Group 1 - The current status of US dollar hegemony is facing unprecedented challenges, with a significant decline in its share of global foreign exchange reserves from 71% in 1999 to 57.4% in Q1 2024, marking a historical low [4][5][6] - Emerging markets, particularly Brazil and India, are actively reducing their dollar reserves, with Brazil and China agreeing to conduct trade settlements in local currencies, indicating a shift towards de-dollarization [4][5][6] - The dollar's share in international trade settlements has also shown a slight decline, with its current share at 49.08%, while the euro and yuan are gaining ground [12][13] Group 2 - The US federal debt has surpassed $36 trillion, with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 124%-125%, the highest since World War II, raising concerns about the sustainability of dollar hegemony [16][17][19] - The US is employing unconventional debt monetization strategies, including the introduction of century bonds and inflation-linked bonds, to maintain the attractiveness of dollar assets [40][41] - The Federal Reserve's aggressive monetary policy, including a cumulative rate hike of 500 basis points since March 2022, has led to significant global financial repercussions, exacerbating the trend of de-dollarization [21][22][24] Group 3 - The "de-dollarization" process has accelerated, with over 110 countries actively participating in initiatives to reduce reliance on the dollar, particularly following geopolitical tensions such as the Ukraine crisis [27][28] - Various regions are adopting different strategies for de-dollarization, with BRICS countries establishing local currency settlement systems and Southeast Asian nations planning to reduce dollar settlements in regional trade [28][29] - The challenges to de-dollarization include the high conversion costs associated with the dollar's established network effects and the depth of the US debt market, which remains unmatched by non-US markets [29][30]

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the unusual characteristics of the current dollar cycle, highlighting its resilience and divergence from historical patterns, suggesting that the dollar may have entered a downward cycle since 2025 due to structural changes in the U.S. economy and global dynamics [1][46]. Historical Review of Dollar Cycles - Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, the dollar has experienced three major appreciation cycles, with significant increases in the DXY index during each period [2][5]. - The current dollar appreciation cycle began in 2008, lasting 17 years and resulting in a 40% increase, marking it as the longest cycle since the Bretton Woods system's dissolution [3][5]. Current Characteristics of the Dollar Cycle - The dollar's peak values have shown a downward trend over the years, indicating a decreasing relative strength of the U.S. economy globally [6]. - The current cycle exhibits three unusual divergences: a decline in the dollar's share of global reserves, a lack of impact from expanding fiscal and trade deficits, and a strong dollar despite rising inflation in the U.S. [7][10][12]. Threefold Analysis Framework - The dollar's exchange rate is fundamentally influenced by the relative performance of the U.S. economy compared to other major economies [15]. - Monetary policy from the Federal Reserve significantly impacts the dollar's strength, with tight monetary policies historically supporting dollar appreciation [20]. - Capital flows are closely linked to the dollar index, with geopolitical factors also playing a crucial role in influencing these flows [21]. Feedback Mechanisms - The dollar's appreciation has asymmetric effects on the global economy, increasing financing costs for other countries while benefiting the U.S. economy [21][22]. - Positive feedback mechanisms exist where dollar appreciation leads to worsening debt burdens for other economies, further driving capital flows into the U.S. [22]. Current Trends and Future Outlook - Since 2025, there are signs that the dollar may be entering a downward cycle due to weakening relative advantages of the U.S. economy and declining risk appetite for dollar assets [34][38]. - The structural changes in the U.S. asset and liability landscape suggest a strong motivation for the U.S. to seek dollar depreciation to manage its growing net liabilities [35][36]. - Market sentiment is shifting, with a notable decrease in net long positions on the dollar, indicating a growing bearish outlook [38][40]. Conclusion - The current dollar cycle is characterized by unprecedented features, with the potential for a downward trend driven by both domestic and international factors, including the competitive landscape in technology and economic policies [45][46].

Core Perspective - The article discusses the recent debates in the U.S. surrounding the casting of diverse actors in classic fairy tale roles, highlighting a growing divide between traditional narratives and contemporary realities [2][3]. Summary by Sections Book Overview - "Empire of Truth" is a unique work that systematically analyzes American history and reality from a non-Western perspective, breaking away from Western discourse [2][4]. - The book employs a "news as history" approach, using recent news events to explore deeper historical roots and institutional logic behind contemporary issues in the U.S. [3][4]. Key Themes - The book covers ten critical aspects of America, including identity crises, indigenous tragedies, racial discrimination, the "American Dream," American democracy, "American exceptionalism," war tendencies, the dollar system, and technology monopolies [3][4]. - Each chapter provides both macro analysis and vivid personal stories, connecting historical events to individual fates, emphasizing the narrative that "people are the creators of history" [4]. Global Context - "Empire of Truth" places the U.S. within a broader global context, offering a multi-faceted and authentic portrayal of America, which caters to both professional researchers and general readers [4]. - The book aims to provide a rational effort to understand America, which is essential for comprehending the evolving international order [4].

中期视角下，全球资本配置逻辑已开始从利差驱动向信任判断转变，美元正从单极货币体系中的绝对 锚，向多极格局中的相对资产过渡。 2025年以来，美元汇率波动加剧，反映的不仅是短期政策的扰动，更是全球市场对美元资产的重新定 价。在财政空间受限、关税政策频繁变动、美联储立场趋于谨慎的背景下，市场对美元资产的信心开始 动摇，对其避险功能与储备价值的认知正在发生微妙而持续的转折。过去得益于全球市场对美元流动性 以及资产安全性的信任缓冲，美国长期的双赤字并未对美元地位构成实质性冲击。当前，关税政策削弱 了美元输出路径使得美元流动性承压，美元体系的内在矛盾也逐步浮出水面，特里芬难题由此从隐性走 向显性。 这一过程中，美元体系开始呈现出一定程度的庞氏特征：其稳定运行依赖于市场对美元信任的延续，若 市场共识瓦解，美元及其相关资产原有的正向循环则可能被逆转。短期来看，近期的美元波动尚未引起 美元资产的系统性抛售。但中期视角下，全球资本配置逻辑已开始从利差驱动向信任判断转变，美元正 从单极货币体系中的绝对锚，向多极格局中的相对资产过渡。综上所述，我们判断美元指数已进入长期 下行通道，目前的波动或许只是美元结构性重估的起点。 政策冲击 ...

Core Viewpoint - The recent legislative developments in the U.S. and Hong Kong regarding stablecoins, along with Circle's listing on the NYSE, have reignited discussions on the impact and implications of stablecoins in both traditional and Web3 finance [1][2]. Group 1: Stablecoin Types and Characteristics - Stablecoins can be categorized into fiat-collateralized, crypto-collateralized, commodity-collateralized, and algorithmic stablecoins, with fiat-collateralized stablecoins being the focus of regulatory scrutiny due to their significant issuance and connection to real-world assets [2][3]. - Fiat-collateralized stablecoins sacrifice decentralization and accept traditional trust risks, integrating into the sovereign credit system [3]. Group 2: Global Regulatory Trends - Since the introduction of the EU's MiCA, global regulators have prioritized fiat-collateralized stablecoins, focusing on non-bank payment institutions' regulatory frameworks, including AML, KYC, and asset segregation [4]. - The regulatory approach aims to enhance consumer protection and compliance within financial market infrastructures, especially given the increasing influence of stablecoins in cross-border payments and DeFi [4][5]. Group 3: Challenges and Opportunities - Despite the opportunities presented by stablecoin legislation, challenges remain, such as the inability to effectively manage market volatility and liquidity shocks, which could exacerbate instability in the crypto space [6][7]. - The push for a "chain-based Bretton Woods system" faces sustainability issues, as the inherent conflict between providing liquidity and maintaining value stability complicates the viability of stablecoins [6][7]. Group 4: China's Strategic Focus - China should prioritize the exploration of a fiat-collateralized stablecoin, particularly a renminbi stablecoin, to establish a presence in the global market, with a focus on high liquidity and low-risk assets [9][10]. - Regulatory frameworks should be developed for both onshore and offshore issuance of renminbi stablecoins, ensuring compliance with domestic and international regulations while promoting the internationalization of the renminbi [9][10].

以下文章来源于巴顿比格斯 ，作者巴顿比格斯 巴顿比格斯 . 历史不会重复，但是它自然成韵。 文 | 巴顿比格斯 来源 | 巴顿比格斯 编辑 | 杨兰 审核 | 浦电路交易员 近期沪银期货价格创上市以来新高，国际白银ETF连续增仓的情况下，欧美降息预期抬升、叠加宏观市场情绪转暖预期提振白银工业 属性，沪银表现强于黄金、金银比小幅修复。 此前黄金屡创新高，白银被低估，金银比一度逼近105（历史均值60-80），随着避险情绪升温，白银成为"价值洼地"，资金涌入推动 其补涨，金银比回落至90。全球最大白银ETF持仓量持续增加，CFTC（美国商品期货交易委员会）净多头持仓攀升，显示出资金对 白银强烈的看涨情绪。 2025年全球货币体系发生深刻变化，美元霸权遭遇挑战。特朗普政府的一系列政策，如强推制造业回流、关税壁垒等，导致全球美元 回流美国，美元流动性减少，且面临 "特里芬难题" 升级版，即美联储在加息抑制通胀与降息刺激经济维持贸易逆差之间两难抉择， 这削弱了美元信用。 投资者对美元信心下降，转而寻求其他避险资产，白银作为传统的避险资产之一，受到投资者青睐。全球政治经济不确定性增加，如 地缘政治冲突、贸易政策不稳定等， ...

Report Industry Investment Rating - Not provided in the content Core Viewpoints of the Report - The bond market in 2025 has entered a state of "low interest rates + narrow spreads + high volatility," and in the second half of the year, there may be two characteristics: the return of the pricing anchor and a favorable period for action from June to August [4]. - External demand expectations are volatile, but the bond market mainly prices domestic demand. The core contradiction in the domestic economy lies in shrinking demand and weakening expectations, with insufficient endogenous economic momentum [4][138]. - The focus of monetary policy in 2025 is different from that in 2023 - 2024, emphasizing seizing opportunities, considering both domestic and external factors, and effectively stabilizing asset prices [5]. - The pricing anchor has returned, and the policy rate determines funds, which in turn price bonds. June - August is a good window for long - position operations in the bond market [7]. Summary by Relevant Catalogs 1. Analysis of the Bond Market Trend from January to Date and Its Macroeconomic Logic - **Market Trends in Different Periods**: In Q1 2025, tight funds and significant bank liability pressure led to a bond market correction; in Q2, repeated tariff expectations and reserve requirement ratio and interest rate cuts caused yields to decline rapidly to a low level and then fluctuate [44]. - **New Features of the Bond Market in 2025**: The central bank's policy rate has become the floor of the money market; short - term bonds perform weakly and are more affected by funds, while long - term bonds have larger fluctuations and are difficult to grasp; the overall fundamentals are stable, but tariff pulses have a significant impact, and the stock and bond markets are greatly influenced by short - term risk preferences [36][43][44]. - **Credit Spreads and Strategies**: The credit spreads of medium - term notes and commercial bank secondary capital bonds have compressed. For credit spreads to return to the low point in August 2024, liquidity easing expectations need to be fulfilled, and liability expansion is required [23][44]. - **Performance of Duration Strategies**: Duration strategies in 2025 have not achieved stable returns, with inconsistent performance in different months [24][26]. - **Asset Returns Reflecting Expectations**: In 2025, the bond market rose while the stock market fell, and the difficulty of bond market timing has increased. Economic pessimistic expectations have been somewhat revised [27][29][32] 2. Changes in External and Domestic Demand and the Core Contradictions in the Bond Market - **External Demand and the "Triffin Dilemma"**: The core of the "Triffin Dilemma" is the long - term coexistence of the global nature of the US dollar's credit and trade deficits. The US faces dual deficits (trade deficit + fiscal deficit), which are more important than tariffs. The US dollar's high valuation affects its export competitiveness, and the demand for US Treasuries is weak, while the supply pressure of refinancing at maturity persists [55][61][138]. - **The "Sea Lake Manor Agreement"**: It aims to restructure global trade through tariffs, weaken the value of the US dollar, and reduce the debt scale and borrowing costs in the US Treasury market. Specific measures may include replacing foreign - held US Treasuries with ultra - long - term zero - coupon bonds and asking countries to cooperate in lowering the US dollar exchange rate [66]. - **US Economic Situation**: US consumer spending has weakened, corporate inventories have increased, and inflation expectations remain high. Tariff impacts may gradually appear in the second and third quarters of 2025, and China's external demand may further decline [67][68][69]. - **Exchange Rate and Domestic Policy**: The exchange rate factor no longer poses a rigid constraint on domestic monetary easing. Short - term "rush to export" supports external demand, but it is likely to decline in the medium term, and the bond market mainly prices domestic demand [77][86][138]. - **Domestic Economic Core Contradictions**: The core contradictions in the domestic economy are shrinking demand and weakening expectations, with insufficient endogenous economic momentum. Demand contraction is characterized by low prices and weak consumption willingness. Expectations are weakening for both residents and enterprises [88][92][138]. - **New and Old Economic Momentum Switching**: The domestic economy is undergoing a switch between new and old economic momentum. The influence of old momentum on the economy is weakening, while the influence of new momentum is accelerating but still has a low proportion [109][112][115]. - **Domestic Policy and Economic Rebound**: Fiscal policy is playing an increasingly active role, and the coordination between monetary and fiscal policies has entered a new stage. However, local governments are still mainly focused on debt resolution. The pressure of asset shortage has been alleviated but not completely eliminated [116][123][138] 3. Central Bank Liquidity: Loose Trading vs. Macro - Prudential Management - **Differences in Monetary Policy Focus**: In 2023, the focus was on reserve requirement ratio and interest rate cuts to support post - pandemic economic recovery; in 2024, it was to promote the transformation of the monetary policy regulatory framework and remove obstacles to interest rate decline; in 2025, it emphasizes seizing opportunities, considering both domestic and external factors, and stabilizing asset prices [5][141][146]. - **Concerns about Liquidity in the Second Half of the Year** - **Reducing Liability Costs**: Deposit transfer disturbances have attenuated; the reset of time deposits may relieve bank liability costs starting from September 2025; if the Q2 research value of the insurance预定 rate remains below 2.25%, the insurance预定 rate may be lowered in Q3 [164][167][175]. - **Reserve Requirement Ratio and Interest Rate Cuts**: There may be a 10 - 20bps interest rate cut in the second half of the year, mainly triggered by the need to support the real estate market. A 50bps reserve requirement ratio cut may be necessary in the second half of the year if the economic data in Q3 are still volatile [180][184]. - **Central Bank Bond Purchases**: The resumption of central bank bond purchases may be approaching, and the purchase intensity may be significant during the second wave of net supply peaks (likely from August to September) [188]. - **Funds Rate Pricing**: The policy rate may become the implicit lower limit of the funds rate [189]. - **Relationship between Loose Trading and Macro - Prudential Management**: In Q1 2025, macro - prudential management played a role in releasing bond market risks, while in Q2, loose trading took precedence. Attention should be paid to whether macro - prudential management will regain the upper hand after the end of loose trading around Q4 [6]. - **Future Monetary Policy Reform Measures**: Consider narrowing the interest rate corridor and reforming the reserve requirement system [6] 4. Return of the Pricing Anchor and the Favorable Period for Action - **Return of the Pricing Anchor**: Open Market Operations (OMO) has become the implicit lower limit of funds, and certificates of deposit (CDs) have become the implicit lower limit of 10 - year Treasury bonds. The conditions for the decline of CDs are likely to be met in Q3 2025 [7]. - **Favorable Period for Action**: June - August is a good window for long - position operations in the bond market. The bond market strategy should focus on liquidity - favorable areas and band - trading opportunities. The yield - to - maturity (YTM) of 10 - year Treasury bonds is expected to be in the range of 1.5% - 1.7% in the next quarter and 1.4% - 1.8% in the next half - year [7]. - **Asset Allocation in the Second Half of the Year**: Convertible bonds > medium - and short - term credit risk - taking > interest rate duration extension in the fixed - income asset allocation in the second half of the year [7]

Core Viewpoint - The current international monetary system is undergoing profound changes due to the long-term disorderly expansion of U.S. public debt, the "weaponization" of the dollar during the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and various policy proposals during the Trump 2.0 era, which erode the credibility of the dollar as the world's reserve currency [2]. Group 1: Triffin Dilemma Misinterpretations - The "Triffin Dilemma" has evolved into two versions post-Bretton Woods: one concerning the current account and the other regarding "safe assets," both of which contain significant misunderstandings [4][13]. - Misconceptions include confusing net capital with total capital inflows, mixing "earned" and "borrowed" foreign exchange reserves, and conflating bilateral with multilateral capital flows [17][19][20]. - The supply of dollar liquidity is not necessarily linked to the U.S. current account deficit, as the U.S. maintained a current account surplus for about 30 years after becoming the primary reserve currency [14][21]. Group 2: U.S. Stocks as Safe Assets - Overseas funds have shifted from U.S. Treasury bonds to U.S. stocks, leading to the disappearance of the equity risk premium in the S&P 500, indicating that investors now view U.S. stocks as safe assets [5][23]. - This shift is driven by declining safety perceptions of U.S. debt and the stable long-term growth of U.S. stocks, with significant capital inflows into the U.S. stock market [26][30]. Group 3: U.S. Reserve Currency Status - The U.S. is unlikely to relinquish its status as the world's reserve currency due to the substantial benefits it provides, including the international seigniorage revenue [6][32]. - The unique asset-liability structure of the U.S. allows it to benefit from dollar depreciation, effectively transferring payment burdens globally [36][39]. Group 4: Declining Economic Share vs. Rising Financial Dominance - While the U.S. share of the real economy is declining, its share in international finance is increasing, primarily due to the offshore dollar being the most important financing currency and onshore dollars being viewed as safe assets [7][40][44]. - The expansion of cross-border capital flows has outpaced trade growth, reinforcing the dollar's financial position [46]. Group 5: Dollar Cycles - The dollar exhibits cyclical characteristics influenced by fundamentals, policies, and capital flows, with positive feedback mechanisms amplifying these cycles [8][48][52]. - The dollar's appreciation impacts global economies asymmetrically, benefiting the U.S. while constraining other economies [53]. Group 6: The Dollar's Global Impact - The U.S. often emerges unscathed from global crises, with the adverse effects disproportionately affecting non-U.S. economies due to the asymmetrical impact of U.S. monetary policy [56][58]. - The dollar's status as a reserve currency provides the U.S. with unique advantages, including lower financing costs and the ability to conduct fiscal stimulus without immediate repayment pressures [57]. Group 7: Need for an International Monetary System - The current trend towards a multi-polar world raises questions about the necessity of an international monetary system, with the dollar still playing a central role in global trade and finance [62][63]. - A multi-currency system may be preferable to a non-system, as it allows for currency competition and provides space for emerging currencies like the renminbi [64]. Group 8: Transitioning to a Multi-Currency System - Transitioning from a dollar-centric system to a multi-currency system requires policy coordination among major currency issuers and flexible exchange rate arrangements [11][65].

中金研究 近期市场对美元走势的关注度大幅上升，不仅关心其短期走势，也关注其长期地位。 美元成为国际储备货币 是市场选择，也是制度安排。一个货币如何成为国际货币 ，学 术领域有经济与非经济视角，Barry Eichengreen等（2019）形象地将之比喻为"水星假说"与"火星假说"。所谓的"水星假说"，强调经济因素（比如 经济规模、资本市场发达程度等）决定某货币是否能成为国际货币；所谓的"火星假说"，强调地缘政治等非经 济因素的作用。 一些人士也指出（如法国财政部长德斯坦），美元受益于其国际储备货币地位，享有低融资成本等"特权"。在 不考虑其他因素的情况下，美国债务与其他国家的债务相比，能享受更低的利率。不管是"火星假说"视角还 是"水星假说"视角，美元的国际地位面临的挑战在增多。从"水星假说"视角来看，我们认为美国财政赤字居高 不下，债务风险增加，美元的信用受到质疑。从"火星假说"视角来看，美国为其盟友提供安全保障的意愿与能 力下降，我们认为降低了美元的"安全溢价"。但是在中短期内，我们认为美元在全球储备中仍占据很重要的地 位。 点击小程序查看报告原文 美元成为国际储备货币是市场选择，也是制度安排 不同的货 ...

Group 1 - The countdown to a potential U.S. debt default is underway, with significant economic turmoil expected in the coming months, particularly around the U.S. government's plans to impose tariffs and the expiration of the U.S.-China trade truce [1][2] - The U.S. national debt has reached $36 trillion, hitting the debt ceiling, forcing the government to borrow new debt to pay off old debt, which has led to difficulties in long-term bond auctions requiring yields as high as 5% to attract investors [2][4] - The Federal Reserve's quantitative easing (QE) since the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in a cycle where maturing low-interest bonds must be replaced with high-interest debt, potentially leading to annual interest payments of $1.5 trillion if all debt is refinanced at 4% [2][6] Group 2 - Concerns about the U.S. debt market have been echoed by major financial figures, including JPMorgan's CEO Jamie Dimon, who warned of cracks in the market and the inevitability of a crisis, suggesting that preparations are being made for potential fallout [4][5] - The U.S. trade deficit has dramatically increased from $600 billion to over $900 billion since 2020, reflecting a 50% rise, which parallels the increase in national debt, highlighting the challenges posed by the Triffin dilemma [6][7] - The U.S. may resort to aggressive economic measures against China, the EU, and other global economies to address the debt crisis, potentially impacting domestic technology giants as well [9][11]