Core Viewpoint - The recent meeting of the Central Financial Committee emphasizes the need to "legally and reasonably govern low-price disorderly competition among enterprises" and to "promote the orderly exit of backward production capacity," indicating a clear direction for "anti-involution" policies [2][72]. Group 1: Differences in the Current "Anti-Involution" Movement - The current "anti-involution" movement is characterized by a higher stance, broader coverage, and stronger coordination, involving local governments, enterprises, and residents [3][73]. - The meeting proposed the "Five Unifications and One Opening" requirement, highlighting the importance of regional governance and the construction of a unified national market [3][73]. - The contradiction between the sharp decline in revenue growth and the rigidity of fixed costs has forced some enterprises to adopt price reduction strategies to pursue "economies of scale" [4][74]. Group 2: Negative Feedback from "Involution" - Low-price competition, a primary method of "involution," often leads to cost compression in the supply chain, with accounts payable turnover rates declining and inventory turnover rates remaining high in the "involution" industries [4][75]. - The internal cost control measures in "involution" industries have resulted in a significant decrease in sales expenses, projected at -9.7% for 2024, and a continued decline in management expenses [4][75]. - The profitability of "involution" industries remains under pressure, with a projected return on assets (ROA) of 2.9% in 2024, a significant drop from 2021 levels [5][76]. Group 3: Solutions to the "Involution" Dilemma - Addressing the "involution" dilemma requires alleviating supply-demand contradictions and promoting the orderly exit of backward production capacity while reconstructing demand expansion dynamics [6][77]. - Structural transformation can be achieved through policy guidance, industry self-discipline, and market mechanisms to promote supply innovation and upgrade [7][78]. - Accelerating the development of the service industry is crucial to address structural unemployment issues arising from the transformation process, with policies focusing on restoring supply and demand in the service sector [7][78].

Group 1: Core Insights - The article discusses the structure of excess savings, indicating that regions with lower savings rates and lower incomes are the primary contributors to excess savings [1][2][3] - It highlights that the increase in excess savings is not primarily due to typical precautionary savings behavior but rather a reduction in housing expenditures [3][28] - The article emphasizes that the release of excess savings in China is likely to flow into real estate rather than consumption, contrasting with trends observed in the US and EU [5][36] Group 2: Savings Structure - The analysis of savings by region shows that areas with lower savings rates, such as Henan and Sichuan, have seen significant increases in their savings rates [9][12] - Income levels correlate with savings rates, where lower-income regions tend to have higher savings rates, while high-income areas like Shanghai and Jiangsu exhibit lower savings rates [12][30] - The age structure of savers indicates that excess savings are not dominated by older populations, as both high and low aging rate regions show similar increases in savings rates [16][30] Group 3: Formation of Excess Savings - The article argues that the increase in excess savings is more influenced by the adjustment in the real estate market rather than a direct response to income declines or consumption reductions [21][28] - It notes that the reduction in housing expenditures has significantly contributed to the increase in excess savings, with annualized consumption from housing dropping from 8 trillion to 3.3 trillion [28][36] - The impact of social security and aging pressures on savings rates is deemed minimal, as both high and low dependency ratio regions exhibit excess savings [30] Group 4: Release Pathways of Excess Savings - The article posits that the stabilization of the real estate market is crucial for the release of excess savings, requiring policies that address both supply and demand sides [40][44] - It suggests that the "保交楼" (ensure delivery of buildings) policy could play a significant role in stabilizing the market and facilitating the release of excess savings [48] - The current environment shows a significant gap in funding for unsold properties, which could be addressed through targeted fiscal policies to stimulate investment and sales [48]

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the unexpected weakening of the US dollar since the implementation of Trump's tariffs on April 2, while the Chinese yuan remains under pressure. It analyzes the reasons behind the dollar's decline and the potential future trends for both the dollar and yuan [1]. Group 1: Recent Weakness of the US Dollar - Since January 10, the US dollar has been continuously weakening, with the dollar index dropping to 99.4 by April 17, a decline of 9.3%. The dollar's performance has shown a clear divergence against developed and emerging market currencies, with declines of 7.6% and 1.4% respectively [2][7]. - Prior to April 7, the primary reason for the dollar's weakness was the rising expectations of a US recession, as indicated by a drop in the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index from 14.5 to -19.5. This led to an increase in market expectations for interest rate cuts, which rose from 1.2 to 4.2 times by April 4, causing a significant drop of 62 basis points in the 10-year US Treasury yield [2][17]. - After April 7, despite a rebound in Treasury yields, the dollar continued to weaken, possibly due to overseas capital fleeing the US. This shift in market sentiment transitioned from "flight to safety" to "flight to non-US" assets [2][28]. Group 2: Future Outlook for the US Dollar - The uncertainty surrounding tariffs and other policies may continue to exert downward pressure on the US economy, potentially leading to further dollar weakness. The tariffs are expected to increase economic and trade uncertainties, impacting corporate activities and consumer confidence [3][39]. - The GTAP model suggests that the tariffs could reduce US GDP by approximately 3 percentage points. Historical patterns indicate that during recessions, the dollar typically strengthens; however, current concerns about US debt sustainability and Trump's isolationist policies may weaken the dollar's safe-haven status [3][52]. - The outflow of funds from US assets could diminish the likelihood of the dollar's typical "smile curve" behavior during a recession, as capital flows towards non-US assets increase [3][52]. Group 3: Implications for the Chinese Yuan - Despite the weakening dollar, the Chinese yuan has also depreciated, primarily due to the direct impact of tariff policies. Since April 2, while the dollar index fell by 4.1%, the onshore yuan depreciated by 0.4%, reaching a new low since the 2015 reform [4][61]. - Looking ahead, the depreciation pressure on the yuan may ease as external shocks diminish. The ongoing US economic downturn and capital outflows from the US could alleviate external pressures on the yuan [4][92]. - The People's Bank of China (PBOC) has tools to counter cyclical behaviors in the market, and the accumulation of approximately $123.9 billion in pending foreign exchange settlements since 2023 may provide a buffer for the yuan's stability [4][77].

Core Viewpoint - Since the late 1990s, Japan's economy has been trapped in a "two-decade deflation," leading the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to become a "laboratory" for cutting-edge monetary policy, with "manufacturing inflation" becoming a priority for its monetary policy [1][7]. Group 1: Evolution of BOJ's Policy Framework - The BOJ's monetary policy framework has evolved through three main stages from 1955 to the present, reflecting changes in economic conditions and financial markets [2][8]. - From 1955 to 1970, the BOJ employed a quantity-based monetary policy framework characterized by strong regulation, including capital controls and fixed exchange rates [2][9]. - The period from 1971 to 1990 saw a transition towards financial liberalization and a shift from quantity-based to price-based frameworks, although quantity remained dominant [15][22]. - Since 1991, the BOJ has engaged in unconventional policy experiments, moving towards a long-term easing cycle, particularly after the asset bubble burst [28][35]. Group 2: Transition from Quantitative Easing to Comprehensive Monetary Easing - The Asian financial crisis in 1997 prompted the BOJ to implement a zero interest rate policy, which was later reversed incorrectly before the internet bubble burst [3][44]. - In March 2001, the BOJ initiated a quantitative easing policy (QEP) with a focus on increasing reserve balances and committing to maintain the policy until core CPI stabilized above 0% [3][81]. - Following the 2008 financial crisis, the BOJ adopted a comprehensive monetary easing (CME) approach, expanding its asset purchases and adjusting its policy tools to address ongoing economic challenges [3][35]. Group 3: Quantitative and Qualitative Easing - Under Governor Kuroda's leadership from 2013, the BOJ's monetary policy can be divided into three phases, starting with the introduction of Quantitative and Qualitative Easing (QQE) [4][36]. - The first phase emphasized increasing base money through long-term government bond purchases, while the second phase introduced negative interest rates to combat deflation [4][36]. - The third phase involved Yield Curve Control (YCC), where the BOJ maintained flexibility in its bond purchases while targeting specific yield levels [4][36]. Group 4: Impact of Geopolitical and Economic Factors - Recent geopolitical tensions, unexpected economic slowdowns in the U.S., and the continued appreciation of the yen have influenced the BOJ's policy decisions and economic outlook [5].

Group 1 - The article discusses the structural imbalances in global trade and the concept of the "twin deficits" in the U.S., providing a framework for analyzing potential solutions to these issues [2][8] - It highlights the paradox of Trump's economic policies, which have led to both internal and external imbalances, exacerbating the trade deficit [3][5] - The U.S. current account deficit accounts for 60-70% of the global total, indicating a significant reliance on foreign capital [4][24] Group 2 - The article outlines three potential solutions to the twin deficits: fiscal consolidation, currency depreciation, and adjustments in domestic savings and investment [6][34] - It emphasizes that the U.S. trade deficit is a reflection of domestic savings shortfalls and rising fiscal deficits, with a 1% increase in fiscal deficit correlating to a 0.3-0.5% increase in the current account deficit as a percentage of GDP [5][97] - The historical context of U.S. trade imbalances is provided, noting that the current account deficit has expanded significantly since the 1980s, particularly after the 2008 financial crisis [29][68] Group 3 - The article discusses the implications of the U.S. dollar's status as a reserve currency, which contributes to trade imbalances and the need for the U.S. to maintain a trade deficit to supply dollars globally [41][72] - It mentions that the U.S. trade deficit has not improved despite tariffs imposed during the Trump administration, with the goods trade deficit rising from $790 billion in 2017 to approximately $1.1 trillion in 2023 [37][61] - The article suggests that the structural issues in the U.S. economy, including low savings rates and high consumption, are fundamental causes of the persistent trade deficit [90][97]

Group 1 - The core issue behind the political crisis surrounding the Federal Reserve is whether it can "manipulate" interest rates and the implications of a steepening U.S. Treasury yield curve [1][5] - The market is optimistic about the Federal Reserve's interest rate cuts in the short term, influenced by Trump's potential nominations for a "dovish" shadow chairman [2][20] - The Federal Reserve can "set" but not "manipulate" policy interest rates, as interest rates are endogenous and influenced by macroeconomic factors [3][45] Group 2 - The U.S. government's fiscal and debt situation is in a "quasi-war state," necessitating fiscal consolidation to manage rising deficits and leverage ratios [7] - Sustainable fiscal consolidation can be achieved through economic growth or budget cuts, each with different political costs [7] - A decrease in the basic fiscal deficit rate by 1 percentage point could lead to a decline in the 10-year Treasury yield by 12-35 basis points [5][7] Group 3 - The Federal Reserve's long-term ability to manipulate the yield curve is limited, and the trend of rising yield premiums on U.S. Treasuries is likely to continue [4] - The market tends to price in overly "dovish" expectations during rate hike cycles and overly "hawkish" expectations during rate cut cycles [4] - The transition from "loose fiscal + loose monetary" to "tight fiscal + loose monetary" policies is crucial for the Federal Reserve's future rate cut space [5][20]

关注、加星，第 时间接收推送！ 文 | 赵伟、陈达飞、李欣越 联系人 | 李欣越 摘要 年初以来，经历了2年多的长牛后，债市持续调整，市场分歧也在明显加剧。当前债市投资中有哪些"盲 点"，2025年债市投研框架或将如何修正？本文分析，供参考。 （一）近期债市"新变化"？长牛之后步入调整，市场情绪较为"纠结" 近些年，债市长牛"气贯长虹"；2023年以来，利率下行速率快、曲线平坦化等特征明显。 1）利率下行迅 猛，下行幅度、速率仅次于2013年的行情；2）收益率曲线平坦化，2023年1月以来，10Y国债利率下行 94bp、远大于1Y国债的53bp；3）利率走势与基本面阶段性背离。 本轮债牛的背景是经济增速与政策利率的下移，叠加"资产荒"。 1）2023年2季度至2024年4季度，我国 GDP增速由6.5%下降至5.4%；2）同期，MLF利率从2.75%下行至2.00%；3）地产市场持续调整下，超额 储蓄多涌入了理财与债市。 年初以来，债市出现显著调整，近期市场分歧在明显增加。 1月6日至3月14日，10Y国债利率由1.60%大 幅上行24bp至1.83%。中长期纯债利率型基金久期中位数明显压降，同时，债券市场久 ...

Core Viewpoint - The Bank of Japan (BOJ) has fully initiated the normalization process of its unconventional monetary policy, marking the third such attempt in this century, with significant implications for interest rates, the yen exchange rate, and the economy [2][8]. Group 1: Evolution and Mechanism of BOJ's Unconventional Policies - Since the implementation of the zero interest rate policy in 1999, the BOJ has led the world in unconventional monetary policy experiments, evolving through three dimensions: interest rates, quantity, and quality [2][8]. - The transition from the zero interest rate policy to quantitative easing (QEP) in 2001 included all three dimensions, with a focus on term premiums initially, and later on risk premiums [2][8]. - The QQE+ policy introduced in 2013 further expanded these dimensions, aiming to lower nominal interest rates and improve financial conditions to support economic recovery [2][12]. Group 2: Effectiveness Assessment of BOJ's Policies - The QQE+ policy has significantly improved Japan's financial conditions, with estimates showing a reduction of approximately 100 basis points in the 10-year Japanese government bond yield since its implementation [3][15]. - Quantitative research indicates that without the QQE+ policy, Japan's real GDP would have been 0.9-1.3 percentage points lower, and core-core CPI inflation would have been 0.6-0.7 percentage points lower [3][51]. - The policy has helped Japan escape the "deflation trap," with a notable decline in loan rates and corporate bond financing rates, alongside a depreciation of the yen [3][25][33]. Group 3: Normalization of Unconventional Policies - The BOJ has officially started the normalization process, with the first step being the cancellation of negative interest rates and the abandonment of the QQE+YCC framework in March 2024 [4][66]. - The BOJ plans to gradually reduce its bond purchases, aiming for a target of approximately 30 trillion yen by early 2026, while also adjusting its asset purchase strategies to respond to rising long-term interest rates [5][66]. - The central bank's future interest rate targets are estimated to be between 1% and 1.5%, aligning with its 2% inflation goal [5][66].

Core Viewpoint - The article emphasizes the importance of continuous research and iteration in approaching the truth, highlighting the commitment to independent and valuable research outcomes in the evolving landscape of 2025 [2][26]. Group 1: Research Framework and Goals - The team is undergoing a comprehensive upgrade in 2025, focusing on restructuring the research framework and systematically presenting research results [2]. - The guiding principle is "research with reason, grounded in reality," aiming to provide genuinely valuable independent research [2]. Group 2: Economic Insights - The article discusses the shift in the economic "three drivers" from manufacturing to services, indicating that as GDP per capita reaches $10,000 to $30,000 and urbanization hits 70%, service demand will accelerate [28]. - It notes that new consumption policies emphasize long-term strategies for domestic demand expansion rather than short-term stimuli, with ongoing support for manufacturing to counter tariff impacts [29]. Group 3: Structural Reforms - The concept of "anti-involution" is presented as a new phase of supply-side structural reform, with increased government and industry focus, broader coverage, and stronger coordination among policies and market mechanisms [31].

Group 1: Tariff Impact and Economic Predictions - The article discusses the overestimation of tariff impacts, highlighting the non-linear diminishing elasticity of tariff shocks and the reflexivity that leads to initial shocks followed by a gradual easing [1][2] - Six key judgments regarding the domestic economy have been made, including the effects of tariff shocks, policy framework changes, and the new "three drivers" of economic growth [1] Group 2: Manufacturing and Export Resilience - The article emphasizes the difficulty of replacing Chinese manufacturing, discussing various perspectives such as exemption lists and reliance on specific products, alongside a softening of US-China tariffs [2] - It is noted that the strong export performance is not merely due to "export grabbing," but reflects medium-term resilience driven by developed countries' normal restocking cycles and accelerated industrialization in emerging markets [3][4] Group 3: Fiscal Policy and Economic Support - The article outlines the challenges faced by the economy, including weak domestic demand and fiscal constraints, and suggests that pragmatic revenue forecasts and increased spending intensity will be used to address these issues [5] - It highlights the potential for increased fiscal measures in the second half of 2025 if economic pressures persist, with a focus on policy tools that do not require budget adjustments [7] Group 4: Anti-Competition Measures - The article discusses the new approach to "anti-involution," emphasizing the need for industry self-discipline and regional collaboration to address severe competition in sectors like photovoltaic, e-commerce, and automotive [8][12] - It corrects misconceptions about the nature of "involution," stressing that merely relying on upstream price increases will not effectively boost the Producer Price Index (PPI) [14] Group 5: Social Security and Demographic Changes - The article points out that while social security coverage is nearly universal, challenges related to aging and regional economic disparities will need to be addressed in future reforms [18] - It emphasizes the shift in industrial structure towards technology innovation and the importance of supporting emerging industries in the upcoming "15th Five-Year Plan" [19] Group 6: Service Industry Opportunities - The article identifies significant investment opportunities in the service sector, estimating a potential gap of 3.3 trillion yuan in service industry investment, driven by demographic changes and the need for tailored services [27] - It highlights the ongoing trend of excess savings being directed more towards investment rather than consumption, particularly among the middle class [26]