关注、加星，第一时间接收推送！ 文 | 赵伟、陈达飞、王茂宇、李欣越、赵宇 联系人 | 王茂宇 摘要 大类资产&海外事件&数据：美国6月核心CPI弱于预期，美国或将提高对欧关税 发达市场多数上涨，美元指数延续反弹。 当周，标普500上涨0.6%，恒生指数上涨2.8%；10Y美债收益率 上行1.0bp至4.4%；美元指数上涨0.6%至98.46，离岸人民币贬值至7.1810；WTI原油下跌1.6%至67.3美元/ 桶，COMEX黄金下跌0.3%至3349.4美元/盎司。 美国或将提高对欧盟关税。 7月12日，特朗普宣布，若贸易谈判无法在8月1日前达成协议，将对欧盟、 墨西哥的进口关税提高至30%。7月15日，USTR正式宣布对巴西发起301调查，同日，美国宣布与印尼达 成贸易协定，印尼出口至美国商品统一适用19%关税。 美国6月核心CPI弱于预期，但6月零售表现较强。 6月美国核心CPI环比0.2%，弱于市场预期的0.3%，但 是商品端已显现出更强的关税传导效应，未来通胀趋势更重要。美国6月零售环比0.6%，较5月大幅回 升，从结构来看，环比改善最明显的是机动车、建材。 风险提示 风险提示：地缘政治冲突升级；美 ...

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the potential implications of Trump's rumored intention to "fire" Powell, the Federal Reserve Chairman, and the resulting market reactions, including a significant sell-off in stocks, bonds, and currencies. Group 1: Rumors of Firing Powell - The rumors of Trump potentially "firing" Powell have led to market volatility, with a notable "triple kill" in stocks, bonds, and currencies observed on July 16-17 [2][5]. - Trump's motivation for wanting to dismiss Powell includes a desire for lower interest rates to stimulate the economy and alleviate fiscal pressure from rising interest payments, which accounted for 16.9% of federal spending by June 2025 [22][33]. - Legal challenges exist regarding Trump's ability to fire Powell, as he would need to prove "misconduct," and Powell could seek legal recourse to maintain his position [38][41]. Group 2: Powell's Potential Resignation - Historically, two Federal Reserve Chairmen have resigned under political pressure, but Powell has expressed a strong commitment to completing his term, stating he cannot envision any situation, aside from death, that would prevent him from doing so [3][45]. - Powell's determination to remain in office contrasts with past instances where political pressure led to resignations, indicating a robust stance against potential dismissal [45]. Group 3: Next Chairman Nomination Process - If Trump successfully dismisses Powell, the nomination process for a new chairman could accelerate, with potential candidates including Waller, Hassett, and Basant, each with distinct qualifications and political alignments [48][59]. - The nomination process involves presidential nomination, Senate hearings, and confirmation, which can vary in duration; past instances show that some nominations have been completed in as little as six days [55]. Group 4: Economic and Market Implications - If the Federal Reserve loses its independence, the economic outlook may only improve in the short term, with long-term inflation expectations and actual interest rates rising, which could hinder economic growth [4]. - The market's reaction to the rumors of Powell's dismissal included a steepening of the yield curve, with significant declines in stock prices and the dollar, while gold prices increased [20][22].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the ongoing challenges and potential shifts in the international monetary system, particularly focusing on the decline of the US dollar and the implications of stablecoins in this context [3][4][5]. Group 1: Current Monetary System Challenges - Since early 2025, the narrative of "American exceptionalism" has been challenged, leading to a 12.5% decline in the US dollar index [3]. - Following the "reciprocal tariffs" impact in April, the US financial markets experienced simultaneous declines in stocks, bonds, and currency [3]. - The "Triffin Dilemma," which predicts a crisis of confidence in the dollar due to excessive credit expansion, is highlighted as a historical precedent for current issues [3][4]. Group 2: Stablecoins and Their Role - The article raises questions about the nature and functions of stablecoins, exploring their potential roles in the monetary system and their relationship with the US dollar [5]. - It emphasizes the need for a deeper understanding of the essence of money and the functions it serves, particularly in the context of stablecoins [5]. Group 3: Political and Economic Interconnections - The relationship between alliance politics, monetary issues, and strategy is underscored, indicating that the dollar and gold issues are intertwined with broader political concerns, such as US-NATO relations and Germany's role [6]. - The article stresses that economic policies cannot be viewed in isolation from strategic and foreign policy issues, highlighting the political dimensions of monetary matters [6].

Core Insights - The article discusses the rising attention towards "anti-involution" in the market, highlighting significant misunderstandings regarding the concept, particularly in the context of supply-side reforms [4] Group 1: Deep Dive on "Anti-Involution" - The market's understanding of "anti-involution" is largely misaligned, with many interpreting it through a supply-side reform lens, which may lead to incorrect conclusions [4] - Besides production adjustments and self-discipline discussions, "anti-involution" encompasses various "hidden strategies" that are not widely recognized [4] Group 2: Economic Trends and Data Analysis - Recent economic data from June reveals five notable anomalies, indicating new changes in the economy that may not be immediately apparent [21] - The U.S. inflation data for June suggests that the third quarter will serve as a critical period for validating the effects of tariffs on inflation [24] - Domestic infrastructure projects have shown a continuous recovery, indicating a potential positive trend in construction activities [26] Group 3: Export Dynamics - The role of "export grabbing" is shifting, with emerging markets nearing the end of this phase while the U.S. begins to see a resurgence in export activities [13][14] - The importance of "strategic resources" in global trade is increasing, prompting discussions on which resources in China possess strategic attributes and how they should be developed in the future [10]

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the rising importance of "anti-involution" in the market, highlighting significant misunderstandings regarding the concept of "involution" and its implications for supply-side reforms and economic structure transformation [2][3]. Group 1: Misunderstanding of "Involution" - "Involution" is not equivalent to "overcapacity"; it arises from strong demand leading to proactive supply increases, contrasting with passive overcapacity due to demand decline [3][4]. - The price behavior differs: "overcapacity" leads to price drops due to demand decline, while "involution" results in chaotic price competition despite strong demand [3][4]. - Supply-side reforms previously addressed overcapacity in high-energy sectors, while current "anti-involution" focuses on the middle and lower reaches of the industry, particularly private enterprises [4][5]. Group 2: Targeted Areas of "Anti-Involution" - The high-energy sector has undergone significant capacity upgrades, and traditional backward capacity is not as pronounced as during previous reforms [5][6]. - Policies may target specific industries with excessive growth, such as coal and pork, to stabilize prices, but the focus is more on aligning supply with demand rather than drastically reducing supply [6][7]. Group 3: Policy Mechanisms - Effective "anti-involution" strategies should not solely rely on self-discipline talks but should include industry mergers, raising standards, and matching supportive policies [8][9]. - Historical experiences from Japan, the US, and Germany suggest that fostering non-price competition and developing non-overcapacity sectors, like services, is crucial for addressing the root causes of "involution" [8][9]. Group 4: Equipment Update and Debt Management - Addressing the issue of equipment updates is vital, as many industries retain old equipment while acquiring new, which can lead to inefficiencies [9][142]. - The current situation shows a significant increase in overdue accounts, particularly among private enterprises, indicating a need for stricter debt management policies [152][160].

Group 1: Industrial Production - Industrial production remains relatively stable, with the blast furnace operating rate maintaining at 0.7% year-on-year [2][5][8] - The chemical production chain shows a slight decline, with soda ash and PTA operating rates down by 2.6 percentage points to 6% and 0.9 percentage points to 1.3% respectively [2][15] - The automotive sector's semi-steel tire operating rate is still below last year's level, up by 2.7 percentage points to -6.3% [2][15] Group 2: Construction Industry - The construction industry shows a mixed performance, with the nationwide grinding operating rate down by 2.4 percentage points to 3.7% [2][27] - Cement shipment rates remain low, with a year-on-year increase of 1.2% to 3% [2][27] - Asphalt operating rates have seen a recovery, up by 0.6 percentage points to 7.4% [2][35] Group 3: Real Estate Transactions - Real estate transactions are at a low point, with the average daily transaction area for new homes down by 19.1% year-on-year, despite a 13.1% increase [2][44] - First-tier cities continue to see a decline in transactions, down by 18.6% to 39.9% [2][44] - Third-tier cities show significant improvement, with transaction volumes up by 72.4% to 17% [2][44] Group 4: Transportation and Shipping - National railway and highway freight volumes have decreased, with year-on-year declines of 1.3% to 1.2% and 0.9% to 0.8% respectively [2][54] - Port cargo throughput and container throughput have also shown a decline, down by 9.3% to 6.8% and 4.7% to 0.9% respectively [2][54] - The overall intensity of human mobility remains high, with a slight year-on-year decrease of 2% to 12.6% [2][63] Group 5: Price Trends - Agricultural product prices are mixed, with pork and vegetable prices rising by 0.1% and 0.8% respectively, while egg and fruit prices fell by 2.2% and 0.1% [3][85] - Industrial product prices have generally increased, with the South China industrial price index rising by 1.1% [3][93] - The energy and chemical price index increased by 1.3%, while the metal price index rose by 0.7% [3][93]

Group 1 - Rare earths are a crucial strategic resource for China due to their key roles in military and high-tech fields, with China holding a complete industrial chain [1][7][16] - China's rare earth production accounts for 70% of global output, with projections for 2024 indicating a production of 270,000 tons, representing 68.5% of global total [1][8][16] - Despite ongoing trade tensions, the U.S. maintains a high dependency on Chinese rare earths, with reliance stabilizing around 75% in recent years [1][8][19] Group 2 - China possesses a complete industrial chain in the rare earth sector, from mining to application, making it difficult for other countries to establish alternative supply chains [2][16] - The rare earth industry is segmented into upstream mining, midstream processing, and downstream manufacturing, with only China achieving full coverage across all segments [2][16] Group 3 - Other products with "extreme reliance" on China include chemicals and mineral metals, particularly in the U.S., where 98 products have over 90% import reliance from China, totaling $16.25 billion [3][19][25] - The U.S. has seen a significant increase in dependency on mineral metals, with reliance jumping from 0% in 2022 to 100% in 2024 [3][25] - Chemical imports from China have also surged, with the dependency rate rising from 28.9% in 2010 to 93.8% in 2024 [3][25][49] Group 4 - Products with strategic value similar to rare earths include certain chemicals and metals, with a total import scale of $1.5 billion, indicating potential as key bargaining chips in trade negotiations [4][39] - Key materials such as lithium battery additives and active pharmaceutical ingredients are dominated by Chinese production, making them difficult to replace [4][33][39] Group 5 - China's export share in chemicals has significantly increased, with a 21.1 percentage point rise since 2010, reflecting enhanced competitiveness [5][42][49] - The U.S. has seen a dramatic increase in chemical imports from China, with the share rising from 34.1% in 2010 to 95.4% in 2024, highlighting the critical role of Chinese chemicals in the U.S. supply chain [5][49]

Overview - The core CPI data for June in the US was slightly weaker than expected, but the inflation effects of tariffs are becoming more evident. The June CPI year-on-year was 2.7%, slightly above the market expectation of 2.6%, while the core CPI year-on-year was 2.9%, matching expectations. The month-on-month core CPI was 0.2%, below the expected 0.3% [3][38] - The 10-year US Treasury yield and the US dollar index initially fell but later rebounded, indicating market expectations of stronger future inflation [11][38] Structure - The main drivers of the CPI rebound in June were crude oil, core goods (excluding new and used cars), and non-rent services. The energy CPI increased by 0.9% month-on-month, compared to a previous decline of 1.0%, reflecting rising global oil prices [4][39] - Core goods inflation showed signs of warming, with the core goods CPI rising by 0.2% month-on-month, indicating the gradual impact of tariffs. However, the CPI for new and used cars remained weak, with used car prices dropping by 0.7% month-on-month [20][39] - Rent inflation slightly slowed, with a month-on-month increase of 0.2% in June, down from 0.3% in May. Core non-rent service inflation rebounded, with medical, transportation, and entertainment services showing month-on-month increases [39][40] Outlook - The second half of the year may see continued upward pressure on US inflation, with the third quarter being a critical verification period for tariff inflation effects. The combination of increased tariff revenues and strong cost-pass-through willingness from US companies suggests inflation may enter an upward range [5][28] - The Federal Reserve is expected to initiate interest rate cuts in September, with two cuts anticipated within the year, despite the potential for rising inflation in the third quarter. The labor market is showing signs of weakness, which may influence the Fed's decisions [34][40]

Core Viewpoints - The economic data for June reveals five significant "anomalies," indicating new changes in the economy lurking in hidden corners [3][9][110] - Despite strong performance in exports and industrial production, the second quarter GDP remained in line with expectations due to a notable decline in construction output and price disturbances affecting nominal indicators [3][9][110] Economic Data Overview - In Q2, GDP grew by 5.2%, matching expectations, while June's retail sales increased by 4.8%, below the expected 5.6%. Fixed asset investment rose by 2.8%, also below the anticipated 3.7%, and industrial value added increased by 6.8%, exceeding the expected 5.5% [2][8][107] Consumption Insights - Retail sales and catering revenues saw a significant decline due to the misalignment of e-commerce promotions and competitive subsidies from food delivery platforms. In June, retail sales growth fell by 1.6 percentage points to 4.8%, with notable drops in categories like home appliances and communication equipment [3][20][108] Investment Analysis - Fixed asset investment growth fell to a three-year low, with a 2.7 percentage point drop to 0% in June. This decline is attributed to a decrease in investment prices and significant downturns in construction, manufacturing, and service sector investments [4][23][66] Real Estate Sector - Although real estate financing improved in June, investment remained weak due to the ongoing impact of reduced stock projects. Credit financing for real estate companies rose by 6.8 percentage points to -2.3%, but real estate investment growth fell to -12.9% [4][30][109] Industrial Production - Industrial value added surged due to an increase in working days and "export grabbing." In June, industrial value added rose by 1 percentage point to 6.8%, with specific sectors like textiles and chemical raw materials benefiting from this trend [5][41][54] Long-term Economic Outlook - The "demand front-loading" and "fiscal front-loading" effects may lead to a switch in economic strength between the first and second halves of the year. The economic adjustment phase since 2022 is nearing its end, with expectations for GDP growth around 4.6% in the second half, while the annual target remains at 5.0% [6][46][110]

Core Viewpoint - The improvement in credit is primarily driven by the rapid growth of short-term loans from enterprises, with a monthly year-on-year increase of 490 billion [3][46] - In June, total new credit reached 2.24 trillion, with a year-on-year increase of 110 billion, where enterprise loans increased by 1.4 trillion, mainly from short-term loans [3][46] - The cautious attitude of enterprises towards long-term investments is reflected in the decline of the PMI production expectation index from 53.3 to 52.0 [3][46] Credit and Loan Data - In June, new loans to residents amounted to 597.6 billion, showing a mild improvement, primarily from operational loans rather than consumption or housing needs [3][13] - The increase in household loans was 1.17 trillion in the first half of the year, with operational loans contributing 923.9 billion [3][13] - The BCI employment outlook index was at 49.1, indicating a challenging employment environment affecting consumer loans [3][13] Social Financing and Government Bonds - The year-on-year increase in social financing expanded, mainly due to net financing from government bonds, with a total increase of 4.7 trillion in the first half of the year [4][47] - Government bond net financing contributed 4.3 trillion to the social financing increase, but the rapid improvement phase may be coming to an end [4][47] - Future social financing growth may stabilize as government bond financing levels remain high [4][47] Monetary Policy Outlook - The People's Bank of China indicated that the effects of monetary policy will take time to manifest, with new policy tools expected to stimulate credit growth and stabilize the economy in the second half of the year [4][22] - The implementation of monetary policy will be adjusted based on domestic and international economic conditions [4][22] M1 and M2 Growth - In June, new credit totaled 2.24 trillion, with a year-on-year increase of 110 billion, primarily from the enterprise sector [5][48] - M2 increased by 0.4 percentage points to 8.3%, while M1 rose by 2.3 percentage points to 4.6% [5][49] - The structure of deposits showed an increase in household deposits by 2.47 trillion and enterprise deposits by 1.78 trillion, while fiscal deposits decreased [5][49]