Scale - The "pending settlement" scale for enterprises is approximately $930 billion, with an expected increase in settlement willingness by 2025. From early 2022 to November 2025, export enterprises accumulated $930 billion in foreign exchange that has not been settled [3][7]. - The settlement rate, which measures the proportion of foreign exchange that enterprises actively convert to RMB, is a good indicator of their willingness to settle. A higher settlement rate indicates stronger willingness [8][10]. - Since early 2025, the settlement rate has improved significantly, rising from a low of 54.4% in February 2025 to a high of 71.2% in September 2025, indicating a shift from "holding foreign exchange" to "steady settlement" [10][11]. Group 2: Factors Influencing Settlement Willingness - Two main factors influence enterprises' willingness to settle: expectations regarding the RMB exchange rate and the comparative returns of holding different currencies. When enterprises expect the RMB to appreciate, they are more inclined to settle early to avoid exchange losses [11][13]. - The attractiveness of RMB assets has increased due to favorable developments in sectors like innovative pharmaceuticals and effective responses to trade tensions, which have boosted risk appetite and improved the performance of Chinese financial assets [13][14]. Group 3: Impact on Liquidity and Market - The settlement of foreign exchange essentially converts foreign assets into RMB deposits, impacting the balance sheets of the central bank, commercial banks, and enterprises. However, the effect on the base currency supply is minimal if commercial banks do not sell the foreign exchange to the central bank [15][20]. - If 20% of the pending settlement is realized by the end of 2026, it could lead to an increase in M1 by approximately 1.3 trillion RMB, contributing about 1.2 percentage points to M1 growth [24][27]. - The increase in M1 is expected to have limited impact on PPI due to insufficient effective demand, and some high-risk enterprises may channel funds into the stock market, providing incremental capital to A-shares [27][28][31].

Group 1 - The core narrative of the market has shifted from "growth" to "competitiveness," driven by external factors such as the U.S.-China tech competition and the need for self-sufficiency in key industries [17][33] - The A-share market has shown resilience despite economic pressures, with the performance of leading companies in global competition being a key driver of market valuation rather than domestic consumption or income growth [18][27] - The current investment logic emphasizes sectors like AI, power, and critical resources, which are experiencing rapid capital expenditure growth, while traditional consumer sectors face challenges [26][28] Group 2 - The divergence between corporate competitiveness and household income growth reflects a broader transformation in the economic structure, where companies are optimizing costs to enhance global competitiveness [28][31] - Historical examples illustrate that market performance can diverge from economic fundamentals, as seen in the U.S. during WWII and China's market in the early 2000s, where investor sentiment and risk premiums played significant roles [9][14][16] - The current market environment suggests that the valuation of leading companies is increasingly decoupled from traditional economic indicators, focusing instead on their long-term competitive advantages [5][8][18] Group 3 - The rise in valuations for sectors like commercial aerospace, AI, and semiconductors reflects a belief in China's ability to compete and innovate in critical areas, despite short-term economic challenges [18][19] - The shift in demand dynamics, particularly in the context of AI and energy infrastructure, is driving a new cycle of investment that differs from traditional recovery patterns [19][24] - The market's focus on a few core assets, which contribute significantly to overall market capitalization, indicates a concentration of value creation in leading firms rather than a broad-based economic recovery [5][8][18] Group 4 - The ongoing adjustments in corporate cost structures and labor compensation models are indicative of a strategic response to global competition, which may lead to increased income volatility for workers [28][31] - The institutional differences between China's centralized policy approach and the more fragmented Western model highlight the advantages of sustained support for key industries in fostering long-term competitiveness [33][34] - The current macroeconomic landscape is characterized by a complex interplay of geopolitical uncertainty, technological competition, and evolving consumer behaviors, necessitating a nuanced investment strategy [35][36]

Core Viewpoint - The article emphasizes the increasing importance of gold as an investment due to its value preservation and hedging properties, driven by monetary expansion and geopolitical tensions [1][4]. Group 1: Gold Investment Attributes - Gold is valued for its two main attributes: value preservation against currency devaluation and as a hedge against unforeseen events, with the saying "in prosperous times, jewelry; in chaotic times, gold" highlighting its role [1]. - The preservation attribute is identified as the primary driver for the continuous rise in gold prices, while the hedging attribute is also significant due to ongoing financial, trade, and technological conflicts among major nations [1]. Group 2: Central Bank Gold Holdings - Global central banks held 12.25 billion ounces of gold in 1964, which decreased to 11.66 billion ounces by 2024, despite significant monetary expansion during the same period [4]. - The price of gold has increased dramatically, from $35 per ounce in 1964 to approximately $2,639 per ounce by the end of 2024, representing a nearly 75-fold increase [4]. - The broad money supply (M2) grew from $0.98 trillion in 1964 to $156.67 trillion in 2024, a growth of 159 times, indicating a much faster expansion compared to gold price increases [4]. Group 3: Gold Reserves and Monetary Policy - By the end of 2024, the market value of central bank gold reserves exceeded $3 trillion, but this still represents a low percentage of global broad money, increasing from 4.3% in 1964 to only 1.9% in 2024 [7][10]. - The share of foreign exchange reserves in total central bank reserves rose from 31% in 1960 to 90% in 2006-2008, then decreased to 77% by 2024, indicating a shift in reserve composition [10]. - The proportion of gold in central bank reserves was 59% in 1964, but it dropped to around 10% from 2000 to 2019, with a slight recovery to 17% by 2024, still below historical levels [10][11]. Group 4: Future Outlook and Recommendations - The article suggests that central banks should continue to increase their gold reserves in response to concerns over U.S. debt and the weakening dollar, which has led to a rise in gold prices since 2022 [13]. - It is noted that China's gold holdings are relatively low, projected to be around 0.74 billion ounces by the end of 2025, representing only 6.3% of global central bank holdings [15]. - The article concludes that to enhance the international status of the Renminbi and optimize reserve structures, China should reduce holdings in U.S. and Japanese government bonds while increasing gold reserves [16].

Core Viewpoint - The A-share market is expected to continue its recovery in 2026, driven by a profound change in risk appetite at the institutional level rather than just profit improvement or liquidity expansion [1] Group 1: U.S.-China Relations - The 2026 U.S. midterm elections may lead to a shift in Trump's focus from governance to political self-preservation, potentially exacerbating the "East rises, West declines" trend [2][5] - Two key windows for potential easing in U.S.-China relations are identified: early-year high-level visits and a possible compromise on trade orders as the midterm elections approach [6] Group 2: Federal Reserve's Easing Path - The nomination of a new Federal Reserve chair in early 2026 is anticipated to be a significant turning point for market liquidity [7] - The first phase involves speculation on the nominee, which could lead to a market rally even if interest rates remain unchanged [10] - A substantial easing phase is expected in the third quarter, contingent on weakening inflation and employment data [10][11] Group 3: Macro Policy - Fiscal efforts in 2026 may see a marginal increase in deficit rates, but the focus will shift to targeted investments rather than broad infrastructure spending [12] - Monetary policy will face dual constraints, balancing liquidity needs with maintaining a strong RMB to uphold national credit asset pricing [12] Group 4: Capital Market Management - A-share market performance is expected to be supported by capital market policies, while Hong Kong stocks may benefit more from economic policies [13][14] - Long-term funds are likely to establish a "policy bottom" through strategic investments, while IPO approvals will remain stringent to manage market pressure [14] Group 5: Resident Funds Entry - The pace of resident funds entering the market is expected to remain slow, transitioning from concentrated entry to gradual allocation [15][17] - Factors influencing this slow entry include the stabilization of real estate prices and cautious attitudes towards income expectations [17] Group 6: Global Technology - The global tech sector, particularly AI, is expected to continue its upward trajectory, but with increased volatility and a shift towards application-based investments [18][21] - The focus will shift from pure computational power to companies with strong cash flow and application capabilities [22] Group 7: Domestic Technology - The investment logic in AI is moving towards application and energy materials, with significant growth expected in humanoid robots and medical AI [22][23] - The regulatory environment may stabilize the earnings of major tech platforms, allowing them to benefit from AI applications [23] Group 8: Anti-Internal Competition - The current anti-internal competition strategy aims to enhance global bargaining power through industry consolidation [24][25] - Strategic metals and renewable energy sectors are highlighted as key areas for investment, benefiting from supply-demand dynamics [25] Group 9: Gold - Gold prices are expected to rise due to geopolitical risks and declining monetary credibility, with a focus on a gradual upward trend rather than a sharp increase [28][30] - The demand for strategic resources like copper and gold is anticipated to grow due to geopolitical tensions and supply constraints [30] Group 10: New Consumption - The trend of low birth rates and the rise of single-person households are reshaping consumption patterns, leading to increased demand for emotional value products [31] - Categories such as pet economy, trendy toys, and AI companions are expected to see significant growth as consumer preferences shift [31]

Core Viewpoint - The GDP growth target for 2026 is expected to remain around 5%, with macro policies focusing on promoting consumption and expanding investment to ensure a good start for the 14th Five-Year Plan [3] Export Performance - China's export performance in 2025 was better than expected, with nominal exports increasing by 5.4% in USD and 6.2% in RMB in the first 11 months. After adjusting for price factors, actual export growth was 7.9% in USD and 9.0% in RMB [4][5] - The strong external demand contributed significantly to China's economic growth, with net exports boosting GDP growth by 1.5 percentage points in the first three quarters of 2025, accounting for 29.0% of the cumulative GDP growth [4] - The expected growth rate for China's exports in 2026 is projected at 3.4% in USD terms, supported by stable US-China tariffs and China's cost advantages [9][28][30] Manufacturing Investment - Manufacturing investment is expected to recover slightly in 2026, from around 1% growth in 2025 to approximately 2% in 2026, driven by resilient exports and policy support for advanced manufacturing [31][46] - The decline in manufacturing investment in 2025 was attributed to "strong supply and weak demand" and trade friction, but the outlook for 2026 suggests a recovery due to improved export expectations and continued policy support [36][46] Real Estate Sector - The direct drag of the real estate sector on the economy is expected to weaken in 2026, with a projected decline in commodity housing sales area of about 5% and a narrowing of the decline in real estate investment to around -11% [55][58] - The real estate sector's recovery will depend on improved consumer confidence and the successful resolution of credit risks among property developers [56][57] Consumption and Investment - Expanding domestic demand is crucial for achieving the 5% GDP growth target in 2026, with a focus on promoting consumption and investment [64] - The government is expected to maintain support for consumption through long-term special bonds, with a funding scale at least equal to the 300 billion RMB allocated in 2025 [66][68] - Infrastructure investment is projected to rebound to 8% growth in 2026, supported by previously announced policies [64]