债务规模整体压降，融资结构有所改善，短期流 动性仍承压 ——贵州省发债城投企业财务表现观察 联合资信 公用评级四部 刘嫱 摘要 www.lhratings.com 研究报告 1 受益于化债政策倾斜重点省份，特殊再融资债券和特殊新增专项债额度释放，加上融资平台债 务展期、降息、置换等化债措施有序推进，贵州省整体债务风险得到进一步缓释，发债城投企 业债务规模持续下降，融资结构有所改善，但短期偿债及流动性仍面临较大压力，净融资额区 域分化明显，部分区域发债城投企业投资端负增长、新增融资受限叠加回款压力，内生偿债能 力及外部流动性均未得到实质改善。 整体看，贵州省发债城投企业短期化债仍靠化债政策"组合拳"以降低债务风险，且区域分化 明显，尾部区域财务基本面改善难度较大；长期发展则需城投企业"在化债中发展，在发展中 化债"通过优化投资结构、扩大内需等方式推动经济高质量发展，为化债创造条件。 注：政府债务率=政府债务余额/综合财力*100%；广义政府债务率=（政府债务余额+城投债务余额）/综合财 力*100%；城投债务余额为联合资信城投企业分类口径中发债城投企业债务之和（已剔除子公司数据）；综合 财力=一般公共预算收入+ ...

翻开贵州省政府公布的名录，这56家公司覆盖省、市、县三级，业务范围涉及城市基建、土地整理、交 通建设等多个领域。它们共同特点是：资产负债率普遍偏高，平均达到65%以上；政府补贴依赖度强， 部分企业营业收入的30%以上来自财政拨款。 贵州这次动作绝非偶然。根据财政部最新通报，全国已有超过2000家融资平台公司完成市场化转型，而 贵州这次56家"类平台"公司的调整，正是这场全国性整顿的组成部分。所谓"类平台"，是指那些虽未明 确标注为政府融资平台，但实际承担政府融资职能的企业。 地方政府隐性债务这个幽灵，已经游荡在中国经济上空多年。这些"类平台"公司通过银行贷款、发行债 券、信托融资等方式筹集资金，表面上是企业行为，实质却是政府信用背书。债务雪球越滚越大，最终 可能演变成系统性风险。 贵州56家"类平台"公司集体剥离政府融资功能，这则消息像一颗深水炸弹，在地方投融资圈激起巨大 波澜。这些曾经在政府项目中扮演关键角色的公司，为何突然被要求"断奶"？背后究竟隐藏着怎样的政 策逻辑和现实考量，湖北友梦政融投资服务有限公司。 贵州的案例特别引人注目。数据显示，贵州省政府债务率长期位居全国前列，部分地市甚至超过300% 的 ...

Report Summary 1. Investment Rating No investment rating information is provided in the report. 2. Core Viewpoints - In 2025 from January to September, the number of consecutive overdue occurrences of bonds - issuing urban investment entities' bills increased significantly year - on - year, while the number of entities with consecutive bill overdue decreased year - on - year. High - frequency overdue enterprises became the main risk source. AA - rated and district - county - level platforms remained the main overdue groups, and the risk differentiation effect of administrative levels and credit ratings was further strengthened. Risks were mainly concentrated in Shandong, Yunnan, Henan, Guizhou and other provinces. Entities with consecutive bill overdue faced relatively large short - term concentrated debt repayment pressure, and attention should be paid to the cross - variety risk spread caused by credit risk transmission [2][22]. 3. Summary by Directory 3.1 Overview of Urban Investment Entities' Bill Overdue - **Change in the number of bonds - issuing urban investment entities with consecutive bill overdue**: From January to September 2025, bonds - issuing urban investment entities were included in the list of consecutive bill overdue 508 times, a year - on - year increase of 38.04%, involving 65 entities, a year - on - year decrease of 4.41%. The monthly number of urban investment entities included in the list was between 54 - 58, and the monthly number of newly - added entities was 2, 3, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 2 respectively [5]. - **Credit rating of bonds - issuing urban investment entities with consecutive bill overdue**: From January to September 2025, entities with consecutive bill overdue were mainly AA - rated, accounting for 63.08%, a year - on - year increase of 1.31 percentage points, with 41 entities, a year - on - year decrease of 1. AA + - rated entities ranked second, accounting for 23.08%, with 15 entities, a year - on - year decrease of 2 [8]. - **Administrative level of bonds - issuing urban investment entities with consecutive bill overdue**: From January to September 2025, district - county - level platforms accounted for the highest proportion among entities with consecutive bill overdue, and there were no provincial - level platforms. District - county - level platforms numbered 39 (60.00%, a year - on - year increase of 4.12 percentage points), municipal - level platforms numbered 21 (32.31%), and there was 1 provincial - level park platform, 2 national - level development zone platforms, 1 national - level high - tech zone platform, and 1 national - level new area platform [11]. - **Geographical distribution of bonds - issuing urban investment entities with consecutive bill overdue**: From January to September 2025, the geographical distribution of bonds - issuing urban investment entities with consecutive bill overdue was highly concentrated, mainly in Shandong, Yunnan, Henan, and Guizhou. There were 11 provinces involved in bill overdue risks, 2 less than the same period last year. Shandong had the largest number of such entities, reaching 26, accounting for 40.00%. Yunnan had 12, and both Henan and Guizhou had 8. In terms of the proportion of the number of entities with consecutive bill overdue to the total number of bonds - issuing urban investment entities in each province, Qinghai, Yunnan, and Shandong ranked in the top three [13]. - **Existing bonds of bonds - issuing urban investment entities with consecutive bill overdue**: As of October 27, 2025, the total balance of existing bonds of 65 bonds - issuing urban investment entities with consecutive bill overdue from January to September 2025 was 144.82 billion yuan. Among them, corporate (enterprise) bonds accounted for 54.25% (78.558 billion yuan), medium - term notes accounted for 18.29% (26.488 billion yuan), private placement financing instruments accounted for 15.61% (22.6 billion yuan), and short - term and ultra - short - term financing bonds accounted for 9.63% (13.944 billion yuan). 39.26% (56.861 billion yuan) of the bonds would mature within 1 year, and 26.31% (38.104 billion yuan) would mature within 1 - 3 years. These entities faced relatively large short - term concentrated debt repayment pressure. Some entities had non - standard financing defaults, and attention should be paid to the cross - variety risk spread [15][21].

违约细节：从利息逾期到本金难偿 作者 | 城投君 2025年11月12日，多名投资者反映，山东省菏泽市成武县两家城投公司——成武郜城城市建设投资有限公司（下称"成武郜城"）与成武文亭城市建设投 资有限公司（下称"成武文亭"）发行的定向融资产品（下称"定融产品"）出现实质性违约。本应于9月20日支付的利息未能如期到账，且到期本金亦未兑 付。投资者多次联系融资方，仅得到"等待化债资金"的回复，问题迟迟未获解决。 工商信息显示，成武郜城成立于2019年10月，注册资本1亿元，实控人为成武县财政局，但2024年企业参保人数为0，年报亦未公示。成武文亭虽成立于 2012年，但在2016-2019年期间参保人数同样为0，2024年虽显示有19名员工，但其业务范围与资金规模严重不匹配。 | 年份 | 人数 | 来源 | | --- | --- | --- | | 2024 | 19 | 工商年报-参保人数 | | 2023 | 20 | 工商年报-参保人数 | | 2022 | 26 | 工商年报-参保人数 | | 2021 | 23 | 工商年报-参保人数 | | 2020 | . | 工商年报 | | 2019 | - ...

1. Report Industry Investment Rating No information provided in the content. 2. Core Viewpoints of the Report - The number of overdue bills of bond - issuing urban investment enterprises increased rapidly and then fluctuated after the introduction of the "package debt - resolution plan", and has been generally stable since November 2024. District - county - level entities among overdue enterprises account for a high proportion and are concentrated in Shandong, Henan, and Guizhou. The regions with concentrated overdue bills have weak regional fiscal self - sufficiency, heavy local government debt burdens, and large broad - based debt repayment pressures. In addition, restrictions on new bond financing and changes in financial indicators of urban investment enterprises in recent years are also reasons for bill overdue. The median net financing of urban investment enterprises that first had bill overdue from January to August 2025 increased in the year before the bill overdue, possibly related to the "targeted support" of local governments and financial institutions under the "package debt - resolution plan". Bill overdue has a negative impact on enterprise credit, financing ability, and the regional financial market. Urban investment enterprises should pay attention to policy impacts, improve liquidity management, and enhance their self - hematopoietic ability [2]. - Bills are an early warning signal of enterprise credit risk, reflecting the lack of enterprise liquidity to some extent and being a leading indicator of enterprise bond default risk. This report tracks, observes, and analyzes the performance, causes, and impacts of bill overdue of urban investment enterprises under the background of the "package debt - resolution plan" and proposes corresponding countermeasures and suggestions [4]. 3. Summary According to Relevant Catalogs 3.1 Overview of Bill Overdue of Urban Investment Enterprises - From November 2021 to August 2025, the number of bond - issuing urban investment enterprises on the list of continuous bill overdue increased fluctuantly. The credit quality of these enterprises is generally average, with AA - rated enterprises accounting for nearly 70%. District - county - level entities among overdue enterprises account for a high proportion. There are 19 provinces involved in bill overdue risks, with more enterprises in Shandong, Henan, and Guizhou. Since 2025, the number of such enterprises has generally stabilized, possibly related to the reduced debt - resolution pressure of urban investment enterprises under the "package debt - resolution plan" [5]. - The Shanghai Commercial Paper Exchange started to release the "List of Continuous Overdue Commercial Bills" monthly since August 2021. The statistical criteria for the continuous overdue list are: since August 2021, acceptors who have had more than 3 payment overdue within 6 months from the cut - off date of the list disclosure, and have an overdue balance at the end of the month or have payment overdue in the current month [5]. - From November 2021 to August 2025, the number of bond - issuing urban investment enterprises with continuous bill overdue as commercial bill acceptors showed a fluctuating growth trend. From August to October 2023, the number of such enterprises increased rapidly, possibly related to restricted new financing and increased short - term debt repayment pressure. From November 2023 to the end of 2024, the number increased slightly with fluctuations. Since 2025, the number has generally stabilized. During this period, bond - issuing urban investment enterprises were included in the bill continuous overdue list 1362 times, involving 155 enterprises [7][8]. - In terms of credit rating, bill - overdue bond - issuing urban investment enterprises are mainly AA - rated, accounting for 67.74% (105 enterprises), followed by AA + - rated enterprises, accounting for 22.58% [12]. - In terms of administrative level, district - county - level platforms among bill - overdue urban investment enterprises account for a high proportion, and there are no provincial - level platforms. There are 91 district - county - level platforms (accounting for 58.71%), 44 municipal - level platforms (accounting for 28.39%), 6 provincial - level park platforms, 6 national - level development zone platforms, 3 national - level high - tech zone platforms, and 5 national - level new area platforms [14]. - In terms of geographical distribution, there are 19 provinces involved in bill overdue risks, including Shandong, Henan, and Guizhou. Shandong has the largest number of bill - overdue bond - issuing urban investment enterprises, reaching 56 (accounting for 36.13%), followed by Henan with 18 and Guizhou with 15 [18]. 3.2 Analysis of the Causes of Bill Overdue of Urban Investment Enterprises 3.2.1 External Factors - **Regional Fiscal and Debt Burden**: In the regions where bill - overdue bond - issuing urban investment enterprises are concentrated, except for Qingdao and Zibo, the fiscal self - sufficiency of other regions is lower than the national average. Most of the cities with a high risk of bill overdue of bond - issuing urban investment enterprises in 2024 had a growth rate of general public budget revenue lower than the national average (0.9%), and the fiscal self - sufficiency rate of most cities was lower than the national average (71.22%). Affected by the sluggish land market in 2024, the government fund revenue in some regions with a high incidence of bill overdue showed a significant downward trend, further increasing the debt repayment pressure of urban investment enterprises in these regions [23][24]. - In 2024, due to factors such as the government's replacement of stock implicit debt under the "package debt - resolution plan", the local government debt balance of cities with a high risk of bill overdue of bond - issuing urban investment enterprises increased year - on - year. These cities have relatively heavy local government debt burdens and large broad - based debt repayment pressures. The government debt ratio of these cities is higher than 150%, and the broad - based debt ratio (including the interest - bearing debt of local urban investment enterprises) of most cities is higher than 400%. The non - standard financing ratio of some cities decreased in 2024, which may be related to the debt replacement policy [27]. - **Other Possible Factors**: In recent years, regulatory authorities and financial institutions have tightened new financing for urban investment enterprises, increasing their financing difficulty. Since bond repayment has strong rigidity, for urban investment enterprises, the risk of bond default is much greater than that of bill overdue. Coupled with the lack of professional debt coordination ability in some regions and the lack of attention to bill repayment management, the repayment priority of bills is relatively low, leading to bill overdue of some bond - issuing urban investment enterprises [30]. 3.2.2 Enterprise Self - factors - **Payable Amount Scale**: The relative scale of accounts payable and notes payable of bill - overdue urban investment enterprises is generally higher than the industry median level, and the relative scale of notes payable fluctuates greatly [32][33]. - **Debt Structure**: The proportion of short - term debt of bill - overdue urban investment enterprises has increased rapidly, and the proportion of short - term debt in the year before the first bill overdue is significantly higher than the industry median level [34]. - **Asset Structure**: The median increase in the proportion of funds occupied by business operations of bill - overdue urban investment enterprises is higher than the industry median increase [39]. - **Short - term Debt Repayment Ability and Fund Raising**: The coverage of cash - like assets to short - term debt of bill - overdue urban investment enterprises is significantly lower than the industry median level. From 2022 to 2024, the median net financing of bill - overdue urban investment enterprises decreased rapidly in the year before the bill overdue, significantly lower than the industry median level. In 2025, the median net financing of bill - overdue urban investment enterprises in the year before the bill overdue increased against the trend, possibly related to the "targeted support" of local governments and financial institutions [40][41]. - **Financing Channels and Costs**: From 2022 to 2024, the proportion of non - standard financing in the total debt of bill - overdue urban investment enterprises is generally higher than the industry median level and fluctuates greatly. The financing cost of bill - overdue urban investment enterprises in the three years before the bill overdue is generally higher than the industry median level [42][43]. 3.3 Impact of Bill Overdue of Urban Investment Enterprises and Countermeasure Suggestions - **Impact**: Bill overdue has a negative impact on enterprise credit, financing ability, and the regional financial market. It will damage the credit of urban investment enterprises, lead to financing difficulties and increased capital costs, and may also trigger legal disputes. It may also cause market concerns about the credit risk of urban investment enterprises in the region, affecting market confidence and leading to tight liquidity in the regional financial market [46]. - **Countermeasure Suggestions**: Urban investment enterprises need to shift from "passively relying on policies" to "actively enhancing resilience". They should strengthen asset liquidity management and improve short - term debt repayment ability through asset revitalization, accounts receivable collection, and optimized fund scheduling. They should also gradually reduce their dependence on government resources, transform from "platform - type" to "operation - type", and cultivate sustainable operating cash flow through refined operations to improve profitability and self - debt - repayment ability [47][48]. 3.4 Summary and Outlook - **Summary**: Although the proportion of notes payable in the interest - bearing debt of urban investment enterprises is low, bill overdue can be an early warning signal, indicating that the enterprise has certain liquidity tension, which may lead to other credit risk events. Since July 2023, after the introduction of the "package debt - resolution plan", the number of bill - overdue bond - issuing urban investment enterprises increased rapidly and then fluctuated. Since November 2024, the number has generally stabilized. District - county - level platforms among overdue enterprises account for a high proportion, and are concentrated in Shandong, Henan, and Guizhou. Bill overdue not only damages the enterprise's own credit and financing ability but may also cause a chain reaction in the regional financial market [49]. - **Outlook**: In 2026, the short - term risk mitigation expectation of urban investment enterprises is clear, but the debt repayment ability of most urban investment enterprises has not been substantially improved, and the operating cash flow has insufficient support for bill repayment. Some urban investment enterprises still have relatively heavy debt burdens, a high proportion of short - term debt, weak financing ability, and high financing costs. Therefore, the phenomenon of continuous bill overdue will still exist in some regions. Urban investment enterprises should pay attention to bill, debt, and public opinion management, strengthen credit management and maintenance, and actively transform into industries that enhance their self - hematopoietic ability [50].

Group 1 - The report emphasizes maintaining duration as the year-end approaches, with a focus on medium to long-term credit varieties, particularly 4-5 year products which show marginal improvement in cost-performance despite still low spread levels [2][10][12] - The current yield range for long-term credit bonds (5 years and above) rated AA+ and above is between 2.16% and 2.66%, indicating a certain level of yield cost-performance [3][10] - The report notes that funds have significantly increased their allocation to 5-year and above credit bonds, reflecting a trend towards extending duration for yield [3][10] Group 2 - The report highlights key policies and events, including Tianjin's measures to support high-quality development of REITs, which aim to enhance capital market services for the real economy [4][19] - The upcoming revision of the "Commercial Bank M&A Loan Management Measures" is expected to broaden the scope of applicable loans and optimize loan conditions, which could facilitate mergers and acquisitions [4][19][24] - The report mentions that the National Development and Reform Commission has recommended 105 infrastructure REITs projects to the CSRC, with 83 already issued, indicating a normalization in the issuance of infrastructure REITs [4][19][24] Group 3 - The report indicates that the credit bond market has seen a majority of yields decline, with financial bonds performing better, while credit spreads have shown divergence [6][10] - The issuance scale of credit bonds this week was 269.9 billion, a decrease of 20.5 billion from the previous week, with net financing also down [7][10] - The report notes a decrease in trading activity in both the interbank and exchange markets for credit bonds, suggesting a decline in market liquidity [7][10]

1. Report Industry Investment Rating No relevant content provided. 2. Core Viewpoints of the Report - Tianjin has significant location advantages, a well - developed transportation network, and relatively strong comprehensive economic strength. In 2024, its per - capita GDP was in the upper level nationwide, and the urbanization rate was high. The government has promoted industrial innovation and optimized the industrial structure, showing a "tertiary - secondary - primary" economic development pattern. Although the general public budget revenue scale is in the middle - lower level nationwide, the revenue quality is good, the fiscal self - sufficiency rate is acceptable, and the overall debt risk is controllable [4]. - There are large differences in economic development among districts in Tianjin. Binhai New Area leads in economic aggregate. The fiscal strength of each district is also highly differentiated, with Binhai New Area being the strongest. By the end of 2024, local government debts were mainly concentrated in the municipal - level and Binhai New Area, and the debt scale of each district increased [4]. - With the support of national policies, Tianjin has taken multiple measures to resolve debts, effectively controlling the debt growth rate of urban investment enterprises, improving the debt term structure and financing channels, narrowing the issuance spread of urban investment bonds, and reducing the interest rate of interest - bearing implicit debts. The number of negative public opinions in the region has decreased [4]. - High - credit - rated bond - issuing urban investment enterprises in Tianjin are concentrated in the municipal - level and Binhai New Area. There are large differences in the scale of urban investment debts among districts. In 2025 from January to September, the net financing of bond - issuing urban investment enterprises in Tianjin was positive. In 2024, the municipal - level and Xiqing District had relatively good support and guarantee capabilities for "total debts of bond - issuing urban investment enterprises + local government debts" [4]. 3. Summary by Relevant Catalogs 3.1 Tianjin's Economic and Fiscal Strength 3.1.1 Regional Characteristics and Economic Development - Tianjin is one of the four municipalities directly under the Central Government in China, with a superior geographical location, rich resources, and a well - developed land, sea, and air comprehensive transportation network. In 2024, the fixed - asset investment in comprehensive transportation was about 1.75 billion yuan [5][6]. - In 2024, Tianjin's GDP was 1.802432 trillion yuan, ranking 24th nationwide, with a growth rate of 5.1%. The per - capita GDP was 132,100 yuan, ranking 6th nationwide. The urbanization rate was 86.01%, much higher than the national average [9]. - The industrial structure has been optimized, showing a "tertiary - secondary - primary" pattern. In 2024, the added value of the tertiary industry was 1.152577 trillion yuan, a year - on - year increase of 5.5%, which was the main driving force for economic growth. The added value of high - tech manufacturing increased by 8.9% [12]. - Multiple policies support regional development, such as the "Tianjin Territorial Spatial Master Plan (2021 - 2035)" and a series of policies in 2024 to promote economic development [13]. 3.1.2 Fiscal Strength and Government Debt - In 2024, Tianjin's general public budget revenue scale was in the middle - lower level nationwide, with good revenue quality, an acceptable fiscal self - sufficiency rate, and an increase in government - funded revenue. The government debt burden was heavy, but the overall debt risk was controllable [19]. - In 2024, the local government debt ratio and debt - to - GDP ratio were 344.03% and 74.36% respectively, ranking 31st and 29th among provincial - level administrative regions [20]. 3.2 Economic, Fiscal, and Debt Management in Tianjin's Districts 3.2.1 Economic Strength of Districts - There are large differences in economic development among districts in Tianjin. Binhai New Area leads in economic aggregate, with a "1 + 3+4" industrial layout. The core six districts have a high proportion of high - tech industries, the four suburban districts benefit from industrial transfer, and the far - flung districts have different development levels [23][25]. - In 2024, most districts in Tianjin achieved varying degrees of economic growth. The GDP growth rate of Hongqiao District was the highest at 6.6% [29]. 3.2.2 Fiscal Strength of Districts - The fiscal strength of each district in Tianjin is highly differentiated, with Binhai New Area being the strongest. In 2024, Binhai New Area's general public budget revenue was 5.9649 billion yuan, leading among all districts [31]. - The growth rate of general public budget revenue varies among districts. In 2024, except for Hongqiao and Jizhou Districts, other districts achieved positive growth. The tax revenue proportion in general public budget revenue also varies, and the overall revenue quality is acceptable [32]. - The fiscal self - sufficiency rate of each district in 2024 was between 20.74% and 75.50%, with large differences. Hexi District had the highest fiscal self - sufficiency rate at 75.50% [33]. - The scale of government - funded revenue varies greatly among districts. In 2024, Binhai New Area ranked first with 1.3447 billion yuan. Except for some districts, other districts' government - funded revenue increased [38]. 3.2.3 Debt Management Measures and Results - By the end of 2024, local government debts in Tianjin were mainly concentrated in the municipal - level and Binhai New Area, and the debt scale of each district increased. Binhai New Area had the fastest growth rate of government debt balance [44][45]. - With the support of national policies, Tianjin has taken measures such as improving debt management systems, strengthening cooperation with financial institutions, debt replacement, and revitalizing stock assets to resolve debts [46]. - Through these measures, the debt growth rate of urban investment enterprises in Tianjin has been effectively controlled, the debt term structure and financing channels have been improved, the issuance spread of urban investment bonds has narrowed, the interest rate of interest - bearing implicit debts has decreased, some financing platforms have been cleaned up and merged, and negative public opinions in the region have decreased [50]. 3.3 Debt - Repayment Ability of Tianjin's Urban Investment Enterprises 3.3.1 Overview of Urban Investment Enterprises - As of the end of September 2025, there were 31 urban investment enterprises with outstanding bonds in Tianjin, including 4 at the municipal - level and 27 at the district - level. Binhai New Area had the largest number of bond - issuing urban investment enterprises [59]. - The credit ratings of bond - issuing urban investment enterprises are mainly AA +, and 2 enterprises' credit ratings were upgraded in 2024 [59][60]. 3.3.2 Bond - Issuing Situation - In 2024, the bond - issuing scale of Tianjin's urban investment enterprises decreased significantly year - on - year, and the net financing was in a net outflow state. In 2025 from January to September, the net financing turned positive [61][63]. 3.3.3 Debt - Repayment Ability Analysis - As of the end of 2024, the coverage of monetary funds for short - term debts of Tianjin's urban investment enterprises was weak, and most enterprises faced large short - term debt - repayment pressure. The debt scale of municipal - level and Binhai New Area's urban investment enterprises accounted for a high proportion, and there was a large concentrated repayment pressure in 2026 [65]. - In 2024, the cash flow from financing activities of Tianjin's urban investment enterprises was in a net inflow state [65]. 3.3.4 Support and Guarantee Ability of District - Level Fiscal Revenue for Urban Investment Enterprises' Debts - The ratio of "total debts of bond - issuing urban investment enterprises + local government debts" to "comprehensive fiscal revenue" in Tianjin's municipal - level and districts was between 300.00% and 1100.00%. Dongli District had the highest ratio at 1055.05%. The municipal - level and Xiqing District had relatively good support and guarantee capabilities [76].

多因素促城投"退平台" 眼下，城投平台的转型进程正全面加速。 新华财经上海11月12日电 当前，城投公司作为城市建设的"主力军"，已然站在从政府融资平台向现代 化国有企业战略转型的历史十字路口。 那么，城投企业如何才能摆脱传统路径依赖，找出符合新阶段发展要求的创新路径？在转型过程中会面 临哪些障碍？需要怎样的政策支持？目前标杆企业进行了哪些探索？ "首先，是受到了政策推动。为了化解地方政府隐性债务风险，推进城投企业市场化转型，国家出台了 一系列化债政策，明确要求剥离城投公司的政府融资职能，推动其退出融资平台名单。"一位券商固收 部门负责人在接受记者采访时指出，"其次，是部分城投平台的融资压力日益加剧。现阶段，城投公司 在融资端面临着诸多限制，尤其是在监管名单内的城投公司，其债务难以继续新增，融资面临极大掣 肘，因此选择退平台以突破融资瓶颈势在必行。再者，部分质素较好的企业，确实存在市场化转型的需 求。城投公司退出平台后，可以更加市场化的模式运作，拓宽融资渠道，优化产业布局，激发企业活 力，提升国有资本与国有资产的运作效率。" 记者观察发现，现阶段拟"退平台"的城投主体具有两大特点。其一，在信用级别和行政级别方 ...

Group 1: Report Summary - The report focuses on the economic, fiscal, and debt situations of Wuxi City, its districts (counties, cities), and the debt - paying ability of local urban investment enterprises [4]. - Wuxi has obvious location advantages, a high - level economy, good fiscal revenue quality, and relatively low government debt burden. However, there are differences in economic and fiscal conditions among districts (counties, cities), and some urban investment enterprises face short - term debt - paying pressure [4]. Group 2: Wuxi City's Economic and Fiscal Strength (1) Regional Characteristics and Economic Development - Wuxi is an important part of the Yangtze River Delta urban agglomeration, with obvious location advantages and convenient transportation. It has a high - level urbanization rate, a reasonable industrial structure, and developed private economy. The four landmark industries have multiple indicators ranking among the top three in Jiangsu Province [5]. - In 2024, Wuxi's GDP ranked third in Jiangsu Province, with a GDP growth rate of 5.8%. Its per - capita GDP ranked first in Jiangsu Province. From January to June 2025, its GDP was 773.515 billion yuan, with a year - on - year growth of 5.3% [8]. - The "465" modern industrial system construction is accelerating, and in 2024, the revenue scale of the "465" industrial cluster reached 1.81 trillion yuan [9][11]. - Wuxi has received strong support from the central and provincial governments in terms of fiscal transfer payments, special funds, and special loans from the National Development Bank [13]. (2) Fiscal Strength and Debt Situation - In 2024, Wuxi's general public budget revenue ranked third in Jiangsu Province, with good revenue quality and strong fiscal self - sufficiency. The government - sponsored fund revenue decreased year - on - year, and superior subsidies contributed to the comprehensive financial resources [17]. - By the end of 2024, Wuxi's government debt burden was at a relatively low level among prefecture - level cities in Jiangsu Province, with a government debt ratio of 115.81% and a government debt - to - GDP ratio of 16.05%, ranking fourth and second respectively (sorted from low to high debt burden) [18]. Group 3: Economic and Fiscal Conditions of Wuxi's Districts (Counties, Cities) (1) Economic Strength - The districts (counties, cities) under Wuxi have a high - level overall economic development, relatively balanced regional economic development, and a high - level urbanization rate. Among them, Jiangyin has the strongest overall economic strength, and Xinwu District has the highest per - capita GDP [19]. - In 2024, Jiangyin was the only county - level city in Wuxi with a GDP exceeding 500 billion yuan. The economic growth rates of the 7 districts (counties, cities) were relatively balanced, and most of them had a growth rate of over 6.00% [25]. (2) Fiscal Strength and Debt Situation Fiscal Revenue - In 2024, the fiscal revenue structure of Wuxi's districts (counties, cities) showed a pattern of "two strong, many stable, and one weak", with differences among regions. Tax revenue accounted for a high proportion and was relatively balanced among districts (counties, cities). Fund revenues decreased year - on - year due to the real - estate market [30]. - In terms of general public budget revenue scale, Jiangyin and Xinwu District ranked first, with over 25 billion yuan. Yixing, Xishan, and Huishan Districts were at a medium level, while Liangxi and Binhu Districts were relatively low [30]. - In terms of comprehensive financial resources, Jiangyin and Xinwu District were the strongest, with over 35 billion yuan. Except for Binhu and Jiangyin Districts, other districts (counties, cities) were highly dependent on fund revenues [37]. Debt - Since 2024, the government debt balances of Wuxi's districts (counties, cities) have been increasing, with relatively small differences in debt burden levels but heavy overall debt burdens. Jiangyin had the largest government debt scale, and Liangxi District had the heaviest debt burden [39]. - Wuxi and its districts (counties, cities) have strengthened debt monitoring and management, actively resolved hidden debts, and controlled debt risks [42]. Group 4: Debt - paying Ability of Wuxi's Urban Investment Enterprises (1) Overview - As of September 30, 2025, there were 61 urban investment enterprises with outstanding bonds in Wuxi, mainly at AA and AA+ levels. There have been no adjustments to the credit ratings and outlooks since 2024 [47]. (2) Bond Issuance - In 2024, the bond issuance scale of Wuxi's urban investment enterprises decreased year - on - year, and most districts' net bond financing scales decreased. The overall bond financing in 2024 was net repayment, and the trend continued in the first three quarters of 2025 [48]. (3) Debt - paying Ability Analysis - As of the end of 2024, the debt scale of Wuxi's urban investment enterprises increased, except for those in Jiangyin. Except for Jiangyin and Xinwu Districts, the debt burdens of urban investment enterprises in other regions increased [54]. - Wuxi, Huishan, and Jiangyin will have large - scale bond maturities within one year. Xishan, Huishan, and Liangxi Districts' cash - like assets have a general coverage of short - term debts, facing certain short - term debt - paying pressure [54]. - In 2024, the cash flow from financing activities of Wuxi's urban investment enterprises was mostly net inflow, but the overall scale decreased year - on - year, indicating a slowdown in the overall financing pace [62]. (4) Support and Guarantee Ability of Fiscal Revenue for Urban Investment Enterprises' Debts - The ratio of "total debt of urban investment enterprises + local government debt" to "comprehensive financial resources" in Wuxi's districts ranges from 196.64% to 694.85%, with Huishan District having the highest ratio [63].

Core Insights - The Chinese government is accelerating the cultivation and large-scale application of new scenarios, with local state-owned enterprises and urban investment companies exploring opportunities in various sectors such as low-altitude economy, new energy technology, and smart housing [1][5] Group 1: New Scenario Development - Chengdu Urban Investment Group is focusing on areas like gas safety, automated manufacturing, and new energy storage, planning to launch new products and innovative scenarios in smart construction and operations [2] - The Chengdu city government is facilitating technology and scenario matching to drive deep integration of technological innovation and industrial application [2] - Nanjing has launched a public service platform for urban scenarios, aiming to create a visual industry scenario map and has already published over 1,500 application scenarios [4] Group 2: Collaborative Projects - Hangzhou City Investment Group and Tsinghua University's technology transfer company have launched an AI industry model project, showcasing several innovative models for public transport and flood prevention [3] - Nanjing Market Scenario Company is not only a facilitator for new scenario projects but also connects companies with financial resources, having issued 8 loans totaling 319 million yuan [5] Group 3: Challenges and Opportunities - Experts indicate that the open innovation of scenarios is still in its early stages, facing systemic barriers and a lack of regulatory frameworks for new industries [6] - The government emphasizes the importance of leveraging China's large market and diverse application scenarios to prioritize new fields and high-value scenarios [5]