Core Viewpoint - The proposal by President Trump to impose a 50% tariff on imported copper reflects a chaotic economic policy that hinders the development of U.S. manufacturers both now and in the future [1] Group 1: Economic Impact - Increasing the cost of copper for Americans will make U.S. aircraft manufacturing less attractive, giving competitors from Europe, Brazil, and Canada an advantage [1] - The tariff could exacerbate the already challenging situation for the U.S. shipbuilding industry, which relies heavily on protectionist policies [1] - The U.S. imports most of its copper from Chile, Canada, and Peru, indicating a reliance on foreign suppliers, particularly China for certain materials [1] Group 2: Domestic Copper Industry - The U.S. has a strong domestic copper industry that accounts for about half of the copper used in the country, primarily sourced from Arizona [2] - There are concerns that raising the price of a widely used production material will weaken U.S. competitiveness in key industries [2] Group 3: Historical Context and Policy Analysis - Historical leaders believed in active government involvement to promote industrialization, contrasting with Trump's approach which may overlook the complexities of modern economies [3] - The focus on resource extraction and primary commodity production could lead to deindustrialization, undermining the goal of becoming a manufacturing powerhouse [3][4] - Trump's tariff policies may raise the prices of essential inputs, potentially stifling capital accumulation necessary for manufacturing growth [4] Group 4: Labor and Skills Consideration - A serious industrial policy should consider establishing visa programs for skilled workers in sectors like semiconductors, batteries, and shipbuilding [5] - The importance of copper lies in its use for manufacturing other goods, suggesting that trade policies should aim to enhance production capabilities rather than hinder them [5]

Core Viewpoint - The "Mar-a-Lago Agreement" aims to restructure global economic governance through high tariffs, dollar depreciation, debt swaps, multilateral currency negotiations, and security fees, indicating potential challenges for the dollar system [1] Group 1: Dollar System Challenges - The internal dilemma of the dollar's reserve status stems from its provision of global liquidity since the Bretton Woods system, leading to persistent trade and current account deficits [6] - The demand for dollars and U.S. Treasury bonds is driven by strategic, risk-averse, and national security considerations rather than trade balance [6] - The implementation of the "Mar-a-Lago Agreement" could trigger a sell-off of dollar assets, although the current domestic holding of U.S. Treasuries exceeds foreign holdings, which may mitigate drastic market reactions [6] Group 2: Trade Policies and Currency Dynamics - High tariff policies may narrow the U.S. trade deficit in the short term but cannot fundamentally alter trade structures or address the hollowing out of manufacturing [11] - A single trade policy is insufficient to disrupt the currency landscape; a macro-level approach involving coordinated policies across trade, fiscal, monetary, and industrial sectors is necessary [15] - Even if trade balances change, the distribution of international monetary power may not shift correspondingly due to institutional inertia [15] Group 3: Global Monetary Governance - The global monetary governance structure will not rapidly restructure due to short-term maneuvers; it requires a systematic replacement path involving technology, governance capabilities, and legal foundations [16] - The "Mar-a-Lago Agreement" could negatively impact China’s economy and industries, particularly in electronics, metallurgy, and transportation equipment sectors [16] - Under unilateral pressure and currency depreciation, China's manufacturing sectors, especially in high-tech fields like semiconductors, may face significant losses [20] Group 4: Future of Currency Systems - The U.S. is attempting to create a new global currency anchor system involving "dollars + gold + digital dollars," necessitating China to propose systematic institutional options for participation [21] - The current trade disputes are evolving into currency wars, highlighting the need for the renminbi to establish its own safe asset attributes and financial institutional discourse power to challenge the dollar's dominance [21]

1. Report Industry Investment Rating No investment rating information is provided in the report. 2. Core Viewpoints of the Report - The US copper tariff policy has increased market volatility, and the price differences between US copper, LME copper, and SHFE copper are expected to widen. There is a risk of correction for LME copper and SHFE copper. [2] - The aluminum market is affected by the strong domestic commodity atmosphere, but the expected increase in aluminum ingot inventory in July may resist the upward movement of aluminum prices. [4] - The lead price shows a relatively strong trend, but the increase of SHFE lead is expected to be limited due to weak domestic consumption. [5] - The zinc price has rebounded, but the expected increase in zinc ingot supply and limited consumption may restrict its upward space. [7] - The tin market is in a stalemate between supply shortage and limited acceptance of high - price raw materials by the end - users, and the price is expected to fluctuate within a certain range. [8][9] - The nickel price is affected by macro - sentiment, but the weak demand for stainless steel and the high premium of nickel price over nickel - iron limit its upward space, and it is recommended to sell short on rallies. [10] - The fundamental situation of lithium carbonate is weak, with increased production and inventory, and the upward space of lithium price is limited. [12] - The alumina market has an over - capacity pattern, and it is recommended to short on rallies, with the price anchored to the cost. [15] - The stainless steel market shows a short - term improvement, but the future trend depends on the implementation of anti - involution policies and the substantial improvement of the fundamentals. [17] - The casting aluminum alloy market has weak supply and demand in the off - season, and the futures price faces upward pressure. [19] 3. Summary by Metals Copper - Market performance: LME copper rose 0.23% to $9682/ton, and SHFE copper closed at 78,590 yuan/ton. [2] - Inventory: LME inventory increased by 975 tons to 108,100 tons, and domestic refined copper social inventory and bonded - area inventory both increased slightly. [2] - Price outlook: There is a risk of correction for LME copper and SHFE copper, and the price difference between US copper and others is expected to widen. The operating range of SHFE copper is 77,000 - 79,200 yuan/ton, and that of LME copper 3M is 9,400 - 9,800 dollars/ton. [2] Aluminum - Market performance: LME aluminum rose 0.15% to $2606/ton, and SHFE aluminum closed at 20,760 yuan/ton. The position of SHFE aluminum weighted contract increased. [4] - Inventory: Domestic aluminum ingot social inventory decreased, while LME aluminum inventory increased. [4] - Price outlook: The expected increase in aluminum ingot inventory in July may resist the upward movement of aluminum prices. The operating range of SHFE aluminum is 20,600 - 20,850 yuan/ton, and that of LME aluminum 3M is 2,570 - 2,640 dollars/ton. [4] Lead - Market performance: SHFE lead index rose 0.34% to 17,238 yuan/ton, and LME lead 3S rose to $2068/ton. [5] - Inventory: Domestic social inventory increased slightly. [5] - Price outlook: The lead price shows a relatively strong trend, but the increase of SHFE lead is expected to be limited due to weak domestic consumption. [5] Zinc - Market performance: SHFE zinc index rose 1.28% to 22,347 yuan/ton, and LME zinc 3S rose to $2767/ton. [7] - Inventory: Domestic social inventory increased slightly. [7] - Price outlook: The zinc price has rebounded, but the expected increase in zinc ingot supply and limited consumption may restrict its upward space. [7] Tin - Market performance: SHFE tin rose 1.46% to 266,740 yuan/ton. [8] - Supply - demand situation: The supply of tin ore is still tight, and the demand is in the off - season, with weak procurement intention. [8] - Price outlook: The domestic tin price is expected to fluctuate between 250,000 - 270,000 yuan/ton, and the LME tin price between 31,000 - 33,000 dollars/ton. [9] Nickel - Market performance: SHFE nickel rose 1.92% to 121,720 yuan/ton, and LME nickel rose 1.90% to $15,285/ton. [10] - Fundamental contradiction: The weak demand for stainless steel leads to a decline in nickel - iron price, and the high premium of nickel price over nickel - iron limits its upward space. [10] - Price outlook: It is recommended to sell short on rallies, with the operating range of SHFE nickel at 115,000 - 128,000 yuan/ton and that of LME nickel 3M at 14,500 - 16,000 dollars/ton. [10] Lithium Carbonate - Market performance: The MMLC index rose 0.32%, and the LC2509 contract fell 0.34%. [12] - Supply - demand situation: Production increased by 3.8% to 18,813 tons, and inventory increased by 1.8% to 140,793 tons. [12] - Price outlook: The upward space of lithium price is limited. The operating range of the LC2509 contract is 62,900 - 65,300 yuan/ton. [12] Alumina - Market performance: The alumina index rose 2.44% to 3,186 yuan/ton. [14] - Cost and price: The price is anchored to the cost, and it is recommended to short on rallies. The operating range of the domestic main contract AO2509 is 2,800 - 3,300 yuan/ton. [15] Stainless Steel - Market performance: The stainless steel main contract rose 0.74% to 12,865 yuan/ton, and the spot price increased. [17] - Inventory: Social inventory increased by 0.93%. [17] - Price outlook: The future trend depends on the implementation of anti - involution policies and the substantial improvement of the fundamentals. [17] Casting Aluminum Alloy - Market performance: The AD2511 contract rose 0.55% to 19,940 yuan/ton. [19] - Inventory: The social inventory of recycled aluminum alloy ingots in three regions increased. [19] - Price outlook: The futures price faces upward pressure due to weak supply and demand in the off - season. [19]

Core Viewpoint - The U.S. government, under President Trump, will impose a 50% tariff on copper imports starting August 1, aimed at revitalizing the domestic metal industry and reversing the decline in U.S. copper market influence [1][5]. Policy Implementation - Specific details regarding the implementation of the copper tariff, such as the method of collection, product scope, and potential supplier exemptions, remain unclear, leaving metal traders awaiting further clarification [3]. - The announcement has already influenced copper futures, which surged to historical highs before slightly retreating, maintaining a 1.40% increase at $5.6200 per pound [3]. Industry Context - The copper tariff is part of a broader series of industrial policies by the Trump administration, which has previously raised tariffs on steel and aluminum, with indications of more industry-specific tariffs in preparation [5]. - The U.S. heavily relies on copper imports, primarily from Chile, Canada, and Mexico, despite copper being the second most used strategic metal by the Department of Defense [5]. - In anticipation of the tariff's impact, U.S. producers and traders are adjusting their supply chains, with some shifting delivery locations to Hawaii and Puerto Rico to shorten shipping times [5]. - Since the initial proposal of the copper tariff in February, U.S. metal imports have reached record highs as traders seek to capitalize on price differences before the tariff takes effect [5].

Group 1 - The current consensus in the market is to combat "involutionary" competition through legal and market measures, stabilizing market prices and promoting the orderly exit of backward production capacity [1] - The complex causes of "involutionary" competition include local governments using industrial policies for inter-regional capacity investment competition, leading to overcapacity and price competition in related industries [1] - The shift to high-quality development emphasizes the importance of the real economy, with a focus on developing emerging industries and promoting the transformation and upgrading of manufacturing [1] Group 2 - Industrial policies and competition policies have coexisted in China, with industrial policies being necessary for promoting technological innovation and industrial upgrading, but they should be based on competitive policies [2] - The experience of Japan suggests that an overemphasis on industrial policies can lead to low growth, highlighting the need for a balance between industrial and competition policies during different growth phases [2] - During the high-quality development phase, the main drivers of economic growth are innovation and the market's ability to shift resources from low productivity to high productivity sectors [3] Group 3 - The need for a coordinated approach between industrial policies and macroeconomic policies is crucial to avoid asset bubbles and ensure effective resource allocation [3] - When industrial policies are misused by local governments for quantity-based expansion, it can lead to "involutionary" competition, reducing corporate profits and hindering innovation investment [3] - Establishing a unified national market is essential for ensuring fair competition and effective resource allocation [4] Group 4 - There is an urgent need to establish a system and institutional guarantees for achieving high-quality development, with central government-led industrial policies to promote innovation and industrial upgrading [4] - A well-coordinated relationship between industrial and competition policies is necessary to prevent local governments from undermining fair competition rules [4] - Improving the assessment systems for high-quality development and local government performance can help avoid the distortion of industrial policies into tools for regional competition [4]

他表示，我国的产业政策长期优先于竞争政策，进而导致一定的微观层面失序，因此，目前正处于一个 时代的拐点，就是产业政策必须重新定位，让竞争政策走到舞台中央，形成宏观调控与微观治理协同发 力的新格局。 当前工业行业普遍存在"成本下降，但利润下降得更快"的现象。针对这一困境，要破解低价与"内卷"现 象，必须全面启动微观治理。 7月5日上海财经大学举行的2025中国宏观经济年中论坛上，刘元春表达了上述观点。他表示，中国的微 观治理有两大类政策： 一是产业政策，二是竞争政策。我国的产业政策长期优先于竞争政策，进而导 致一定的微观层面失序，因此，目前正处于一个时代的拐点，就是产业政策必须重新定位，让竞争政策 走到舞台中央，形成宏观调控与微观治理协同发力的新格局。 "反内卷"已经成为我国政策的工作重点。2024年7月30日召开的中共中央政治局会议，首次提出要强化 行业自律，防止"内卷式"恶性竞争。 2024年底召开的中央经济工作会议提出五个"必须统筹"，也就是必须统筹好五个关系，包括有效市场和 有为政府、总供给和总需求、培育新动能和更新旧动能、做优增量和盘活存量、提升质量和做大总量。 刘元春建议，宏观经济治理要在当前五个统 ...

Group 1 - The article emphasizes that the U.S. needs to adopt a unique industrial policy inspired by China's successful economic organization and mobilization strategies to compete effectively in manufacturing [1][2] - It highlights the long-standing perception of the U.S. as a major consumer and China as a major producer, with both countries now attempting to shift towards each other's roles [1] - The article points out that the U.S. faces a significant shortcoming in "scale," which hampers efficiency and productivity, suggesting that collaboration with allies is essential to address this issue [1][2] Group 2 - The article discusses China's remarkable achievements in electrification, particularly through the development of a comprehensive supply chain for electric vehicles, which includes investments in power infrastructure and advanced technologies [2][4] - It notes that China's vertical integration in manufacturing allows for rapid product iteration, cost reduction, and efficiency, resulting in significantly lower prices for solar panels compared to the U.S. and Europe [4][6] - The Chinese government's coordinated efforts in innovation and deployment have led to accelerated development cycles in energy technologies, exemplified by the swift commercialization of advanced nuclear reactors [6] Group 3 - The article highlights the importance of regional industrial clusters in China's manufacturing success, where companies benefit from shared resources and reduced transaction costs [7][9] - It provides an example of the Pearl River Delta, where government initiatives have attracted suppliers and manufacturers, leading to a concentration of high-value production [7] - The collaboration between local governments and electric vehicle manufacturers in cities like Hefei has resulted in the establishment of integrated supply chain ecosystems, drawing significant investments from global automakers [9]

Group 1 - The concept of "consumption-driven" economic growth does not exist in the long term, as economic growth fundamentally relies on investment [2][3][5] - The relationship between consumption and investment is not a zero-sum game; rather, they complement each other in the long run [8][9] - China's consumption rate is often perceived as low, but data suggests it may actually exceed that of the United States when considering different consumption structures and price levels [13][15][16] Group 2 - The current measures to stimulate consumption need further research to assess their effectiveness, as the average final consumption rate in China has fluctuated around 54% over the past decade [24][26] - Infrastructure investment is proposed as a primary driver for economic growth, creating a virtuous cycle of income and consumption [30][31] - The government is encouraged to initiate large-scale infrastructure projects similar to the previous 4 trillion yuan stimulus plan to address economic challenges [36][37]

Group 1 - The core viewpoint of the articles is that the Chinese government is intensifying policies to boost consumption, as evidenced by the recent guidance from six departments aimed at stimulating and expanding consumer spending [1] - In the first five months of the year, retail sales of consumer goods increased by 5% year-on-year, with May seeing a notable growth of 6.4%, marking the highest monthly growth rate in 2024 [1] - The acceleration in consumption growth is primarily attributed to the "trade-in" policy, which has significantly boosted sales in furniture, communications, and home appliances, all showing growth rates exceeding 20% [1] Group 2 - Experts suggest that to further support consumption growth, it is essential to understand the underlying factors driving consumer behavior, which include GDP growth, primary and secondary distribution, and consumption propensity [1] - The most significant factor influencing consumer growth is GDP growth, while the effects of consumption propensity and distribution are comparatively less impactful [1] - Short-term policies should focus on utilizing counter-cyclical measures to enhance residents' income and expectations, thereby expanding consumption effectively [1] Group 3 - Recommendations for immediate policy actions include pilot programs to encourage childbirth, urban area development, and housing support for migrant workers, which could enhance the consumption propensity of certain demographics [2] - Long-term strategies to boost consumption involve improving social welfare and security levels, which are crucial for increasing consumption propensity over time [2] - Industrial policies aimed at unleashing the potential of the service sector are also highlighted as essential for increasing overall income growth and improving primary distribution, thereby supporting future consumption growth [2]

Group 1: Key Events - On June 16, the White House announced a trade agreement between the U.S. and the UK, which includes a quota of 100,000 vehicles per year for U.S. imports from the UK, with a 10% tariff rate [1] - On June 17, the Bank of Japan decided to maintain its policy interest rate at around 0.5% and slow down the pace of bond purchase reductions, currently reducing by approximately 400 billion yen per quarter [2] - On June 18, the Federal Reserve maintained the federal funds rate target range at 4.25% to 4.50%, marking the fourth consecutive meeting without a rate change, while lowering economic growth forecasts for the U.S. [1][2] Group 2: Economic Data - Japan's exports fell for the first time in eight months in May, with exports to the U.S. down 11.1% year-on-year to 1.51 trillion yen, driven by declines in automotive and automotive parts exports [5] - The ZEW Economic Sentiment Index for the Eurozone rose significantly to 35.3 in June, up from 11.6, with Germany's index increasing to 47.5 from 25.2 [5] - U.S. retail sales fell by 0.9% month-on-month in May, the largest decline since March 2023, primarily due to decreased automobile purchases [5] Group 3: Monetary Policy - The Bank of England decided to keep its key interest rate unchanged at 4.25%, citing weak GDP growth and a soft labor market [2] - The yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds decreased by 0.9 basis points, while the yield on 10-year Japanese bonds fell by 1.6 basis points [10] Group 4: Commodity Prices - Brent crude oil prices fell by 3.76% to $75.78 per barrel, while WTI crude oil prices increased slightly by 0.28% to $74.04 per barrel [12] - The CRB Commodity Index decreased by 0.59%, while the Baltic Dry Index dropped by 3.54% [12]