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诸多因素制约希腊经济发展
Jing Ji Ri Bao· 2025-10-09 03:01
这一问题已经体现在通胀水平上。数据显示,希腊近几个月的平均通胀率明显高于欧元区整体水平,希 腊央行在其通胀监测报告中已将2025年的统一通胀率预测上调至3.1%,高于此前的2.5%。这种通胀并 非单纯由外部输入型因素造成,而更多反映出内部"需求大于供给"的矛盾,尽管经济在增长,但供给能 力不足以匹配需求扩张,因而推高了价格。这种局面如果持续,可能会进一步加大工资上涨的压力,形 成通胀与成本螺旋上升的格局,对宏观稳定构成威胁。要破解这一困境,关键在于提升生产率,斯图纳 拉斯特别强调,数字化转型、资本设备的升级以及人工智能在生产中的应用,都是希腊需要重点推进的 方向。然而,这些措施的落实受到基础设施不足、行政效率低下、司法体系迟缓等结构性短板的制约, 改革的长期性与复杂性决定了难以一蹴而就。 债务比率的下降,财政纪律的改善,以及部分结构性改革的推进,为希腊经济恢复奠定了一定基础。然 而,希腊经济发展仍然面临诸多风险点,制约经济前行。 近年来,希腊经济在经历了长达10余年的债务危机、财政紧缩和外部援助之后,逐渐走出衰退的阴影, 重新回到增长轨道。债务比率的下降,财政纪律的改善,以及部分结构性改革的推进,为希腊经济恢 ...
重新审视社会保障问题的核心|宏观经济
清华金融评论· 2025-10-05 08:00
以下文章来源于中国金融四十人论坛 ,作者蔡昉 中国金融四十人论坛 . 聚焦金融热点,速递论坛动态,独家发布论坛课题成果,连载书系新书、好书。 文/ 中国金融四十人论坛(CF40)学术委员会主席、中国社会科学院国家高端智 库首席专家 蔡昉 当前养老保险再次成为重点关注问题。首先需要清楚, 影响社保可持续 性的三大因素为人口、劳动力市场与劳动生产率 ,分解来看,老龄化与 高龄化趋势不可逆转,劳动力市场存在结构性就业矛盾、非正规化趋势、 岗位破坏与人工智能冲击。但是,人工智能同时提升了劳动生产率的增长 潜力,未来要完善社会保障,并不缺物质财富,而是缺少制度安排。 现在养老保险再次成为重点关注问题,固然有老龄化加剧、经济增长减速、企业遭遇困难等原因,这些既是全球问题也有中国表现,尤其是中国的 老龄化、少子化导致抚养比明显上升,因此产生了" 精算忧虑 ",就是说一算账大家就预期要出现养老赤字。另外,最高人民法院的《司法解释 二》进一步强化了社保缴纳问题,其更加倾向于保护缴纳社保,更加严格地限制不缴社保的任何协议,一些人担心这会成为压倒小微企业的最后一 根稻草。关于社保问题,不只是企业,政府、老百姓、学者都反复陷入这种担 ...
蔡昉:重新审视社会保障问题的核心
和讯· 2025-09-22 09:58
Core Viewpoint - The article emphasizes the urgent need to reform China's social security system, particularly the pension scheme, in light of demographic changes, labor market challenges, and the potential for increased productivity through artificial intelligence [5][7][12]. Group 1: Factors Affecting Social Security Sustainability - The three main factors impacting the sustainability of social security are population dynamics, labor market conditions, and labor productivity [5][8]. - Population aging is accelerating, with projections indicating that by 2032, over 21% of China's population will be aged 65 and above, marking a significant demographic shift [8]. - The labor market faces structural employment issues, including high youth unemployment rates and challenges for older workers nearing retirement [9][10]. - Labor productivity has the potential for significant growth, particularly with advancements in artificial intelligence, which could enhance the capacity to support the elderly [11][12]. Group 2: Institutional Arrangements for Sharing Productivity Gains - Current social security arrangements are inadequate for sharing the benefits of increased productivity, necessitating reforms in the pension system [12][16]. - The first pillar of social security is crucial; without a robust first pillar, the second and third pillars cannot function effectively [6][15]. - There is a need to improve the formalization of employment to ensure broader coverage of social security, especially for non-standard employment [13][14]. Group 3: Recommendations for Reform - Establish a universal social security system that includes a living wage and unconditional basic income to address the challenges posed by artificial intelligence [18]. - Reconsider the nominal account system, focusing on a bookkeeping approach that records contributions without requiring them to be fully realized, thus addressing the current paradox in the pay-as-you-go system [19].
人口灰犀牛:现状、影响和应对(国金宏观张馨月)
雪涛宏观笔记· 2025-09-13 05:04
Core Viewpoint - The key to maintaining output growth in the face of accelerating population aging is to improve labor productivity through technological advancement, increasing labor participation rates, and expanding overseas operations [2]. Group 1: Global Population Trends - The global population is transitioning through four stages of demographic transformation, with most countries having completed industrialization or being in its middle stages, leading to a decline in the demographic dividend and an increase in aging and low birth rates [5][10]. - By 2024, the global population aged 65 and older is projected to reach 10.2%, with this figure expected to rise to 13.1% by 2035, indicating a shift towards moderate aging societies [10]. - The total fertility rate globally has decreased from a peak of 5.32 in the 1960s to 2.25 in 2024, nearing the replacement level of 2.1, with developed economies facing significant challenges related to low birth rates [11]. Group 2: China's Population Challenges - China is entering a phase of accelerated aging, with the proportion of the population aged 65 and older expected to reach 15.6% by 2024, transitioning to a moderately aged society [16]. - The total fertility rate in China has fallen below the replacement level since 1991, reaching 1.0 in 2023, necessitating comprehensive policies to support childbearing and reduce the burden of child-rearing [18]. - The phenomenon of "aging before becoming rich" poses challenges for total demand and the social security system, as the elderly population's consumption capacity may be weaker than that of developed economies [20]. Group 3: Macroeconomic Impacts of Population Structure Changes - The aging population is expected to exert downward pressure on potential growth rates due to a shrinking labor force, with China's labor force participation rate declining from a peak of 74.5% in 2010 to 68.3% by 2024 [31][34]. - The aging process can lead to a negative output gap, as seen in Japan, where actual economic growth has consistently lagged behind potential growth due to demographic shifts [36]. - Population aging is associated with a shift in consumption patterns, increasing demand for services such as healthcare and elder care, which may enhance service consumption's share of total consumption [39]. Group 4: Strategies to Address Aging Challenges - Improving labor productivity is crucial to counter the negative impacts of an aging population, with technology playing a key role in enhancing productivity through automation and innovation [46][51]. - Increasing labor participation rates, particularly among women, and extending working hours can help mitigate the labor supply challenges posed by an aging population [57]. - Expanding overseas operations and attracting foreign labor can serve as effective strategies to address domestic labor shortages and enhance productivity [59][60].
【环球财经】欧元区二季度GDP环比增长0.1%
Xin Hua Cai Jing· 2025-09-05 13:45
Economic Growth - In Q2 2025, the Eurozone GDP grew by 0.1% quarter-on-quarter, while the EU overall grew by 0.2% [1] - Year-on-year, the Eurozone and EU GDP increased by 1.5% and 1.6%, respectively [1] - Finland, Germany, and Italy experienced declines in GDP by 0.4%, 0.3%, and 0.1% respectively, while Denmark, Croatia, and Romania saw increases of 1.3% and 1.2% [1] Demand Structure - Final consumption by households showed slight growth, government final consumption rebounded, while fixed capital investment declined significantly [1] - Exports decreased, imports remained stable, and overall EU imports increased by 0.3% [1] - Inventory growth contributed approximately 0.5 percentage points to the quarterly growth, while fixed capital investment negatively contributed by 0.4 percentage points [1] Employment Trends - Employment in the Eurozone and EU grew by 0.1% quarter-on-quarter, with year-on-year growth of 0.6% and 0.4%, respectively [2] - Bulgaria, Spain, and Malta experienced the fastest employment growth rates of 1.1%, 0.7%, and 0.7% [2] - The total employment in the EU is approximately 219.9 million, with the Eurozone accounting for 171.6 million [2] Productivity Improvement - Labor productivity improved, with a year-on-year increase of 0.8% in the Eurozone and 1.2% in the EU based on headcount [2] - When measured by hours worked, productivity increased by 1.1% in the Eurozone and 1.5% in the EU year-on-year [2]
Weak Private Payrolls Data for August
ZACKS· 2025-09-04 16:01
Employment Data - The latest ADP report indicates an addition of +54K new private-sector jobs in August, missing expectations by 20K [1] - The four-month average for private-sector job growth is +55K, a significant decline from the previous average of +102K [2] - Large corporations added only +18K jobs, while medium-sized companies contributed +25K and small firms added +12K [3] Industry Performance - The Leisure/Hospitality sector saw the highest job growth with +50K new jobs, followed by Construction at +16K and Professional/Business Services at +15K [4] - The Trade/Transportation/Utilities sector experienced the largest decline with -17K jobs, and Education/Healthcare lost -12K jobs [4][5] Wage Trends - Job Stayers experienced an average earnings gain of +4.4%, while Job Changers saw a +7.1% increase, indicating a narrowing wage gap [6] Jobless Claims - Initial Jobless Claims rose to +237K, exceeding expectations and marking the highest monthly total since June [7] - Continuing Jobless Claims decreased to 1.940 million, remaining below the critical 2 million mark for 13 consecutive weeks [8] Productivity and Labor Costs - Q2 Productivity increased to a seasonally adjusted annualized rate of +3.3%, the strongest quarterly productivity since Q3 2024 [9] - Unit Labor Costs for the quarter were lower than expected at +1.0%, suggesting a favorable economic environment [9] Trade Deficit - The U.S. Trade Deficit widened to -$78.3 billion in July, a significant increase from the previous month's revised figure of -$59.1 billion [10]
李迅雷:大国债务——经济增长的代价
Sou Hu Cai Jing· 2025-09-03 04:47
Group 1 - The macro leverage ratio in China has increased to 300.4% in Q2 2025, marking a significant rise from 298.5% in Q1 2025, indicating a growing debt burden associated with economic growth [1] - The rapid increase in debt levels in China is primarily driven by government departments and state-owned enterprises leveraging up [2][9] - The macro leverage ratio of China is projected to rise from 239.5% in 2019 to 286.5% by the end of 2024, showing the most significant increase among major economies [2][28] Group 2 - The leverage ratio of non-financial enterprises in China has shown a pattern of increase since 2022, reaching 139.4% by Q3 2024, driven by significant investments in emerging industries and high-end manufacturing [5][32] - The debt levels of state-owned enterprises are notably higher than those of non-state enterprises, with an average asset-liability ratio of 85.6% for state-owned enterprises compared to 78.3% for non-state enterprises [7][9] - Government leverage in China has risen from 59.6% at the end of 2019 to 88.4% by the end of 2024, contrasting with the trends in Germany, Japan, and the US, where government leverage has fluctuated [9][10] Group 3 - The nominal GDP growth in China has been slower compared to the actual GDP growth, which has implications for the macro leverage ratio as it is inversely related to the growth of nominal GDP [32][34] - The price levels in China have been declining, negatively impacting the growth of nominal GDP, which is crucial for managing the macro leverage ratio [36][37] - The efficiency of debt usage in China is under scrutiny, with suggestions for improving capital allocation and enhancing productivity to manage the rising leverage ratio effectively [38][44]
李迅雷专栏 | 大国债务:经济增长的代价
中泰证券资管· 2025-08-27 11:33
Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the rising macro leverage ratio in China, which has increased to 300.4% in Q2 2025, and compares the debt costs of economic growth among China, the US, Japan, and Germany, highlighting the implications of rising debt levels on economic performance [1][3]. Group 1: Macro Leverage Ratio Trends - China's macro leverage ratio has shown a significant upward trend, increasing from 239.5% in 2019 to 286.5% by the end of 2024, the most pronounced increase among the four countries analyzed [3][5]. - In contrast, Germany, Japan, and the US experienced a "sharp rise and fall" pattern in their leverage ratios, with declines expected by 2024, while China's ratio continues to rise steadily [3][5]. Group 2: Sectoral Debt Analysis - The macro leverage ratio can be broken down into three sectors: households, non-financial enterprises, and government. The household leverage ratios in China, Germany, Japan, and the US have remained relatively stable, with minor fluctuations [5][8]. - Non-financial enterprise leverage in China has shown a "rise-fall-rise" pattern, increasing from 125.5% in 2019 to a peak of 139.4% in Q3 2024, driven by significant investments in emerging industries [8][9]. Group 3: Government Debt Dynamics - The government leverage ratio in China has risen from 59.6% at the end of 2019 to 88.4% by the end of 2024, contrasting with the trends in Germany, Japan, and the US, where government leverage ratios peaked and then declined [13][25]. - The increase in China's government leverage is not solely linked to international economic crises, indicating a potential weakening of the effectiveness of counter-cyclical policies over time [25][26]. Group 4: Economic Growth and Debt Efficiency - The article suggests that the rising leverage ratio may be a result of insufficient economic growth, as nominal GDP growth has lagged behind debt growth, with China's nominal GDP growth being slower than that of the US and other developed nations [40][41]. - To reduce the cost of maintaining growth, the article emphasizes the need for improved efficiency in the use of debt resources, advocating for better capital allocation and investment in human capital and technology [47][48].
经济增长的代价
Hua Xia Shi Bao· 2025-08-21 15:18
Core Viewpoint - The macro leverage ratio in China has risen significantly, reaching 300.4% in Q2 2025, indicating a growing debt burden associated with economic growth [2][3][4]. Group 1: Macro Leverage Ratio Trends - China's macro leverage ratio increased from 298.5% in Q1 2025 to 300.4% in Q2 2025, marking the first time it has exceeded 300% [2]. - By the end of 2024, the macro leverage ratios for China, Germany, Japan, and the U.S. were projected to be 286.5%, 198.6%, 387%, and 249.3% respectively, with China showing the most significant increase [3]. - The rise in China's macro leverage ratio is attributed to the debt growth outpacing nominal GDP growth [3]. Group 2: Sectoral Analysis of Leverage - The leverage ratio of non-financial enterprises in China has shown a pattern of "rise-fall-rise," with a notable increase since 2022, reaching 139.4% by Q3 2024 [4][5]. - In contrast, the leverage ratios of non-financial enterprises in Germany, Japan, and the U.S. have experienced a "rise-fall" trend, with a decline expected by the end of 2024 [4]. - Government leverage in China has increased from 59.6% at the end of 2019 to 88.4% by the end of 2024, while the government leverage ratios in Germany, Japan, and the U.S. have shown a decline after initial increases [5][6]. Group 3: Economic Growth and Debt Relationship - The relationship between economic growth and leverage is highlighted, with the assertion that faster GDP growth could lead to a reduction in government leverage ratios [10]. - Despite China's actual GDP growth outpacing that of the U.S., the nominal GDP growth has been slower, contributing to the rising leverage ratio [11]. - The nominal GDP growth has been hindered by low price levels, which negatively impacts the overall economic growth and leverage dynamics [12]. Group 4: Policy Implications and Recommendations - The need to lower local government leverage has been recognized, with various measures already implemented to address local hidden debts [14]. - Improving the efficiency of policy resource utilization is essential for stabilizing growth and addressing structural economic issues [14][15]. - The focus on enhancing human capital and technological advancement is crucial for improving labor productivity and overall economic performance [16][18].
大国债务:经济增长的代价
Hu Xiu· 2025-08-15 07:12
Group 1 - The macro leverage ratio is a relative indicator of debt levels, calculated as the ratio of non-financial sector debt to total GDP [1] - The increase in macro leverage ratio is driven by the growth rate of debt exceeding the growth rate of nominal GDP [2] - As of the end of 2019, the macro leverage ratios for China, Germany, Japan, and the United States were 239.5%, 202%, 382.9%, and 256.3% respectively, with projections for 2024 showing significant increases for China [3] Group 2 - The trend for Germany, Japan, and the United States shows a pattern of "sharp rise and fall," with their macro leverage ratios peaking in 2020 and returning to levels similar to 2019 by the end of 2024, while China's ratio continues to rise steadily [4] - The macro (non-financial sector) debt total is composed of household, non-financial enterprise, and government debt [6] Group 3 - Household leverage ratios in China, Germany, Japan, and the United States remained relatively stable, with changes within a range of approximately ±5 percentage points from 2019 to 2024 [7] - China's non-financial enterprise leverage ratio exhibited a pattern of "rise-fall-rise," with a notable increase since 2022, contrasting with the trends in Germany, Japan, and the United States [8][10] Group 4 - The government leverage ratio in China has been steadily increasing, projected to rise from 59.6% at the end of 2019 to 88.4% by the end of 2024, while the ratios for Germany, Japan, and the United States show an initial increase followed by a decline [14] - The increase in China's government leverage ratio is not solely linked to international economic crises, indicating a potential weakening of the effectiveness of counter-cyclical policies over time [24] Group 5 - The analysis indicates that the increase in China's macro leverage ratio is associated with a slower growth in nominal GDP, despite higher real GDP growth compared to the United States [38][39] - The nominal GDP growth in China from 2022 to 2024 is projected to lag behind that of the United States, Germany, and Japan [39] Group 6 - The current macro leverage ratio in China is significantly higher than the global trend, indicating a situation of "debt before wealth" [43] - The government debt levels in China have increased significantly, with the nominal value of government debt nearly doubling from 2019 to 2024, while the increases in Germany, Japan, and the United States are comparatively lower [33][34]