Core Viewpoint - The dialogue between the chief economists of Zhongtai Securities highlights the core issues of China's economic growth model, emphasizing the shift from debt-driven growth to structural optimization [1] Group 1: Debt-Driven Growth - The past few decades have seen China relying on a debt-driven growth model, which is easy to understand despite its technical terminology [1] - The investment returns have diminished as the economy has developed, leading to a shift from an early target of "maintaining 8% growth" to a current target of "maintaining 5%" [3] - To achieve growth targets, China relies on the "three drivers" of investment, consumption, and exports, with investment becoming the most direct choice due to the challenges in boosting consumption and the uncertainties in exports [4][6] Group 2: Debt Accumulation and Economic Impact - From 2019 to 2023, local government debt has increased at a rate three times that of GDP growth, indicating a concerning trade-off between debt and economic growth [6][8] - The macro leverage ratio has exceeded 300%, surpassing that of developed countries like the U.S., raising concerns about the sustainability of this debt-driven model [8] - Many infrastructure projects have been built, but their utility is questionable, as some areas do not generate sufficient traffic to justify the investments [10] Group 3: Consumer Income and Spending - Only 20% of every dollar invested translates into resident income, which limits the potential for consumption growth [11] - Despite a decent GDP growth in the first half of the year, consumption has not increased correspondingly, highlighting a fundamental issue in the economic structure [11] - Policies aimed at boosting consumption, such as trade-in programs, often fail to benefit lower-income groups and can lead to price increases by manufacturers [13] Group 4: Service Sector Potential - The service sector has significant potential for growth and employment, with the U.S. absorbing over 80% of its workforce in services, compared to less than 50% in China [16] - Easing restrictions on the service sector could stimulate consumption among wealthier individuals, which in turn could create jobs for lower-income groups, fostering a positive economic cycle [18] - Optimizing fiscal spending towards healthcare, education, and direct consumer vouchers may yield more tangible benefits than direct cash transfers [18] Group 5: Economic Transition - Relying on debt for infrastructure development is becoming increasingly unsustainable, necessitating a shift towards consumption-driven growth [19][21] - Adjusting the economic structure to make consumption the primary driver of growth is essential for sustainable development [21] - The ultimate goal of economic development is to improve the quality of life for citizens, which requires careful resource allocation and addressing various challenges in the transition process [22]

Core Viewpoint - The Federal Reserve has initiated a rate cut cycle, reducing the federal funds rate target range by 25 basis points to 4.00%-4.25%, which may influence the People's Bank of China (PBOC) to consider similar actions in the context of China's economic conditions and expectations for lower interest rates [1][2]. Group 1: Economic Context - China's total social financing reached 433.66 trillion yuan, increasing the demand for a rate cut among economic entities and individuals [1]. - The PBOC has maintained the Loan Prime Rate (LPR) stable at 3.00% for one year and 3.50% for five years, with no adjustments for four consecutive months since May [1][2]. Group 2: Banking Sector Challenges - The net interest margin (NIM) of the banking sector has been under pressure, dropping to 0.947% in Q1 2025, the lowest in history, while the non-performing loan ratio exceeded 1% [2]. - The ability of banks to cover risk costs has diminished, with the NIM's coverage of non-performing loans falling from 120.2% in 2021 to 94.7% in Q1 2025 [2]. Group 3: Monetary Policy Constraints - The PBOC's decision to hold rates steady is influenced by the dual pressures of declining asset yields and intensified competition on the liability side, leading to a significant reduction in risk appetite within the financial system [3]. - Recent market interest rate trends and fiscal policy execution have created technical constraints on the PBOC's ability to lower rates, with long-term rates rising and indicating tighter liquidity expectations [4]. Group 4: Capital Flows and Exchange Rate Pressures - The inverted yield curve between Chinese and U.S. bonds has raised concerns about capital outflows, with estimates suggesting a net outflow of $100-120 billion in the first half of 2025 [5]. - The PBOC faces pressure to maintain exchange rate stability, as further rate cuts could exacerbate capital outflow risks and weaken the yuan [5][6]. Group 5: Future Policy Considerations - The PBOC is likely to consider a rate cut in late October, potentially aligning with the outcomes of the upcoming 20th Central Committee meeting, which may signal new economic policy directions [7]. - The need to achieve the annual economic growth target of around 5% and to stimulate domestic demand and stabilize the real estate market will add pressure for future monetary easing [6][7].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the increasing global macro leverage ratio, primarily driven by government borrowing, and its implications for economic growth and stability [2][3][6]. Group 1: Global Debt Trends - Since the 2008 financial crisis, global debt has risen significantly, with the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 350% today, up from around 320% before the pandemic [3]. - Government debt has increased at a faster rate than that of the private sector, with major economies surpassing post-World War II levels [3][6]. - The macro leverage ratio in developed countries is higher than in developing countries, indicating a trend where larger economies require more debt to grow [3][6]. Group 2: Government Borrowing Dynamics - Governments are more willing to increase leverage during economic downturns to stabilize the economy, contrasting with private sectors that typically reduce debt in such times [10]. - The U.S. government has seen its debt interest payments rise significantly, with projections indicating that interest payments will account for a substantial portion of federal revenue [46]. - Japan's government has maintained a high leverage ratio, but its economy has struggled with stagnation despite this [10][46]. Group 3: Fiscal Policy and Taxation - Tax reforms have led to a decline in corporate tax rates globally, with the average rate dropping from 46.8% in 1980 to 25.7% in 2023 [23]. - In the U.S., the tax burden has shifted, with corporate tax contributions decreasing while payroll taxes have increased, potentially exacerbating income inequality [25]. - China's government has implemented tax reductions to stimulate investment, resulting in a significant increase in government leverage [32]. Group 4: Social Spending and Aging Population - The U.S. faces rising mandatory spending due to an aging population, with social security and healthcare costs expected to continue increasing [34][36]. - China's fiscal support for social insurance has grown dramatically, with subsidies for social insurance funds increasing by 229% over ten years [37]. - The need for increased government spending to address pension shortfalls is becoming critical, with projections indicating a significant funding gap due to demographic changes [40]. Group 5: Recommendations for Fiscal Management - The article suggests enhancing the transparency of public debt and utilizing special bonds to manage hidden debts effectively [60]. - It emphasizes the importance of improving the efficiency of fiscal spending to stimulate economic growth and consumer demand [60]. - Recommendations include increasing investment in social services and infrastructure to support long-term economic stability and growth [61].

1. Report Industry Investment Rating No relevant content provided. 2. Core Views of the Report - The overall outlook for China in 2025 is that the real GDP growth rate of the asset side will run smoothly, fluctuating narrowly between 4 - 5%. The liability side will see the debt growth rate of the real - sector decline and approach the nominal economic growth rate. The monetary policy will coordinate with the fiscal policy, maintaining an overall neutral and oscillating stance [21]. - The stock - bond performance shows that the risk preference has declined, funds tend to flow into long - term bonds and value - style equities. The equity style is dominated by value, and the stock - bond ratio favors bonds. The long - term bond yield has decreased, and the short - term bond yield has increased [6][22]. - In the contraction cycle, the stock - bond ratio favors equities to a limited extent, and the value style is more likely to be dominant. A + H dividend portfolios and A - share portfolios are recommended, mainly concentrated in industries such as banking, telecommunications, petroleum and petrochemicals, and transportation [10][25]. 3. Summary According to the Directory 3.1 National Balance Sheet Analysis - **Liability Side**: In September 2025, the debt growth rate of the real sector was 8.9%, in line with expectations. It is expected to drop to around 8.7% in October, and further to around 8.5% by the end of the year. The financial sector's capital is still tight, and risk preference has declined, with funds flowing into long - term bonds and value - style equities [1][17]. - **Fiscal Policy**: Last week, the net reduction of government bonds was 238 billion yuan, higher than the planned 69.1 billion yuan. Next week, the net increase of government bonds is planned to be 133.3 billion yuan. The government debt growth rate in September 2025 was 14.5%, expected to drop to around 13.6% in October and around 13.0% by the end of the year [2][18]. - **Monetary Policy**: Last week, the average weekly trading volume of funds increased, the price decreased, and the term spread narrowed significantly. The one - year Treasury yield rose to 1.44% at the weekend, and its lower limit is estimated to be around 1.3%. The term spread between the ten - year and one - year Treasury bonds narrowed to 38 basis points. The future yield fluctuation ranges of the ten - year and thirty - year Treasury bonds are estimated to be around 1.6% - 1.9% and 1.8% - 2.3% respectively [3][19]. - **Asset Side**: The physical volume data in August continued to weaken compared to July. The annual real economic growth target for 2025 is around 5%, and the nominal economic growth target is around 4.9%. It remains to be seen whether 5% will become the central target for China's nominal economic growth in the next 1 - 2 years [5][20]. 3.2 Stock - Bond Ratio and Stock - Bond Style - **Overall Outlook**: In 2025, China's asset side real GDP growth will be stable, and the liability side's real - sector debt growth rate will decline. The stock - bond ratio favors bonds, and the equity style is dominated by value. The recommended allocation is 60% for the Shanghai Composite 50 Index, 20% for the CSI 1000 Index, and 20% for the 30 - year Treasury Bond ETF [21][25]. - **Market Performance**: Last week, the risk preference declined, funds flowed into long - term bonds and value - style equities. The ten - year Treasury yield decreased by 2 basis points to 1.82%, the one - year Treasury yield increased by 7 basis points to 1.44%, and the 30 - year Treasury yield decreased by 8 basis points to 2.20%. The broad - based rotation strategy outperformed the CSI 300 Index by 1.51 percentage points last week [6][22]. 3.3 Industry Recommendation - **Industry Performance Review**: This week, the A - share market declined with shrinking trading volume. Among the Shenwan primary industries, banking, coal, food and beverage, transportation, and textile and apparel had the largest increases, while electronics, media, automobiles, communications, and machinery had the largest declines [30]. - **Industry Crowding and Trading Volume**: As of October 17, the top five crowded industries were electronics, power equipment, non - ferrous metals, computers, and machinery. The industries with the largest increase in crowding this week were pharmaceutical biology, transportation, coal, banking, and commercial retail. The overall average daily trading volume of A - shares decreased this week. Industries such as steel, coal, transportation, banking, and beauty care had the highest year - on - year trading volume growth [33][34]. - **Industry Valuation and Earnings**: Among the Shenwan primary industries this week, banking, coal, food and beverage, transportation, and textile and apparel had the largest increases in PE (TTM), while electronics, media, communications, basic chemicals, and machinery had the smallest increases. Industries with high 2024 full - year earnings forecasts and relatively low current valuations compared to history include banking, insurance, petroleum and petrochemicals, transportation, traditional Chinese medicine, pharmaceutical biology, beauty care, and consumer electronics [38][39]. - **Industry Prosperity**: Externally, the global manufacturing PMI declined in September, the CCFI index decreased, and the port cargo throughput declined. South Korea's export growth rate decreased in early October. Domestically, the second - hand housing price decreased last week, and the quantity indicators showed mixed trends. The highway truck traffic volume increased, the ten - industry fitted capacity utilization rate declined from September to October, the automobile trading volume was at a relatively high level in the same period of history, the new - housing trading volume was at a historical low, and the second - hand housing trading volume declined seasonally [43]. - **Public Offering Market Review**: In the second week of October (October 13 - 17), most active public - offering equity funds underperformed the CSI 300. As of October 17, the net asset value of active public - offering equity funds was 4.04 trillion yuan, slightly higher than 3.66 trillion yuan in Q4 2024 [59]. - **Industry Recommendation**: In the contraction cycle, the stock - bond ratio favors equities to a limited extent, and the value style is more likely to be dominant. Recommended A + H dividend portfolios and A - share portfolios mainly include 20 stocks each, concentrated in industries such as banking, telecommunications, petroleum and petrochemicals, and transportation [10][63].

1. Report Industry Investment Rating No information provided in the content. 2. Core Viewpoints of the Report - China's de - leveraging is a proactive risk mitigation under high leverage, aiming for a gradual reduction of the corporate sector's leverage at a high level [2][85]. - Policy paths should draw on US and Japanese experiences, with a low probability of a large - scale "flood - irrigation" fiscal environment in China. Monetary policy has room but must prevent capital idling and avoid further increasing leverage and asset bubbles [2]. - China's de - leveraging pace may be between that of the US and Japan, aiming for a "harmonious de - leveraging" by balancing risk disposal and employment maintenance and resolving risks over time [2][89]. - Asset allocation can refer to US and Japanese experiences. Interest rates may rebound during de - leveraging, and low - interest rates are conducive to debt clearance. Asset price increases should interact positively with the de - leveraging process [2][90]. 3. Summary by Relevant Catalogs 3.1 Debt Cycle: The Clearing Phase Continues 3.1.1 Changes in Leverage Ratios of Each Sector Since the New Round of Debt Resolution - Since 1992, China has experienced two complete large - scale debt cycles and is currently in a continuous and fluctuating de - leveraging large - scale cycle since 2008, with four complete small - scale cycles from 2008 - 2021. In 2024, it was in the de - leveraging phase of the small - scale debt cycle after 2021Q4. In the first half of 2025, debt continued to clear, and in the second half, it was expected to restart the leveraging process, with the restart of the corporate debt cycle being the key [11]. - The household sector's de - leveraging process is relatively advanced and may continue to bottom out. The leverage ratio fluctuation item continued to decline in the first half of 2025, and the 9 - month consumer loan subsidy policy may only ease the decline but cannot reverse the trend. In the long run, the household sector may start a new small - scale debt cycle after reaching the bottom, but the time may be postponed [13][14]. - The corporate sector's leverage ratio fluctuation item is oscillating at a high level, and no de - leveraging trend has been formed. Affected by policy support, the leverage ratio fluctuation item has not shown a trend of de - leveraging. Forecasts indicate a further decline with a gentle slope, and credit financing demand remains weak [16]. - The government sector's leverage ratio fluctuation item is expected to continue to oscillate upward. In 2025, the government bond issuance was concentrated in the early stage. Without new policies in the fourth quarter, the leverage ratio fluctuation item may decline. In 2026, the fiscal policy's debt - issuing scale may expand further, driving the government sector's leverage ratio to rise [19]. 3.1.2 Has the Debt Pressure of the Three Sectors Eased? - The household sector's overall de - leveraging has led to a decrease in mortgage - centered debt costs. Policy - driven interest rate cuts and relaxed mortgage conditions have alleviated the debt pressure, but income growth remains under pressure, and de - leveraging continues [24]. - The corporate sector's interest - payment pressure has decreased, but the increase in the leverage ratio has affected the safety margin of corporate operations. Although financial expenses have decreased, the debt ratio has risen again, and the pressure to reduce leverage remains high [26]. - The government sector's cost - control measures have a greater impact than leveraging, and the interest - payment pressure has stabilized. Interest rate cuts have reduced the weighted average cost of national and local debts, but the debt scale is still expanding. Overall, the interest - payment pressure is controllable [30]. 3.2 International Experience: Two "De - leveraging" Paths in Japan and the US 3.2.1 Japan: After the Economic Bubble Burst in the 1990s, De - leveraging Was Long and Passive - The household sector's debt de - leveraging process was slow due to asset shrinkage and high - cost debts. Asset - side housing and financial asset values declined significantly and were not repaired for a long time, and income growth was weak. On the liability side, high - cost debts and deflation pressure made it difficult to de - leverage [39][42]. - The corporate sector's de - leveraging was difficult. The "convoy system" led to the formation of many zombie enterprises, and the slow disposal of non - performing assets made the de - leveraging process long. Enterprises mainly reduced investment and capital expenditure to repay debts, lacking structural adjustments [50][55]. - The government's policy response was ineffective. Monetary policy fell into a liquidity trap, and fiscal policy was inconsistent. Early large - scale stimulus led to a sharp increase in government debt, and later fiscal tightening and policy mistakes weakened the economic recovery momentum [59][60]. 3.2.2 US: Fast - paced, Market - oriented De - leveraging with Policy Coordination for Rapid Clearing - The household sector quickly de - leveraged through default clearance, active debt reduction, and refinancing restructuring. The Fed's low - interest rate policy and government - led mortgage restructuring programs helped reduce debt pressure, and the release of consumption potential promoted economic recovery [68]. - The corporate sector completed de - leveraging through bankruptcy liquidation, restructuring, investment reduction, asset sales, and equity capital supplementation. The leverage ratio decreased significantly and then stabilized [70]. - The government sector increased leverage significantly during the private sector's de - leveraging period, providing support for the economy. Fiscal stimulus and the Fed's balance - sheet expansion helped transfer private - sector risks to the public sector. As the economy recovered, the fiscal deficit narrowed, and government debt stabilized [73]. 3.3 Asset Allocation: Asset Performance During the "De - leveraging" Phase 3.3.1 Japanese Experience: Reasons and Magnitudes of Interest Rate Rebounds During De - leveraging - Interest rates of 10 - year Japanese government bonds rebounded significantly during de - leveraging, mainly due to recovery and re - inflation expectations and fiscal supply - demand mismatches. There were also some 50 - BP rebounds during the in - depth de - leveraging period in the 2010s [75][76]. 3.3.2 US Experience: Asset Price Repair and Wealth Effect During De - leveraging - The rapid repair of asset prices during the household sector's de - leveraging process had a wealth effect, reducing the leverage ratio, improving consumer confidence, and promoting consumption. The Fed's policies also controlled the government's bond - issuing costs [80][82]. 3.3.3 China's Reference: Balancing Economic Stability and De - leveraging - China's de - leveraging is a proactive adjustment under high leverage, different from the passive de - leveraging in the US and Japan. It aims to gradually reduce the corporate sector's leverage and maintain a reasonable household leverage level [85]. - Policy tools should draw on US and Japanese experiences, combining prudent loosening and targeted support to balance economic stability and de - leveraging [87][88]. - China's de - leveraging pace may be between that of the US and Japan, achieving a "harmonious de - leveraging" by actively resolving risks and maintaining employment [89].

Report Industry Investment Rating - Not provided in the content Core Viewpoints of the Report - The issuance rules of local government bonds have changed significantly in the past decade. Policy encourages the issuance of longer - term special bonds, and the weighted average issuance term of local government bonds has been greatly extended. There may be pressure of supply - demand imbalance for ultra - long bonds in the future, and high macro - leverage ratio in the non - financial sector may lead to increased debt pressure when interest rates rise. It is recommended to address the supply - demand imbalance from both the supply and demand sides [1] Summary by Related Catalogs Changes in Local Government Bond Issuance Rules - In 2015, local governments fully launched independent bond issuance, with a maximum term of 10 years and strict restrictions on medium - and long - term proportions. In 2018, 15 - year and 20 - year terms were added. In 2019, the limit on the term - ratio structure of local bond issuance was removed, and long - term special bonds were encouraged. In 2020, 9 terms were specified, and requirements for the average issuance term of new general bonds were set [1] Differences between General Bonds and Special Bonds - General bonds are used for non - revenue public welfare projects, repaid mainly by general public budget revenue, with an average term within 10 years. Special bonds are for projects with certain revenues, repaid by government fund revenues or special revenues, and long - term issuance is encouraged. In 2025, 4.4 trillion yuan of local government special bonds are planned [1] Changes in the Weighted Average Issuance Term of Local Government Bonds - From 2015 - 2018, the weighted average issuance term was about 6 years. Since 2019, it has increased significantly from 10.3 years in 2019 to 15.5 years as of September 15, 2025. The proportion of local bonds with a term of 15 years and above has risen from 18.6% in 2019 to 48.6% as of September 15, 2025 [1] Potential Supply - Demand Imbalance of Ultra - Long Bonds - The annual issuance scale of interest - bearing bonds with a term of 20 years and above has increased from 1.96 trillion in 2021 to 4.65 trillion as of September 25, 2025. The demand for ultra - long bonds mainly comes from life insurance. However, factors such as the significant reduction of insurance preset interest rates, the peak of non - standard investment maturity of insurance funds, and the new regulations on punitive redemption fees of public funds may lead to a weakening of demand. Banks may also net sell ultra - long interest - bearing bonds in the secondary market [1] High Macro - Leverage Ratio and Debt Pressure - As of the end of March 2025, China's non - financial sector macro - leverage ratio was 292.2%, significantly higher than the average of developed economies (258%). Rising interest rates may increase the debt pressure on enterprises and local governments [1] Suggestions to Alleviate Supply - Demand Imbalance - Demand side: The central bank should restart the purchase of government bonds and expand the scope to local bonds, and encourage banks to promote ultra - long interest - bearing bonds to individual investors and guide long - term funds such as social security and annuities to increase investment. Supply side: Control the proportion of government bonds with a term of 15 years and above and encourage the issuance of floating - rate bonds [2]

Group 1 - The central bank has conducted a 600 billion MLF operation today, resulting in a net injection of 300 billion, indicating a continued loose liquidity environment [1][2][3] - The average yield of medium to long-term pure bond funds since the beginning of the year is only 0.29%, marking one of the worst years for bond investments [1] - The macro leverage ratio of China's non-financial sector reached 292.2% in Q1 2025, significantly higher than the average of developed economies at 252% [1] Group 2 - Jiangxi province has issued various local government bonds with different maturities and interest rates, including a 5-year bond at 1.80% and a 30-year bond at 2.46% [2] - The central bank has been increasing MLF operations for seven consecutive months, with expectations that market interest rates will not rise significantly in the fourth quarter [2][3] - The National Development Bank ETF has shown a 1.54% increase over the past year, with a trading volume of 330.73 million as of September 24, 2025 [3] Group 3 - The management fee for the National Development Bank ETF is 0.15%, and the custody fee is 0.05%, which are among the lowest in comparable funds [4] - The tracking error for the National Development Bank ETF over the past month is 0.011%, indicating high tracking precision compared to similar funds [5]

Group 1 - The global macro leverage ratio has been continuously increasing, primarily driven by government leverage, with total global debt exceeding 350% of GDP [2][5][6] - Major economies like the US, Japan, and China have shown a trend of increasing government leverage while corporate and household leverage remains stable or decreases [5][12][41] - The US government debt interest payments are projected to exceed $1 trillion for the first time, highlighting the growing fiscal pressure [41][42] Group 2 - The structure of leverage in major economies indicates that government departments are increasing their debt levels, while businesses and households are more cautious [5][9][12] - Japan's government has maintained a high leverage ratio, yet its economy has struggled with long-term stagnation despite significant fiscal stimulus [9][12][41] - China's government leverage has risen rapidly post-pandemic, contrasting with the declining leverage in many developed countries [12][35][41] Group 3 - The increasing reliance on debt to stimulate economic growth raises concerns about the sustainability of this model, as investment returns decline [45][46] - The need for effective fiscal policy is emphasized, with suggestions for improving the efficiency of government spending and addressing social welfare needs [57][58][59] - The demographic challenges, particularly aging populations, are driving up social security expenditures, necessitating higher government spending [33][35][41]

Core Viewpoint - The article emphasizes that the world has experienced a prolonged period of relative peace since the end of World War II, leading to significant population and economic growth, but also highlights the substantial costs associated with this growth, including rising inequality and increasing public debt [1] Economic Growth and Population - Since 1945, the global population has increased from 2.5 billion to 8.1 billion, indicating a substantial demographic expansion [1] - Economic growth has outpaced population growth, but this has come at a significant cost [1] Costs of Economic Growth - The article outlines several negative consequences of economic growth, including: - Widening wealth disparity - Environmental pollution - Intensified economic conflicts between nations - Domestic debt crises [1] Debt Dependency - Major global economies are increasingly reliant on debt for growth, with the rate of debt increase surpassing economic growth rates [1] - The macro leverage ratio is continuously rising, indicating a growing dependency on borrowing [1] Recommendations for Debt Management - The article suggests several measures to address the rising public debt: - Increase transparency regarding debt levels - Make hidden debts visible - Utilize larger-scale local special bonds to replace hidden debts - Encourage local governments to obtain long-term low-interest loans from policy banks and state-owned banks to replace hidden debts [1] - It also recommends that central banks implement significant interest rate cuts and modify laws to allow central banks to purchase government bonds, thereby increasing the proportion of government bonds in central bank assets [1]

Group 1 - The article discusses the long-term global peace since World War II, leading to significant population growth and economic expansion, but also highlights the rising issues of wealth disparity, environmental pollution, and increasing national debts [1] - Global macro leverage ratios have been increasing, primarily driven by government borrowing, with government debt levels reaching historical highs post-2008 financial crisis [2][5] - The article notes that the macro leverage ratio in China has surpassed 300%, exceeding that of the US and developed countries, indicating a trend of increasing government debt [2][14] Group 2 - The structure of leverage in major economies shows that government sectors are increasing leverage while corporate and household sectors are stabilizing or reducing their leverage [5][10] - The article explains that only governments are willing to increase leverage counter-cyclically, as they can coordinate fiscal and monetary policies to create favorable borrowing conditions [7][10] - It highlights that during significant economic events, government deficits and debts tend to spike, as seen during the COVID-19 pandemic [16][19] Group 3 - The article discusses the challenges of tax reforms, noting that high-income countries tend to maintain stable tax revenues while facing pressures to reduce corporate tax rates [22][24] - It points out that the US has seen a decline in corporate tax burdens while increasing payroll taxes, potentially exacerbating wealth inequality [24][25] - Japan's tax structure has shifted towards consumption taxes, which disproportionately affect lower-income groups [27][28] Group 4 - The article emphasizes the need for increased government spending on social security due to aging populations, with the US seeing a significant rise in mandatory spending related to social welfare [31][34] - China's government has been increasing subsidies to social insurance funds significantly, indicating a growing fiscal burden due to demographic changes [37][38] - The article warns of diminishing returns on debt-driven growth, suggesting that the efficiency of using debt to stimulate economic growth is declining [49][51] Group 5 - The article suggests that China should focus on demand-side strategies to address overcapacity and low inflation, advocating for increased consumption from both government and households [51][58] - It discusses the importance of improving the efficiency of fiscal spending, shifting from construction-focused investments to social welfare and public services [54][58] - Recommendations include enhancing transparency in public debt, reducing local government hidden debts, and improving the overall fiscal framework to support sustainable growth [59][60]